Designing robots that do no harm: understanding the challenges of Ethics for Robots

This article describes key challenges in creating an ethics "for" robots. Robot ethics is not only a matter of the effects caused by robotic systems or the uses to which they may be put, but also the ethical rules and principles that these systems ought to follow-what we call "Ethics for Robots." We suggest that the Principle of Nonmaleficence, or "do no harm," is one of the basic elements of an ethics for robots-especially robots that will be used in a healthcare setting. We argue, however, that the implementation of even this basic principle will raise significant challenges for robot designers. In addition to technical challenges, such as ensuring that robots are able to detect salient harms and dangers in the environment, designers will need to determine an appropriate sphere of responsibility for robots and to specify which of various types of harms must be avoided or prevented. These challenges are amplified by the fact that the robots we are currently able to design possess a form of semi-autonomy that differs from other more familiar semi-autonomous agents such as animals or young children. In short, robot designers must identify and overcome the key challenges of an ethics for robots before they may ethically utilize robots in practice.

Moral Reasons for Individuals in High-Income Countries to Limit Beef Consumption

This paper argues that individuals in many high-income countries typically have moral reasons to limit their beef consumption and consume plant-based protein instead, given the negative effects of beef production and consumption. Beef production is a significant source of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental impacts, high levels of beef consumption are associated with health risks, and some cattle production systems raise animal welfare concerns. These negative effects matter, from a variety of moral perspectives, and give us collective moral reasons to reduce beef production and consumption. But, as some ethicists have argued, we cannot draw a straight line from the ethics of production to the ethics of consumption: even if a production system is morally impermissible, this does not mean that any given individual has moral reasons to stop consuming the products of that system, given how miniscule one individual’s contributions are. This paper considers how to connect those dots. We consider three distinct lines of argument in support of the conclusion that individuals have moral reasons to limit their beef consumption and shift to plant-based protein, and we consider objections to each argument. This argument applies to individuals in high beef-consuming and high greenhouse gas-emitting high-income countries, though we make this argument with a specific focus on the United States.

"What can I possibly do?": White individual responsibility for addressing racism as a public health crisis

What responsibilities do individuals have when it comes to combating large-scale public health crises such as racism? A seductive argument borrowed from the climate ethics literature suggests that focusing on individual morality for a structural problem such as racism is at best unhelpful and at worst actively harmful. In response, we argue that individuals have good moral reasons to modify their own behaviors to help in the fight against large, structural public health emergencies in general, and that the public health crisis of racism, in particular, demands heightened moral responsiveness from individual white people to resist white supremacy. The moral reasons that support white engagement in antiracist work extend above and beyond those regarding individual involvement in the fight against other collectively created public health challenges. Our conclusions help to defend the claim that racial literacy and antiracist education aimed at individuals are vital.

Why the World Needs Bioethics Communication

This essay argues for the importance of formalizing public engagement efforts around bioethics as something we might call "bioethics communication," and it outlines the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics' plans for engaging in this effort. Because science is complex and difficult to explain to nonexperts, the field of science communication has arisen to meet this need. The field involves both a practice and a subject of empirical research. Like science, bioethics is also complex and difficult to explain, which is why the world needs bioethics communication. The authors are engaged in a brand-new effort to establish the sort of public bioethics efforts that would constitute bioethics communication, through a program which they call the Dracopoulos-Bloomberg iDeas Lab. The authors invite colleagues to experiment and learn with them as they invest in the development of bioethics communicators and their products.

Solving the Opioid Crisis Isn't Just a Public Health Challenge-It's a Bioethics Challenge

Among those who discuss America's opioid crisis, it is popular to claim that we know what we, as a society, ought to do to solve the problem-we simply don't want it badly enough. We don't lack knowledge; we lack the will to act and to fund the right policies. In fact, I've heard two versions of this. Among those who focus on prescription opioids, it is clear that we ought to stop prescribing so many powerful opioid painkillers. And among my public health colleagues focusing on illicit drug use, it is clear that we ought to expand addiction treatment and harm-reduction services. The problem, however, is that the second claim is not obvious (and, indeed, is denied by many Americans), and the first claim probably isn't even true (at least, not in so crude a form). In short, the opioid crisis presents not only a problem of political will but also one of ethics. It will take work to discover or justify our normative claims in this arena.

