Cortical excitability controls the strength of mental imagery

Intrinsic functional connectivity mediates the effect of personality traits on depressive symptoms

BACKGROUND

Personality traits have been proposed as risk factors for depressive symptoms. However, the neural mechanism behind these relationships is unclear. This study examined the possible mediating effect of resting-state functional connectivity networks on these relationships.

METHODS

Data from 153 healthy Germans were obtained from the MPI-Leipzig Mind-Brain-Body: Neuroanatomy & Connectivity Protocol database. Network-based statistics were used to identify significant functional connectivity networks that were positively and negatively associated with the personality traits of neuroticism, conscientiousness, and extraversion, with and without demographical covariates. Mediation analyses were performed for each personality trait and depressive symptoms with the significant positive and negative network strengths of the respective personality traits as mediators.

RESULTS

Neuroticism, conscientiousness, and extraversion were significantly correlated with depressive symptoms. Network-based statistics identified patterns of functional connectivity that were significantly associated with neuroticism and conscientiousness. After controlling for demographical covariates, significant conscientiousness-associated and extraversion-associated networks emerged. Mediation analysis concluded that only the neuroticism-positive network mediated the effect of neuroticism on depressive symptoms. When age and sex were controlled, the extraversion-positive network completely mediated the effect of extraversion on depressive symptoms.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings revealed that patterns of intrinsic functional networks predict personality traits and suggest that the relationship between personality traits and depressive symptoms may in part be due to their common patterns of intrinsic functional networks.

Uncovering the Role of the Early Visual Cortex in Visual Mental Imagery

The question of whether the early visual cortex (EVC) is involved in visual mental imagery remains a topic of debate. In this paper, I propose that the inconsistency in findings can be explained by the unique challenges associated with investigating EVC activity during imagery. During perception, the EVC processes low-level features, which means that activity is highly sensitive to variation in visual details. If the EVC has the same role during visual mental imagery, any change in the visual details of the mental image would lead to corresponding changes in EVC activity. Within this context, the question should not be whether the EVC is 'active' during imagery but how its activity relates to specific imagery properties. Studies using methods that are sensitive to variation in low-level features reveal that imagery can recruit the EVC in similar ways as perception. However, not all mental images contain a high level of visual details. Therefore, I end by considering a more nuanced view, which states that imagery can recruit the EVC, but that does not mean that it always does so.

Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes

The vividness of imagery varies between individuals. However, the existence of people in whom conscious, wakeful imagery is markedly reduced, or absent entirely, was neglected by psychology until the recent coinage of 'aphantasia' to describe this phenomenon. 'Hyperphantasia' denotes the converse - imagery whose vividness rivals perceptual experience. Around 1% and 3% of the population experience extreme aphantasia and hyperphantasia, respectively. Aphantasia runs in families, often affects imagery across several sense modalities, and is variably associated with reduced autobiographical memory, face recognition difficulty, and autism. Visual dreaming is often preserved. Subtypes of extreme imagery appear to be likely but are not yet well defined. Initial results suggest that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for visual imagery extremes.

Multisensory subtypes of aphantasia: Mental imagery as supramodal perception in reverse

Cognitive neuroscience research on mental imagery has largely focused on the visual imagery modality in unimodal task contexts. Recent studies have uncovered striking individual differences in visual imagery capacity, with some individuals reporting a subjective absence of conscious visual imagery ability altogether ("aphantasia"). However, naturalistic mental imagery is often multi-sensory, and preliminary findings suggest that many individuals with aphantasia also report a subjective lack of mental imagery in other sensory domains (such as auditory or olfactory imagery). In this paper, we perform a series of cluster analyses on the multi-sensory imagery questionnaire scores of two large groups of aphantasic subjects, defining latent sub-groups in this sample population. We demonstrate that aphantasia is a heterogenous phenomenon characterised by dominant sub-groups of individuals with visual aphantasia (those who report selective visual imagery absence) and multi-sensory aphantasia (those who report an inability to generate conscious mental imagery in any sensory modality). We replicate our findings in a second large sample and show that more unique aphantasia sub-types also exist, such as individuals with selectively preserved mental imagery in only one sensory modality (e.g. intact auditory imagery). We outline the implications of our findings for network theories of mental imagery, discussing how unique aphantasia aetiologies with distinct self-report patterns might reveal alterations to various levels of the sensory processing hierarchy implicated in mental imagery.

