On the limits of top-down control of visual selection

Adapting attentional control settings in a shape-changing environment

In rich visual environments, humans have to adjust their attentional control settings in various ways, depending on the task. Especially if the environment changes dynamically, it remains unclear how observers adapt to these changes. In two experiments (online and lab-based versions of the same task), we investigated how observers adapt their target choices while searching for color singletons among shape distractor contexts that changed over trials. The two equally colored targets had shapes that differed from each other and matched a varying number of distractors. Participants were free to select either target. The results show that participants adjusted target choices to the shape ratio of distractors: even though the task could be finished by focusing on color only, participants showed a tendency to choose targets matching with fewer distractors in shape. The time course of this adaptation showed that the regularities in the changing environment were taken into account. A Bayesian modeling approach was used to provide a fine-grained picture of how observers adapted their behavior to the changing shape ratio with three parameters: the strength of adaptation, its delay relative to the objective distractor shape ratio, and a general bias toward specific shapes. Overall, our findings highlight that systematic changes in shape, even when it is not a target-defining feature, influence how searchers adjust their attentional control settings. Furthermore, our comparison between lab-based and online assessments with this paradigm suggests that shape is a good choice as a feature dimension in adaptive choice online experiments.

Pinging the brain to reveal the hidden attentional priority map using encephalography

Attention has been usefully thought of as organized in priority maps - putative maps of space where attentional priority is weighted across spatial regions in a winner-take-all competition for attentional deployment. Recent work has highlighted the influence of past experiences on the weighting of spatial priority - called selection history. Aside from being distinct from more well-studied, top-down forms of attentional enhancement, little is known about the neural substrates of history-mediated attentional priority. Using a task known to induce statistical learning of target distributions, in an EEG study we demonstrate that this otherwise invisible, latent attentional priority map can be visualized during the intertrial period using a 'pinging' technique in conjunction with multivariate pattern analyses. Our findings not only offer a method of visualizing the history-mediated attentional priority map, but also shed light on the underlying mechanisms allowing our past experiences to influence future behavior.

EXPRESS: Item-specific control of attention capture: An eye movement study

Measures of attentional capture are sensitive to attentional control settings. Recent research suggests that such control settings can be linked associatively to specific items. Rapid item-specific retrieval of these control settings can then modulate measures of attentional capture. However, the processes that produce this item-specific control of attentional capture are unclear. The current study addressed this issue by examining eye-movement patterns associated with the item-specific proportion congruency effect (ISPC). Participants searched for a shape singleton target in search displays that also contained a color singleton-the color singleton was either the same item as the shape singleton (congruent trials) or a different item (incongruent trials). The relative proportions of congruent and incongruent trials were manipulated separately for two distinct item types that were randomly intermixed. RTs were faster on congruent than incongruent trials, and this congruency effect was larger for high proportion congruent (HPC) than low proportion congruent (LPC) items. Eye movement data revealed a higher proportion of saccades towards the distractor and longer dwell times on the distractor in the HPC condition. These results suggest that item-specific associative learning can influence the strength of representation of the task goal (e.g., find the odd shape), a form of selection history effect in visual search.

The role of visual working memory capacity in attention capture among video game players

It is well established that attention can be captured by salient distractors. Some studies have found that action video game players were less susceptible to attention capture by irrelevant distractors than non-players. Other studies have also found that individuals with greater visual working memory capacity are less susceptible to capture by irrelevant distractors than individuals with lower visual working memory capacity. The present study examined whether action video game players were less susceptible to be captured by salient distractors and, if so, whether that relationship was due to greater visual working memory capacity. Participants completed a questionnaire reporting their video game playing experience, followed by a color change detection task assessing their visual working memory capacity. They then performed an attention capture task, where they determined the orientation of a bar within a shape singleton while attempting to ignore a color singleton distractor that appeared in 50% of the trials. Results showed that action video game players did not produce less capture effect than non-action video game players. However, high visual working memory capacity individuals produced less capture effect than low visual working memory capacity individuals regardless of their video game experience. These results suggest that the ability to resist capture by irrelevant distractors may be better explained by individual differences in visual working memory capacity than by action video game experience.

