The breakdown of social looking

Individual differences in social looking are commonly believed to reflect one single heritable dimension tightly linked to autism. Yet, recent data suggest that in human infants, looking to eyes (rather than mouth) and preference for faces (versus non-social objects) reflect distinct genetic influences, and neither appear to have a clear-cut relation to autism.

Estimating the cardiac signals of chimpanzees using a digital camera: validation and application of a novel non-invasive method for primate research

Cardiac measures such as heart rate measurements are important indicators of both physiological and psychological states. However, despite their extraordinary potential, their use is restricted in comparative psychology because traditionally cardiac measures involved the attachment of sensors to the participant's body, which, in the case of undomesticated animals such as nonhuman primates, is usually only possible during anesthesia or after extensive training. Here, we validate and apply a camera-based system that enables contact-free detection of animals' heart rates. The system automatically detects and estimates the cardiac signals from cyclic change in the hue of the facial area of a chimpanzee. In Study 1, we recorded the heart rate of chimpanzees using the new technology, while simultaneously measuring heart rate using classic PPG (photoplethysmography) finger sensors. We found that both methods were in good agreement. In Study 2, we applied our new method to measure chimpanzees' heart rate in response to seeing different types of video scenes (groupmates in an agonistic interaction, conspecific strangers feeding, nature videos, etc.). Heart rates changed during video presentation, depending on the video content: Agonistic interactions and conspecific strangers feeding lead to accelerated heart rate relative to baseline, indicating increased emotional arousal. Nature videos lead to decelerated heart rate relative to baseline, indicating a relaxing effect or heightened attention caused by these stimuli. Our results show that the new contact-free technology can reliably assess the heart rate of unrestrained chimpanzees, and most likely other primates. Furthermore, our technique opens up new avenues of research within comparative psychology and facilitates the health management of captive individuals.

Maximizing valid eye-tracking data in human and macaque infants by optimizing calibration and adjusting areas of interest

Remote eye tracking with automated corneal reflection provides insights into the emergence and development of cognitive, social, and emotional functions in human infants and non-human primates. However, because most eye-tracking systems were designed for use in human adults, the accuracy of eye-tracking data collected in other populations is unclear, as are potential approaches to minimize measurement error. For instance, data quality may differ across species or ages, which are necessary considerations for comparative and developmental studies. Here we examined how the calibration method and adjustments to areas of interest (AOIs) of the Tobii TX300 changed the mapping of fixations to AOIs in a cross-species longitudinal study. We tested humans (N = 119) at 2, 4, 6, 8, and 14 months of age and macaques (Macaca mulatta; N = 21) at 2 weeks, 3 weeks, and 6 months of age. In all groups, we found improvement in the proportion of AOI hits detected as the number of successful calibration points increased, suggesting calibration approaches with more points may be advantageous. Spatially enlarging and temporally prolonging AOIs increased the number of fixation-AOI mappings, suggesting improvements in capturing infants' gaze behaviors; however, these benefits varied across age groups and species, suggesting different parameters may be ideal, depending on the population studied. In sum, to maximize usable sessions and minimize measurement error, eye-tracking data collection and extraction approaches may need adjustments for the age groups and species studied. Doing so may make it easier to standardize and replicate eye-tracking research findings.

Are there disciplinary boundaries in the comparative study of primate cognition?

A view continues to gain momentum that regards investigation of the cognition of great apes in captive settings as affording us a model for human cognitive evolution. Researchers from disciplines such as comparative psychology, anthropology, and even archaeology, seem eager to put their theories to the test by using great apes as their chosen experimental model. Questions addressed currently by comparative psychologists have long been the object of attention by neurophysiologists, psychobiologists and neuroscientists, who, however, often use rodents and monkeys as the species of choice. Whereas comparative psychology has been influenced greatly by ethology, much neuroscience has developed against a background of physiology and medicine. This separation of the intellectual contexts wherein they have arisen and flourished has impeded the development of fluid interaction between comparative psychologists and researchers in the other disciplines. We feel that it would be beneficial for comparative psychologists and neuroscientists to combine research endeavours far more often, in order to address common questions of interest related to cognition. We regard interdisciplinary cross-pollination to be particularly desirable, even if many comparative psychologists lack deep expertise about the workings of the brain, and even if many neuroscientists lack expert knowledge about the behaviour of different species. Furthermore, we believe that anthropology, archaeology, human evolutionary studies, and related disciplines, may well provide us with significant contextual knowledge about the physical and temporal background to the evolution in humans of specific cognitive skills. To that end, we urge researchers to dismantle methodological, conceptual and historical disciplinary boundaries, in order to strengthen cross-disciplinary cooperation in order to broaden and deepen our insights into the cognition of nonhuman and human primates.

