Implicit learning: Indirect, not unconscious

Evaluative Conditioning as Memory-Based Judgment

The article proposes a view of evaluative conditioning (EC) as resulting from judgments based on learning instances stored in memory. It is based on the formal episodic memory model MINERVA 2. Additional assumptions specify how the information retrieved from memory is used to inform specific evaluative dependent measures. The present approach goes beyond previous accounts in that it uses a well-specified formal model of episodic memory; it is however more limited in scope as it aims to explain EC phenomena that do not involve reasoning processes. The article illustrates how the memory-based-judgment view accounts for several empirical findings in the EC literature that are often discussed as evidence for dual-process models of attitude learning. It sketches novel predictions, discusses limitations of the present approach, and identifies challenges and opportunities for its future development.

Can People Judge the Veracity of Their Intuitions?

People differ in the belief that their intuitions produce good decision outcomes. In the present research, we sought to test the validity of these beliefs by comparing individuals’ self-reports with measures of actual intuition performance in a standard implicit learning task, exposing participants to seemingly random letter strings (Studies 1a–b) and social media profile pictures (Study 2) that conformed to an underlying rule or grammar. A meta-analysis synthesizing the present data (N = 400) and secondary data by Pretz, Totz, and Kaufman found that people’s enduring beliefs in their intuitions were not reflective of actual performance in the implicit learning task. Meanwhile, task-specific confidence in intuition bore no sizable relation with implicit learning performance, but the observed data favoured neither the null hypothesis nor the alternative hypothesis. Together, the present findings suggest that people’s ability to judge the veracity of their intuitions may be limited.

Post-training Meditation Promotes Motor Memory Consolidation

Following training, motor memory consolidation is thought to involve either memory stabilization or off-line learning processes. The extent to which memory stabilization or off-line learning relies on post-training wakeful periods or sleep is not clear and thus, novel research approaches are needed to further explore the conditions that promote motor memory consolidation. The present experiment represents the first empirical test of meditation as potential facilitator of motor memory consolidation. Twelve adult residents of a yoga center with a mean of 9 years meditation experience were trained on a sequence key pressing task. Three hours after training, the meditation group completed a 30 min session of yoga nidra meditation while a control group completed 30 min of light work duties. A wakeful period of 4.5 h followed meditation after which participants completed a test involving both trained and untrained sequences. Training performance did not significantly differ between groups. Comparison of group performance at test, revealed a performance benefit of post-training meditation but this was limited to trained sequences only. That the post-training meditation performance benefit was specific to trained sequences is consistent with the notion of meditation promoting motor memory consolidation as opposed to general motor task performance benefits from meditation. Further, post-training meditation appears to have promoted motor memory stabilization as opposed to off-line learning. These findings represent the first demonstration of meditation related motor memory consolidation and are consistent with a growing body of literature demonstrating the benefits of meditation for cognitive function, including memory.

Implicit learning: news from the front

Can we learn without awareness? While the current consensus is most likely to be `no', there is, however, considerable ongoing debate about the role that consciousness plays in cognition and about the nature of consciousness itself. In this article, we review recent advances in the field of implicit learning, based on three perspectives: empirical findings (including neuropsychological evidence), methodological issues, and theoretical positions (including computational models). The overall picture that emerges is complex and reflects a field that is very much in flux: while it seems undeniable that cognition involves some form of unconscious processing, it is as yet unclear how to best separate conscious and unconscious influences on learning, and how to best think about the status of the `cognitive unconscious'. We suggest that implicit learning is best construed as a complex form of priming taking place in continuously learning neural systems, and that the distributional knowledge so acquired can be causally efficacious in the absence of awareness that this knowledge was acquired or that it is currently influencing processing, that is, in the absence of metaknowledge.

Incidental learning of secondary attentional cueing

Subjects instructed to detect targets following moderately valid location cues started being presented at some point in the course of the experiment, without having been informed about it, with a color secondary cue on all invalidly cued trials. In Experiment 1 most subjects quickly learned to use the secondary cue, ending in latency cost being eliminated or even turned negative. The effect failed to manifest only when the secondary cue appeared outside the object serving as imperative cue. Experiment 2 showed that performance with a secondary cue differed significantly from the performance in two control conditions in which colors were not correlated with validity or were not presented at all. On the other hand, it resembled performance of subjects informed beforehand about the secondary cue. Awareness of the contingency as well as of its effect on behavior was probed by a post-test questionnaire. An effect of learning without awareness was not observed in Experiment 1, but was found in Experiment 3, where awareness was probed more shortly after the emergence of incidental learning. Conceivably, subjects first learn to use the contingencies implicitly, and only later do they become aware of the outcome of that learning. Apparently, the attentional system might incidentally learn contingencies detected while being engaged in another task and use them for orienting despite a partial conflict with the following as instructed endogenous cues.

