Working memory and insight in verbal problems: analysis of compound remote associates

Insight and non-insight problem solving: A heart rate variability study

Occasionally, problems are solved with a sudden Aha! moment (insight), while the mundane approach to solving problems is analytical (non-insight). At first glance, non-insight appears to depend on the availability and taxation of cognitive resources to execute the step-by-step approach, whereas insight does not, or to a lesser extent. However, this remains debated. To investigate the reliance of both solution types on cognitive resources, we assessed the involvement of the prefrontal cortex using vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) as an index. Participants (N = 68) solved 70 compound remote associates word puzzles solvable with insight and non-insight. Before, during, and after solving the word puzzles, we measured the vmHRV. Our results showed that resting-state vmHRV (trait) showed a negative association with behavioural performance for both solution types. This might reflect inter-individual differences in inhibitory control. As the solution search requires one to think of remote associations, inhibitory control might hamper rather than aid this process. Furthermore, we observed, for both solution types, a vmHRV increase from resting-state to solution search (state), lingering on in the post-task recovery period. This could mark the increase of prefrontal resources to promote an open-minded stance, essential for divergent thinking, which arguably is crucial for this task. Our findings suggest that, at a general level, both solution types share common aspects. However, a closer analysis of early and late solutions and puzzle difficulty suggested that metacognitive differentiation between insight and non-insight improved with higher trait vmHRV, and that a unique association between trait vmHRV and puzzle difficulty was present for each solution type.

Scaling a common assessment of associative ability: Development and validation of a multiple-choice compound remote associates task

The assessment of creativity as an individual difference has historically focused on divergent thinking, which is increasingly viewed as involving the associative processes that are also understood to be a key component of creative potential. Research on associative processes has proliferated in many sub-fields, often using Compound Remote Associates (CRA) tasks with an open response format and relatively small participant samples. In the present work, we introduce a new format that is more amenable to large-scale data collection in survey designs, and present evidence for the reliability and validity of CRA measures in general using multiple large samples. Study 1 uses a large, representative dataset (N = 1,323,480) to demonstrate strong unidimensionality and internal consistency (α = .97; ωt = .87), as well as links to individual differences in temperament, cognitive ability, occupation, and job characteristics. Study 2 uses an undergraduate sample (N = 685) to validate the use of a multiple-choice format relative to the traditional approach. Study 3 uses a crowdsourced sample (N = 357) to demonstrate high test-retest reliability of the items (r =.74). Finally, Study 4 uses a sample that overlaps with Study 1 (N = 1,502,922) to provide item response theory (IRT) parameters for a large set of high-quality CRA items that use a multiple-choice response mode, thus facilitating their use in future research on creativity, insight, and related topics.

Tracing executive functions in insight

Usually the central executive is considered as a single capacity in the insight studies which leads to inconsistent results on the link between the central executive of working memory and insight. We suppose a more detailed view on the process of insight solution in which various executive functions could be important at different solution stages: updating is necessary to build a problem's representation, inhibition-to overcome the impasse, shifting-to restructure the problem's representation. These assumptions were not confirmed in an experiment via dual-task paradigm and cognitive load. We did not find the relation between executive functions and solution stages, but we demonstrated that the more complexity of dual-task, the more cognitive load in problem solving. Moreover, the highest load of executive functions is observed at the end of insight solution. We speculate that the loading occurs either due to decrease of the free space in working memory storage systems, or due to a resource-intensive event (for example, representational change).

Q-learning model of insight problem solving and the effects of learning traits on creativity

Despite the fact that insight is a crucial component of creative thought, the means by which it is cultivated remain unknown. The effects of learning traits on insight, specifically, has not been the subject of investigation in pertinent research. This study quantitatively examines the effects of individual differences in learning traits estimated using a Q-learning model within the reinforcement learning framework and evaluates their effects on insight problem solving in two tasks, the 8-coin and 9-dot problems, which fall under the umbrella term "spatial insight problems." Although the learning characteristics of the two problems were different, the results showed that there was a transfer of learning between them. In particular, performance on the insight tasks improved with increasing experience. Moreover, loss-taking, as opposed to loss aversion, had a significant effect on performance in both tasks, depending on the amount of experience one had. It is hypothesized that loss acceptance facilitates analogical transfer between the two tasks and improves performance. In addition, this is one of the few studies that attempted to analyze insight problems using a computational approach. This approach allows the identification of the underlying learning parameters for insight problem solving.