Problems and Mysteries of the Many Languages of Thought

"What is the structure of thought?" is as central a question as any in cognitive science. A classic answer to this question has appealed to a Language of Thought (LoT). We point to emerging research from disparate branches of the field that supports the LoT hypothesis, but also uncovers diversity in LoTs across cognitive systems, stages of development, and species. Our letter formulates open research questions for cognitive science concerning the varieties of rules and representations that underwrite various LoT-based systems and how these variations can help researchers taxonomize cognitive systems.

Making Drawings Speak Through Mathematical Metrics

Figurative drawing is a skill that takes time to learn, and it evolves during different childhood phases that begin with scribbling and end with representational drawing. Between these phases, it is difficult to assess when and how children demonstrate intentions and representativeness in their drawings. The marks produced are increasingly goal-oriented and efficient as the child's skills progress from scribbles to figurative drawings. Pre-figurative activities provide an opportunity to focus on drawing processes. We applied fourteen metrics to two different datasets (N = 65 and N = 344) to better understand the intentional and representational processes behind drawing, and combined these metrics using principal component analysis (PCA) in different biologically significant dimensions. Three dimensions were identified: efficiency based on spatial metrics, diversity with color metrics, and temporal sequentiality. The metrics at play in each dimension are similar for both datasets, and PCA explains 77% of the variance in both datasets. Gender had no effect, but age influenced all three dimensions differently. These analyses for instance differentiate scribbles by children from those drawn by adults. The three dimensions highlighted by this study provide a better understanding of the emergence of intentions and representativeness in drawings. We discussed the perspectives of such findings in comparative psychology and evolutionary anthropology.

Mimicry eases prediction and thereby smoothens social interactions

In their "social contextual view" of emotional mimicry, authors Hess and Fischer (2022) put forward emotional mimicry as a social regulator, considering it a social act, bound to certain affiliative contexts or goals. In this commentary, we argue that the core function of mimicry is to ease predicting conspecifics' behaviours and the environment, and that as a consequence, this often smoothens social interactions. Accordingly, we make three main points. First, we argue that there is no good reason to believe that the mimicry of negative expressions is fundamentally different than the mimicry of positive or ambiguous or autonomic expressions. Second, we give examples of empirical evidence that mimicry is not always a social act. Third, we show that mimicry has primary benefits for the mimicker. As such, we will briefly summarise and elaborate on the relevant findings in these respects, and propose a comparative, multi-method and ecologically valid approach which can explain the multifaceted character of the phenomenon.

Taking account of others' goals in social information use: Developmental changes in 3- to 7-year-old children

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Social information use improved with age but only for exploration of alternatives.

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Children were able to account for others’ conflicting motivations from 4 years.

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Alignment of the demonstrator’s and children’s goals did not influence performance.

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From 6 years children could infer the outcome of others’ behaviour.

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Rates of copying were low at all ages, even when it was the appropriate response.

The ability to take mental states such as goals into account when interpreting others’ behavior has been proposed to be what sets human use of social information apart from that of other animals. If so, children’s social information use would be expected to change as their understanding of others’ mental states develops. We explored age-related changes in 3- to 7-year-old children’s ability to strategically use social information by taking into account another’s goal when it was, or was not, aligned with their own. Children observed as a puppet demonstrator selected a capsule, peeked inside, and chose to accept or reject it, following which children made their own selection. Children were able to account for others’ conflicting motivations from around 4 years of age and reliably inferred the outcome of others’ behavior from 6 years. However, using social information based on such inferences appeared to be challenging regardless of whether the demonstrator’s goal was, or was not. aligned to that of the participant. We found that social information use improved with age; however, this improvement was restricted to cases in which the appropriate response was to avoid copying the demonstrator’s selection. In contrast to previous research, appropriate copying responses remained at chance. Possible explanations for this unexpected pattern of results are discussed. The cognitive challenge associated with the ability to account for others’ goals could offer humans a significant advantage over that of other animals in their ability to use social information.