Artificial Intelligence in Service of Human Needs: Pragmatic First Steps Toward an Ethics for Semi-Autonomous Agents

The ethics of robots and artificial intelligence (AI) typically centers on "giving ethics" to as-yet imaginary AI with human-levels of autonomy in order to protect us from their potentially destructive power. It is often assumed that to do that, we should program AI with the true moral theory (whatever that might be), much as we teach morality to our children. This paper argues that the focus on AI with human-level autonomy is misguided. The robots and AI that we have now and in the near future are "semi-autonomous" in that their ability to make choices and to act is limited across a number of dimensions. Further, it may be morally problematic to create AI with human-level autonomy, even if it becomes possible. As such, any useful approach to AI ethics should begin with a theory of giving ethics to semi-autonomous agents (SAAs). In this paper, we work toward such a theory by evaluating our obligations to and for "natural" SAAs, including nonhuman animals and humans with developing and diminished capacities. Drawing on research in neuroscience, bioethics, and philosophy, we identify the ways in which AI semi-autonomy differs from semi-autonomy in humans and nonhuman animals. We conclude on the basis of these comparisons that when giving ethics to SAAs, we should focus on principles and restrictions that protect human interests, but that we can only permissibly maintain this approach so long as we do not aim at developing technology with human-level autonomy.

Is Nonconsensual Tapering of High-Dose Opioid Therapy Justifiable?

This case considers a so-called legacy patient, one whose behaviors and symptoms express a legacy of past, aggressive opioid prescribing by a clinician. Some prescribers might feel pressured to taper doses of opioids for such patients, but this article argues that nonconsensual dose reductions for stable opioid therapy patients is impermissible because it both puts a patient at risk and wrongs an individual in a misdirected attempt to ameliorate a systemic wrong. Although perhaps surprising, this argument is supported by current evidence and recommendations for patient-centered pain care.

Does Health Promotion Harm the Environment?

Health promotion involves social and environmental interventions designed to benefit and protect health. It often harmfully impacts the environment through air and water pollution, medical waste, greenhouse gas emissions, and other externalities. We consider potential conflicts between health promotion and environmental protection and why and how the healthcare industry might promote health while protecting environments. After probing conflicts between promoting health and protecting the environment we highlight the essential role that environmental resources play in health and healthcare to show that environmental protection is a form of health promotion. We then explore relationships between three radical forms of health promotion and the environment: (1) lowering the human birth rate; (2) transforming the food system; and (3) genetically modifying mosquitos. We conclude that healthcare and other industries and their institutions and leaders have responsibilities to re-consider and modify their priorities, policies, and practices.

There's Never Just One Side to the Story: Why America Must Stop Swinging the Opioid Pendulum

For those of us knee-deep in the debate over ethical use of opioids during an epidemic, it is all too easy to draw battle lines and become either 'pro-opioid' or 'anti-opioid'. Historically, too, the attitudes within medicine and the general population have tended to swing back and forth between these two extremes. However, both extremes are unjustifiable, and so at this moment in history, we must try to stop swinging the opioid pendulum. What we need, instead, is a nuanced attitude toward opioids that acknowledges both their potential for benefit and their very real risks. In this paper, I make the case for this view by citing the powerful essays included in this symposium. In short, I suggest that were we to take any individual's experience with opioids as authoritative, we might run the risk of swinging that pendulum to one of the extremes. But by listening to the complex stories of everyone, we are more likely, I think, to recognize the need for care and compassion that necessitates a more subtle look at responsible opioid use.

In Opioid Withdrawal, With No Help In Sight

A patient receives prescription opioids after an accident-and no support from his physicians as he weans himself off.

Fertility, immigration, and the fight against climate change

Several philosophers have recently argued that policies aimed at reducing human fertility are a practical and morally justifiable way to mitigate the risk of dangerous climate change. There is a powerful objection to such "population engineering" proposals: even if drastic fertility reductions are needed to prevent dangerous climate change, implementing those reductions would wreak havoc on the global economy, which would seriously undermine international antipoverty efforts. In this article, we articulate this economic objection to population engineering and show how it fails. We argue, first, that the economic objection paints an inaccurate picture of the complicated relationship between demographic change and economic growth, and second, that any untoward economic effects of fertility reduction can be mitigated with additional policies. Specifically, we argue that supplementing fertility reduction with policies that facilitate the emigration of younger people from developing nations to developed nations could allow for both global reductions in GHG emissions and continued economic stability. Further, we show that moral arguments against such unprecedented increases in immigration are unsuccessful. We conclude that population engineering is a practical and morally justifiable tool for addressing the twin evils of climate change and global poverty.

Saving or Creating: Which Are We Doing When We Resuscitate Extremely Preterm Infants?

Neonatal intensive care units represent simultaneously one of the great success stories of modern medicine, and one of its most controversial developments. One particularly controversial issue is the resuscitation of extremely preterm infants. Physicians in the United States generally accept that they are required to resuscitate infants born as early as 25 weeks and that it is permissible to resuscitate as early as 22 weeks. In this article, I question the moral pressure to resuscitate by criticizing the idea that resuscitation in this context "saves" a human life. Our radical medical advancements have allowed us to intervene in the life of a human before it makes sense to say that such an intervention "saves" someone; rather, what the physician does in resuscitating and treating an extremely preterm infant is to take over creating it. This matters, I argue, because "rescues" are much more morally urgent than "creations."