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McConnell D. Assessing Public Reason Approaches to Conscientious Objection in Healthcare. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2024:1-11. [PMID: 38602073 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180124000112] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/12/2024]
Abstract
Sometimes healthcare professionals conscientiously refuse to treat patients despite the patient requesting legal, medically indicated treatments within the professionals' remit. Recently, there has been a proliferation of views using the concept of public reason to specify which conscientious refusals of treatment should be accommodated. Four such views are critically assessed, namely, those of Robert Card, Massimo Reichlin, David Scott, and Doug McConnell. This paper argues that McConnell's view has advantages over the other approaches because it combines the requirement that healthcare professionals publicly justify the grounds of their conscientious refusals of treatment with the requirement that those grounds align with minimally decent healthcare. This relatively restrictive approach accommodates conscientious refusals from minimally decent healthcare professionals while still protecting good healthcare, the independence of the healthcare professions, and the fiduciary relationships.
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Affiliation(s)
- Doug McConnell
- Philosophy Department, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
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Brummett A, Eberl J. The Reasonable Content of Conscience in Public Bioethics. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2024:1-13. [PMID: 38469878 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180124000070] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/13/2024]
Abstract
Bioethicists aim to provide moral guidance in policy, research, and clinical contexts using methods of moral analysis (e.g., principlism, casuistry, and narrative ethics) that aim to satisfy the constraints of public reason. Among other objections, some critics have argued that public reason lacks the moral content needed to resolve bioethical controversies because discursive reason simply cannot justify any substantive moral claims in a pluralistic society. In this paper, the authors defend public reason from this criticism by showing that it contains sufficient content to address one of the perennial controversies in bioethics-the permissibility and limits of clinician conscientious objection. They develop a "reasonability view" grounded in public reason and apply it to some recent examples of conscientious objection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Abram Brummett
- Department of Foundational Medical Studies, Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine, Rochester, MI, USA
| | - Jason Eberl
- Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO, USA
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Fleck LM. Public Reason, Bioethics, and Public Policy: A Seductive Delusion or Ambitious Aspiration? Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2024:1-15. [PMID: 38465673 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180124000124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/12/2024]
Abstract
Can Rawlsian public reason sufficiently justify public policies that regulate or restrain controversial medical and technological interventions in bioethics (and the broader social world), such as abortion, physician aid-in-dying, CRISPER-cas9 gene editing of embryos, surrogate mothers, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of eight-cell embryos, and so on? The first part of this essay briefly explicates the central concepts that define Rawlsian political liberalism. The latter half of this essay then demonstrates how a commitment to Rawlsian public reason can ameliorate (not completely resolve) many of the policy disagreements related to bioethically controversial medical interventions today. The goal of public reason is to reduce the size of the disagreement by eliminating features of the disagreement that violate the norms of public reason. The norms of public reason are those norms that are politically necessary to preserve the liberal, pluralistic, democratic character of this society. What remains is reasonable disagreement to be addressed through normal democratic deliberative processes. Specific issues addressed from a public reason perspective include personal responsibility for excessive health costs, the utility of a metaphysical definition of death for organ transplantation, and the moral status of excess embryos generated through IVF and/or their use in medical research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leonard M Fleck
- Center for Bioethics and Social Justice, College of Human Medicine, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA
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Holm S. Public Reason Requirements in Bioethical Discourse. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2024:1-10. [PMID: 38389493 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180124000094] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/24/2024]
Abstract
This paper analyzes the use of public reason requirements in bioethical discourse and discusses when such requirements are warranted. By a "public reason requirement," I mean a requirement that those involved in a particular discourse or debate only use reasons that can properly be described as public reasons. The first part of the paper outlines the concept of public reasons as developed by John Rawls and others and discusses some of the general criticisms of the concept and its importance. The second part then distinguishes between two types of public reason requirements in bioethics. One type is what I will call the orthodox public reason requirement since it hews closely to the original Rawlsian conception. The second is what I will call the expansive public reason requirement, which departs quite radically from the Rawlsian conception and applies the requirement not to policy discourse or policymaking, but to the actions of individuals. Both types of requirements will be analyzed, and some problems in applying public reason requirements in bioethics will be identified. It will be argued that the expansive public reason requirement is misguided. The concluding part argues that requirements of civic civility and what Rawls terms an "inclusive view" of public reason should be important in bioethical discourse.