Memory and creativity: A meta-analytic examination of the relationship between memory systems and creative cognition

Increasing evidence suggests that specific memory systems (e.g., semantic vs. episodic) may support specific creative thought processes. However, there are a number of inconsistencies in the literature regarding the strength, direction, and influence of different memory (semantic, episodic, working, and short-term) and creativity (divergent and convergent thinking) types, as well as the influence of external factors (age, stimuli modality) on this purported relationship. In this meta-analysis, we examined 525 correlations from 79 published studies and unpublished datasets, representing data from 12,846 individual participants. We found a small but significant (r = .19) correlation between memory and creative cognition. Among semantic, episodic, working, and short-term memory, all correlations were significant, but semantic memory - particularly verbal fluency, the ability to strategically retrieve information from long-term memory - was found to drive this relationship. Further, working memory capacity was found to be more strongly related to convergent than divergent creative thinking. We also found that within visual creativity, the relationship with visual memory was greater than that of verbal memory, but within verbal creativity, the relationship with verbal memory was greater than that of visual memory. Finally, the memory-creativity correlation was larger for children compared to young adults despite no impact of age on the overall effect size. These results yield three key conclusions: (1) semantic memory supports both verbal and nonverbal creative thinking, (2) working memory supports convergent creative thinking, and (3) the cognitive control of memory is central to performance on creative thinking tasks.

A Positive Association between Working Memory Capacity and Human Creativity: A Meta-Analytic Evidence

Creativity serves as a fountain for social and scientific development. As one of the most crucial human capabilities, creativity has been believed to be supported by the core component of higher cognitive functions—working memory capacity (WMC). However, the evidence supporting the association between WMC and creativity remains contradictory. Here, we conducted a meta-analysis using random-effects models to investigate the linear association between WMC and creativity by pooling the individual effect size from the previous literature. Further, a subgroup analysis was performed to examine whether such association is specific for different WMC categories (i.e., verbal WMC, visual−spatial WMC and dual-task WMC). The main meta-analytic results showed a significantly positive association between WMC and creativity (r = .083, 95% CI: .050−.115, p < .001, n = 3104, k = 28). The subgroup analysis demonstrated consistent results by showing a significantly positive association between them, irrespective of WMC category. We also found that cultural environments could moderate this association, and we identified a strong correlation in participants from an Asian cultural context. In conclusion, this study provides the evidence to clarify the positive association between WMC and creativity, and implies that the Asian cultural context may boost such an association.

The association of prenatal manganese exposure with problem-solving skills and its mediation by the building blocks of executive function

BACKGROUND

Problem-solving skills build upon three core executive functions: inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility. There is evidence of adverse associations of prenatal exposure to manganese (Mn) with core executive functions, but less is known about Mn associations with problem-solving or potential mediators of this association.

OBJECTIVES

This study aimed to investigate the association of prenatal Mn exposure with problem-solving and to identify potential neuropsychological mechanisms through which this association may be mediated.

METHODS

Study participants were 410 adolescents from the New Bedford Cohort (NBC) who have undergone periodic evaluations since their birth (1993-1998) to mothers residing near a Massachusetts Superfund site. We investigated the association of cord blood Mn with problem-solving measured by the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) Sorting and Tower subtests (scores scaled to a mean ± SD of 10 ± 3) using multivariable linear regression. Inhibition and cognitive flexibility were also measured by the D-KEFS; working memory was measured with the Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning, 2nd edition. Regression-based causal mediation analysis was used to assess the proportion of the Mn-problem-solving association mediated by inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility individually and jointly.

RESULTS

NBC adolescents (mean age 15.5 years) were socio-demographically diverse with 31 % in a low-income household at birth and had cord blood Mn concentrations similar to other general population samples. Mn was associated with Sorting but not Tower scores. Specifically, a doubling of cord blood Mn concentrations was associated with - 0.59 points lower (95 % CI: -1.16, -0.03) Sort Recognition score. In mediation analyses, there was suggestive evidence that inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility combined mediated 30 % of the total effect of Mn on Sorting. When analyzed individually, working memory mediated a larger proportion (24 %) of the effect than inhibition or cognitive flexibility.

DISCUSSION

We observed adverse associations of cord blood Mn with problem-solving among adolescents. There was suggestive evidence that the building blocks of executive function jointly, and working memory individually, were potentially important mediators of this association.

Aha! under pressure: The Aha! experience is not constrained by cognitive load

The Aha! moment- the sudden insight sometimes reached when solving a vexing problem- entails a different problem-solving experience than solution retrieval reached by an analytical, multistep strategy (i.e., non-insight). To date, the (un)conscious nature of insight remains debated. We addressed this by studying insight under cognitive load. If insight and non-insight problem solving rely on conscious, effortful processes, they should both be influenced by a concurrent cognitive load. However, if unconscious processes characterize insight, cognitive load might not affect it at all. Using a dual-task paradigm, young, healthy adults (N = 106) solved 70 word puzzles under different cognitive loads. We confirmed that insight solutions were more often correct and received higher solution confidence. Importantly, as cognitive load increased, non-insight solutions became less frequent and required more solution time, whereas insightful ones remained mostly unaffected. This implies that insight problem solving did not compete for limited cognitive resources.