Quantitative abilities of invertebrates: a methodological review

Quantitative abilities are widely recognized to play important roles in several ecological contexts, such as foraging, mate choice, and social interaction. Indeed, such abilities are widespread among vertebrates, in particular mammals, birds, and fish. Recently, there has been an increasing number of studies on the quantitative abilities of invertebrates. In this review, we present the current knowledge in this field, especially focusing on the ecological relevance of the capacity to process quantitative information, the similarities with vertebrates, and the different methods adopted to investigate this cognitive skill. The literature argues, beyond methodological differences, a substantial similarity between the quantitative abilities of invertebrates and those of vertebrates, supporting the idea that similar ecological pressures may determine the emergence of similar cognitive systems even in distantly related species.

Convergent evolution of complex cognition: Insights from the field of avian cognition into the study of self-awareness

Pioneering research on avian behaviour and cognitive neuroscience have highlighted that avian species, mainly corvids and parrots, have a cognitive tool kit comparable with apes and other large-brained mammals, despite conspicuous differences in their neuroarchitecture. This cognitive tool kit is driven by convergent evolution, and consists of complex processes such as casual reasoning, behavioural flexibility, imagination, and prospection. Here, we review experimental studies in corvids and parrots that tested complex cognitive processes within this tool kit. We then provide experimental examples for the potential involvement of metacognitive skills in the expression of the cognitive tool kit. We further expand the discussion of cognitive and metacognitive abilities in avian species, suggesting that an integrated assessment of these processes, together with revised and multiple tasks of mirror self-recognition, might shed light on one of the most highly debated topics in the literature-self-awareness in animals. Comparing the use of multiple assessments of self-awareness within species and across taxa will provide a more informative, richer picture of the level of consciousness in different organisms.

Cognitive prerequisites for cumulative culture are context-dependent: Children's potential for ratcheting depends on cue longevity

Human cumulative culture has been suggested to depend on human-unique cognitive mechanisms, explaining its apparent absence in other species. We show that the potential for exhibiting cumulative culture depends on the cognitive abilities of the agents and the demands associated with using information generated by others' activity. 154 children aged 3-6 years played a searching game ("Find the Treasure"), taking their turn after a puppet demonstrator. The puppet's attempt revealed information about the contents of the locations searched, which could be exploited to target rewarded locations, and avoid unrewarded ones. Two conditions were presented, intended to capture realistic variation in the transience of the cues generated by another individual's activity. In one condition, the puppet's demonstration provided transient information - boxes were opened, seen to be rewarded or not, and then closed. In the other condition the puppet's chosen boxes remained partially open, providing an enduring visible cue as to whether that location was rewarded. Children undertook three trials of varying demonstration success, and we used patterns of performance to infer the potential for improvement over multiple generations of transmission. In the Enduring Cues condition, children's performance demonstrated the potential for cumulative culture. In contrast, in the Transient Information condition, only older children showed improved performances following higher success demonstrations and overall performance was not compatible with the possibility of improvements over generations of social transmission. We conclude that under certain conditions cumulative culture could occur in many species, but in a broader range of contexts in humans.

Using FACS to trace the neural specializations underlying the recognition of facial expressions: A commentary on Waller et al. (2020)

In the recent review by Waller et al. (2020) the authors discuss how the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) can be used to study the evolution of facial behaviors. This is a timely and thought-provoking review which highlights the numerous ways in which FACS could be used to compare the mechanisms responsible for the production of facial behaviors across species. We propose that FACS could also be used to study the recognition of facial behaviors in nonhuman subjects where one of the key challenges is finding suitable stimuli that convey different emotions. By using FACS-rated images in awake neuroimaging experiments, researchers could accurately identify the brain mechanisms responsible for recognizing expressions across mammalian species. This approach would reveal neural homologs and deepen our understanding of how nonverbal social communication has evolved.

The global workspace theory, the phenomenal concept strategy, and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.

Anthropomorphism in comparative affective science: Advocating a mindful approach

Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human-like capacities and traits to non-human entities. Anthropomorphism is ubiquitous in everyday life and in scientific domains, operating both implicitly and explicitly as a function of the human lens through which we view the world. A rich history of work in psychology, animal behavior, cognitive science, and philosophy has highlighted the negative and, to a lesser degree, the positive implications of anthropomorphism. In this article, we aim to provide a nuanced perspective of how anthropomorphism impacts the work of comparative affective science. Specifically, we discuss three domains of empirical inquiry in which lessons can be drawn about the benefits and pitfalls of anthropomorphism: responses to death, inequity aversion, and prosocial behavior. On balance, we advocate a mindful approach to anthropomorphizing in comparative affective science, and comparative science more generally.