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Affiliation(s)
- Søren Holm
- Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, Department of Law, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
- Center for Medical Ethics, HELSAM, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
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Fleck LM. Precision Medicine and Rough Justice: Wicked Problems. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2024; 33:1-4. [PMID: 37326243 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180123000312] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/17/2023]
Abstract
What exactly is a "wicked problem"? It is a social or economic problem that is so complex and so interconnected with other issues that it is extraordinarily difficult or impossible to resolve. This is because all proposed resolutions generate equally complex, equally wicked problems. In this essay, I argue that precision medicine, especially in the context of the U.S. healthcare system, generates numerous wicked problems related to distributive justice. Further, I argue that there are no easy solutions to these wicked problems. The need for trade-offs is inescapable. Rough justice is the best outcome we can hope for, and that outcome requires a commitment to processes of public reason that are fair and inclusive.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leonard M Fleck
- Center for Bioethics and Social Justice, College of Human Medicine, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA
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Fleck LM. The Dobbs Decision: Can It Be Justified by Public Reason? Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2023;:1-13. [PMID: 36683585 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180122000822] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/24/2023]
Abstract
John Rawls has held up as a model of public reason the U.S. Supreme Court. I argue that the Dobbs Court is justifiably criticized for failing to respect public reason. First, the entire opinion is governed by an originalist ideological logic almost entirely incongruent with public reason in a liberal, pluralistic, democratic society. Second, Alito's emphasis on "ordered liberty" seems completely at odds with the "disordered liberty" regarding abortion already evident among the states. Third, describing the embryo/fetus from conception until birth as an "unborn human being" begs the question of the legal status of the embryo/fetus, as if an obiter dictum settled the matter. Fourth, Alito accuses the Roe court of failing to exercise judicial restraint, although Alito argued to overturn Roe in its entirety. In brief, the Dobbs opinion is an illiberal, disingenuous, ideological swamp that swallows up public reason and the reproductive rights of women.
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Hordern J. Accommodating religion and belief in healthcare: Political threats, agonistic democracy and established religion. Bioethics 2023; 37:15-27. [PMID: 36399084 PMCID: PMC10099616 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13112] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/08/2021] [Revised: 09/18/2022] [Accepted: 10/26/2022] [Indexed: 05/06/2023]
Abstract
This paper considers what concept of accommodation is necessary to identify and address discrimination, disadvantages and disparities in such a way that the plurality of religious people with their beliefs, values and practices may be justly accommodated in healthcare. It evaluates threats to the possibility of such accommodation pertaining by considering what beliefs and practices might increase the risk of unjust discrimination against and disadvantage for religious people, whether as individuals or as groups; and the risk of disparities between the care provided to religious people. The claim is that there is an important cluster of risks that are political in kind and emergent within philosophical bioethics. While not amounting (yet) to a trend, they are sufficiently threatening to a just civic life for patients and healthcare staff as to warrant scrutiny. After an Introductory Section 1, Section 2 evaluates a criticism of 'accommodation' and the apparently additional health-related requirements that those of religious faith demand, when compared with other people. It does so by comparing Lori Beaman's idea of agonism with that of a distinct and somewhat complementary approach in Jonathan Chaplin's political philosophy, before examining the role of established religion in setting the conditions for the accommodation of religion and belief in healthcare. Section 3 examines risks to such accommodation by engaging critically with three health-related instantiations of political philosophy that differ radically from both Beaman and Chaplin. A concluding Section 4 focusses on appropriate modes of communicating about religious and other beliefs in healthcare.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joshua Hordern
- Harris Manchester College, Faculty of Theology and ReligionUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK
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Jennings B. John Rawls, Godfather of Bioethics. Hastings Cent Rep 2021; 51:51-53. [PMID: 34904737 DOI: 10.1002/hast.1306] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
At a time when ethical and political philosophy were thought passé, John Rawls gave serious attention to ethical questions, providing them with a renewed academic legitimacy. This helped fields of practical ethics such as bioethics become established in higher education and in public affairs. This essay addresses the influence Rawls has had on bioethics through both the style and the substance of his ethical argumentation. The essay argues that his distinctive rhetorical strategy and tone attempted to rein in the scope of normative commitments in order to make an equilibrium between refined understandings of freedom and equality possible and sustainable. Bioethics has been strongly influenced by this approach to maintaining social stability in a liberal society that has become highly stratified and culturally diverse. Bioethics continues to echo the Rawlsian call for a calmly reasoned political life but finds that call increasingly difficult to answer.
