Now and then: Hand choice is influenced by recent action history

Where scrollbars are clicked, and why

Scrolling is a widely used mean to interact with visual displays, usually to move content to a certain target location on the display. Understanding how user scroll might identify potentially suboptimal use and allows to infer users' intentions. In the present study, we examined where users click on a scrollbar depending on the intended scrolling action. In two online experiments, click positions were systematically adapted to the intended scrolling action. Click position selection could not be explained as strict optimization of the distance traveled with the cursor, memory load, or motor-cognitive factors. By contrast, for identical scrolling actions click positions strongly depended on the context and on previous scrolls. The behavior of our participants closely resembled behavior observed for manipulation of other physical devices and suggested a simple heuristic of movement planning. The results have implications for modeling human-computer interaction and may contribute to predicting user behavior.

Getting stuck in a rut as an emergent feature of a dynamic decision-making system

Human sensorimotor decision making has a tendency to get 'stuck in a rut', being biased towards selecting a previously implemented action structure (hysteresis). Existing explanations propose this is the consequence of an agent efficiently modifying an existing plan, rather than creating a new plan from scratch. Instead, we propose that hysteresis is an emergent property of a system learning from the consequences of its actions. To examine this, 152 participants moved a cursor to a target on a tablet device while avoiding an obstacle. Hysteresis was observed when the obstacle moved sequentially across the screen between trials, whereby the participant continued moving around the same side of the obstacle despite it now requiring a larger movement than the alternative. Two further experiments (n = 20) showed an attenuation when time and resource constraints were eased. We created a simple computational model capturing probabilistic estimate updating that showed the same patterns of results. This provides, to our knowledge, the first computational demonstration of how sensorimotor decision making can get 'stuck in a rut' through the updating of the probability estimates associated with actions.

Active reinforcement learning versus action bias and hysteresis: control with a mixture of experts and nonexperts

Active reinforcement learning enables dynamic prediction and control, where one should not only maximize rewards but also minimize costs such as of inference, decisions, actions, and time. For an embodied agent such as a human, decisions are also shaped by physical aspects of actions. Beyond the effects of reward outcomes on learning processes, to what extent can modeling of behavior in a reinforcement-learning task be complicated by other sources of variance in sequential action choices? What of the effects of action bias (for actions per se) and action hysteresis determined by the history of actions chosen previously? The present study addressed these questions with incremental assembly of models for the sequential choice data from a task with hierarchical structure for additional complexity in learning. With systematic comparison and falsification of computational models, human choices were tested for signatures of parallel modules representing not only an enhanced form of generalized reinforcement learning but also action bias and hysteresis. We found evidence for substantial differences in bias and hysteresis across participants-even comparable in magnitude to the individual differences in learning. Individuals who did not learn well revealed the greatest biases, but those who did learn accurately were also significantly biased. The direction of hysteresis varied among individuals as repetition or, more commonly, alternation biases persisting from multiple previous actions. Considering that these actions were button presses with trivial motor demands, the idiosyncratic forces biasing sequences of action choices were robust enough to suggest ubiquity across individuals and across tasks requiring various actions. In light of how bias and hysteresis function as a heuristic for efficient control that adapts to uncertainty or low motivation by minimizing the cost of effort, these phenomena broaden the consilient theory of a mixture of experts to encompass a mixture of expert and nonexpert controllers of behavior.

Hysteresis reveals a happiness bias effect in dynamic emotion recognition from ambiguous biological motion