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.

The Cognitive Underpinnings of Multiply-Constrained Problem Solving

Individuals encounter problems daily wherein varying numbers of constraints require delimitation of memory to target goal-satisfying information. Multiply-constrained problems, such as the compound remote associates, are commonly used to study this type of problem solving. Since their development, multiply-constrained problems have been theoretically and empirically related to creative thinking, analytical problem solving, insight problem solving, and a multitude of other cognitive abilities. In the present study, we empirically evaluated the range of cognitive abilities previously associated with multiply-constrained problem solving to assess common versus unique predictive variance (i.e., working memory, attention control, episodic and semantic memory, and fluid and crystallized intelligence). Additionally, we sought to determine whether problem-solving ability and self-reported strategy adoption (analytical or insightful) were task specific or task general through the use of novel multiply-constrained problem-solving tasks (TriBond and Location Bond). Performance across these tasks was shown to be domain general, solutions derived through insightful strategies were more often correct than those derived through analytical strategies, and crystallized intelligence was the sole cognitive ability that provided unique predictive value after accounting for all other abilities.

The effects of risk-taking, exploitation, and exploration on creativity

The purpose of this paper was to investigate the effects of risk-taking, exploitation, and exploration on creativity by taking a model-based computational approach to both divergent and convergent thinking as primary ingredients of creativity. We adopted a reinforcement learning framework of Q learning to provide a simple, rigorous account of behavior in the decision-making process and examined the determinants of divergent and convergent thinking. Our findings revealed that risk-taking has positive effects on divergent thinking, but not related to convergent thinking. In particular, divergent thinkers with a high learning capacity were more likely to engage in risk-taking when facing losses than when facing gains. This risk-taking behavior not only contributes to the rapid achievement of learning convergence, but is also associated with high performance in divergent thinking tasks. Conversely, both exploitation and exploration had no significant effects on creativity once these risk attitudes were considered. Moreover, while convergent thinking relied on personality characteristics, it was not associated with risk-taking, exploitation, or exploration.

When working memory mechanisms compete: Predicting cognitive flexibility versus mental set

Cognitive flexibility is a hallmark of individuals with higher working memory capacity (WMC). Yet, individuals with higher WMC sometimes demonstrate greater rigidity in problem solving. The present research examines a novel account for these contradictory findings-that different WMC mechanisms support versus constrain cognitive flexibility. Across three studies, participants completed the water jug task-a problem-solving task requiring them to first establish and then break mental set. Predictor measures targeted three WMC mechanisms: attention control, primary memory, and secondary memory. In Study 1, primary and secondary memory predicted breaking mental set in opposite directions. Higher primary memory facilitated breaking mental set, whereas higher secondary memory hindered it. Study 2 demonstrated that attention control moderates these effects. Study 3 replicated these results using a less restrictive sampling procedure (i.e., participants were provided the strategy needed to establish mental set). The present research supports the proposed theory of functional opponency in WMC.

The role of working memory capacity in analytic and multiply-constrained problem-solving in demanding situations

Working memory processes are important for analytic problem-solving; however, their role in multiply-constrained problem-solving is currently debated. This study explored individual differences in working memory and successful completion of analytic and multiply-constrained problem-solving by having participants solve algebra and compound remote associate (CRAT) problems of varying difficulty under low and high memory demand conditions. Working memory was predictive of both algebra and multiply-constrained problem-solving. Specifically, participants with high working memory solved more problems than those with low working. Memory load did not differentially affect performance for low and high working memory participants. However, for multiply-constrained problem-solving the effect of item difficulty was more detrimental for high-span participants than low-span participants. Together, these findings suggest that working memory processes are important for both types of problem-solving and that participants with low working memory capacity may need to offload internal memory demands onto the environment to efficiently solve problems.

Solving stumpers, CRT and CRAT: Are the abilities related?

Bar-Hillel, Noah and Frederick (2018) studied a class of riddles they called stumpers, which have simple, but curiously elusive, solutions. A canonical example is: “Andy is Bobbie’s brother, but Bobbie is not Andy’s brother. How come?” Though not discussed there, we found that the ability to solve stumpers correlates significantly with performance on items resembling the CRT (Cognitive Reflection Test) but not with performance on items from the CRAT (Compound Remote Associates Test). We report those results here.

