Great ape gestures: intentional communication with a rich set of innate signals

Bared-teeth displays in bonobos (Pan paniscus): An assessment of the power asymmetry hypothesis

Facial expressions are key to navigating social group life. The Power Asymmetry Hypothesis of Motivational Emancipation predicts that the type of social organization shapes the meaning of communicative displays in relation to an individual's dominance rank. The bared-teeth (BT) display represents one of the most widely observed communicative signals across primate species. Studies in macaques indicate that the BT display in despotic species is often performed unidirectionally, from low- to high-ranking individuals (signaling submission), whereas the BT display in egalitarian species is usually produced irrespective of dominance (mainly signaling affiliation and appeasement). Despite its widespread presence, research connecting BT displays to the power asymmetry hypothesis outside the Macaca genus remains scarce. To extend this knowledge, we investigated the production of BT in relation to social dominance in dyadic interactions (N = 11,377 events) of 11 captive bonobos (Pan paniscus). Although adult bonobos were more despotic than previously suggested in the literature, BT displays were produced irrespective of dominance rank. Moreover, while adults produced the BT exclusively during socio-sexual interactions, especially during periods of social tension, immature bonobos produced the BT in a wider number of contexts. As such, the results indicate that the communicative meaning of the BT display is consistent with signaling appeasement, especially in periods of social tension. Moreover, the BT display does not seem to signal social status, supporting the prediction for species with a high degree of social tolerance. These results advance our understanding of the origins of communicative signals and their relation to species' social systems.

A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness

Most research on the neurobiology of language ignores consciousness and vice versa. Here, language, with an emphasis on inner speech, is hypothesised to generate and sustain self-awareness, i.e., higher-order consciousness. Converging evidence supporting this hypothesis is reviewed. To account for these findings, a 'HOLISTIC' model of neurobiology of language, inner speech, and consciousness is proposed. It involves a 'core' set of inner speech production regions that initiate the experience of feeling and hearing words. These take on affective qualities, deriving from activation of associated sensory, motor, and emotional representations, involving a largely unconscious dynamic 'periphery', distributed throughout the whole brain. Responding to those words forms the basis for sustained network activity, involving 'default mode' activation and prefrontal and thalamic/brainstem selection of contextually relevant responses. Evidence for the model is reviewed, supporting neuroimaging meta-analyses conducted, and comparisons with other theories of consciousness made. The HOLISTIC model constitutes a more parsimonious and complete account of the 'neural correlates of consciousness' that has implications for a mechanistic account of mental health and wellbeing.

Dialogic Book-Sharing as a Privileged Intersubjective Space

Parental reading to young children is well-established as being positively associated with child cognitive development, particularly their language development. Research indicates that a particular, "intersubjective," form of using books with children, "Dialogic Book-sharing" (DBS), is especially beneficial to infants and pre-school aged children, particularly when using picture books. The work on DBS to date has paid little attention to the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the approach. Here, we address the question of what processes taking place during DBS confer benefits to child development, and why these processes are beneficial. In a novel integration of evidence, ranging from non-human primate communication through iconic gestures and pointing, archaeological data on Pre-hominid and early human art, to experimental and naturalistic studies of infant attention, cognitive processing, and language, we argue that DBS entails core characteristics that make it a privileged intersubjective space for the promotion of child cognitive and language development. This analysis, together with the findings of DBS intervention studies, provides a powerful intellectual basis for the wide-scale promotion of DBS, especially in disadvantaged populations.

EXPRESS: Co-linguistic content inferences: From gestures to sound effects and emoji

Among other uses, co-speech gestures can contribute additional semantic content to the spoken utterances with which they coincide. A growing body of research is dedicated to understanding how inferences from gestures interact with logical operators in speech, including negation ("not"/"n't"), modals (e.g., "might"), and quantifiers (e.g., "each", "none", "exactly one"). A related but less-addressed question is what kinds of meaningful content other than gestures can evince this same behavior; this is in turn connected to the much broader question of what properties of gestures are responsible for how they interact with logical operators. We present two experiments investigating sentences with co-speech sound effects and co-text emoji in lieu of gestures, revealing a remarkably similar inference pattern to that of co-speech gestures. The results suggest that gestural inferences do not behave the way they do because of any traits specific to gestures, and that the inference pattern extends to a much broader range of content.

A socio-ecological perspective on the gestural communication of great ape species, individuals, and social units

Over the last 30 years, most research on non-human primate gestural communication has been produced by psychologists, which has shaped the questions asked and the methods used. These researchers have drawn on concepts from philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, and ethology, but despite these broad influences the field has neglected to situate gestures into the socio-ecological context in which the diverse species, individuals, and social-units exist. In this review, we present current knowledge about great ape gestural communication in terms of repertoires, meanings, and development. We fold this into a conversation about variation in other types of ape social behaviour to identify areas for future research on variation in gestural communication. Given the large variation in socio-ecological factors across species and social-units (and the individuals within these groups), we may expect to find different preferences for specific gesture types; different needs for communicating specific meanings; and different rates of encountering specific contexts. New tools, such as machine-learning based automated movement tracking, may allow us to uncover potential variation in the speed and form of gesture actions or parts of gesture actions. New multi-group multi-generational datasets provide the opportunity to apply analyses, such as Bayesian modelling, which allows us to examine these rich behavioural landscapes. Together, by expanding our questions and our methods, researchers may finally be able to study great ape gestures from the perspective of the apes themselves and explore what this gestural communication system reveals about apes’ thinking and experience of their world.