Contrasting attentional biases in a saccadic choice task

To gain insight into how human observers select items in the visual field we pitted two attentional biases against one another in a single free choice design. The first bias is the nasal-temporal asymmetry during free choice tasks, where observers tend to choose targets that appear in their temporal hemifield over targets appearing in their nasal hemifield. The second is the choice bias found in studies of attentional priming. When observers have to select between a stimulus that shares features with a preceding target and a stimulus sharing features with previous distractors, they have a strong tendency to choose the preceding search target and this bias increases the more often the same search is repeated. Our results show that both biases affect saccadic choice, but they also show that the nasal-temporal bias can modulate the strength of the priming effects, but not vice versa. The priming effect was stronger for stimuli appearing in the temporal than in the nasal hemifield, but the nasal-temporal bias was similar for primed and unprimed targets. Additionally, our findings are the first to show how search repetition leads to faster saccades. The observed difference between the effects of the NTA and priming biases may reflect the difference in neural mechanisms thought to be behind these biases and that biases at lower levels may outrank higher-level biases, at least in their effect on visual attention.

Does feature intertrial priming guide attention? The jury is still out

Our search performance is strongly influenced by our past experience. In the lab, this influence has been demonstrated by investigating a variety of phenomena, including intertrial priming, statistical learning, and reward history, and collectively referred to as selection history. The resulting findings have led researchers to claim that selection history guides attention, thereby challenging the prevailing dichotomy, according to which top-down and bottom-up factors alone determine attentional priority. Here, we re-examine this claim with regard to one selection-history phenomenon, feature intertrial priming (aka priming of pop-out). We evaluate the evidence that specifically pertains to the role of feature intertrial priming in attentional guidance, rather than in later selective processes occurring after the target is found. We distinguish between the main experimental rationales, while considering the extent to which feature intertrial priming, as studied through different protocols, shares characteristics of top-down attention. We show that there is strong evidence that feature intertrial priming guides attention when the experimental protocol departs from the canonical paradigm and encourages observers to maintain the critical feature in visual working memory or to form expectations about the upcoming target. By contrast, the current evidence regarding the standard feature intertrial priming phenomenon is inconclusive. We propose directions for future research and suggest that applying the methodology used here in order to re-evaluate of the role of other selection history phenomena in attentional guidance should clarify the mechanisms underlying the strong impact of past experience on visual search performance.

Distractor suppression leads to reduced flanker interference

Recent studies using the additional singleton paradigm have shown that regularities in distractor locations can cause biases in the spatial priority map, such that attentional capture by salient singletons is reduced for locations that are likely to contain distractors. It has been suggested that this type of suppression is proactive (i.e., occurring before display onset). The current study replicated the original findings using an online version of the task. To further assess the suppression of high-probability locations, we employed a congruence manipulation similar to the traditional flanker effect, where distractors could be either congruent or incongruent with the response to the target. Experiment 1 shows that through statistical learning distractor suppression reduces the interference from incongruent distractors, as participants made less errors in high-probability versus low-probability conditions. In Experiment 2, participants were forced to search for a specific target feature (the so-called feature-search mode), which is assumed to allow participants to ignore distractors in a top-down manner. Yet even when this "top-down" search mode was employed, there was still a congruence effect when the distractor singleton was presented at the low-probability but not at the high-probability location. The absence, but not reversal, of a congruence effect at the high-probability location also further indicates that this distractor suppression mechanism is proactive. The results indicate that regardless of the search mode used, there is suppression of the high-probability location indicating that this location competes less for attention within the spatial priority map than all other locations.

Independent effects of statistical learning and top-down attention

It is well known that spatial attention can be directed in a top-down way to task-relevant locations in space. In addition, through visual statistical learning (VSL), attention can be biased towards relevant (target) locations and away from irrelevant (distractor) locations. The present study investigates the interaction between the explicit task-relevant, top-down attention and the lingering attentional biases due to VSL. We wanted to determine the contribution of each of these two processes to attentional selection. In the current study, participants performed a search task while keeping a location in spatial working memory. In Experiment 1, the target appeared more often in one location, and appeared less often in other location. In Experiment 2, a color singleton distractor was presented more often in location than in all other locations. The results show that when the search target matched the location that was kept in working memory, participants were much faster at responding to the search target than when it did not match, signifying top-down attentional selection. Independent of this top-down effect, we found a clear effect of VSL as responses were even faster when target (Experiment 1) or the distractor (Experiment 2) was presented at a more likely location in visual field. We conclude that attentional selection is driven by implicit biases due to statistical learning and by explicit top-down processing, each process individually and independently modulating the neural activity within the spatial priority map.