Are individual differences in auditory processing related to auditory distraction by irrelevant sound? A replication study

Irrelevant sounds can be very distracting, especially when trying to recall information according to its serial order. The irrelevant sound effect (ISE) has been studied in the literature for more than 40 years, yet many questions remain. One goal that has received little attention involves the discernment of a predictive factor, or individual difference characteristic, that would help to determine the size of the ISE. The current experiments were designed to replicate and extend prior work by Macken, Phelps, and Jones (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 139–144, 2009), who demonstrated a significant predictive relationship between the size of the ISE and a type of auditory processing called global pattern matching. The authors also found a relationship between auditory processing involving deliberate recoding of sounds and serial order recall performance in silence. Across two experiments, this dissociation was not replicated. Additionally, the two types of auditory processing were not significantly correlated with each other. The lack of a clear pattern of findings replicating the Macken et al. (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 139–144, 2009) study raises several questions regarding the need for future research on the characteristics of these auditory processing tasks, and the stability of the measurement of the ISE itself.

Listening to your intuition in the face of distraction: Effects of taxing working memory on accuracy and bias of intuitive judgments of semantic coherence

People can intuitively estimate the semantic coherence of word triads, even when they are unable to state the triads' common denominator. The present research examines the role of working memory in such intuitive coherence judgments. Dual-process models of information processing suggest that intuition does not depend on working memory. Consistent with this, the authors predicted that taxing working memory capacity will not lower the accuracy of intuitive coherence judgments. Nevertheless, taxing working memory may impede metacognitive processing, which may lead people to become more conservative in judging triads as coherent. Two studies (combined N = 307) tested these predictions by asking participants to memorize letter-number combinations of varying lengths while providing intuitive coherence judgments. As expected, working memory load had no effect on the accuracy of intuitive coherence judgments (Studies 1 & 2). Effects on judgment bias were less consistent. In Study 1, participants became slightly more conservative in judging triads as coherent under moderate (compared to low) working memory load. In Study 2, which was preregistered, working memory load led to more conservative intuitive coherence judgments, but only when participants prioritized a highly demanding load task. Unexpectedly, when focusing on a moderate (compared to a low) working memory load, participants were more liberal in judging triads as coherent. Together, these findings indicate that taxing working memory may interfere with people's inclination to trust their intuition, even when it leaves the accuracy of people's intuition intact.

Reconsidering unconscious persistence: Suppressing unwanted memories reduces their indirect expression in later thoughts

When we seek to forget unwelcome memories, does the suppressed content still exert an unconscious influence on our thoughts? Although intentionally stopping retrieval of a memory reduces later episodic retention for the suppressed trace, it remains unclear the extent to which suppressed content persists in indirectly influencing mental processes. Here we tested whether inhibitory control processes underlying retrieval suppression alter the influence of a memory's underlying semantic content on later thought. To achieve this, across two experiments, we tested whether suppressing episodic retrieval of to-be-excluded memories reduced the indirect expression of the unwanted content on an apparently unrelated test of problem solving: the remote associates test (RAT). Experiment 1 found that suppressed content was less likely than unsuppressed content to emerge as solutions to RAT problems. Indeed, suppression abolished evidence of conceptual priming, even when participants reported no awareness of the relationship between the memory and the problem solving tasks. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and also found that directing participants to use explicit memory to solve RAT problems eliminated suppression effects. Experiment 2 thus rules out the possibility that suppression effects reflect contamination by covert explicit retrieval strategies. Together, our results indicate that inhibitory control processes underlying retrieval suppression not only disrupt episodic retention, but also reduce the indirect influence of suppressed semantic content during unrelated thought processes. Considered with other recent demonstrations of implicit suppression effects, these findings indicate that historical assumptions about the persisting influence of suppressed thoughts on mental health require closer empirical scrutiny and need to be reconsidered.

The Effect of Working Memory Updating Ability on Spatial Insight Problem Solving: Evidence From Behavior and Eye Movement Studies

It still remains uncertain whether working memory updating ability influences spatial insight problem solving and whether working memory updating ability plays a role in the representation restructuring phase. The current study explored the correlation of working memory updating ability and spatial insight problem solving by behavior and eye movement experiments, and the results showed that high working memory updating ability individuals spend significant shorter time to solve spatial insight problem than low working memory updating ability individuals. For participants with high or low working memory updating ability, the underlying mechanism of spatial insight problem solving is sudden rather than incremental, which demonstrated that the working memory updating ability did not influence the representation restructuring phase. Working memory updating ability influences spatial problem solving, and it works critically in the problem space search phase, while the restructuring phase is sudden and immediate, which is not influenced by working memory updating ability. The representation restructuring tends to be spontaneous.

