The stability flexibility tradeoff and the dark side of detail

Autistic traits foster effective curiosity-driven exploration

Curiosity-driven exploration involves actively engaging with the environment to learn from it. Here, we hypothesize that the cognitive mechanisms underlying exploratory behavior may differ across individuals depending on personal characteristics such as autistic traits. In turn, this variability might influence successful exploration. To investigate this, we collected self- and other-reports of autistic traits from university students, and tested them in an exploration task in which participants could learn the hiding patterns of multiple characters. Participants' prediction errors and learning progress (i.e., the decrease in prediction error) on the task were tracked with a hierarchical delta-rule model. Crucially, participants could freely decide when to disengage from a character and what to explore next. We examined whether autistic traits modulated the relation of prediction errors and learning progress with exploration. We found that participants with lower scores on other-reports of insistence-on-sameness and general autistic traits were less persistent, primarily relying on learning progress during the initial stages of exploration. Conversely, participants with higher scores were more persistent and relied on learning progress in later phases of exploration, resulting in better performance in the task. This research advances our understanding of the interplay between autistic traits and exploration drives, emphasizing the importance of individual traits in learning processes and highlighting the need for personalized learning approaches.

Consistency within change: Evaluating the psychometric properties of a widely used predictive-inference task

Rapid adaptation to sudden changes in the environment is a hallmark of flexible human behaviour. Many computational, neuroimaging, and even clinical investigations studying this cognitive process have relied on a behavioural paradigm known as the predictive-inference task. However, the psychometric quality of this task has never been examined, leaving unanswered whether it is indeed suited to capture behavioural variation on a within- and between-subject level. Using a large-scale test-retest design (T1: N = 330; T2: N = 219), we assessed the internal (internal consistency) and temporal (test-retest reliability) stability of the task's most used measures. We show that the main measures capturing flexible belief and behavioural adaptation yield good internal consistency and overall satisfying test-retest reliability. However, some more complex markers of flexible behaviour show lower psychometric quality. Our findings have implications for the large corpus of previous studies using this task and provide clear guidance as to which measures should and should not be used in future studies.

ASD-similar social behaviour scores affect stimulus generalization in family dogs

Generalization, the tendency to respond in the same way to different but similar stimuli, is one of the main cognitive abilities that make category formation possible and thus is a prerequisite for efficiency in learning. Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) experience pervasive difficulty with producing generalized responses across materials, people, places, and contexts. Increasing evidence suggests that "ASD-like" social impairments appear endogenously and spontaneously in family dogs providing a high-validity model for understanding the phenotypic expression of human ASD. The present study aims to further investigate the dog model of ASD by the approach of searching for analogues in dogs showing "ASD-like" social impairments of cognitive phenomena in humans specific to ASD, specifically impairments of generalization abilities. We have tested 18 family dogs with formerly established "ASD-like" behaviour scores (F1, F2, F3) in a generalization task involving three conditions (size, colour and texture). We found a significant association between F1 scores and test performance as well as improvement during testing sessions. Our study provides further support for the notion that dogs with lower social competence-similarly to humans with ASD-exhibit attentional and perceptual abnormalities, such as being sensitive to minor changes to a non-adaptive extent.

Thalamocortical architectures for flexible cognition and efficient learning

The brain exhibits a remarkable ability to learn and execute context-appropriate behaviors. How it achieves such flexibility, without sacrificing learning efficiency, is an important open question. Neuroscience, psychology, and engineering suggest that reusing and repurposing computations are part of the answer. Here, we review evidence that thalamocortical architectures may have evolved to facilitate these objectives of flexibility and efficiency by coordinating distributed computations. Recent work suggests that distributed prefrontal cortical networks compute with flexible codes, and that the mediodorsal thalamus provides regularization to promote efficient reuse. Thalamocortical interactions resemble hierarchical Bayesian computations, and their network implementation can be related to existing gating, synchronization, and hub theories of thalamic function. By reviewing recent findings and providing a novel synthesis, we highlight key research horizons integrating computation, cognition, and systems neuroscience.

Probabilistic Learning of Cue-Outcome Associations is not Influenced by Autistic Traits

According to Bayesian/predictive coding models of autism, autistic individuals may have difficulties learning probabilistic cue-outcome associations, but empirical evidence has been mixed. The target cues used in previous studies were often straightforward and might not reflect real-life learning of such associations which requires learners to infer which cue(s) among many to track. Across two experiments, we compared adult learners with varying levels of autistic traits on their ability to infer the correct cue to learn probabilistic cue-outcome associations when explicitly instructed to do so or when exposed implicitly. We found no evidence for the effect of autistic traits on probabilistic learning accuracy, contrary to the predictions of Bayesian/predictive coding models. Implications for the current Bayesian/predictive coding models are discussed.

Computational mechanisms of belief updating in relation to psychotic-like experiences

Introduction

Psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) may occur due to changes in weighting prior beliefs and new evidence in the belief updating process. It is still unclear whether the acquisition or integration of stable beliefs is altered, and whether such alteration depends on the level of environmental and belief precision, which reflects the associated uncertainty. This motivated us to investigate uncertainty-related dynamics of belief updating in relation to PLEs using an online study design.

Methods

We selected a sample (n = 300) of participants who performed a belief updating task with sudden change points and provided self-report questionnaires for PLEs. The task required participants to observe bags dropping from a hidden helicopter, infer its position, and dynamically update their belief about the helicopter's position. Participants could optimize performance by adjusting learning rates according to inferred belief uncertainty (inverse prior precision) and the probability of environmental change points. We used a normative learning model to examine the relationship between adherence to specific model parameters and PLEs.