Inferential Communication: Bridging the Gap Between Intentional and Ostensive Communication in Non-human Primates

Communication, when defined as an act intended to affect the psychological state of another individual, demands the use of inference. Either the signaler, the recipient, or both must make leaps of understanding which surpass the semantic information available and draw from pragmatic clues to fully imbue and interpret meaning. While research into human communication and the evolution of language has long been comfortable with mentalistic interpretations of communicative exchanges, including rich attributions of mental state, research into animal communication has balked at theoretical models which describe mentalized cognitive mechanisms. We submit a new theoretical perspective on animal communication: the model of inferential communication. For use when existing proximate models of animal communication are not sufficient to fully explain the complex, flexible, and intentional communication documented in certain species, specifically non-human primates, we present our model as a bridge between shallower, less cognitive descriptions of communicative behavior and the perhaps otherwise inaccessible mentalistic interpretations of communication found in theoretical considerations of human language. Inferential communication is a framework that builds on existing evidence of referentiality, intentionality, and social inference in primates. It allows that they might be capable of applying social inferences to a communicative setting, which could explain some of the cognitive processes that enable the complexity and flexibility of primate communication systems. While historical models of animal communication focus on the means-ends process of behavior and apparent cognitive outcomes, inferential communication invites consideration of the mentalistic processes that must underlie those outcomes. We propose a mentalized approach to questions, investigations, and interpretations of non-human primate communication. We include an overview of both ultimate and proximate models of animal communication, which contextualize the role and utility of our inferential communication model, and provide a detailed breakdown of the possible levels of cognitive complexity which could be investigated using this framework. Finally, we present some possible applications of inferential communication in the field of non-human primate communication and highlight the role it could play in advancing progress toward an increasingly precise understanding of the cognitive capabilities of our closest living relatives.

Limb Preference in Animals: New Insights into the Evolution of Manual Laterality in Hominids

Until the 1990s, the notion of brain lateralization—the division of labor between the two hemispheres—and its more visible behavioral manifestation, handedness, remained fiercely defined as a human specific trait. Since then, many studies have evidenced lateralized functions in a wide range of species, including both vertebrates and invertebrates. In this review, we highlight the great contribution of comparative research to the understanding of human handedness’ evolutionary and developmental pathways, by distinguishing animal forelimb asymmetries for functionally different actions—i.e., potentially depending on different hemispheric specializations. Firstly, lateralization for the manipulation of inanimate objects has been associated with genetic and ontogenetic factors, with specific brain regions’ activity, and with morphological limb specializations. These could have emerged under selective pressures notably related to the animal locomotion and social styles. Secondly, lateralization for actions directed to living targets (to self or conspecifics) seems to be in relationship with the brain lateralization for emotion processing. Thirdly, findings on primates’ hand preferences for communicative gestures accounts for a link between gestural laterality and a left-hemispheric specialization for intentional communication and language. Throughout this review, we highlight the value of functional neuroimaging and developmental approaches to shed light on the mechanisms underlying human handedness.

Symbolic Signal Use in Wild Chimpanzee Gestural Communication?: A Theoretical Framework

Symbolic communication is not obvious in the natural communicative repertoires of our closest living relatives, the great apes. However, great apes do show symbolic competencies in laboratory studies. This includes the understanding and the use of human-provided abstract symbols. Given this evidence for the underlying ability, the apparent failure to make use of it in the wild is puzzling. We provide a theoretical framework for identifying basic forms of symbolic signal use in chimpanzee natural communication. In line with the laboratory findings, we concentrate on the most promising domain to investigate, namely gesture, and we provide a case study in this area. We suggest that evidence for basic symbolic signal use would consist of the presence of two key characteristics of symbolic communication, namely arbitrariness and conventionalization. Arbitrariness means that the linkage between the form of the gesture and its meaning shows no obvious logical or otherwise motivated connection. Conventionalization means that the gesture is shared at the group-level and is thus socially learned, not innate. Further, we discuss the emergence and transmission of these gestures. Demonstrating this basic form of symbolic signal use would indicate that the symbolic capacities revealed by laboratory studies also find their expression in the natural gestural communication of our closest living relatives, even if only to a limited extent. This theoretical article thus aims to contribute to our understanding of the developmental origins of great ape gestures, and hence, arguably, of human symbolic communication. It also has a very practical aim in that by providing clear criteria and by pointing out potential candidates for symbolic communication, we give fieldworkers useful prerequisites for identifying and analyzing signals which may demonstrate the use of great apes' symbolic capacities in the wild.