A saliency-specific and dimension-independent mechanism of distractor suppression

During everyday tasks, salient distractors may capture our attention. Recently, it was shown that through implicit learning, capture by a salient distractor is reduced by suppressing the location where a distractor is likely to appear. In the current study, we presented distractors of different saliency levels at the same specific location, asking the question whether there is always one suppression level for a particular location or whether, for one location, suppression depends on the actual saliency of the distractor appearing at that location. In three experiments, we demonstrate a saliency-specific mechanism of distractor suppression, which can be flexibly modulated by the overall probability of encountering distractors of different saliency levels to optimize behavior in a specific environment. The results also suggest that this mechanism has dimension-independent aspects, given that the saliency-specific suppression pattern is unaffected when saliency signals of distractors are generated by different dimensions. It is argued that suppression is saliency-dependent, implying that suppression is modulated on a trial-by-trial basis contingent on the saliency of the actual distractor presented.

Implicitly and explicitly encoded features can guide attention in free viewing

It is well known that priming, probably by the contents of working memory, can influence subsequent visual task performance. How ubiquitous is this effect? Can incidental exposure to visual stimuli influence the deployment of attention when there is no explicit visual task? Results of two experiments show that a preceding stimulus can influence free-viewing eye movements. A simple change detection task was used as the cover task. The initial memory display was the priming display, while subsequent filler display constituted the free-viewing display of our interest. In Experiment 1, subjects were asked to memorize the number of items in the priming display. Subjects were not explicitly instructed to attend to features, but these might still be implicitly encoded. In Experiment 2, a more complex change detection task required subjects to memorize the number, color, and shape of priming items. Here, prime features were attended and, presumably, explicitly encoded. We were interested to know whether incidentally or explicitly encoded features of prime items would influence attention distribution in the filler display. In both experiments, items sharing color and shape with the prime were attended more often than predicted by chance. Items sharing neither color nor shape were attended less often. Items sharing either color or shape (not both) could also attract attention showing that the priming need not be based on a bound representation of the primed item. Effects were stronger in Experiment 2. No intention or top-down control appears to be needed to produce this priming.

Searching for emotion: A top-down set governs attentional orienting to facial expressions

Research indicates that humans orient attention toward facial expressions of emotion. Orienting to facial expressions has typically been conceptualised as due to bottom-up attentional capture. However, this overlooks the contributions of top-down attention and selection history. In the present study, across four experiments, these three attentional processes were differentiated using a variation of the dot-probe task, in which participants were cued to attend to a happy or angry face on each trial. Results show that attention toward facial expressions was not exclusively driven by bottom-up attentional capture; instead, participants could shift their attention toward both happy and angry faces in a top-down manner. This effect was not found when the faces were inverted, indicating that top-down attention relies on holistic processing of the face. In addition, no evidence of selection history was found (i.e., no improvement on repeated trials or blocks of trials in which the task was to orient to the same expression). Altogether, these results suggest that humans can use top-down attentional control to rapidly orient attention to emotional faces.

Changes (but not differences) in motion direction fail to capture attention

In this study we investigated under what conditions motion direction changes pop out in continuously moving target/distractor environments. Participants were presented with vertically oriented Gabor patches whose carrier components drifted at a constant speed from left to right and then reversed direction. On any given trial, one of these elements was nominated as the target and the remaining elements were distractors. Distractor elements all changed direction simultaneously. The distractors either moved in a homogeneous manner (i.e. all moved in the same direction), or in a heterogeneous manner (i.e. direction was randomized). The target moved with a similar spatio-temporal trajectory as the distractors from left to right (or vice versa), but changed direction asynchronously with respect to the distracting elements. The participants' task was to locate this deviant (target) Gabor patch. We show that a motion direction change pops out (as indicated by the absence of a set size effect) when the surrounding distractors move in a homogeneous direction. When the distractors moved in heterogenous directions, a similar pop out effect was observed when the set size was small (≤5 elements), but not when it was large. This suggests that motion direction changes capture attention only when the change results in a unique direction of motion. Consistent with this finding we also show that a moving target (without direction change) captures attention in cases in which all distractors recently changed direction. This corroborates the idea that, in addition to direction cues, the temporal uniqueness of a change in an object's direction (or absence, thereof) relative to surrounding objects is a cue capable of capturing attention.

Inhibition as a potential resolution to the attentional capture debate

Physically salient stimuli, such as uniquely colored objects, seem to have an inherent power to capture our attention, but formal research on this topic has produced conflicting results and theories. Here, we review evidence that the attentional capture debate can be resolved by positing a new suppressive process. This suppressive process can occur before attentional shifting to prevent salient items from attracting attention. In the current article, we review converging evidence that salient items are suppressed to avoid attentional capture comes from studies of psychophysics, eye movements, single-unit recordings, and event-related potentials (ERPs). Crucially, the ability to inhibit salient distractors seems to be learned as participants gain experience with the simple features of the to-be-ignored stimuli.