Considering the nonlinear dynamic nature of emotion recognition, it is believed to be strongly dependent on temporal context. This can be investigated by resorting to the phenomenon of hysteresis, which features a form of serial dependence, entailed by continuous temporal stimulus trajectories. Under positive hysteresis, the percept remains stable in visual memory (persistence) while in negative hysteresis, it shifts earlier (adaptation) to the opposite interpretation. Here, we asked whether positive or negative hysteresis occurs in emotion recognition of inherently ambiguous biological motion, while testing for the controversial debate of a negative versus positive emotional bias. Participants (n = 22) performed a psychophysical experiment in which they were asked to judge stimulus transitions between two emotions, happiness and sadness, from an actor database, and report perceived emotion across time, from one emotion to the opposite as physical cues were continuously changing. Our results reveal perceptual hysteresis in ambiguous emotion recognition, with positive hysteresis (visual persistence) predominating. However, negative hysteresis (adaptation/fatigue) was also observed in particular in the direction from sadness to happiness. This demonstrates a positive (happiness) bias in emotion recognition in ambiguous biological motion recognition. Finally, the interplay between positive and negative hysteresis suggests an underlying competition between visual persistence and adaptation mechanisms during ambiguous emotion recognition.

Hysteresis in motor and language production

Hysteresis in motor planning and syntactic priming in language planning refer to the influence of prior production history on current production behaviour. Computational efficiency accounts of action hysteresis and theoretical accounts of syntactic priming both argue that reusing an existing plan is less costly than generating a novel plan. Despite these similarities across motor and language frameworks, research on planning in these domains has largely been conducted independently. The current study adapted an existing language paradigm to mirror the incremental nature of a manual motor task to investigate the presence of parallel hysteresis effects across domains. We observed asymmetries in production choice for both the motor and language tasks that resulted from the influence of prior history. Furthermore, these hysteresis effects were more exaggerated for subordinate production forms implicating an inverse preference effect that spanned domain. Consistent with computational efficiency accounts, across both task participants exhibited reaction time savings on trials in which they reused a recent production choice. Together, these findings lend support to the broader notion that there are common production biases that span both motor and language domains.

Hand choice is unaffected by high frequency continuous theta burst transcranial magnetic stimulation to the posterior parietal cortex

The current study used a high frequency TMS protocol known as continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) to test a model of hand choice that relies on competing interactions between the hemispheres of the posterior parietal cortex. Based on the assumption that cTBS reduces cortical excitability, the model predicts a significant decrease in the likelihood of selecting the hand contralateral to stimulation. An established behavioural paradigm was used to estimate hand choice in each individual, and these measures were compared across three stimulation conditions: cTBS to the left posterior parietal cortex, cTBS to the right posterior parietal cortex, or sham cTBS. Our results provide no supporting evidence for the interhemispheric competition model. We find no effects of cTBS on hand choice, independent of whether the left or right posterior parietal cortex was stimulated. Our results are nonetheless of value as a point of comparison against prior brain stimulation findings that, in contrast, provide evidence for a causal role for the posterior parietal cortex in hand choice.

Episodic Binding and Retrieval in Sequences of Discrete Movements - Evidence from Grasping Actions

In everyday life humans are confronted with changing environmental demands. In order to act successfully and achieve intended goals, action control is required. A recent approach, the Binding and Retrieval in Action Control (BRAC) framework, attempts to provide an overarching perspective on action control. Based on basic principles such as binding and retrieval, findings from several experimental paradigms could be integrated. However, the focus so far has been on rather artificial paradigms involving very simple motor response requirements, like finger lifting or button presses. We aimed to extend the BRAC framework to more complex movements consisting of a sequence of several discrete actions. Participants were asked to grasp and lift an object with an uneven mass distribution. Object features, like mass distribution and position, were either kept constant on a global level or varied in a pseudorandomized manner. When both object features were kept constant, participants were able to adjust their grasp so that it resulted in a more stable lift and less object roll. Further, with randomly mixed object features, we found best task performance when both object features were completely repeated from one trial to the other. These results suggest that tasks with more complex movements are capable of reflecting principles of action control as defined by the BRAC framework. This offers the possibility to test these principles in even more complex and ecologically relevant paradigms to improve our understanding of everyday life actions.

