Sources and destinations of misattributions in recall of instances of repeated events

Repeated experience of events promotes schema formation. Later activation of the schema facilitates recall of the general structure of the events, whereas attribution of details to instances requires systematic decision-making based on detail characteristics. For repeated events, source monitoring may be less effective due to the similarity and interference of details across instances and consequently result in source attribution errors. To date, researchers have examined aggregated misattributions across instances and have found that misattributions are more frequent in the middle than in the boundary instances. In this study, we investigated the trajectories of misattributions using data from six studies (N = 633), where participants recalled repeated interactive marketing-themed events (Study 1), mock-crime filmed events (Study 2), stories (Study 3), and categorized word lists (Studies 4-6). The patterns confirmed the expected primacy and recency effects, showing fewer misattributions from and to the boundary instances relative to the middle instances. In addition, the patterns indicated proximity effects: Confusions more frequently occurred across adjacent instances and gradually decreased for instances that were further apart from the source. Our findings suggest that detail characteristics that form the basis of source attribution decisions provide information about the relative position of instances in repeated events, where the boundary instances serve as anchors, and where confusion relatively easily occurs across neighbouring instances. In line with context-based models of memory, our findings indicate that a higher-level organization of repeated events that emerges at encoding guides retrieval and source monitoring decisions.

A deeper view of insight in schizophrenia: Insight dimensions, unawareness and misattribution of particular symptoms and its relation with psychopathological factors

OBJECTIVE

1. To describe insight in a large sample of schizophrenia subjects from a multidimensional point of view, including unawareness of general insight dimensions as well as unawareness and misattribution of particular symptoms. 2. To explore the relationship between unawareness and clinical and socio-demographic variables.

METHODS

248 schizophrenia patients were assessed with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, five factor model of Lindenmayer) and the full Scale of Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD). Bivariate associations and multiple linear regression analyses were used to investigate the relationship between unawareness, symptoms and socio-demographic variables.

RESULTS

Around 40% of the sample showed unawareness of mental disorder, of the need for medication and of the social consequences. Levels of unawareness and misattribution of particular symptoms varied considerably. General unawareness dimensions showed small significant correlations with positive, cognitive and excitement factors of psychopathology, whereas these symptom factors showed higher correlations with unawareness of particular symptoms. Similarly, regression models showed a small significant predictive value of positive symptoms in the three general unawareness dimensions while a moderate one in the prediction of particular symptoms. Misattribution showed no significant correlations with any symptom factors.

CONCLUSIONS

Results confirm that insight in schizophrenia is a multi-phased phenomenon and that unawareness into particular symptoms varies widely. The overlap between unawareness dimensions and psychopathology is small and seems to be restricted to positive and cognitive symptoms, supporting the accounts from cognitive neurosciences that suggest that besides basic cognition poor insight may be in part a failure of self-reflection or strategic metacognition.

A 'curse of knowledge' in the absence of knowledge? People misattribute fluency when judging how common knowledge is among their peers

Knowledge can be a curse: Once we have acquired a particular item of knowledge it tends to bias, or contaminate, our ability to reason about a less informed perspective (referred to as the 'curse of knowledge' or 'hindsight bias'). The mechanisms underlying the curse of knowledge bias are a matter of great import and debate. We highlight two mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie this bias-inhibition and fluency misattribution. Explanations that involve inhibition argue that people have difficulty fully inhibiting or suppressing the content of their knowledge when trying to reason about a less informed perspective. Explanations that involve fluency misattribution focus on the feelings of fluency with which the information comes to mind and the tendency to misattribute the subjective feelings of fluency associated with familiar items to the objective ease or foreseeability of that information. Three experiments with a total of 359 undergraduate students provide the first evidence that fluency misattribution processes are sufficient to induce the curse of knowledge bias. These results add to the literature on the many manifestations of the curse of knowledge bias and the many types of source misattributions, by revealing their role in people's judgements of how common, or widespread, one's knowledge is. The implications of these results for cognitive science and social cognition are discussed.

Sentence context influences the subjective perception of foreign accents

We examined whether sentence context (the predictability of the final word) influences listeners' ratings of foreign-accented words. Previous work has demonstrated that accent manipulations affect listeners' processing of spoken language. We examined the converse of this relationship; whether context manipulations affect listeners' perceptions of accents. If there is a bidirectional relationship, listeners should be more likely to rate an accent as strong when the accented word is not predicted by the sentence. In Experiment 1, the results revealed that participants were significantly more likely to rate words spoken by foreign-accented speakers as "Strong Accent" in the unpredictable sentences when compared to the predictable sentences. Moreover, in Experiment 2, this effect was replicated and extended to a native speaker. These results support the idea that there is a bidirectional relationship between language processing and perceptions of accents. We discuss the practical implications for foreign-accented speakers.

Ambiguity between self and other: Individual differences in action attribution

Individuals differ in their ability to attribute actions to self or other. This variance is thought to explain, in part, the experience of voice-hearing. Misattribution can also be context-driven. For example, causal ambiguity can arise when the actions of two or more individuals are coordinated and produce similar effects (e.g., music-making). Experience in such challenging contexts may refine skills of action attribution. Forty participants completed a novel finger-tapping task which parametrically manipulated the proportion of control that 'self' versus 'other' possessed over resulting auditory tones. Results showed that action misattribution peaked in the middle of the self-to-other continuum and was biased towards other. This pattern was related to both high hallucination-proneness and to low musical-experience. Findings suggest not only that causal ambiguity plays a key role in agency but also that action attribution abilities may improve with practice, potentially providing an avenue for remediation of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.

The "emotion misattribution" procedure: processing beyond good and bad under masked and unmasked presentation conditions

In general, it is assumed that misattribution in the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) is restricted to crude affect due to its unbound nature, especially under limited presentation conditions. In two experiments, we investigated whether emotion-specific misattributions occur using a four-category misattribution procedure. Experiment 1 yielded emotion-specific misattribution effects under clearly visible presentation conditions demonstrating that the procedure is principally susceptible for emotion-specific effects. In Experiment 2, we employed masked presentation conditions impeding conscious prime perception. A specific pattern of emotion-specific misattributions effects emerged indicating some emotion-specific processing at initial stages of processing. However, not each emotion was misattributed equally. We discuss the implications of these results for the non-conscious processing of emotional information, for the supposed mechanisms of the AMP and its implicit nature.