How Working Memory Provides Representational Change During Insight Problem Solving

Numerous studies of insight problem solving are focused on both the control and storage systems of working memory. We obtained contradictory data about how working memory systems are involved in insight problem solving process. We argue that measuring the dynamics of the control system and storage systems through the course of problem solving can provide a more refined view on the processes involved, as a whole, and explain the existing controversies. We theorize that specific insight mechanisms require varying working memory capacities at different stages of the problem solving process. Our study employed a dual task paradigm to track the dynamics of working memory systems load during problem solving by measuring the reaction time in a secondary probe-task during different stages of problem solving. We varied the modality (verbal, visual) and the complexity of the probe-task during insight and non-insight problem solving. The results indicated that the dynamics of working memory load in insight problems differs from those in non-insight problems. Our first experiment shows that the complexity of the probe-task affects overall probe-task reaction times in both insight and non-insight problem solving. Our second experiment demonstrates that the solution of a non-insight problem is primarily associated with the working memory control system, while insight problems rely on relevant storage systems. Our results confirm that insight process requires access to various systems of working memory throughout the solution. We found that working memory load in non-insight problems increases from stage to stage due to allocation of the attentional control resources to interim calculations. The nature of the dynamics of working memory load in insight problems remains debatable. We claim that insight problem solving demands working memory storage during the entire problem solving process and that control system plays an important role just prior to the solution.

Insomnia and intellect mask the positive link between schizotypal traits and creativity

Background

Schizotypy is a set of personality traits that resemble the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia in the general population, and it is associated with various subclinical mental health problems, including sleep disturbances. Additionally, dimensions of schizotypy show specific but weak associations with creativity. Given that creativity demands cognitive control and mental health, and that sleep disturbances negatively impact cognitive control, we predicted that positive, impulsive and disorganised schizotypy will demonstrate stronger associations with indicators of creativity, if the effect of mental health, insomnia, and intellect are statistically controlled.

Methods

University students (N = 182) took part in the study. Schizotypy was assessed with the shortened Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (sO-LIFE). Creative achievements were measured with the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ), divergent thinking was assessed with the ‘Just suppose’ task, and remote association problem solving was tested with Compound Remote Associate (CRA) problems. Mental health was assessed with the 12-item version of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12), and insomnia was examined with the Athens Insomnia Scale (AIS). Verbal short term memory was measured with the forward digit span task, and intellect was assessed with the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI). Multiple linear regressions were performed to examine the relationship between creativity and schizotypy. Indicators of creativity were the dependent variables. In the first block, dimensions of schizotypy, age, gender and smoking were entered, and in the second block, the models were extended with mental health, insomnia, verbal short term memory, and intellect.

Results

Positive schizotypy positively predicted real-life creative achievements, independently from the positive effect of intellect. Follow-up analyses revealed that positive schizotypy predicted creative achievements in art, while higher disorganised schizotypy was associated with creative achievements in science (when intellect was controlled for). Furthermore, disorganised schizotypy positively predicted remote association problem solving performance, if insomnia and verbal short term memory were statistically controlled. No dimension of schizotypy was significantly associated with divergent thinking.

Discussion

In line with previous findings, positive schizotypy predicted real-life creative achievements. The positive effects of disorganised schizotypy might be explained in terms of the simultaneous involvement of enhanced semantic priming and cognitive control in problem solving. We speculate that the lack of associations between divergent thinking and schizotypy might be related to instruction effects. Our study underscores the relevance of sleep impairment to the psychosis-spectrum, and refines our knowledge about the adaptive aspects of schizotypy in the general population.

Ultra-high-field fMRI insights on insight: Neural correlates of the Aha!-moment

Finding creative solutions to difficult problems is a fundamental aspect of human culture and a skill highly needed. However, the exact neural processes underlying creative problem solving remain unclear. Insightful problem solving tasks were shown to be a valid method for investigating one subcomponent of creativity: the Aha!-moment. Finding insightful solutions during a remote associates task (RAT) was found to elicit specific cortical activity changes. Considering the strong affective components of Aha!-moments, as manifested in the subjectively experienced feeling of relief following the sudden emergence of the solution of the problem without any conscious forewarning, we hypothesized the subcortical dopaminergic reward network to be critically engaged during Aha. To investigate those subcortical contributions to insight, we employed ultra-high-field 7 T fMRI during a German Version of the RAT. During this task, subjects were exposed to word triplets and instructed to find a solution word being associated with all the three given words. They were supposed to press a button as soon as they felt confident about their solution without further revision, allowing us to capture the exact event of Aha!-moment. Besides the finding on cortical involvement of the left anterior middle temporal gyrus (aMTG), here we showed for the first time robust subcortical activity changes related to insightful problem solving in the bilateral thalamus, hippocampus, and the dopaminergic midbrain comprising ventral tegmental area (VTA), nucleus accumbens (NAcc), and caudate nucleus. These results shed new light on the affective neural mechanisms underlying insightful problem solving.