Fishnition: Developing Models From Cognition Toward Consciousness

A challenge to developing a model for testing animal consciousness is the pull of opposite intuitions. On one extreme, the anthropocentric view holds that consciousness is a highly sophisticated capacity involving self-reflection and conceptual categorization that is almost certainly exclusive to humans. At the opposite extreme, an anthropomorphic view attributes consciousness broadly to any behavior that involves sensory responsiveness. Yet human experience and observation of diverse species suggest that the most plausible case is that consciousness functions between these poles. In exploring the middle ground, we discuss the pros and cons of "high level" approaches such as the dual systems approach. According to this model, System 1 can be thought of as unconscious; processing is fast, automatic, associative, heuristic, parallel, contextual, and likely to be conserved across species. Consciousness is associated with System 2 processing that is slow, effortful, rule-based, serial, abstract, and exclusively human. An advantage of this model is the clear contrast between heuristic and decision-based responses, but it fails to include contextual decision-making in novel conditions which falls in between these two categories. We also review a "low level" model involving trace conditioning, which is a trained response to the first of two paired stimuli separated by an interval. This model highlights the role of consciousness in maintaining a stimulus representation over a temporal span, though it overlooks the importance of attention in subserving and also disrupting trace conditioning in humans. Through a critical analysis of these two extremes, we will develop the case for flexible behavioral response to the stimulus environment as the best model for demonstrating animal consciousness. We discuss a methodology for gauging flexibility across a wide variety of species and offer a case study in spatial navigation to illustrate our proposal. Flexibility serves the evolutionary function of enabling the complex evaluation of changing conditions, where motivation is the basis for goal valuation, and attention selects task-relevant stimuli to aid decision-making processes. We situate this evolutionary function within the Temporal Representation Theory of consciousness, which proposes that consciousness represents the present moment in order to facilitate flexible action.

Repetition effects in action planning reflect effector- but not hemisphere-specific coding

Action choices are influenced by future and recent past action states. For example, when performing two actions in succession, response times (RTs) to initiate the second action are reduced when the same hand is used. These findings suggest the existence of effector-specific processing for action planning. However, given that each hand is primarily controlled by the contralateral hemisphere, the RT benefit might actually reflect effector-independent, hemisphere-specific rather than effector-specific repetition effects. Here, participants performed two consecutive movements, each with a hand or a foot, in one of two directions. Direction was specified in an egocentric reference frame (inward, outward) or in an allocentric reference frame (left, right). Successive actions were initiated faster when the same limb (e.g., left hand-left hand), but not the other limb of the same body side (e.g., left foot-left hand), executed the second action. The same-limb advantage was evident even when the two movements involved different directions, whether specified egocentrically or allocentrically. Corroborating evidence from computational modeling lends support to the claim that repetition effects in action planning reflect persistent changes in baseline activity within neural populations that encode effector-specific action plans.

NEW & NOTEWORTHY Repeated hand use facilitates the initiation of successive actions (repetition effect). This finding has been interpreted as evidence for effector-specific action plans. However, given that each hand is primarily controlled by the contralateral hemisphere, any differences might reflect effector-independent, hemisphere-specific rather than effector-specific processing. We dissociated these alternatives by asking participants to perform successive actions with hands and feet and provide novel evidence that repetition effects in limb use truly reflect effector-specific coding.

Products With High Purchase Frequency Require Greater Inhibitory Control: An Event-Related Potential Study

One’s past behavior influences their present behavior. The effects of such response history have often been tested using response inhibition tasks. Since previous studies have highlighted the effect of immediate action history formed directly before the subsequent response in a laboratory environment, we aimed to elucidate the longer-term effects of response history, using repetitive and habitual consumer behavior in daily life as the response history. We used event-related potentials recorded in a Go/No-go task to investigate brain activity related to inhibitory control, hypothesizing that stimuli with a high frequency of choice in everyday life would elicit stronger inhibition-related activity, that is, the No-go-N2 component. Participants were asked to evaluate the frequency of purchase and use of some products, such as food and drink or social networking services (SNS) in everyday situations. Images of each product were assigned as stimuli in the Go and No-go trials according to the frequency of choice. The results showed that frequently purchased No-go stimuli yielded a larger amplitude of the No-go-N2 component and a negative shift between 200 and 300ms after the presentation of No-go stimuli. The results suggest that frequently chosen products evoke stronger inhibition conflicts and require greater cognitive control to withhold a response. Our findings showed that repeated purchase behavior in daily life forms a response history and has a long-term influence on the inhibition of even simple approaching behaviors, such as button pressing.