Conwy Lloyd Morgan, Methodology, and the Origins of Comparative Psychology

The British biologist, philosopher, and psychologist Conwy Lloyd Morgan is widely regarded as one of the founders of comparative psychology. He is especially well known for his eponymous canon, which aimed to provide a rule for the interpretation of mind from behavior. Emphasizing the importance of the context in which Morgan was working-one in which casual observations of animal behavior could be found in Nature magazine every week and psychology itself was fighting for scientific legitimacy-I provide an account of Morgan's vision for the comparative psychologist qua professional psychologist. To this end, I explore the important connection between Morgan and the evolutionary theorist, philosopher, and psychologist Herbert Spencer. It is from Spencer, I contend, that Morgan inherited a number of his key epistemological and methodological concerns about the nascent science of comparative psychology. This extends all the way to the canon, which only works as intended when paired with a Spencerian understanding of mental evolution as a progressive linear sequence. Far from being an incidental residue of a pre-Darwinian time, hierarchy was intentionally built into the very core of Morgan's scientific comparative psychology.

Dogs do not demonstrate a human-like bias to defer to communicative cues

Human children and domesticated dogs learn from communicative cues, such as pointing, in highly similar ways. In two experiments, we investigate whether dogs are biased to defer to these cues in the same way as human children. We tested dogs on a cueing task similar to one previously conducted in human children. Dogs received conflicting information about the location of a treat from a Guesser and a Knower, who either used communicative cues (i.e., pointing; Experiments 1 and 2), non-communicative physical cues (i.e., a wooden marker; Experiment 1), or goal-directed actions (i.e., grasping; Experiment 2). Although human children tested previously struggled to override inaccurate information provided by the Guesser when she used communicative cues, in contrast to physical cues or goal-directed actions, dogs were more likely to override the Guesser's information when she used communicative cues or goal-directed actions than when she used non-communicative physical cues. Given that dogs did not show the same selective bias towards the Guesser's information in communicative contexts, these findings provide clear evidence that dogs do not demonstrate a human-like bias to defer to communicative cues. Instead, dogs may be more likely to critically evaluate information presented via communicative cues than either physical or non-communicative cues.

Metacognition in dogs: Do dogs know they could be wrong?

In the current study, we investigated the question of whether dogs were sensitive to the information that they themselves had or had not acquired. For this purpose, we conducted three consecutive experiments in which dogs had to find a reward that was hidden behind one of two V-shaped fences with a gap at the point of the V. This setup allowed us to distinguish between selecting one of the fences by walking around it and seeking additional information by checking through the gap in the fence. We varied whether dogs had visual access to the baiting procedure or not. In addition, we manipulated the type and quality of reward as well as the time delay between baiting and choosing to analyze if the dogs' searching behavior was affected. Our results were partly consistent with the findings of Call (Animal Cognition, 13 (5), 689-700, 2010) with great apes, on whose findings we based our experiments. We found that dogs checked more often through the corner of the V-shaped fence when they had not seen where the reward was hidden. Interestingly, dogs rewarded with toys selected the correct fence more often than dogs rewarded with food. Even though dogs' performance was not affected by the food quality condition, dogs were significantly faster in fetching a high-quality food reward as opposed to a low-quality food reward. When testing whether forgetting and checking would increase as a function of delay, we found that although dogs slightly decreased in their success in finding the food when time delays were longer, they were not more likely to check before choosing. We show that - similar to apes - dogs seek additional information in uncertain situations, but their behavior in uncertain situations is less flexible compared to great apes.