Working memory signals in early visual cortex are present in weak and strong imagers

It has been suggested that visual images are memorized across brief periods of time by vividly imagining them as if they were still there. In line with this, the contents of both working memory and visual imagery are known to be encoded already in early visual cortex. If these signals in early visual areas were indeed to reflect a combined imagery and memory code, one would predict them to be weaker for individuals with reduced visual imagery vividness. Here, we systematically investigated this question in two groups of participants. Strong and weak imagers were asked to remember images across brief delay periods. We were able to reliably reconstruct the memorized stimuli from early visual cortex during the delay. Importantly, in contrast to the prediction, the quality of reconstruction was equally accurate for both strong and weak imagers. The decodable information also closely reflected behavioral precision in both groups, suggesting it could contribute to behavioral performance, even in the extreme case of completely aphantasic individuals. Our data thus suggest that working memory signals in early visual cortex can be present even in the (near) absence of phenomenal imagery.

A novel model of divergent predictive perception

Predictive processing theories state that our subjective experience of reality is shaped by a balance of expectations based on previous knowledge about the world (i.e. priors) and confidence in sensory input from the environment. Divergent experiences (e.g. hallucinations and synaesthesia) are likely to occur when there is an imbalance between one's reliance on priors and sensory input. In a novel theoretical model, inspired by both predictive processing and psychological principles, we propose that predictable divergent experiences are associated with natural or environmentally induced prior/sensory imbalances: inappropriately strong or inflexible (i.e. maladaptive) high-level priors (beliefs) combined with low sensory confidence can result in reality discrimination issues, a characteristic of psychosis; maladaptive low-level priors (sensory expectations) combined with high sensory confidence can result in atypical sensory sensitivities and persistent divergent percepts, a characteristic of synaesthesia. Crucially, we propose that whether different divergent experiences manifest with dominantly sensory (e.g. hallucinations) or nonsensory characteristics (e.g. delusions) depends on mental imagery ability, which is a spectrum from aphantasia (absent or weak imagery) to hyperphantasia (extremely vivid imagery). We theorize that imagery is critically involved in shaping the sensory richness of divergent perceptual experience. In sum, to predict a range of divergent perceptual experiences in both clinical and general populations, three factors must be accounted for: a maladaptive use of priors, individual level of confidence in sensory input, and mental imagery ability. These ideas can be expressed formally using nonparametric regression modeling. We provide evidence for our theory from previous work and deliver predictions for future research.

The role of dopamine in visual imagery-An experimental pharmacological study

Mental imagery enables people to simulate experiences in their minds without the presence of an external stimulus. The underlying biochemical mechanisms are poorly understood but there is vague evidence that dopamine may play a significant role. A better understanding at the biochemical level could help to unravel the mechanisms of mental imagery and related phenomena such as aphantasia (= lack of voluntary mental imagery), but also opens up possibilities for interventions to enhance or restore mental imagery. To test the hypothesis that acute dopamine depletion leads to a decrease in the strength of mental imagery, N = 22 male participants will be administered an amino acid mixture containing branched-chain amino acids (BCAAs) and tryptophan (TRP) to transiently reduce dopamine synthesis and further N = 22 male participants will receive a placebo. Plasma prolactin (PRL) levels are determined as a peripheral marker of brain dopamine function. The strength of mental imagery will be measured before and after ingestion of the BCAA/TRP mixture using the method of mental imagery priming. Additional exploratory analyses will use genetic data to investigate possible effects of variations on dopaminergic gene loci (e.g., DAT1) on dopamine levels and strength of mental imagery. The results show […].