Sympathetic involvement in time-constrained sequential foraging

Appraising sequential offers relative to an unknown future opportunity and a time cost requires an optimization policy that draws on a learned estimate of an environment’s richness. Converging evidence points to a learning asymmetry, whereby estimates of this richness update with a bias toward integrating positive information. We replicate this bias in a sequential foraging (prey selection) task and probe associated activation within the sympathetic branch of the autonomic system, using trial-by-trial measures of simultaneously recorded cardiac autonomic physiology. We reveal a unique adaptive role for the sympathetic branch in learning. It was specifically associated with adaptation to a deteriorating environment: it correlated with both the rate of negative information integration in belief estimates and downward changes in moment-to-moment environmental richness, and was predictive of optimal performance on the task. The findings are consistent with a framework whereby autonomic function supports the learning demands of prey selection.

Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Activity and Sympathetic Allostasis During Value-Based Ambivalence

Anxiety is characterized by low confidence in daily decisions, coupled with high levels of phenomenological stress. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) plays an integral role in maladaptive anxious behaviors via decreased sensitivity to threatening vs. non-threatening stimuli (fear generalization). vmPFC is also a key node in approach-avoidance decision making requiring two-dimensional integration of rewards and costs. More recently, vmPFC has been implicated as a key cortical input to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system. However, little is known about the role of this brain region in mediating rapid stress responses elicited by changes in confidence during decision making. We used an approach-avoidance task to examine the relationship between sympathetically mediated cardiac stress responses, vmPFC activity and choice behavior over long and short time-scales. To do this, we collected concurrent fMRI, EKG and impedance cardiography recordings of sympathetic drive while participants made approach-avoidance decisions about monetary rewards paired with painful electric shock stimuli. We observe first that increased sympathetic drive (shorter pre-ejection period) in states lasting minutes are associated with choices involving reduced decision ambivalence. Thus, on this slow time scale, sympathetic drive serves as a proxy for "mobilization" whereby participants are more likely to show consistent value-action mapping. In parallel, imaging analyses reveal that on shorter time scales (estimated with a trial-to-trial GLM), increased vmPFC activity, particularly during low-ambivalence decisions, is associated with decreased sympathetic state. Our findings support a role of sympathetic drive in resolving decision ambivalence across long time horizons and suggest a potential role of vmPFC in modulating this response on a moment-to-moment basis.

When do response-related episodic retrieval effects co-occur with inhibition of return?

At some point, spatial priming effects more faithfully reflect response selection processes than they do attentional orienting or sensory processes. Findings from the spatial cueing literature suggest that two factors may be critical: (1) the amount of identity processing that is required in order to respond correctly (feature-based response hypothesis), and (2) the amount of spatial processing that is required in order to respond correctly (space-based response hypothesis). To test the first hypothesis, we manipulated whether observers made single keypress detection or two-choice localization responses to serially presented stimuli in peripheral vision and whether stimulus identity information processing was necessary before responding. Responses were always slowest when the target location repeated, consistent with an attentional orienting bias independent of keypress responding (i.e., inhibition of return; IOR). The localization procedure revealed a subtle additional cost for changing the target location and repeating a response, consistent with a response-related episodic retrieval effect predicted by the Theory of Event Coding (TEC). Neither effect was modulated by the need to discriminate features. To test the second hypothesis, we made spatial processing indispensable to response selection by requiring a decision between a detection and localization response, depending on where the target appeared. IOR was eliminated for detection, but not localization, responses, consistent with the TEC. Collectively, the findings suggest that the amount of space-based, but not feature-based, processing that is required to determine a response is responsible for the response retrieval effects that can co-occur with IOR.