Using Experimental Research Designs to Explore the Scope of Cumulative Culture in Humans and Other Animals

In humans, cultural evolutionary processes are capable of shaping our cognition, because the conceptual tools we learn from others enable mental feats which otherwise would be beyond our capabilities. This is possible because human culture supports the intergenerational accumulation of skills and knowledge, such that later generations can benefit from the experience and exploration efforts of their predecessors. However, it remains unclear how exactly human social transmission supports the accumulation of advantageous traits, and why we see little evidence of this in the natural behavior of other species. Thus, it is difficult to know whether the cognitive abilities of other animals might be similarly scaffolded by processes of cultural evolution. In this article, I discuss how experimental studies of cultural evolution have contributed to our understanding of human cumulative culture, as well as some of the limitations of these approaches. I also discuss how similar research designs can be used to evaluate the potential for cumulative culture in other species. Such research may be able to clarify what distinguishes human cumulative culture from related phenomena in nonhumans, shedding light on the issue of whether other species also have the potential to develop cognitive capacities that are outcomes of cultural evolution.

Culture drives cognitive evolution by supporting the transmission and intergenerational accumulation of skills and knowledge, based on social learning and teaching: Later generations benefit from what their predecessors acquired. Taking a metaperspective on those experimental studies that explore the mechanisms underlying cultural transmission, Caldwell discusses their potential for generating valuable insights, their possible limitations, and their generalizability to other species.

Dissociable learning processes in comparative psychology

Comparative and cognitive psychologists interpret performance in different ways. Animal researchers invoke a dominant construct of associative learning. Human researchers acknowledge humans' capacity for explicit-declarative cognition. This article offers a way to bridge a divide that defeats productive cross-talk. We show that animals often challenge the associative-learning construct, and that it does not work to try to stretch the associative-learning construct to encompass these performances. This approach thins and impoverishes that important construct. We describe an alternative approach that restrains the construct of associative learning by giving it a clear operational definition. We apply this approach in several comparative domains to show that different task variants change-in concert-the level of awareness, the declarative nature of knowledge, the dimensional breadth of knowledge, and the brain systems that organize learning. These changes reveal dissociable learning processes that a unitary associative construct cannot explain but a neural-systems framework can explain. These changes define the limit of associative learning and the threshold of explicit cognition. The neural-systems framework can broaden empirical horizons in comparative psychology. It can offer animal models of explicit cognition to cognitive researchers and neuroscientists. It can offer simple behavioral paradigms for exploring explicit cognition to developmental researchers. It can enliven the synergy between human and animal research, promising a productive future for both.

The Development of Sociobiology in Relation to Animal Behavior Studies, 1946-1975

This paper aims at bridging a gap between the history of American animal behavior studies and the history of sociobiology. In the post-war period, ecology, comparative psychology and ethology were all investigating animal societies, using different approaches ranging from fieldwork to laboratory studies. We argue that this disunity in "practices of place" (Kohler, Robert E. Landscapes & Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) explains the attempts of dialogue between those three fields and early calls for unity through "sociobiology" by J. Paul Scott. In turn, tensions between the naturalist tradition and the rising reductionist approach in biology provide an original background for a history of Edward Wilson's own version of sociobiology, much beyond the William Hamilton's papers (Journal of Theoretical Biology 7: 1-16, 17-52, 1964) usually considered as its key antecedent. Naturalists were in a defensive position in the geography of the fields studying animal behavior, and in reaction were a driving force behind the various projects of synthesis called "sociobiology".

"Other minds than ours": a controversial discussion on the limits and possibilities of comparative psychology in the light of C. Lloyd Morgan's work

C. Lloyd Morgan is mostly known for Morgan's canon (An introduction to comparative psychology, Walter Scott, Limited, London, 1894), still a popular and frequently quoted principle in comparative psychology and ethology. There has been a fair amount of debate on the canon's interpretation, function, and value regarding the research on animal minds, usually referring to it as an isolated principle. In this paper we rather shed light on Morgan's overall scientific program and his vision for comparative psychology. We argue that within his program Morgan identified crucial conceptual, ontological, and methodical issues, that are still fundamental to the current research on animal minds. This also highlights a new aspect of his role as one of the "founding fathers" of modern comparative psychology. In order to understand Morgan's program, we briefly outline the historical context in which he began his work on a science of comparative psychology. We will then emphasize to what extent his taxonomy of psychological capacities, the development of his metaphysics for a comparative psychology, and his newly introduced interdisciplinary procedures justify Morgan's distinctive approach to still rather sensitive issues. In doing so, we aim to provide a more comprehensive picture of Morgan's methodological signature and we contend that a proper understanding of his canon can only be gained by taking it as part of this program. We finally understand his most renown considerations as part of his struggle to ascertain the limits and possibilities of the discipline he contributed to set up, and thus emphasize the need to keep the discussion going, notably on the accessibility of other minds than one's own and on the limits of one's research perspectives.