"The Penny Drops": Investigating Insight Through the Medium of Cryptic Crosswords

A new protocol for eliciting insight (“Aha!”/Eureka) moments is proposed, involving the solving of British-style cryptic crosswords. The mechanics of cryptic crossword clues are briefly explained, and the process is set into the insight literature, with parallels being drawn between several different types of cryptic crossword clues and other insight-triggering problems such as magic, jokes, anagrams, rebus, and remote association puzzles (RAT), as well as “classic” thematic or spatial challenges. We have evidence from a previous survey of cryptic crossword solvers that the “Aha!” moment is the most important driver of continued participation in this hobby, suggesting that the positive emotional “payback” has an energizing effect on a participant's motivation to continue solving. Given the success with which a good quality cryptic crossword elicits “Aha!” moments, cryptics should prove highly valuable in exploring insight under lab conditions. We argue that the crossword paradigm overcomes many of the issues which beset other insight problems: for example, solution rates of cryptic crossword clues are high; new material can easily be commissioned, leading to a limitless pool of test items; and each puzzle contains clues resembling a wide variety of insight problem types, permitting a comparison of heterogeneous solving mechanisms within the same medium. Uniquely among insight problems, considerations of expertise also come into play, allowing us to explore how crossword solving experts handle the deliberate misdirection of the cryptic clue more effectively than non-expert, but equally experienced, peers. Many have debated whether there is such a thing as an “insight problem” per se: typically, problems can be solved with or without insight, depending on the context. We argue that the same is true for cryptic crosswords, and that the key to the successful triggering of insight may lie in both the difficulty of the challenge and the degree to which misdirection has been used. Future research is outlined which explores the specific mechanisms of clue difficulty. This opens the way to an exploration of potential links between solving constraints and the experiencing of the “Aha!” moment, which may shed light on the cognitive processes involved in insight solution.

In Search of Somatic Precursors of Spontaneous Insight

Abstract. A considerable number of behavioral and neuroscientific studies on insight problem solving have revealed behavioral and neural correlates of the dynamic insight process; however, somatic correlates, particularly somatic precursors of creative insight, remain undetermined. To characterize the somatic precursor of spontaneous insight, 22 healthy volunteers were recruited to solve the compound remote associate (CRA) task in which a problem can be solved by either an insight or an analytic strategy. The participants’ peripheral nervous activities, particularly electrodermal and cardiovascular responses, were continuously monitored and separately measured. The results revealed a greater skin conductance magnitude for insight trials than for non-insight trials in the 4-s time span prior to problem solutions and two marginally significant correlations between pre-solution heart rate variability (HRV) and the solution time of insight trials. Our findings provide the first direct evidence that spontaneous insight in problem solving is a somatically peculiar process that is distinct from the stepwise process of analytic problem solving and can be represented by a special somatic precursor, which is a stronger pre-solution electrodermal activity and a correlation between problem solution time and certain HRV indicators such as the root mean square successive difference (RMSSD).

Quantifying insightful problem solving: a modified compound remote associates paradigm using lexical priming to parametrically modulate different sources of task difficulty

Insight problem solving has been conceptualized as a dynamic search through a constrained search space, where a non-obvious solution needs to be found. Multiple sources of task difficulty have been defined that can keep the problem solver from finding the right solution such as an overly large search space or knowledge constraints requiring a change of the problem representation. Up to now, there are very few accounts that focus on different aspects of difficulty within an insight problem-solving context and how they affect task performance as well as the probability of finding a solution that is accompanied by an Aha! experience. In addition, we are not aware of any approaches investigating how knowledge constraints parametrically modulate task performance and the Aha! experience in compound remote associates (CRA) when controlling for other sources of task difficulty. Therefore, we first developed, tested, and externally validated a modified CRA paradigm in combination with lexical priming that is more likely to elicit representational change than the classical CRA tasks. Second, we parametrically estimated the effect of the knowledge constraint together with other sources of difficulty (size of the problem and search space, word length and frequency) using general linear mixed models. The knowledge constraint (and the size of the search space) was operationalized as lexical distance (measured as cosine distances) between different word pairs within this task. Our results indicate that the experimentally induced knowledge constraint still affects task performance and is negatively related to the Aha! experience when controlling for various other types of task difficulties. Finally, we will present the complete stimulus set in German language together with their statistical (i.e., item difficulty and mean solution time) and lexical properties.

Aiding the search: Examining individual differences in multiply-constrained problem solving

Understanding and resolving complex problems is of vital importance in daily life. Problems can be defined by the limitations they place on the problem solver. Multiply-constrained problems are traditionally examined with the compound remote associates task (CRAT). Performance on the CRAT is partially dependent on an individual's working memory capacity (WMC). These findings suggest that executive processes are critical for problem solving and that there are reliable individual differences in multiply-constrained problem solving abilities. The goals of the current study are to replicate and further elucidate the relation between WMC and CRAT performance. To achieve these goals, we manipulated preexposure to CRAT solutions and measured WMC with complex-span tasks. In Experiment 1, we report evidence that preexposure to CRAT solutions improved problem solving accuracy, WMC was correlated with problem solving accuracy, and that WMC did not moderate the effect of preexposure on problem solving accuracy. In Experiment 2, we preexposed participants to correct and incorrect solutions. We replicated Experiment 1 and found that WMC moderates the effect of exposure to CRAT solutions such that high WMC participants benefit more from preexposure to correct solutions than low WMC (although low WMC participants have preexposure benefits as well). Broadly, these results are consistent with theories of working memory and problem solving that suggest a mediating role of attention control processes.

