Tracking the relation between gist and item memory over the course of long-term memory consolidation

Drawings reveal changes in object memory, but not spatial memory, across time

Time has an immense influence on our memory. Truncated encoding leads to memory for only the 'gist' of an image, and long delays before recall result in generalized memories with few details. Here, we used crowdsourced scoring of hundreds of drawings made from memory after variable encoding (Experiment 1) and retentions of that memory (Experiment 2) to quantify what features of memory content change across time. We found that whereas some features of memory are highly dependent on time, such as the proportion of objects recalled from a scene and false recall for objects not in the original image, spatial memory was highly accurate and relatively independent of time. We also found that we could predict which objects were recalled across time based on the location, meaning, and saliency of the objects. The differential impact of time on object and spatial memory supports a separation of these memory systems.

Reconciling categorization and memory via environmental statistics

How people represent categories and how those representations change over time is a basic question about human cognition. Previous research has demonstrated that people categorize objects by comparing them to category prototypes in early stages of learning but consider the individual exemplars within each category in later stages. However, these results do not seem consistent with findings in the memory literature showing that it becomes increasingly easier to access representations of general knowledge than representations of specific items over time. Why would one rely more on exemplar-based representations in later stages of categorization when it is more difficult to access these exemplars in memory? To reconcile these incongruities, our study proposed that previous findings on categorization are a result of human participants adapting to a specific experimental environment, in which the probability of encountering an object stays uniform over time. In a more realistic environment, however, one would be less likely to encounter the same object if a long time has passed. Confirming our hypothesis, we demonstrated that under environmental statistics identical to typical categorization experiments the advantage of exemplar-based categorization over prototype-based categorization increases over time, replicating previous research in categorization. In contrast, under realistic environmental statistics simulated by our experiments the advantage of exemplar-based categorization over prototype-based categorization decreases over time. A second set of experiments replicated our results, while additionally demonstrating that human categorization is sensitive to the category structure presented to the participants. These results provide converging evidence that human categorization adapts appropriately to environmental statistics.

Memory consolidation affects the interplay of place and response navigation

Navigation through space is based on memory representations of landmarks ('place') or movement sequences ('response'). Over time, memory representations transform through consolidation. However, it is unclear how the transformation affects place and response navigation in humans. In the present study, healthy adults navigated to target locations in a virtual maze. The preference for using place and response strategies and the ability to recall place and response memories were tested after a delay of one hour (n = 31), one day (n = 30), or two weeks (n = 32). The different delays captured early-phase synaptic changes, changes after one night of sleep, and long-delay changes due to the reorganization of navigation networks. Our results show that the relative contributions of place and response navigation changed as a function of time. After a short delay of up to one day, participants preferentially used a place strategy and exhibited a high degree of visual landmark exploration. After a longer delay of two weeks, place strategy use decreased significantly. Participants now equally relied on place and response strategy use and increasingly repeated previously taken paths. Further analyses indicate that response strategy use predominantly occurred as a compensatory strategy in the absence of sufficient place memory. Over time, place memory faded before response memory. We suggest that the observed shift from place to response navigation is context-dependent since detailed landmark information, which strongly relied on hippocampal function, decayed faster than sequence information, which required less detail and depended on extra-hippocampal areas. We conclude that changes in place and response navigation likely reflect the reorganization of navigation networks during systems consolidation.

Drawings reveal changes in object memory, but not spatial memory, across time

Time has an immense influence on our memory. Truncated encoding leads to memory for only the 'gist' of an image, and long delays before recall result in generalized memories with few details. Here, we used crowdsourced scoring of hundreds of drawings made from memory after variable encoding (Experiment 1) and retentions of that memory (Experiment 2) to quantify what features of memory content change across time. We found that whereas some features of memory are highly dependent on time, such as the proportion of objects recalled from a scene and false recall for objects not in the original image, spatial memory was highly accurate and relatively independent of time. We also found that we could predict which objects were recalled across time based on the location, meaning, and saliency of the objects. The differential impact of time on object and spatial memory supports a separation of these memory systems.