Is Language Production Planning Emergent From Action Planning? A Preliminary Investigation

The nature of syntactic planning for language production may reflect language-specific processes, but an alternative is that syntactic planning is an example of more domain-general action planning processes. If so, language and non-linguistic action planning should have identifiable commonalities, consistent with an underlying shared system. Action and language research have had little contact, however, and such comparisons are therefore lacking. Here, we address this gap by taking advantage of a striking similarity between two phenomena in language and action production. One is known as syntactic priming-the tendency to re-use a recently produced sentence structure-and the second is hysteresis-the tendency to re-use a previously executed abstract action plan, such as a limb movement. We examined syntactic priming/hysteresis in parallel language and action tasks intermixed in a single experimental session. Our goals were to establish the feasibility of investigating language and action planning within the same participants and to inform debates on the language-specific vs. domain-general nature of planning systems. In both action and language tasks, target trials afforded two alternative orders of subcomponents in the participant's response: in the language task, a picture could be described with two different word orders, and in the action task, locations on a touch screen could be touched in two different orders. Prime trials preceding the target trial promoted one of two plans in the respective domain. Manipulations yielded higher rates of primed behavior in both tasks. In an exploratory cross-domain analysis, there was some evidence for stronger priming effects in some combinations of action and language priming conditions than others. These results establish a method for investigating the degree to which language planning is part of a domain-general action planning system.

Implicit task switching in Parkinson's disease is preserved when on medication

People with Parkinson's disease have been shown to have difficulty switching between movement plans. In the great majority of studies, the need to switch between tasks was made explicitly. Here, we tested whether people with Parkinson's disease, taking their normal medication, have difficulty switching between implicitly specified tasks. We further examined whether this switch is performed predictively or reactively. Twenty five people with Parkinson's disease continuously increased or decreased the frequency of their arm movements, inducing an abrupt-but unaware-switch between rhythmic movements (at high frequencies) and discrete movements (at low frequencies). We tested whether that precipitous change was performed reactively or predictively. We found that 56% of participants predictively switched between the two movement types. The ability of people with Parkinson's disease, taking their regular medication, to predictively control their movements on implicit tasks is thus preserved.

The neural basis of hand choice: An fMRI investigation of the Posterior Parietal Interhemispheric Competition model

The current study investigates a new neurobiological model of human hand choice: The Posterior Parietal Interhemispheric Competition (PPIC) model. The model specifies that neural populations in bilateral posterior intraparietal and superior parietal cortex (pIP-SPC) encode actions in hand-specific terms, and compete for selection across and within hemispheres. Actions with both hands are encoded bilaterally, but the contralateral hand is overrepresented. We use a novel fMRI paradigm to test the PPIC model. Participants reach to visible targets while in the scanner, and conditions involving free choice of which hand to use (Choice) are compared with when hand-use is instructed. Consistent with the PPIC model, bilateral pIP-SPC is preferentially responsive for the Choice condition, and for actions made with the contralateral hand. In the right pIP-SPC, these effects include anterior intraparietal and superior parieto-occipital cortex. Left dorsal premotor cortex, and an area in the right lateral occipitotemporal cortex show the same response pattern, while the left inferior parietal lobule is preferentially responsive for the Choice condition and when using the ipsilateral hand. Behaviourally, hand choice is biased by target location - for targets near the left/right edges of the display, the hand in ipsilateral hemispace is favoured. Moreover, consistent with a competitive process, response times are prolonged for choices to more ambiguous targets, where hand choice is relatively unbiased, and fMRI responses in bilateral pIP-SPC parallel this pattern. Our data provide support for the PPIC model, and reveal a selective network of brain areas involved in free hand choice, including bilateral posterior parietal cortex, left-lateralized inferior parietal and dorsal premotor cortices, and the right lateral occipitotemporal cortex.