Can Intrinsic and Extrinsic Metacognitive Cues Shield Against Distraction in Problem Solving?

We investigated the capacity for two different forms of metacognitive cue to shield against auditory distraction in problem solving with Compound Remote Associates Tasks (CRATs). Experiment 1 demonstrated that an intrinsic metacognitive cue in the form of processing disfluency (manipulated using an easy-to-read vs. difficult-to-read font) could increase focal task engagement so as to mitigate the detrimental impact of distraction on solution rates for CRATs. Experiment 2 showed that an extrinsic metacognitive cue that took the form of an incentive for good task performance (i.e. 80% or better CRAT solutions) could likewise eliminate the negative impact of distraction on CRAT solution rates. Overall, these findings support the view that both intrinsic and extrinsic metacognitive cues have remarkably similar effects. This suggests that metacognitive cues operate via a common underlying mechanism whereby a participant applies increased focal attention to the primary task so as to ensure more steadfast task engagement that is not so easily diverted by task-irrelevant stimuli.

What about False Insights? Deconstructing the Aha! Experience along Its Multiple Dimensions for Correct and Incorrect Solutions Separately

The subjective Aha! experience that problem solvers often report when they find a solution has been taken as a marker for insight. If Aha! is closely linked to insightful solution processes, then theoretically, an Aha! should only be experienced when the correct solution is found. However, little work has explored whether the Aha! experience can also accompany incorrect solutions ("false insights"). Similarly, although the Aha! experience is not a unitary construct, little work has explored the different dimensions that have been proposed as its constituents. To address these gaps in the literature, 70 participants were presented with a set of difficult problems (37 magic tricks), and rated each of their solutions for Aha! as well as with regard to Suddenness in the emergence of the solution, Certainty of being correct, Surprise, Pleasure, Relief, and Drive. Solution times were also used as predictors for the Aha!

EXPERIENCE

This study reports three main findings: First, false insights exist. Second, the Aha! experience is multidimensional and consists of the key components Pleasure, Suddenness and Certainty. Third, although Aha! experiences for correct and incorrect solutions share these three common dimensions, they are also experienced differently with regard to magnitude and quality, with correct solutions emerging faster, leading to stronger Aha! experiences, and higher ratings of Pleasure, Suddenness, and Certainty. Solution correctness proffered a slightly different emotional coloring to the Aha! experience, with the additional perception of Relief for correct solutions, and Surprise for incorrect ones. These results cast some doubt on the assumption that the occurrence of an Aha! experience can serve as a definitive signal that a true insight has taken place. On the other hand, the quantitative and qualitative differences in the experience of correct and incorrect solutions demonstrate that the Aha! experience is not a mere epiphenomenon. Strong Aha! experiences are clearly, but not exclusively linked to correct solutions.

Is creative insight task-specific? A coordinate-based meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on insightful problem solving

The question of whether creative insight varies across problem types has recently come to the forefront of studies of creative cognition. In the present study, to address the nature of creative insight, the coordinate-based activation likelihood estimation (ALE) technique was utilized to individually conduct three quantitative meta-analyses of neuroimaging experiments that used the compound remote associate (CRA) task, the prototype heuristic (PH) task and the Chinese character chunk decomposition (CCD) task. These tasks were chosen because they are frequently used to uncover the neurocognitive correlates of insight. Our results demonstrated that creative insight reliably activates largely non-overlapping brain regions across task types, with the exception of some shared regions: the CRA task mainly relied on the right parahippocampal gyrus, the superior frontal gyrus and the inferior frontal gyrus; the PH task primarily depended on the right middle occipital gyrus (MOG), the bilateral superior parietal lobule/precuneus, the left inferior parietal lobule, the left lingual gyrus and the left middle frontal gyrus; and the CCD task activated a broad cerebral network consisting of most dorsolateral and medial prefrontal regions, frontoparietal regions and the right MOG. These results provide the first neural evidence of the task dependence of creative insight. The implications of these findings for resolving conflict surrounding the different theories of creative cognition and for defining insight as a set of heterogeneous processes are discussed.