Social feedback biases emerge during recall but not prediction and shift across the development of social anxiety

Memory is a reconstructive process that can result in events being recalled as more positive or negative than they actually were. While positive recall biases may contribute to well-being, negative recall biases may promote internalizing symptoms, such as social anxiety. Adolescence is characterized by increased salience of peers and peak incidence of social anxiety. Symptoms often wax and wane before becoming more intractable during adulthood. Open questions remain regarding how and when biases for social feedback are expressed and how individual differences in biases may contribute to social anxiety across development. Two studies used a social feedback and cued response task to assess biases about being liked or disliked when retrieving memories vs. making predictions. Findings revealed a robust positivity bias about memories for social feedback, regardless of whether memories were true or false. Moreover, memory bias was associated with social anxiety in a developmentally sensitive way. Among adults (study 1), more severe symptoms of social anxiety were associated with a negativity bias. During the transition from adolescence to adulthood (study 2), age strengthened the positivity bias in those with less severe symptoms and strengthened the negativity bias in those with more severe symptoms. These patterns of bias were isolated to perceived memory retrieval and did not generalize to predictions about social feedback. These results provide initial support for a model by which schemas may infiltrate perceptions of memory for past, but not predictions of future, social events, shaping susceptibility for social anxiety, particularly during the transition into adulthood.

Effects of memory cue and interest in remembering and forgetting of gist and details

The gist and details of an event are both important for us to establish and maintain episodic memory. On the other hand, episodic memory is influenced by both external and internal factors, such as memory cue and intrinsic motivation. To what extent these factors and their interaction modulate memory and forgetting of gist and detailed information remains unclear. In this study, 29 participants watched film clips accompanied by either gist or detailed cues and rated their interest in these clips. Their memories of gist and detailed information were tested after 10 min, 1 day, and 1 week. The results showed that memory cue modulated the forgetting of gist and detailed memories. Specifically, when gist cues were used, gist memory was forgotten more slowly than detailed memory. When detailed cues were used, detailed memory was forgotten more slowly than gist memory. Differently, the subjective interest in the clips enhanced memory accuracy irrespective of memory type but did not influence the forgetting of gist and detailed memories. Moreover, there was a significant interaction between memory cue and interest, showing that gist cues enhanced memory than detailed cues only for low-interest clips. These results suggest that external and internal factors have differential effects on memory and forgetting, and the effectiveness of external factors depends on the state of intrinsic motivation. The significant interplay of different factors in influencing the remembering or forgetting of gist and detailed memories provides potential ways to enhance memory and retention of gist and detailed information.

More than a moment: What does it mean to call something an 'event'?

Experiences are stored in the mind as discrete mental units, or 'events,' which influence-and are influenced by-attention, learning, and memory. In this way, the notion of an 'event' is foundational to cognitive science. However, despite tremendous progress in understanding the behavioral and neural signatures of events, there is no agreed-upon definition of an event. Here, we discuss different theoretical frameworks of event perception and memory, noting what they can and cannot account for in the literature. We then highlight key aspects of events that we believe should be accounted for in theories of event processing--in particular, we argue that the structure and substance of events should be better reflected in our theories and paradigms. Finally, we discuss empirical gaps in the event cognition literature and what the future of event cognition research may look like.

A quantitative model of ensemble perception as summed activation in feature space

Ensemble perception is a process by which we summarize complex scenes. Despite the importance of ensemble perception to everyday cognition, there are few computational models that provide a formal account of this process. Here we develop and test a model in which ensemble representations reflect the global sum of activation signals across all individual items. We leverage this set of minimal assumptions to formally connect a model of memory for individual items to ensembles. We compare our ensemble model against a set of alternative models in five experiments. Our approach uses performance on a visual memory task for individual items to generate zero-free-parameter predictions of interindividual and intraindividual differences in performance on an ensemble continuous-report task. Our top-down modelling approach formally unifies models of memory for individual items and ensembles and opens a venue for building and comparing models of distinct memory processes and representations.

Feedback signals in visual cortex during episodic and schematic memory retrieval and their potential implications for aphantasia

Recent findings indicate that visual feedback derived from episodic memory can be traced down to the earliest stages of visual processing, whereas feedback stemming from schema-related memories only reach intermediate levels in the visual processing hierarchy. In this opinion piece, we examine these differences in light of the 'what' and 'where' streams of visual perception. We build upon this new framework to propose that the memory deficits observed in aphantasics might be better understood as a difference in high-level feedback processing along the 'what' stream, rather than an episodic memory impairment.

Spatial Scene Memories Are Biased Towards a Fixed Amount of Semantic Information

Scene memory has known spatial biases. Boundary extension is a well-known bias whereby observers remember visual information beyond an image's boundaries. While recent studies demonstrate that boundary contraction also reliably occurs based on intrinsic image properties, the specific properties that drive the effect are unknown. This study assesses the extent to which scene memory might have a fixed capacity for information. We assessed both visual and semantic information in a scene database using techniques from image processing and natural language processing, respectively. We then assessed how both types of information predicted memory errors for scene boundaries using a standard rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) forced error paradigm. A linear regression model indicated that memories for scene boundaries were significantly predicted by semantic, but not visual, information and that this effect persisted when scene depth was considered. Boundary extension was observed for images with low semantic information, and contraction was observed for images with high semantic information. This suggests a cognitive process that normalizes the amount of semantic information held in memory.