Context-specific learning and control: the roles of awareness, task relevance, and relative salience

The processes mediating dynamic and flexible responding to rapidly changing task-environments are not well understood. In the present research we employ a Stroop procedure to clarify the contribution of context-sensitive control processes to online performance. In prior work Stroop interference varied as a function of probe location context, with larger Stroop interference occurring for contexts associated with a high proportion of congruent items [Crump, M. J., Gong, Z., & Milliken, B. (2006). The context-specific proportion congruent stroop effect: location as a contextual cue. Psychonomic Bulletin &Review, 13, 316-321.] Here, we demonstrate that this effect does not depend on awareness of the context manipulation, but that it can depend on attention to the predictive context dimension, and on the relative salience of the target and predictive context dimensions. We discuss the implications of our results for current theories of cognitive control.

Qualitative differences between implicit and explicit sequence learning

Four experiments investigate the differences between implicit and explicit sequence learning concerning their resilience to structural and superficial task changes. A superficial change that embedded the SRT task in the context of a selection task, while maintaining the sequence, did selectively hinder the expression of implicit learning. In contrast, a manipulation that maintained the task surface, but decreased the sequence validity, affected the expression of learning specifically when it was explicit. These results are discussed in the context of a dynamic framework (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), which assumes that implicit knowledge is specially affected by contextual factors and that, as knowledge becomes explicit, it allows for the development of relevant metaknowledge that modulates the expression of explicit knowledge.

Implicit learning of nonlocal musical rules: implicitly learning more than chunks

Dominant theories of implicit learning assume that implicit learning merely involves the learning of chunks of adjacent elements in a sequence. In the experiments presented here, participants implicitly learned a nonlocal rule, thus suggesting that implicit learning can go beyond the learning of chunks. Participants were exposed to a set of musical tunes that were all generated using a diatonic inversion. In the subsequent test phase, participants either classified test tunes as obeying a rule (direct test) or rated their liking for the tunes (indirect test). Both the direct and indirect tests were sensitive to knowledge of chunks. However, only the indirect test was sensitive to knowledge of the inversion rule. Furthermore, the indirect test was overall significantly more sensitive than the direct test, thus suggesting that knowledge of the inversion rule was below an objective threshold of awareness.

Interactions between encoding and retrieval in the domain of sequence-learning

In this article, the authors propose to characterize sequence learning in terms of automatic versus non-automatic processing and to apply this contrast independently to knowledge acquisition and retrieval. In several experiments of sequence learning, automaticity of both the acquisition and retrieval of the acquired knowledge was independently assessed. It was found that the sequence learning order can be demonstrated under all combinations of knowledge acquisition and retrieval. In particular, at least in the simple sequences the authors used, this applies in cases in which both the acquisition and the retrieval of knowledge are strictly automatic--that is, when neither is required for the task nor beneficial to deliberate behavior. The proposed framework has implications for the notion of sequence learning and the investigation of learning in general.

Are strategy shifts caused by data-driven processes or by voluntary processes?

The present research investigates the role of voluntary, conscious processing in strategy change. In 2 experiments, we address whether the switch to a new strategy is the result of data-driven, automatic processes or of voluntary processes. Experiment 1 demonstrates that participants performing an alphabet verification task are able to (a) transfer a newly adopted strategy to dissimilar information never encountered before, (b) verbally describe the task regularity that allows for the generation and application of the new strategy immediately after the strategy was adopted. Using the same experimental task, Experiment 2 shows that participants, and (c) decide against adopting a new strategy when the available evidence suggests that the new strategy cannot be used for the entire range of problems encountered. Overall, the obtained results support the view that strategy change is mediated by voluntary controlled processing. They do not support the view that strategy change is an inevitable, automatic consequence of task practice. The present research thus highlights a potential function of conscious human processing.

Memory and learning for a novel written style

Subjects read and recalled a series of five short stories in one of four plot and style combinations. The stories were written in one of two styles that consisted of opposing clause orders (i.e., independent-dependent vs. dependent-independent), tense forms (i.e., past vs. present), and descriptor forms (modifier modifier vs. modifier as a noun). The subjects incorporated both plot and style characteristics into their recalls. Other subjects, who, after five recalls, either generated a new story or listed the rules that had been followed by the stories read, included the marked forms of the characteristics they learned more often, except for tense. The subjects read and recalled four stories of the same plot and style and then read and recalled a fifth story of the same plot and style or of one of the other three plot/style combinations. Ability to switch style depended on both the characteristic and the markedness.