Different Mechanisms for Supporting Mental Imagery and Perceptual Representations: Modulation Versus Excitation

Recent research suggests imagery is functionally equivalent to a weak form of visual perception. Here we report evidence across five independent experiments on adults that perception and imagery are supported by fundamentally different mechanisms: Whereas perceptual representations are largely formed via increases in excitatory activity, imagery representations are largely supported by modulating nonimagined content. We developed two behavioral techniques that allowed us to first put the visual system into a state of adaptation and then probe the additivity of perception and imagery. If imagery drives similar excitatory visual activity to perception, pairing imagery with perceptual adapters should increase the state of adaptation. Whereas pairing weak perception with adapters increased measures of adaptation, pairing imagery reversed their effects. Further experiments demonstrated that these nonadditive effects were due to imagery weakening representations of nonimagined content. Together these data provide empirical evidence that the brain uses categorically different mechanisms to represent imagery and perception.

Aphantasia within the framework of neurodivergence: Some preliminary data and the curse of the confidence gap

Aphantasia is a neurocognitive phenomenon affecting voluntary visual imagery, such that it is either entirely absent, or markedly impaired. Using both the social and medical models of disability, this article discusses the extent to which aphantasia can be understood as a disorder or just a form of neutral neurodivergence, given that imagery plays a central role in thinking and memory for most other people. Preliminary school performance data are presented, showing that low imagery does not necessarily complicate life, especially given compensatory strategies and low societal barriers. In addition, we discuss the consequences of labelling aphantasia a disorder with regard to self- and public stigma, and we provide further data regarding a confidence gap, by which aphantasics perceive themselves as performing worse than they objectively do. We conclude that aphantasia should be understood as neutral neurodivergence and that labelling it a disorder is not only wrong, but potentially harmful.

Neural Representations in Visual and Parietal Cortex Differentiate between Imagined, Perceived, and Illusory Experiences

Humans constantly receive massive amounts of information, both perceived from the external environment and imagined from the internal world. To function properly, the brain needs to correctly identify the origin of information being processed. Recent work has suggested common neural substrates for perception and imagery. However, it has remained unclear how the brain differentiates between external and internal experiences with shared neural codes. Here we tested this question in human participants (male and female) by systematically investigating the neural processes underlying the generation and maintenance of visual information from voluntary imagery, veridical perception, and illusion. The inclusion of illusion allowed us to differentiate between objective and subjective internality: while illusion has an objectively internal origin and can be viewed as involuntary imagery, it is also subjectively perceived as having an external origin like perception. Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, we observed superior orientation representations in parietal cortex during imagery compared with perception, and conversely in early visual cortex. This imagery dominance gradually developed along a posterior-to-anterior cortical hierarchy from early visual to parietal cortex, emerged in the early epoch of imagery and sustained into the delay epoch, and persisted across varied imagined contents. Moreover, representational strength of illusion was more comparable to imagery in early visual cortex, but more comparable to perception in parietal cortex, suggesting content-specific representations in parietal cortex differentiate between subjectively internal and external experiences, as opposed to early visual cortex. These findings together support a domain-general engagement of parietal cortex in internally generated experience.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does the brain differentiate between imagined and perceived experiences? Combining fMRI, eye-tracking, multivariate decoding, and encoding approaches, the current study revealed enhanced stimulus-specific representations in visual imagery originating from parietal cortex, supporting the subjective experience of imagery. This neural principle was further validated by evidence from visual illusion, wherein illusion resembled perception and imagery at different levels of cortical hierarchy. Our findings provide direct evidence for the critical role of parietal cortex as a domain-general region for content-specific imagery, and offer new insights into the neural mechanisms underlying the differentiation between subjectively internal and external experiences.

Vividness as the similarity between generated imagery and an internal model

Vividness in visual mental imagery has been relatively under-explored compared to imagery's representational format and neural mechanisms. In this paper, we take a deeper look at vividness and suggest that in re-framing it, we can potentially reconcile disparate findings regarding visual cortex activation during imagery. Unlike traditional views of vividness that define the concept in terms of perception, we frame vividness in terms of imagery's relation to an internal model; the closer the generated imagery is to this model, the more vivid it is. This view is considered alongside existing neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical research, as well as directions for future research.