Structured memory representations develop at multiple time scales in hippocampal-cortical networks

Influential views of systems memory consolidation posit that the hippocampus rapidly forms representations of specific events, while neocortical networks extract regularities across events, forming the basis of schemas and semantic knowledge. Neocortical extraction of schematic memory representations is thought to occur on a protracted timescale of months, especially for information that is unrelated to prior knowledge. However, this theorized evolution of memory representations across extended timescales, and differences in the temporal dynamics of consolidation across brain regions, lack reliable empirical support. To examine the temporal dynamics of memory representations, we repeatedly exposed human participants to structured information via sequences of fractals, while undergoing longitudinal fMRI for three months. Sequence-specific activation patterns emerged in the hippocampus during the first 1-2 weeks of learning, followed one week later by high-level visual cortex, and subsequently the medial prefrontal and parietal cortices. Schematic, sequence-general representations emerged in the prefrontal cortex after 3 weeks of learning, followed by the medial temporal lobe and anterior temporal cortex. Moreover, hippocampal and most neocortical representations showed sustained rather than time-limited dynamics, suggesting that representations tend to persist across learning. These results show that specific hippocampal representations emerge early, followed by both specific and schematic representations at a gradient of timescales across hippocampal-cortical networks as learning unfolds. Thus, memory representations do not exist only in specific brain regions at a given point in time, but are simultaneously present at multiple levels of abstraction across hippocampal-cortical networks.

Sleep-A brain-state serving systems memory consolidation

Although long-term memory consolidation is supported by sleep, it is unclear how it differs from that during wakefulness. Our review, focusing on recent advances in the field, identifies the repeated replay of neuronal firing patterns as a basic mechanism triggering consolidation during sleep and wakefulness. During sleep, memory replay occurs during slow-wave sleep (SWS) in hippocampal assemblies together with ripples, thalamic spindles, neocortical slow oscillations, and noradrenergic activity. Here, hippocampal replay likely favors the transformation of hippocampus-dependent episodic memory into schema-like neocortical memory. REM sleep following SWS might balance local synaptic rescaling accompanying memory transformation with a sleep-dependent homeostatic process of global synaptic renormalization. Sleep-dependent memory transformation is intensified during early development despite the immaturity of the hippocampus. Overall, beyond its greater efficacy, sleep consolidation differs from wake consolidation mainly in that it is supported, rather than impaired, by spontaneous hippocampal replay activity possibly gating memory formation in neocortex.

Inferring danger with minimal aversive experience

Learning about threats is crucial for survival and fundamentally rests upon Pavlovian conditioning. However, Pavlovian threat learning is largely limited to detecting known (or similar) threats and involves first-hand exposure to danger, which inevitably poses a risk of harm. We discuss how individuals leverage a rich repertoire of mnemonic processes that operate largely in safety and significantly expand our ability to recognize danger beyond Pavlovian threat associations. These processes result in complementary memories - acquired individually or through social interactions - that represent potential threats and the relational structure of our environment. The interplay between these memories allows danger to be inferred rather than directly learned, thereby flexibly protecting us from potential harm in novel situations despite minimal prior aversive experience.

Associative memory of structured knowledge

A long standing challenge in biological and artificial intelligence is to understand how new knowledge can be constructed from known building blocks in a way that is amenable for computation by neuronal circuits. Here we focus on the task of storage and recall of structured knowledge in long-term memory. Specifically, we ask how recurrent neuronal networks can store and retrieve multiple knowledge structures. We model each structure as a set of binary relations between events and attributes (attributes may represent e.g., temporal order, spatial location, role in semantic structure), and map each structure to a distributed neuronal activity pattern using a vector symbolic architecture scheme.We then use associative memory plasticity rules to store the binarized patterns as fixed points in a recurrent network. By a combination of signal-to-noise analysis and numerical simulations, we demonstrate that our model allows for efficient storage of these knowledge structures, such that the memorized structures as well as their individual building blocks (e.g., events and attributes) can be subsequently retrieved from partial retrieving cues. We show that long-term memory of structured knowledge relies on a new principle of computation beyond the memory basins. Finally, we show that our model can be extended to store sequences of memories as single attractors.