Formal models in animal-metacognition research: the problem of interpreting animals' behavior

Ongoing research explores whether animals have precursors to metacognition-that is, the capacity to monitor mental states or cognitive processes. Comparative psychologists have tested apes, monkeys, rats, pigeons, and a dolphin using perceptual, memory, foraging, and information-seeking paradigms. The consensus is that some species have a functional analog to human metacognition. Recently, though, associative modelers have used formal-mathematical models hoping to describe animals' "metacognitive" performances in associative-behaviorist ways. We evaluate these attempts to reify formal models as proof of particular explanations of animal cognition. These attempts misunderstand the content and proper application of models. They embody mistakes of scientific reasoning. They blur fundamental distinctions in understanding animal cognition. They impede theoretical development. In contrast, an energetic empirical enterprise is achieving strong success in describing the psychology underlying animals' metacognitive performances. We argue that this careful empirical work is the clear path to useful theoretical development. The issues raised here about formal modeling-in the domain of animal metacognition-potentially extend to biobehavioral research more broadly.

The detour paradigm in animal cognition

In this paper, we review one of the oldest paradigms used in animal cognition: the detour paradigm. The paradigm presents the subject with a situation where a direct route to the goal is blocked and a detour must be made to reach it. Often being an ecologically valid and a versatile tool, the detour paradigm has been used to study diverse cognitive skills like insight, social learning, inhibitory control and route planning. Due to the relative ease of administrating detour tasks, the paradigm has lately been used in large-scale comparative studies in order to investigate the evolution of inhibitory control. Here we review the detour paradigm and some of its cognitive requirements, we identify various ecological and contextual factors that might affect detour performance, we also discuss developmental and neurological underpinnings of detour behaviors, and we suggest some methodological approaches to make species comparisons more robust.

Building a Science of Animal Minds: Lloyd Morgan, Experimentation, and Morgan's Canon

Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936) is widely regarded as the father of modern comparative psychology. Yet, Morgan initially had significant doubts about whether a genuine science of comparative psychology was even possible, only later becoming more optimistic about our ability to make reliable inferences about the mental capacities of non-human animals. There has been a fair amount of disagreement amongst scholars of Morgan's work about the nature, timing, and causes of this shift in Morgan's thinking. We argue that Morgan underwent two quite different shifts of attitude towards the proper practice of comparative psychology. The first was a qualified acceptance of the Romanesian approach to comparative psychology that he had initially criticized. The second was a shift away from Romanes' reliance on systematizing anecdotal evidence of animal intelligence towards an experimental approach, focused on studying the development of behaviour. We emphasize the role of Morgan's evolving epistemological views in bringing about the first shift - in particular, his philosophy of science. We emphasize the role of an intriguing but overlooked figure in the history of comparative psychology in explaining the second shift, T. Mann Jones, whose correspondence with Morgan provided an important catalyst for Morgan's experimental turn, particularly the special focus on development. We also shed light on the intended function of Morgan's Canon, the methodological principle for which Morgan is now mostly known. The Canon can only be properly understood by seeing it in the context of Morgan's own unique experimental vision for comparative psychology.

The interplay between uncertainty monitoring and working memory: Can metacognition become automatic?

The uncertainty response has grounded the study of metacognition in nonhuman animals. Recent research has explored the processes supporting uncertainty monitoring in monkeys. It has revealed that uncertainty responding, in contrast to perceptual responding, depends on significant working memory resources. The aim of the present study was to expand this research by examining whether uncertainty monitoring is also working memory demanding in humans. To explore this issue, human participants were tested with or without a cognitive load on a psychophysical discrimination task that included either an uncertainty response (allowing the participant to decline difficult trials) or a middle-perceptual response (labeling the same intermediate trial levels). The results demonstrated that cognitive load reduced uncertainty responding, but increased middle responding. However, this dissociation between uncertainty and middle responding was only observed when participants either lacked training or had very little training with the uncertainty response. If more training was provided, the effect of load was small. These results suggest that uncertainty responding is resource demanding, but with sufficient training, human participants can respond to uncertainty either by using minimal working memory resources or by effectively sharing resources. These results are discussed in relation to the literature on animal and human metacognition.