A generative adversarial model of intrusive imagery in the human brain

The mechanisms underlying the subjective experiences of mental disorders remain poorly understood. This is partly due to long-standing over-emphasis on behavioral and physiological symptoms and a de-emphasis of the patient's subjective experiences when searching for treatments. Here, we provide a new perspective on the subjective experience of mental disorders based on findings in neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI). Specifically, we propose the subjective experience that occurs in visual imagination depends on mechanisms similar to generative adversarial networks that have recently been developed in AI. The basic idea is that a generator network fabricates a prediction of the world, and a discriminator network determines whether it is likely real or not. Given that similar adversarial interactions occur in the two major visual pathways of perception in people, we explored whether we could leverage this AI-inspired approach to better understand the intrusive imagery experiences of patients suffering from mental illnesses such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and acute stress disorder. In our model, a nonconscious visual pathway generates predictions of the environment that influence the parallel but interacting conscious pathway. We propose that in some patients, an imbalance in these adversarial interactions leads to an overrepresentation of disturbing content relative to current reality, and results in debilitating flashbacks. By situating the subjective experience of intrusive visual imagery in the adversarial interaction of these visual pathways, we propose testable hypotheses on novel mechanisms and clinical applications for controlling and possibly preventing symptoms resulting from intrusive imagery.

No general pathological significance of aphantasia: An evaluation based on criteria for mental disorders

As awareness of the phenomenon of aphantasia (= lack of voluntary imagery) has increased in recent years, many psychotherapists ponder its clinical implications. The present study investigates whether aphantasia meets the criteria for mental disorders, i.e. statistical rarity, impairment in activities of daily living, violation of social norms and inappropriate behavior and personal distress. Prevalence of aphantasia was determined meta-analytically based on 3,543 participants. An international sample of 156 participants with aphantasia (58.3% male; M_age  = 35.23) and 131 controls (65.6% male; M_age  = 28.88) was assessed with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, the Questionnaire for the Assessment of Everyday Memory Performance and the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire, as well as measures of depression, anxiety and well-being. The prevalence of aphantasia was estimated at 3.5 to 4.8%. Participants with aphantasia scored significantly lower than controls on every day and autobiographical memory, but not on theory of mind. A subgroup of 34.7% of participants with aphantasia reported distress significantly associated with lower well-being and high levels of anxiety and depression. The level of distress increased with poorer performance in autobiographical memory and theory of mind. Although aphantasia meets the criterion of statistical rarity, the impact on activities of daily living and personal distress is too weak to justify a classification as a mental disorder. In a subgroup, however, distress can reach clinically relevant levels. In individual cases, it is therefore advisable to conduct a psychological assessment, for example by means of the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire.

Decreased associative processing and memory confidence in aphantasia

Visual imagery and mental reconstruction of scenes are considered core components of episodic memory retrieval. Individuals with absent visual imagery (aphantasia) score lower on tests of autobiographical memory, suggesting that aphantasia may be associated with differences in episodic and associative processing. In this online study, we tested aphantasic participants and controls on associative recognition and memory confidence for three types of associations encoded incidentally: associations between visual-visual and audio-visual stimulus pairs, associations between an object and its location on the screen, and intraitem associations. Aphantasic participants had a lower rate of high-confidence hits in all associative memory tests compared with controls. Performance on auditory-visual associations was correlated with individual differences in a measure of object imagery in the aphantasic group but not in controls. No overall group difference in memory performance was found, indicating that visual imagery selectively contributes to memory confidence. Analysis of the encoding task revealed that aphantasics made fewer associative links between the stimuli, suggesting a role for visual imagery in associative processing of visual and auditory input. These data enhance our understanding of visual imagery contributions to associative memory and further characterize the cognitive profile of aphantasia.