Enhanced early visual processing after evaluative conditioning

The emotional significance of a stimulus is known to influence attentional selection leading to prioritization even at early stages of visual perception (e.g., selection from iconic memory). However, as the emotional meaning can be confounded with physical stimulus properties, it is possible that the prioritization is not driven by emotional factors alone. Here we use evaluative conditioning to manipulate the emotional meaning of arbitrary visual stimuli by repeatedly pairing each stimulus with either positive, negative, or neutral pictures. The subjective liking of conditioned stimuli (CSs) revealed reliable evaluative conditioning effects. Sensory processing advantages were measured by presenting the CSs in an iconic memory task asking participants to identify a target in a display of briefly presented stimuli. An adaptive variation of exposure durations revealed that shorter durations were required for the recognition of targets that were previously paired with negative or positive images than for neutral targets, indicating prioritized selection of affective CSs from iconic memory. Two additional experiments investigated the subsequent decay of information that was initially available in iconic memory by manipulated the delay of the recognition cue. Results show that positive CSs were more likely to be selected from iconic memory than neutral CSs, whereas negative CSs were prioritized in terms of prolonged availability in iconic memory. Taken together, the findings suggest that the affective learning history leads to prioritization at the level of iconic memory.

Association between cue lead time and template-for-rejection effect

The human visual system can actively prioritize task-relevant features to search for a target. Recent studies have reported cases in which the system may suppress irrelevant features by using a template for rejection. However, in those studies, the templates used for rejection were limited to the color domain, and they have yielded mixed results. Our literature review identified three differences among studies that may be responsible for such mixed results: differences in the spatial segmentation of items (i.e., segregated or intermixed across the display), differences in how features are defined and reported (i.e., combined or separate), and differences in cue lead times (short or long). Participants searched for a target-line segment in a shape and identified its orientation from among non-target line-shaped compound shapes that were preceded by one of three cue displays. Positive cues indicated that the target segment would appear in a shape, and negative cues that it would not appear in a shape. Neutral cues indicated that a particular shape would not appear in the current search display. The results demonstrated that reaction times were faster under the negative-cue condition than the neutral-cue condition, reflecting the effect of a shape-based template for rejection (Experiment 1). Experiment 2 replicated the absence of the effect in the shape domain. Experiment 3 indicated that the template-for-rejection effect occurred only when the cue lead time was relatively long, suggesting that time is required (approximately 2,400 ms or longer) for the visual system to form rejection templates. Experiment 4 excluded the possibility that a confound in the target-defining/reporting feature was involved. These results indicated that apparent inconsistencies in research on the template-for-rejection effect can be explained in terms of the time required for templates to be configured.

Unique objects attract attention even when faint

Locally contrasting objects, e.g. a red apple surrounded by green apples, attract attention. Does this generalize to differences in feature space? That is, do unique objects-regardless of their location-stand out from a collection of objects that are similar to one another, even when the unique object has lower local contrast with the background than the other objects? Behavioral data show indeed a preference for unique items but previous experiments enabled viewers to anticipate what response they were "supposed" to give. We developed a new experimental paradigm that minimizes such top-down effects. Pitting local contrast against global uniqueness, we show that unique stimuli attract attention even in not-anticipated, never-seen images, and even when the unique stimuli are faint (low contrast). A computational model explains how competition between objects in feature space favors dissimilar objects over those with similar features. The model explains how humans select unique objects, without a loss of performance on natural scenes.

Strategic visual imagery and automatic priming effects in pop-out visual search

Priming of Pop-out (PoP) is defined by faster responses in singleton search when the target repeats across trials than when it switches. In a recent study, it was shown that the PoP effect can be reversed using visual imagery (Cochrane, Nwabuike, Thomson, & Milliken, 2018). The goal of the current study was to pinpoint the procedural constraints necessary to observe the imagery-induced reversal of PoP. Across four experiments the reversal of the PoP effect (i) depended critically on the response-stimulus interval between trials, (ii) was remarkably stable across long experimental sessions, (iii) was observed within trial-pairs when participants engaged in visual imagery, but not between trial-pairs when participants did not, and (iv) appeared to be more robust with self-paced trial-pairs than with a long continuous run of trials. Together, these results offer strong confirmation of the idea that self-generated visual imagery can produce robust reversals of the PoP effect.