Insightful Imagery is Related to Working Memory Updating

Available body of evidence concerning the relationship between insight problem solving and working memory (WM) is ambiguous. Several authors propose that restructuring of the problem representation requires controlled search processes, which needs planning and involvement of WM. Other researchers suggest that the restructuring is achieved through the automatic spread of activation in long-term memory, assigning a limited role to WM capacity. In the present study we examined the correlations between insight problem solving performance and measures of WM updating function (n-back task), including general intelligence (as measured by Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices). The results revealed that updating function shared up to 30% of variance with the insight problem task performance, even when the influence of general mental ability was controlled for. These results suggest that insight problem solving is constrained by individual ability to update the content of WM.

The roles of associative and executive processes in creative cognition

How does the mind produce creative ideas? Past research has pointed to important roles of both executive and associative processes in creative cognition. But such work has largely focused on the influence of one ability or the other-executive or associative-so the extent to which both abilities may jointly affect creative thought remains unclear. Using multivariate structural equation modeling, we conducted two studies to determine the relative influences of executive and associative processes in domain-general creative cognition (i.e., divergent thinking). Participants completed a series of verbal fluency tasks, and their responses were analyzed by means of latent semantic analysis (LSA) and scored for semantic distance as a measure of associative ability. Participants also completed several measures of executive function-including broad retrieval ability (Gr) and fluid intelligence (Gf). Across both studies, we found substantial effects of both associative and executive abilities: As the average semantic distance between verbal fluency responses and cues increased, so did the creative quality of divergent-thinking responses (Study 1 and Study 2). Moreover, the creative quality of divergent-thinking responses was predicted by the executive variables-Gr (Study 1) and Gf (Study 2). Importantly, the effects of semantic distance and the executive function variables remained robust in the same structural equation model predicting divergent thinking, suggesting unique contributions of both constructs. The present research extends recent applications of LSA in creativity research and provides support for the notion that both associative and executive processes underlie the production of novel ideas.

More mind wandering, fewer original ideas: be not distracted during creative idea generation

Several studies suggest that mind wandering (MW) benefits creativity when the MW occurs in the incubation period of creative problem solving. The aim of present study was to examine the effects of MW that occurs in the course of creative idea generation. Participants received an Alternative Uses Task (AUT) and were asked to generate ideas for 20min. Their MW frequencies as time passed were measured by means of probe-caught MW. Comparisons of the AUT performances of high and low MW groups revealed that greater MW was associated with lower fluency and originality scores on the AUT. Furthermore, the high MW group showed greater MW as time passed, while the low MW group's MW was steady during the course of idea generation. Accordingly, the originality of idea generation decreased with time passing for the high MW group but was steady for the low MW group. The findings suggest that the MW during the course of creative idea generation is negatively related to creativity, perhaps because the control processes involved in idea generation are impaired by the mind wandering.

Mind wandering "Ahas" versus mindful reasoning: alternative routes to creative solutions

Based on mixed results linking both mindfulness and its opposing construct mind wandering to enhanced creativity, we predicted that the relationship between mindfulness and creativity might depend on whether creative problems are approached through analytic strategy or through "insight" (i.e., sudden awareness of a solution). Study 1 investigated the relationship between trait mindfulness and compound remote associates problem solving as a function of participants' self-reported approach to each problem. The results revealed a negative relationship between mindfulness and problem-solving overall. However, more detailed analysis revealed that mindfulness was associated with impaired problem solving when approaching problems with insight, but increased problem solving when using analysis. In Study 2, we manipulated participants' problem-solving approach through instructions. We again found a negative relationship between mindfulness and creative performance in general, however, more mindful participants again performed better when instructed to approach problems analytically.

What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

The distinction between intuitive and analytic thinking is common in psychology. However, while often being quite clear on the characteristics of the two processes ('Type 1' processes are fast, autonomous, intuitive, etc. and 'Type 2' processes are slow, deliberative, analytic, etc.), dual-process theorists have been heavily criticized for being unclear on the factors that determine when an individual will think analytically or rely on their intuition. We address this issue by introducing a three-stage model that elucidates the bottom-up factors that cause individuals to engage Type 2 processing. According to the model, multiple Type 1 processes may be cued by a stimulus (Stage 1), leading to the potential for conflict detection (Stage 2). If successful, conflict detection leads to Type 2 processing (Stage 3), which may take the form of rationalization (i.e., the Type 1 output is verified post hoc) or decoupling (i.e., the Type 1 output is falsified). We tested key aspects of the model using a novel base-rate task where stereotypes and base-rate probabilities cued the same (non-conflict problems) or different (conflict problems) responses about group membership. Our results support two key predictions derived from the model: (1) conflict detection and decoupling are dissociable sources of Type 2 processing and (2) conflict detection sometimes fails. We argue that considering the potential stages of reasoning allows us to distinguish early (conflict detection) and late (decoupling) sources of analytic thought. Errors may occur at both stages and, as a consequence, bias arises from both conflict monitoring and decoupling failures.