Common neural substrates of diverse neurodevelopmental disorders

Neurodevelopmental disorders are categorized and studied according to their manifestations as distinct syndromes. For instance, congenital prosopagnosia and dyslexia have largely non-overlapping research literatures and clinical pathways for diagnosis and intervention. On the other hand, the high incidence of neurodevelopmental comorbidities or co-existing extreme strengths and weaknesses suggest that transdiagnostic commonalities may be greater than currently appreciated. The core-periphery model holds that brain regions within the stable core perceptual and motor regions are more densely connected to one another compared to regions in the flexible periphery comprising multimodal association regions. This model provides a framework for the interpretation of neural data in normal development and clinical disorders. Considering network-level commonalities reported in studies of neurodevelopmental disorders, variability in multimodal association cortex connectivity may reflect a shared origin of seemingly distinct neurodevelopmental disorders. This framework helps to explain both comorbidities in neurodevelopmental disorders and profiles of strengths and weaknesses attributable to competitive processing between cognitive systems within an individual.

Self-reported vividness of tactile imagery for object properties and body regions: An exploratory study

Mental imagery ability has been examined principally in the visual domain. Despite evidence for tactile mental representations in the absence of direct stimulation, this ability is poorly understood. We investigated tactile imagery for both active and passive tasks in a large sample (N = 118). Vividness of imagery was tested across two different tasks: somatosensory imagery (of body sensitivity) and tactile imagery (of object properties) in all participants. Evidence for vivid imagery across tactile and somatosensory dimensions was found with a positive, albeit weak, correlation in imagery strength between dimensions. Imagery ratings varied across objects and object properties in the tactile imagery task and across body sites in the somatosensory imagery task. These findings shed light on the capacity for, and characteristics of, tactile mental imagery in the general population and suggest that the ability to experience vivid tactile mental images may mediate performance across a number of perceptual tasks.

Imagery adds stimulus-specific sensory evidence to perceptual detection

Internally generated imagery and externally triggered perception rely on overlapping sensory processes. This overlap poses a challenge for perceptual reality monitoring: determining whether sensory signals reflect reality or imagination. In this study, we used psychophysics to investigate how imagery and perception interact to determine visual experience. Participants were instructed to detect oriented gratings that gradually appeared in noise while simultaneously either imagining the same grating, a grating perpendicular to the to-be-detected grating, or nothing. We found that, compared to both incongruent imagery and no imagery, congruent imagery caused a leftward shift of the psychometric function relating stimulus contrast to perceptual threshold. We discuss how this effect can best be explained by a model in which imagery adds sensory signal to the perceptual input, thereby increasing the visibility of perceived stimuli. These results suggest that, in contrast to changes in sensory signals caused by self-generated movement, the brain does not discount the influence of self-generated sensory signals on perception.

The prevalence of aphantasia (imagery weakness) in the general population

Visual mental imagery is the ability to create a quasi-perceptual visual picture in the mind's eye. For people with the rare trait of aphantasia, this ability is entirely absent or markedly impaired. Here, we aim to clarify the prevalence of aphantasia in the general population, while overcoming limitations of previous research (e.g., recruitment biases). In Experiment 1, we screened a cohort of undergraduate students (n502) using the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) and found that 4.2% had aphantasia. To establish the reliability of our estimate, we then screened a new sample of people (n502) at an online crowdsourcing marketplace, again finding that approximately four percent (3.6%) had aphantasia. Overall, our combined prevalence from over a thousand people of 3.9% - which shows no gender bias - provides a useful index for how commonly aphantasia occurs, based on measures and diagnostic thresholds in line with contemporary aphantasia literature.

What is the Link Between Mental Imagery and Sensory Sensitivity? Insights from Aphantasia

People with aphantasia have impoverished visual imagery so struggle to form mental pictures in the mind's eye. By testing people with and without aphantasia, we investigate the relationship between sensory imagery and sensory sensitivity (i.e., hyper- or hypo-reactivity to incoming signals through the sense organs). In Experiment 1 we first show that people with aphantasia report impaired imagery across multiple domains (e.g., olfactory, gustatory etc.) rather than simply vision. Importantly, we also show that imagery is related to sensory sensitivity: aphantasics reported not only lower imagery, but also lower sensory sensitivity. In Experiment 2, we showed a similar relationship between imagery and sensitivity in the general population. Finally, in Experiment 3 we found behavioural corroboration in a Pattern Glare Task, in which aphantasics experienced less visual discomfort and fewer visual distortions typically associated with sensory sensitivity. Our results suggest for the very first time that sensory imagery and sensory sensitivity are related, and that aphantasics are characterised by both lower imagery, and lower sensitivity. Our results also suggest that aphantasia (absence of visual imagery) may be more accurately defined as a subtype of a broader imagery deficit we name dysikonesia, in which weak or absent imagery occurs across multiple senses.