Visual Selection: Usually Fast and Automatic; Seldom Slow and Volitional

Recently it was argued that in addition to top-down and bottom-up processes, lingering biases of selection history play a major role in visual selection (Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2012). Since its publication there has been a growing controversy about the terms top-down, bottom-up and selection-history in relation to visual selection. In the current paper we define these terms, discuss some controversies about these terms and explain what kind of effects should be considered to be the result of lingering biases of selection history, i.e., priming, reward/fear, and statistical learning. We discuss the properties of top-down selection (slow, effortful, and controlled) versus the properties of lingering biases of selection history (fast, effortless, and automatic). We adhere the position that the experience with selecting a particular feature or the location of a feature, may boost and sharpen its representation within the priority selection map above and beyond its physical salience. It is as if the experience may render a feature or location subjectively more salient. Our message of the current review is that true top-down control of visual selection occurs far less often than what is typically assumed. Most of the time, selection is based on experience and history. It is fast, automatic and occurs without much, if any, effort.

Selection history: How reward modulates selectivity of visual attention

Visual attention enables us to selectively prioritize or suppress information in the environment. Prominent models concerned with the control of visual attention differentiate between goal-directed, top-down and stimulus-driven, bottom-up control, with the former determined by current selection goals and the latter determined by physical salience. In the current review, we discuss recent studies that demonstrate that attentional selection does not need to be the result of top-down or bottom-up processing but, instead, is often driven by lingering biases due to the "history" of former attention deployments. This review mainly focuses on reward-based history effects; yet other types of history effects such as (intertrial) priming, statistical learning and affective conditioning are also discussed. We argue that evidence from behavioral, eye-movement and neuroimaging studies supports the idea that selection history modulates the topographical landscape of spatial "priority" maps, such that attention is biased toward locations having the highest activation on this map.

What Is Memory-Guided Attention? How Past Experiences Shape Selective Visuospatial Attention in the Present

What controls our attention? It is historically thought that there are two primary factors that determine selective attention: the perceptual salience of the stimuli and the goals based on the task at hand. However, this distinction doesn't neatly capture the varied ways our past experience can influence our ongoing mental processing. In this chapter, we aim to describe how past experience can be systematically characterized by different types of memory, and we outline experimental evidence suggesting how attention can then be guided by each of these different memory types. We highlight findings from human behavioral, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological work from the perspective of two related frameworks of human memory: the multiple memory systems (MMS) framework and the neural processing (NP) framework. The MMS framework underscores how memory can be separated based on consciousness (declarative and non-declarative memory), while the NP framework emphasizes different forms of memory as reflective of different brain processing modes (rapid encoding of flexible associations, slow encoding of rigid associations, and rapid encoding of single or unitized items). We describe how memory defined by these frameworks can guide our attention, even when they do not directly relate to perceptual salience or the goals concerning the current task. We close by briefly discussing theoretical implications as well as some interesting avenues for future research.

Distractors associated with reward break through the focus of attention

In the present study, we investigated the conditions in which rewarded distractors have the ability to capture attention, even when attention is directed toward the target location. Experiment 1 showed that when the probability of obtaining reward was high, all salient distractors captured attention, even when they were not associated with reward. This effect may have been caused by participants suboptimally using the 100%-valid endogenous location cue. Experiment 2 confirmed this result by showing that salient distractors did not capture attention in a block in which no reward was expected. In Experiment 3, the probability of the presence of a distractor was high, but it only signaled reward availability on a low number of trials. The results showed that those very infrequent distractors that signaled reward captured attention, whereas the distractors (both frequent and infrequent ones) not associated with reward were simply ignored. The latter experiment indicates that even when attention is directed to a location in space, stimuli associated with reward break through the focus of attention, but equally salient stimuli not associated with reward do not.

Selection History Modulates Working Memory Capacity

Recent studies have shown that past selection history affects the allocation of attention on target selection. However, it is unclear whether context-driven selection history can modulate the efficacy of attention allocation on working memory (WM) representations. This study tests the influences of selection history on WM capacity. A display of one item (low load) or three/four items (high load) was shown for the participants to hold in WM in a delayed response task. Participants then judged whether a probe item was in the memory display or not. Selection history was defined as the number of items attended across trials in the task context within a block, manipulated by the stimulus set-size in the contexts with fewer possible stimuli (4-item or 5-item context) or more possible stimuli (8-item or 9-item context) from which the memorized content was selected. The capacity measure (i.e., the K measure) was estimated to reflect the number of items that can be held in WM. Across four behavioral experiments, the results revealed that the capacity was significantly reduced in the context with more possible stimuli relative to the context with fewer possible stimuli. Moreover, the reduction in capacity was significant for high WM load and not observed when the focus was on only a single item. Together, these findings indicate that context-driven selection history and focused attention influence WM capacity.