Darwin, Hume, Morgan, and the verae causae of psychology

Charles Darwin and C. Lloyd Morgan forward two influential principles of cognitive ethological inference that yield conflicting results about the extent of continuity in the cognitive traits of humans and other animals. While these principles have been interpreted as reflecting commitments to different senses of parsimony, in fact, both principles result from the same vera causa inferential strategy, according to which "We ought to admit no more causes of natural things, than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances". Instead, the conflict stems from Darwin's and Morgan's views about the true causes of human psychology. Darwin holds a thoroughly Humean philosophy of the human mind, from which he infers significant continuity between human and animal minds. In contrast, Morgan argues that Humean cognitive mechanisms cannot account for a class of uniquely human behaviors, and therefore, he concludes that there is a significant discontinuity between human and animal cognition. This historical debate is informative for current controversies in comparative psychology.

Measurement Invariance Conventions and Reporting: The State of the Art and Future Directions for Psychological Research

Measurement invariance assesses the psychometric equivalence of a construct across groups or across time. Measurement noninvariance suggests that a construct has a different structure or meaning to different groups or on different measurement occasions in the same group, and so the construct cannot be meaningfully tested or construed across groups or across time. Hence, prior to testing mean differences across groups or measurement occasions (e.g., boys and girls, pretest and posttest), or differential relations of the construct across groups, it is essential to assess the invariance of the construct. Conventions and reporting on measurement invariance are still in flux, and researchers are often left with limited understanding and inconsistent advice. Measurement invariance is tested and established in different steps. This report surveys the state of measurement invariance testing and reporting, and details the results of a literature review of studies that tested invariance. Most tests of measurement invariance include configural, metric, and scalar steps; a residual invariance step is reported for fewer tests. Alternative fit indices (AFIs) are reported as model fit criteria for the vast majority of tests; χ² is reported as the single index in a minority of invariance tests. Reporting AFIs is associated with higher levels of achieved invariance. Partial invariance is reported for about one-third of tests. In general, sample size, number of groups compared, and model size are unrelated to the level of invariance achieved. Implications for the future of measurement invariance testing, reporting, and best practices are discussed.

Measurement Invariance Conventions and Reporting: The State of the Art and Future Directions for Psychological Research

Measurement invariance assesses the psychometric equivalence of a construct across groups or across time. Measurement noninvariance suggests that a construct has a different structure or meaning to different groups or on different measurement occasions in the same group, and so the construct cannot be meaningfully tested or construed across groups or across time. Hence, prior to testing mean differences across groups or measurement occasions (e.g., boys and girls, pretest and posttest), or differential relations of the construct across groups, it is essential to assess the invariance of the construct. Conventions and reporting on measurement invariance are still in flux, and researchers are often left with limited understanding and inconsistent advice. Measurement invariance is tested and established in different steps. This report surveys the state of measurement invariance testing and reporting, and details the results of a literature review of studies that tested invariance. Most tests of measurement invariance include configural, metric, and scalar steps; a residual invariance step is reported for fewer tests. Alternative fit indices (AFIs) are reported as model fit criteria for the vast majority of tests; χ² is reported as the single index in a minority of invariance tests. Reporting AFIs is associated with higher levels of achieved invariance. Partial invariance is reported for about one-third of tests. In general, sample size, number of groups compared, and model size are unrelated to the level of invariance achieved. Implications for the future of measurement invariance testing, reporting, and best practices are discussed.

Why Brains Are Not Computers, Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism, and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.

Blocking in rats, humans and snails using a within-subjects design

The present research investigated the blocking effect in three different species, rats, humans and snails in formally equivalent tasks using a within-subjects design. Experiment 1 demonstrated the blocking effect in a context-flavour aversive conditioning preparation in rats: Animals failed to associate a flavour with an illness episode when it was presented in a context in which the illness was already predicted by other cues. Experiment 2 replicated this blocking effect in humans assessing their ability to learn a goal location in a virtual environment: Participants failed to learn the location of the goal in reference to a spatial cue presented alongside other pre-trained spatial cues that already indicated its location. Finally, in Experiment 3, snails failed to associate an odour with the presentation of food in the presence of other odours that already reliably predicted its presentation. The present study offers a start point for systematic comparisons between vertebrate and invertebrate species in formally equivalent tasks that produce univocal demonstrations of the blocking effect.