Neural Circuits, Microtubule Processing, Brain's Electromagnetic Field-Components of Self-Awareness

The known theories discussing the essence of consciousness have been recently updated. This prompts an attempt to integrate these explanations concerning several distinct components of the consciousness phenomenon such as the ego, and qualia perceptions. Therefore, it is useful to consider the latest publications on the ‘Orch OR’ and ‘cemi’ theories, which assume that quantum processing occurs in microtubules and that the brain’s endogenous electromagnetic field is important. The authors combine these explanations with their own theory describing the neural circuits realizing imagery. They try to present such an interdisciplinary, integrated theoretical model in a manner intuitively understandable to people with a typical medical education. In order to do this, they even refer to intuitively understandable metaphors. The authors maintain that an effective comprehension of consciousness is important for health care professionals because its disorders are frequent medical symptoms in emergencies, during general anesthesia and in the course of cognitive disorders in elderly people. The authors emphasize the current possibilities to verify these theses regarding the essence of consciousness thanks to the development of functional brain imaging methods—magnetoencephalography, transcranial magnetic stimulation—as well as clinical studies on the modification of perceptions and feelings by such techniques as mindfulness and the use of certain psychoactive substances, especially among people with self-awareness and identity disorders.

The Ganzflicker experience: High probability of seeing vivid and complex pseudo-hallucinations with imagery but not aphantasia

There are considerable individual differences in visual mental imagery ability across the general population, including a "blind mind's eye", or aphantasia. Recent studies have shown that imagery is linked to differences in perception in the healthy population, and clinical work has found a connection between imagery and hallucinatory experiences in neurological disorders. However, whether imagery ability is associated with anomalous perception-including hallucinations-in the general population remains unclear. In the current study, we explored the relationship between imagery ability and the anomalous perception of pseudo-hallucinations (PH) using rhythmic flicker stimulation ("Ganzflicker"). Specifically, we investigated whether the ability to generate voluntary imagery is associated with susceptibility to flicker-induced PH. We additionally explored individual differences in observed features of PH. We recruited a sample of people with aphantasia (aphants) and imagery (imagers) to view a constant red-and-black flicker for approximately 10 min. We found that imagers were more susceptible to PH, and saw more complex and vivid PH, compared to aphants. This study provides the first evidence that the ability to generate visual imagery increases the likelihood of experiencing complex and vivid anomalous percepts.

Behavioral and Neural Signatures of Visual Imagery Vividness Extremes: Aphantasia versus Hyperphantasia

Although Galton recognized in the 1880s that some individuals lack visual imagery, this phenomenon was mostly neglected over the following century. We recently coined the terms "aphantasia" and "hyperphantasia" to describe visual imagery vividness extremes, unlocking a sustained surge of public interest. Aphantasia is associated with subjective impairment of face recognition and autobiographical memory. Here we report the first systematic, wide-ranging neuropsychological and brain imaging study of people with aphantasia (n = 24), hyperphantasia (n = 25), and midrange imagery vividness (n = 20). Despite equivalent performance on standard memory tests, marked group differences were measured in autobiographical memory and imagination, participants with hyperphantasia outperforming controls who outperformed participants with aphantasia. Face recognition difficulties and autistic spectrum traits were reported more commonly in aphantasia. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory highlighted reduced extraversion in the aphantasia group and increased openness in the hyperphantasia group. Resting state fMRI revealed stronger connectivity between prefrontal cortices and the visual network among hyperphantasic than aphantasic participants. In an active fMRI paradigm, there was greater anterior parietal activation among hyperphantasic and control than aphantasic participants when comparing visualization of famous faces and places with perception. These behavioral and neural signatures of visual imagery vividness extremes validate and illuminate this significant but neglected dimension of individual difference.