Implicit short- and long-term memory direct our gaze in visual search

Visual attention is strongly affected by the past: both by recent experience and by long-term regularities in the environment that are encoded in and retrieved from memory. In visual search, intertrial repetition of targets causes speeded response times (short-term priming). Similarly, targets that are presented more often than others may facilitate search, even long after it is no longer present (long-term priming). In this study, we investigate whether such short-term priming and long-term priming depend on dissociable mechanisms. By recording eye movements while participants searched for one of two conjunction targets, we explored at what stages of visual search different forms of priming manifest. We found both long- and short- term priming effects. Long-term priming persisted long after the bias was present, and was again found even in participants who were unaware of a color bias. Short- and long-term priming affected the same stage of the task; both biased eye movements towards targets with the primed color, already starting with the first eye movement. Neither form of priming affected the response phase of a trial, but response repetition did. The results strongly suggest that both long- and short-term memory can implicitly modulate feedforward visual processing.

The effect of search mode on dimension weighting

In a visual feature search task, reaction times to a singleton target are known to be shorter when participants have advance knowledge of the defining-features of targets. The present study examined whether the prior-knowledge effect is influenced by search modes (feature vs. singleton). In addition, using a variant of the flanker task, the present study assessed whether prior-knowledge affected efficiency of attentional focusing to a target. When participants performed a target discrimination task (i.e., compound search task), using a singleton detection mode, no prior-knowledge effect was found (Experiments 1 and 3). However, when the same task was performed using a feature search mode, prior-knowledge facilitated performance (Experiment 2). This suggests that the dimension weighting of a target-defining feature is modulated by the search mode. Also flanker response congruency was affected by prior-knowledge suggesting that the dimension weighting correlated with attentional focusing to targets. On the other hand, inter-trial dimensional priming was not affected by the search mode. Implications for mechanisms of feature-based top-down control of attention in visual feature search are discussed.

How do we select multiple features? Transient costs for selecting two colors rather than one, persistent costs for color-location conjunctions

In a previous study Lo, Howard, & Holcombe (Vision Research 63:20-33, 2012), selecting two colors did not induce a performance cost, relative to selecting one color. For example, requiring possible report of both a green and a red target did not yield a worse performance than when both targets were green. Yet a cost of selecting multiple colors was observed when selection needed be contingent on both color and location. When selecting a red target to the left and a green target to the right, superimposing a green distractor to the left and a red distractor to the right impeded performance. Possibly, participants cannot confine attention to a color at a particular location. As a result, distractors that share the target colors disrupt attentional selection of the targets. The attempt to select the targets must then be repeated, which increases the likelihood that the trial terminates when selection is not effective, even for long trials. Consistent with this, here we find a persistent cost of selecting two colors when the conjunction of color and location is needed, but the cost is confined to short exposure durations when the observer just has to monitor red and green stimuli without the need to use the location information. These results suggest that selecting two colors is time-consuming but effective, whereas selection of simultaneous conjunctions is never entirely successful.

Constraints on dilution from a narrow attentional zoom reveal how spatial and color cues direct selection

Distractor interference is subject to dilution from other nontarget elements, and the level of dilution is affected by attention. This study explores the nature of dilution when the location and color of the target is known in advance. Experiments 1 and 2 show that attention is effectively limited to the precued region, so that it is the nontarget letters appearing at the cued locations that are responsible for most of the dilution, and not those appearing at the uncued locations. Furthermore, this dilution occurs relatively early in processing. Experiment 3 demonstrates that top-down attentional control can prevent dilution, because foreknowledge of the target color leads to quick attention shifts. Experiment 4 illustrates bottom-up attentional control in preventing dilution when the distractor is a color singleton that is segregated from the diluting nontargets. The results show that dilution is modulated by both top-down and bottom-up factors, that it can occur even when attention is restricted to a relatively small region, and that it occurs early in processing, but not so early that it avoids the effects of attention. They provide new challenges for earlier accounts suggesting that dilution is widespread and unfettered by attention. Likewise, some parts of the results are difficult to reconcile with the alternative perceptual load theory, but they do support a form of dilution that is limited by attentional boundaries. Because of that link to attention, dilution is a useful tool for measuring how attention is guided by information about target location and color.