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Blackford R, Schüklenk U. Religion at Work in Bioethics and Biopolicy: Christian Bioethicists, Secular Language, Suspicious Orthodoxy. J Med Philos 2021; 46:169-187. [PMID: 33822133 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhaa037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The proper role, if any, for religion-based arguments is a live and sometimes heated issue within the field of bioethics. The issue attracts heat primarily because bioethical analyses influence the outcomes of controversial court cases and help shape legislation in sensitive biopolicy areas. A problem for religious bioethicists who seek to influence biopolicy is that there is now widespread academic and public acceptance, at least within liberal democracies, that the state should not base its policies on any particular religion's metaphysical claims or esoteric moral system. In response, bioethicists motivated by religious concerns have adopted two identifiable strategies. Sometimes they rely on slippery-slope arguments that, sometimes at least, have empirically testable premises. A more questionable response is the manipulation and misuse of secular-sounding moral language, such as references to "human dignity," and the plights of groups of people labeled "vulnerable."
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Abstract
Robert Card’s “Reasonability View” is a significant contribution to the debate over the place of conscientious objection in health care. In his view, conscientious objections can only be accommodated if the grounds for the objection meet a reasonability standard. I identify inconsistencies in Card’s description of the reasonability standard and argue that each version he specifies is unsatisfactory. The criteria for reasonability that Card sets out most frequently have no clear underpinning principle and are too permissive of immoral objections. Card has also claimed that petitioners must justify their positions with Rawlsian public reason. I argue that, although the resulting reasonability standard is principled, it is overly restrictive. I also show that a reasonability standard built on Rawls’ more lenient conception of reasonableness would be overly permissive of objections at odds with professional healthcare standards. Finally, I argue for my favored solution, which bases the reasonability standard on minimal professional standards.
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McConnell D, Card RF. Public reason in justifications of conscientious objection in health care. Bioethics 2019; 33:625-632. [PMID: 30865301 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12573] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/25/2018] [Revised: 11/30/2018] [Accepted: 12/22/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
Current mainstream approaches to conscientious objection either uphold the standards of public health care by preventing objections or protect the consciences of health-care professionals by accommodating objections. Public justification approaches are a compromise position that accommodate conscientious objections only when objectors can publicly justify the grounds of their objections. Public justification approaches require objectors and assessors to speak a common normative language and to this end it has been suggested that objectors should be required to cast their objection in terms of public reason. We provide critical support for such a public reason condition and argue that it would be neither too demanding nor too permissive. We also respond to objections that it unfairly favours secular over religious objectors and that public reasons cannot be held with the kind of sincerity thought to characterize conscientious objections.
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Affiliation(s)
- Doug McConnell
- University of Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Oxford, UK
| | - Robert F Card
- State University of New York at Oswego, New York, USA
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Greenblum J. Public reason and the limited right to conscientious objection: a response to Magelssen. J Med Ethics 2018; 44:206-209. [PMID: 28912287 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2017-104237] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2017] [Revised: 04/20/2017] [Accepted: 05/14/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
In a recent article for this journal, Morten Magelssen argues that the right to conscientious objection in healthcare is grounded in the moral integrity of healthcare professionals, a good for both professionals and society. In this paper, I argue that there is no right to conscientious objection in healthcare, at least as Magelssen conceives of it. Magelssen's conception of the right to conscientious objection is too expansive in nature. Although I will assume that there is a right to conscientious objection, it does not extend to objections that are purely religious in nature. i Thus, this right is considerably more restricted than Magelssen thinks. In making my case, I draw on John Rawls's later work in arguing for the claim that conscientious objection based on purely religious considerations fails to benefit society in the appropriate way.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jake Greenblum
- Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, USA
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Abstract
The label 'post-truth' signals for many a troubling turn away from principles of enlightened government. The word 'post', moreover, implies a past when things were radically different and whose loss should be universally mourned. In this paper, we argue that this framing of 'post-truth' is flawed because it is ahistorical and ignores the co-production of knowledge and norms in political contexts. Debates about public facts are necessarily debates about social meanings, rooted in realities that are subjectively experienced as all-encompassing and complete, even when they are partial and contingent. Facts used in policy are normative in four ways: They are embedded in prior choices of which experiential realities matter, produced through processes that reflect institutionalized public values, arbiters of which issues are open to democratic contestation and deliberation, and vehicles through which polities imagine their collective futures. To restore truth to its rightful place in democracy, governments should be held accountable for explaining who generated public facts, in response to which sets of concerns, and with what opportunities for deliberation and closure.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sheila Jasanoff
- Program on Science, Technology & Society, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
| | - Hilton R Simmet
- John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
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