Mistaking imagination for reality: Congruent mental imagery leads to more liberal perceptual detection

Visual experiences can be triggered externally, by signals coming from the outside world during perception; or internally, by signals from memory during mental imagery. Imagery and perception activate similar neural codes in sensory areas, suggesting that they might sometimes be confused. In the current study, we investigated whether imagery influences perception by instructing participants to imagine gratings while externally detecting these same gratings at threshold. In a series of three experiments, we showed that imagery led to a more liberal criterion for reporting stimulus presence, and that this effect was both independent of expectation and stimulus-specific. Furthermore, participants with more vivid imagery were generally more likely to report the presence of external stimuli, independent of condition. The results can be explained as either a low-level sensory or a high-level decision-making effect. We discuss that the most likely explanation is that during imagery, internally generated sensory signals are sometimes confused for perception and suggest how the underlying mechanisms can be further characterized in future research. Our findings show that imagery and perception interact and emphasize that internally and externally generated signals are combined in complex ways to determine conscious perception.

Neural representations underlying mental imagery as unveiled by representation similarity analysis

It is commonly acknowledged that visual imagery and perception rely on the same content-dependent brain areas in the high-level visual cortex (HVC). However, the way in which our brain processes and organizes previous acquired knowledge to allow the generation of mental images is still a matter of debate. Here, we performed a representation similarity analysis of three previous fMRI experiments conducted in our laboratory to characterize the neural representation underlying imagery and perception of objects, buildings and faces and to disclose possible dissimilarities in the neural structure of such representations. To this aim, we built representational dissimilarity matrices (RDMs) by computing multivariate distances between the activity patterns associated with each pair of stimuli in the content-dependent areas of the HVC and HC. We found that spatial information is widely coded in the HVC during perception (i.e. RSC, PPA and OPA) and imagery (OPA and PPA). Also, visual information seems to be coded in both preferred and non-preferred regions of the HVC, supporting a distributed view of encoding. Overall, the present results shed light upon the spatial coding of imagined and perceived exemplars in the HVC.

Why do imagery and perception look and feel so different?

Despite the past few decades of research providing convincing evidence of the similarities in function and neural mechanisms between imagery and perception, for most of us, the experience of the two are undeniably different, why? Here, we review and discuss the differences between imagery and perception and the possible underlying causes of these differences, from function to neural mechanisms. Specifically, we discuss the directional flow of information (top-down versus bottom-up), the differences in targeted cortical layers in primary visual cortex and possible different neural mechanisms of modulation versus excitation. For the first time in history, neuroscience is beginning to shed light on this long-held mystery of why imagery and perception look and feel so different. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Attention driven phantom vision: measuring the sensory strength of attentional templates and their relation to visual mental imagery and aphantasia

When we search for an object in an array or anticipate attending to a future object, we create an 'attentional template' of the object. The definitions of attentional templates and visual imagery share many similarities as well as many of the same neural characteristics. However, the phenomenology of these attentional templates and their neural similarities to visual imagery and perception are rarely, if ever discussed. Here, we investigate the relationship between these two forms of non-retinal phantom vision through the use of the binocular rivalry technique, which allows us to measure the sensory strength of attentional templates in the absence of concurrent perceptual stimuli. We find that attentional templates correlate with both feature-based attention and visual imagery. Attentional templates, like imagery, were significantly disrupted by the presence of irrelevant visual stimuli, while feature-based attention was not. We also found that a special population who lack the ability to visualize (aphantasia), showed evidence of feature-based attention when measured using the binocular rivalry paradigm, but not attentional templates. Taken together, these data suggest functional similarities between attentional templates and visual imagery, advancing the theory of visual imagery as a general simulation tool used across cognition. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Visual mental imagery engages the left fusiform gyrus, but not the early visual cortex: A meta-analysis of neuroimaging evidence

The dominant neural model of visual mental imagery (VMI) stipulates that memories from the medial temporal lobe acquire sensory features in early visual areas. However, neurological patients with damage restricted to the occipital cortex typically show perfectly vivid VMI, while more anterior damages extending into the temporal lobe, especially in the left hemisphere, often cause VMI impairments. Here we present two major results reconciling neuroimaging findings in neurotypical subjects with the performance of brain-damaged patients: (1) A large-scale meta-analysis of 46 fMRI studies, of which 27 investigated specifically visual mental imagery, revealed that VMI engages fronto-parietal networks and a well-delimited region in the left fusiform gyrus. (2) A Bayesian analysis showed no evidence for imagery-related activity in early visual cortices. We propose a revised neural model of VMI that draws inspiration from recent cytoarchitectonic and lesion studies, whereby fronto-parietal networks initiate, modulate, and maintain activity in a core temporal network centered on the fusiform imagery node, a high-level visual region in the left fusiform gyrus.