Implicit learning modulates attention capture: evidence from an item-specific proportion congruency manipulation

A host of research has now shown that our explicit goals and intentions can, in large part, overcome the capture of visual attention by objects that differ from their surroundings in terms of size, shape, or color. Surprisingly however, there is little evidence for the role of implicit learning in mitigating capture effects despite the fact that such learning has been shown to strongly affect behavior in a host of other performance domains. Here, we employ a modified attention capture paradigm, based on the work of Theeuwes (1991, 1992), in which participants must search for an odd-shaped target amongst homogeneous distracters. On each trial, there is also a salient, but irrelevant odd-colored distracter. Across the experiments reported, we intermix two search contexts: for one set of distracters (e.g., squares) the shape singleton and color singleton coincide on a majority of trials (high proportion congruent condition), whereas for the other set of distracters (e.g., circles) the shape and color singletons are highly unlikely to coincide (low proportion congruent condition). Crucially, we find that observers learn to allow the capture of attention by the salient distracter to a greater extent in the high, compared to the low proportion congruent condition, albeit only when search is sufficiently difficult. Moreover, this effect of prior experience on search behavior occurs in the absence of awareness of our proportion manipulation. We argue that low-level properties of the search displays recruit representations of prior experience in a rapid, flexible, and implicit manner.

Priming and the guidance by visual and categorical templates in visual search

Visual search is thought to be guided by top-down templates that are held in visual working memory. Previous studies have shown that a search-guiding template can be rapidly and strongly implemented from a visual cue, whereas templates are less effective when based on categorical cues. Direct visual priming from cue to target may underlie this difference. In two experiments we first asked observers to remember two possible target colors. A postcue then indicated which of the two would be the relevant color. The task was to locate a briefly presented and masked target of the cued color among irrelevant distractor items. Experiment 1 showed that overall search accuracy improved more rapidly on the basis of a direct visual postcue that carried the target color, compared to a neutral postcue that pointed to the memorized color. However, selectivity toward the target feature, i.e., the extent to which observers searched selectively among items of the cued vs. uncued color, was found to be relatively unaffected by the presence of the visual signal. In Experiment 2 we compared search that was based on either visual or categorical information, but now controlled for direct visual priming. This resulted in no differences in overall performance nor selectivity. Altogether the results suggest that perceptual processing of visual search targets is facilitated by priming from visual cues, whereas attentional selectivity is enhanced by a working memory template that can formed from both visual and categorical input. Furthermore, if the priming is controlled for, categorical- and visual-based templates similarly enhance search guidance.

Neural mechanisms underlying pain's ability to reorient attention: evidence for sensitization of somatic threat detectors

Pain typically signals damage to the body, and as such can be perceived as threatening and can elicit a strong emotional response. This ecological significance undoubtedly underlies pain's well-known ability to demand attention. However, the neural mechanisms underlying this ability are poorly understood. Previous work from the author's laboratory has reported behavioral evidence suggesting that participants disengage their attention from an incorrectly cued visual target stimulus and reorient it toward a somatic target more rapidly when the somatic target is painful than when it is nonpainful. Furthermore, electrophysiological data suggest that this effect is mediated by a stimulus-driven process, in which somatic threat detectors located in the dorsal posterior insula activate the medial and lateral prefrontal cortex areas involved in reorienting attention toward the painful target. In these previous studies, the painful and nonpainful somatic targets were given in separate experiments involving different participants. Here, the nonpainful and painful somatic targets were presented in random order within the same block of trials. Unlike in the previous studies, both the nonpainful and painful somatic targets activated the somatic threat detectors, and the times taken to disengage and reorient attention were the same for both. These electrophysiological and behavioral data suggest that somatic threat detectors can become sensitized to nonpainful somatic stimuli that are presented in a context that includes painful stimuli.

Feature-based attention: it is all bottom-up priming

Feature-based attention (FBA) enhances the representation of image characteristics throughout the visual field, a mechanism that is particularly useful when searching for a specific stimulus feature. Even though most theories of visual search implicitly or explicitly assume that FBA is under top-down control, we argue that the role of top-down processing in FBA may be limited. Our review of the literature indicates that all behavioural and neuro-imaging studies investigating FBA suffer from the shortcoming that they cannot rule out an effect of priming. The mere attending to a feature enhances the mandatory processing of that feature across the visual field, an effect that is likely to occur in an automatic, bottom-up way. Studies that have investigated the feasibility of FBA by means of cueing paradigms suggest that the role of top-down processing in FBA is limited (e.g. prepare for red). Instead, the actual processing of the stimulus is needed to cause the mandatory tuning of responses throughout the visual field. We conclude that it is likely that all FBA effects reported previously are the result of bottom-up priming.