Results

PLEs were linked to lower accuracy in tracking the outcome (helicopter location) (β = 0.26 ± 0.11, p = 0.018) and to a smaller increase of belief precision across observations after a change point (β = -0.003 ± 0.0007, p < 0.001). PLEs were related to slower belief updating when participants encountered large prediction errors (β = -0.03 ± 0.009, p = 0.001). Computational modeling suggested that PLEs were associated with reduced overall belief updating in response to prediction errors (βPE = -1.00 ± 0.45, p = 0.028) and reduced modulation of updating at inferred environmental change points (βCPP = -0.84 ± 0.38, p = 0.023).

Discussion

We conclude that PLEs are associated with altered dynamics of belief updating. These findings support the idea that the process of balancing prior belief and new evidence, as a function of environmental uncertainty, is altered in PLEs, which may contribute to the development of delusions. Specifically, slower learning after large prediction errors in people with high PLEs may result in rigid beliefs. Disregarding environmental change points may limit the flexibility to establish new beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. The present study fosters a deeper understanding of inferential belief updating mechanisms underlying PLEs.

Transfer of Learned Cognitive Flexibility to Novel Stimuli and Task Sets

Adaptive behavior requires learning about the structure of one's environment to derive optimal action policies, and previous studies have documented transfer of such structural knowledge to bias choices in new environments. Here, we asked whether people could also acquire and transfer more abstract knowledge across different task environments, specifically expectations about cognitive control demands. Over three experiments, participants (Amazon Mechanical Turk workers; N = ~80 adults per group) performed a probabilistic card-sorting task in environments of either a low or high volatility of task rule changes (requiring low or high cognitive flexibility, respectively) before transitioning to a medium-volatility environment. Using reinforcement-learning modeling, we consistently found that previous exposure to high task rule volatilities led to faster adaptation to rule changes in the subsequent transfer phase. These transfers of expectations about cognitive flexibility demands were both task independent (Experiment 2) and stimulus independent (Experiment 3), thus demonstrating the formation and generalization of environmental structure knowledge to guide cognitive control.

Fast rule switching and slow rule updating in a perceptual categorization task

To adapt to a changing world, we must be able to switch between rules already learned and, at other times, learn rules anew. Often we must do both at the same time, switching between known rules while also constantly re-estimating them. Here, we show these two processes, rule switching and rule learning, rely on distinct but intertwined computations, namely fast inference and slower incremental learning. To this end, we studied how monkeys switched between three rules. Each rule was compositional, requiring the animal to discriminate one of two features of a stimulus and then respond with an associated eye movement along one of two different response axes. By modeling behavior, we found the animals learned the axis of response using fast inference (rule switching) while continuously re-estimating the stimulus-response associations within an axis (rule learning). Our results shed light on the computational interactions between rule switching and rule learning, and make testable neural predictions for these interactions.

Models of Dynamic Belief Updating in Psychosis-A Review Across Different Computational Approaches

To understand the dysfunctional mechanisms underlying maladaptive reasoning of psychosis, computational models of decision making have widely been applied over the past decade. Thereby, a particular focus has been on the degree to which beliefs are updated based on new evidence, expressed by the learning rate in computational models. Higher order beliefs about the stability of the environment can determine the attribution of meaningfulness to events that deviate from existing beliefs by interpreting these either as noise or as true systematic changes (volatility). Both, the inappropriate downplaying of important changes as noise (belief update too low) as well as the overly flexible adaptation to random events (belief update too high) were theoretically and empirically linked to symptoms of psychosis. Whereas models with fixed learning rates fail to adjust learning in reaction to dynamic changes, increasingly complex learning models have been adopted in samples with clinical and subclinical psychosis lately. These ranged from advanced reinforcement learning models, over fully Bayesian belief updating models to approximations of fully Bayesian models with hierarchical learning or change point detection algorithms. It remains difficult to draw comparisons across findings of learning alterations in psychosis modeled by different approaches e.g., the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter and change point detection. Therefore, this review aims to summarize and compare computational definitions and findings of dynamic belief updating without perceptual ambiguity in (sub)clinical psychosis across these different mathematical approaches. There was strong heterogeneity in tasks and samples. Overall, individuals with schizophrenia and delusion-proneness showed lower behavioral performance linked to failed differentiation between uninformative noise and environmental change. This was indicated by increased belief updating and an overestimation of volatility, which was associated with cognitive deficits. Correlational evidence for computational mechanisms and positive symptoms is still sparse and might diverge from the group finding of instable beliefs. Based on the reviewed studies, we highlight some aspects to be considered to advance the field with regard to task design, modeling approach, and inclusion of participants across the psychosis spectrum. Taken together, our review shows that computational psychiatry offers powerful tools to advance our mechanistic insights into the cognitive anatomy of psychotic experiences.

Dynamic functional connectivity profile of the salience network across the life span

The insular cortex and anterior cingulate cortex together comprise the salience or midcingulo-insular network, involved in detecting salient events and initiating control signals to mediate brain network dynamics. The extent to which functional coupling between the salience network and the rest of the brain undergoes changes due to development and aging is at present largely unexplored. Here, we examine dynamic functional connectivity (dFC) of the salience network in a large life span sample (n = 601; 6-85 years old). A sliding-window analysis and k-means clustering revealed five states of dFC formed with the salience network, characterized by either widespread asynchrony or different patterns of synchrony between the salience network and other brain regions. We determined the frequency, dwell time, total transitions, and specific state-to-state transitions for each state and subject, regressing the metrics with subjects' age to identify life span trends. A dynamic state characterized by low connectivity between the salience network and the rest of the brain had a strong positive quadratic relationship between age and both frequency and dwell time. Additional frequency, dwell time, total transitions, and state-to-state transition trends were observed with other salience network states. Our results highlight the metastable dynamics of the salience network and its role in the maturation of brain regions critical for cognition.