Has the concept of systems consolidation outlived its usefulness? Identification and evaluation of premises underlying systems consolidation

Systems consolidation has mostly been treated as a neural construct defined by the time-dependent change in memory representation from the hippocampus (HPC) to other structures, primarily the neocortex. Here, we identify and evaluate the explicit and implicit premises that underlie traditional or standard models and theories of systems consolidation based on evidence from research on humans and other animals. We use the principle that changes in neural representation over time and experience are accompanied by corresponding changes in psychological representations, and vice versa, to argue that each of the premises underlying traditional or standard models and theories of systems consolidation is found wanting. One solution is to modify or abandon the premises or theories and models. This is reflected in moderated models of systems consolidation that emphasize the early role of the HPC in training neocortical memories until they stabilize. The fault, however, may lie in the very concept of systems consolidation and its defining feature. We propose that the concept be replaced by one of memory systems reorganization, which does not carry the theoretical baggage of systems consolidation and is flexible enough to capture the dynamic nature of memory from inception to very long-term retention and retrieval at a psychological and neural level. The term "memory system reorganization" implies that memory traces are not fixed, even after they are presumably consolidated. Memories can continue to change as a result of experience and interactions among memory systems across the lifetime. As will become clear, hippocampal training of neocortical memories is only one type of such interaction, and not always the most important one, even at inception. We end by suggesting some principles of memory reorganization that can help guide research on dynamic memory processes that capture corresponding changes in memory at the psychological and neural levels.

Effects of Information Load on Schema and Episodic Memory Formation

The formation of semantic memories is assumed to result from the abstraction of general, schema-like knowledge across multiple experiences, while at the same time, episodic details from individual experiences are forgotten. Against this backdrop, our study examined the effects of information load (high vs. low) during encoding on the formation of episodic and schema memory using an elaborated version of an object-place recognition (OPR) task in rats. The task allowed for the abstraction of a spatial rule across four (low information load) or eight (high information load) encoding episodes (spaced apart by a 20 min interval) in which the rats could freely explore two objects in an open field arena. After this encoding phase, animals were left undisturbed for 24 h and then tested either for the expression of schema memory, i.e., for the spatial rule, or memory for an individual encoding episode. Rats in the high information load condition exhibited a more robust schema memory for the spatial rule than in the low information load condition. In contrast, rats in the low load condition showed more robust memory for individual learning episodes than in the high information load condition. Our findings of opposing effects might point to an information-load-dependent competitive relationship between processes of schema and episodic memory formation, although other explanations are possible.

Schematic information influences memory and generalisation behaviour for schema-relevant and -irrelevant information

Schemas modulate memory performance for schema-congruent and -incongruent information. However, it is assumed they do not influence behaviour for information irrelevant to themselves. We assessed memory and generalisation behaviour for information related to an underlying pattern, where a schema could be extracted (schema-relevant), and information that was unrelated and therefore irrelevant to the extracted schema (schema-irrelevant). Using precision measures of long-term memory, where participants learnt associations between words and locations around a circle, we assessed memory and generalisation for schema-relevant and -irrelevant information. Words belonged to two semantic categories: human-made and natural. For one category, word-locations were clustered around one point on the circle (clustered condition), while the other category had word-locations randomly distributed (non-clustered condition). The presence of an underlying pattern in the clustered condition allows for the extraction of a schema that can support both memory and generalisation. At test, participants were presented with old (memory) and new (generalisation) words, requiring them to identify a remembered location or make a best guess. The presence of the clustered pattern modulated memory and generalisation. In the clustered condition, participants placed old and new words in locations consistent with the underlying pattern. In contrast, for the non-clustered condition, participants were less likely to place old and new non-clustered words in locations consistent with the clustered condition. Therefore, we provide evidence that the presence of schematic information modulates memory and generalisation for schema-relevant and -irrelevant information. Our results highlight the need to carefully construct appropriate schema-irrelevant control conditions such that behaviour in these conditions is not modulated by the presence of a schema. Theoretically, models of schema processing need to account for how the presence of schematic information can have consequences for information that is irrelevant to itself.

Tracking the relation between gist and item memory over the course of long-term memory consolidation

Our experiences in the world support memories not only of specific episodes but also of the generalities (the 'gist') across related experiences. It remains unclear how these two types of memories evolve and influence one another over time. In two experiments, 173 human participants encoded spatial locations from a distribution and reported both item memory (specific locations) and gist memory (center for the locations) across 1-2 months. Experiment 1 demonstrated that after 1 month, gist memory was preserved relative to item memory, despite a persistent positive correlation between them. Critically, item memories were biased toward the gist over time. Experiment 2 showed that a spatial outlier item changed this relationship and that the extraction of gist is sensitive to the regularities of items. Our results suggest that the gist starts to guide item memories over longer durations as their relative strengths change.