Romance Scams: Romantic Imagery and Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation

Love has an enormous effect on mental health. One does not need an actual romantic relationship to be in love. Indeed, romantic love can be built upon without frequent or real-life encounters, such as with a stranger from a matching website. With the advancement of the Internet and the influence of coronavirus disease, it is believed that these distant romantic relationships and related romance scams are burgeoning. Often, the victims of scams keep emotionally attached to the scammer even after the lie is revealed, which is hypothesized to be attributed to the aberrantly exaggerated romantic imagery of the victims. It is observed that many victims suffer from symptoms similar to a post-traumatic stress disorder, and some even consider suicide. However, there is scant literature on this topic. In this article, it is further postulated that the aberrant romantic imagery might be associated with impulsive acts such as suicide once the ideal but fake romantic relationship is dissolved. Thereafter, it is further speculated that manipulation of the visual network, possibly by transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), might be a promising treatment.

Symptoms of depersonalisation/derealisation disorder as measured by brain electrical activity: A systematic review

Depersonalisation/derealisation disorder (DPD) refers to frequent and persistent detachment from bodily self and disengagement from the outside world. As a dissociative disorder, DPD affects 1-2 % of the population, but takes 7-12 years on average to be accurately diagnosed. In this systematic review, we comprehensively describe research targeting the neural correlates of core DPD symptoms, covering publications between 1992 and 2020 that have used electrophysiological techniques. The aim was to investigate the diagnostic potential of these relatively inexpensive and convenient neuroimaging tools. We review the EEG power spectrum, components of the event-related potential (ERP), as well as vestibular and heartbeat evoked potentials as likely electrophysiological biomarkers to study DPD symptoms. We argue that acute anxiety- or trauma-related impairments in the integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive signals play a key role in the formation of DPD symptoms, and that future research needs analysis methods that can take this integration into account. We suggest tools for prospective studies of electrophysiological DPD biomarkers, which are urgently needed to fully develop their diagnostic potential.

Does hippocampal volume explain performance differences on hippocampal-dependant tasks?

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Evidence is mixed about whether hippocampal volume affects cognitive task performance.

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This is particularly the case concerning individual differences in healthy people.

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We collected structural MRI data from 217 healthy people.

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They also had widely-varying performance on cognitive tasks linked to the hippocampus.

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In-depth analyses showed little evidence hippocampal volume affected task performance.

Marked disparities exist across healthy individuals in their ability to imagine scenes, recall autobiographical memories, think about the future and navigate in the world. The importance of the hippocampus in supporting these critical cognitive functions has prompted the question of whether differences in hippocampal grey matter volume could be one source of performance variability. Evidence to date has been somewhat mixed. In this study we sought to mitigate issues that commonly affect these types of studies. Data were collected from a large sample of 217 young, healthy adult participants, including whole brain structural MRI data (0.8 mm isotropic voxels) and widely-varying performance on scene imagination, autobiographical memory, future thinking and navigation tasks. We found little evidence that hippocampal grey matter volume was related to task performance in this healthy sample. This was the case using different analysis methods (voxel-based morphometry, partial correlations), when whole brain or hippocampal regions of interest were examined, when comparing different sub-groups (divided by gender, task performance, self-reported ability), and when using latent variables derived from across the cognitive tasks. Hippocampal grey matter volume may not, therefore, significantly influence performance on tasks known to require the hippocampus in healthy people. Perhaps only in extreme situations, as in the case of licensed London taxi drivers, are measurable ability-related hippocampus volume changes consistently exhibited.