Simultaneous attentional guidance by working-memory and selection history reveals two distinct sources of attention

Recent theories of attention have proposed that selection history is a separate, dissociable source of information that influences attention. The current study sought to investigate the simultaneous involvement of selection history and working-memory on attention during visual search. Experiments 1 and 2 used target feature probability to manipulate selection history and found significant effects of both working-memory and selection history, although working-memory dominated selection history when they cued different locations. Experiment 3 eliminated the contribution of voluntary refreshing of working-memory and replicated the main effects, although selection history became dominant. Using the same methodology, but with reduced probability cue validity, both effects were present in Experiment 4 and did not significantly differ in their contribution to attention. Effects of selection history and working-memory never interacted. These results suggest that selection history and working-memory are separate influences on attention and have little impact on each other. Theoretical implications for models of attention are discussed.

Cross-modal associations between vision, touch, and audition influence visual search through top-down attention, not bottom-up capture

Recently, Guzman-Martinez, Ortega, Grabowecky, Mossbridge, and Suzuki (Current Biology : CB, 22(5), 383-388, 2012) reported that observers could systematically match auditory amplitude modulations and tactile amplitude modulations to visual spatial frequencies, proposing that these cross-modal matches produced automatic attentional effects. Using a series of visual search tasks, we investigated whether informative auditory, tactile, or bimodal cues can guide attention toward a visual Gabor of matched spatial frequency (among others with different spatial frequencies). These cues improved visual search for some but not all frequencies. Auditory cues improved search only for the lowest and highest spatial frequencies, whereas tactile cues were more effective and frequency specific, although less effective than visual cues. Importantly, although tactile cues could produce efficient search when informative, they had no effect when uninformative. This suggests that cross-modal frequency matching occurs at a cognitive rather than sensory level and, therefore, influences visual search through voluntary, goal-directed behavior, rather than automatic attentional capture.

A value-driven mechanism of attentional selection

Attention selects stimuli for cognitive processing, and the mechanisms that underlie the process of attentional selection have been a major topic of psychological research for over 30 years. From this research, it has been well documented that attentional selection can proceed both voluntarily, driven by visual search goals, and involuntarily, driven by the physical salience of stimuli. In this review, I provide a conceptual framework for attentional control that emphasizes the need for stimulus selection to promote the survival and wellbeing of an organism. I argue that although goal-driven and salience-driven mechanisms of attentional selection fit within this framework, a central component that is missing is a mechanism of attentional selection that is uniquely driven by learned associations between stimuli and rewards. I go on to review recent evidence for such a value-driven mechanism of attentional selection, and describe how this mechanism functions independently of the well-documented salience-driven and goal-driven mechanisms. I conclude by arguing that reward learning modifies the attentional priority of stimuli, allowing them to compete more effectively for selection even when nonsalient and task-irrelevant.

Automatic control of visual selection

This paper seeks out to reduce the role of the homunculus, the 'little man in the head' that is still prominent in most psychological theories regarding the control our behaviour. We argue that once engaged in a task (which is a volitional act), visual selection run off more or less in an automatic fashion. We argue that the salience map that drives automatic selection is not only determined by raw physical salience of the objects in the environment but also by the way these objects appear to the person. We provide evidence that priming (feature priming, priming by working memory and reward priming) sharpens the cortical representation of these objects such that these objects appear to be more salient above and beyond their physical salience. We demonstrate that this type of priming is not under volitional control: it occurs even if observers try to volitionally prepare for something else. In other words, looking at red prepares our brain for things that are red even if we volitionally try to prepare for green.

Top-down versus bottom-up attentional control: a failed theoretical dichotomy

Prominent models of attentional control assert a dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up control, with the former determined by current selection goals and the latter determined by physical salience. This theoretical dichotomy, however, fails to explain a growing number of cases in which neither current goals nor physical salience can account for strong selection biases. For example, equally salient stimuli associated with reward can capture attention, even when this contradicts current selection goals. Thus, although 'top-down' sources of bias are sometimes defined as those that are not due to physical salience, this conception conflates distinct--and sometimes contradictory--sources of selection bias. We describe an alternative framework, in which past selection history is integrated with current goals and physical salience to shape an integrated priority map.