Major Evolutionary Transitions and the Roles of Facilitation and Information in Ecosystem Transformations

A small number of extraordinary “Major Evolutionary Transitions” (METs) have attracted attention among biologists. They comprise novel forms of individuality and information, and are defined in relation to organismal complexity, irrespective of broader ecosystem-level effects. This divorce between evolutionary and ecological consequences qualifies unicellular eukaryotes, for example, as a MET although they alone failed to significantly alter ecosystems. Additionally, this definition excludes revolutionary innovations not fitting into either MET type (e.g., photosynthesis). We recombine evolution with ecology to explore how and why entire ecosystems were newly created or radically altered – as Major System Transitions (MSTs). In doing so, we highlight important morphological adaptations that spread through populations because of their immediate, direct-fitness advantages for individuals. These are Major Competitive Transitions, or MCTs. We argue that often multiple METs and MCTs must be present to produce MSTs. For example, sexually-reproducing, multicellular eukaryotes (METs) with anisogamy and exoskeletons (MCTs) significantly altered ecosystems during the Cambrian. Therefore, we introduce the concepts of Facilitating Evolutionary Transitions (FETs) and Catalysts as key events or agents that are insufficient themselves to set a MST into motion, but are essential parts of synergies that do. We further elucidate the role of information in MSTs as transitions across five levels: (I) Encoded; (II) Epigenomic; (III) Learned; (IV) Inscribed; and (V) Dark Information. The latter is ‘authored’ by abiotic entities rather than biological organisms. Level IV has arguably allowed humans to produce a MST, and V perhaps makes us a FET for a future transition that melds biotic and abiotic life into one entity. Understanding the interactive processes involved in past major transitions will illuminate both current events and the surprising possibilities that abiotically-created information may produce.

Orangutans have larger gestural repertoires in captivity than in the wild-A case of weak innovation?

Whether nonhuman species can change their communicative repertoire in response to socio-ecological environments has critical implications for communicative innovativeness prior to the emergence of human language, with its unparalleled productivity. Here, we use a comparative sample of wild and zoo-housed orangutans of two species (Pongo abelii, Pongo pygmaeus) to assess the effect of the wild-captive contrast on repertoires of gestures and facial expressions. We find that repertoires on both the individual and population levels are larger in captive than in wild settings, regardless of species, age class, or sampling effort. In the more sociable Sumatran species, dominant use of signals toward single outcomes was also higher in captive settings. We thus conclude that orangutans exposed to more sociable and terrestrial conditions evince behavioral plasticity, in that they produce additional innate or innovated signals that are highly functionally specific. These findings suggest a latent capacity for innovativeness in these apes' communicative repertoires.

Sensitivity to the communicative partner's attentional state: A developmental study on mother-infant dyads in wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii)

Gestural communication permeates all domains of chimpanzees' social life and is intentional in use. However, we still have only limited information on how young apes develop the sociocognitive skills needed for intentional communication. In this cross-sectional study, we document the development of behavioral adjustment to the recipient's visual attention-considered a hallmark of intentional communication-in wild immature chimpanzees' gestural communication. We studied 11 immature chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii): three infants, four juveniles, and four adolescents gesturing towards their mother. We quantified silent-visual, audible, and contact gestures indexed to maternal visual attention and inattention. We investigated unimodal adjustment, defined by the capacity of young chimpanzees to deploy fewer silent-visual signals when their mothers did not show full visual attention towards them as compared with when they did. We then examined cross-modal adjustment, defined as the capacity of chimpanzees to deploy more audible-or-contact gestures than silent-visual gestures in the condition where their mothers did not show full visual attention as compared to when they did. Our results show a gradual decline in the use of silent-visual gestures when the mother is not visually attentive with increasing age. The absence of silent-visual gesture production toward a visually inattentive recipient (complete unimodal adjustment) was not fully in place until adolescence. Immature chimpanzees used more audible-or-contact gestures than silent-visual ones when their mothers did not show visual attention and vice-versa when they did. This cross-modal adjustment was expressed in juveniles and adolescents but not in infants. Overall, this study shows that infant chimpanzees were limited in their sensitivity to maternal attention when gesturing, whereas adolescent chimpanzees adjusted their communication appropriately. Juveniles present an intermediate pattern with cross-modal adjustment preceding unimodal adjustment and with variability in the age of onset.

The origin of language and relative roles of voice and gesture in early communication development

Both vocalization and gesture are universal modes of communication and fundamental features of language development. The gestural origins theory proposes that language evolved out of early gestural use. However, evidence reported here suggests vocalization is much more prominent in early human communication than gesture is. To our knowledge no prior research has investigated the rates of emergence of both gesture and vocalization across the first year in human infants. We evaluated the rates of gestures and speech-like vocalizations (protophones) in 10 infants at 4, 7, and 11 months of age using parent-infant laboratory recordings. We found that infant protophones outnumbered gestures substantially at all three ages, ranging from >35 times more protophones than gestures at 3 months, to >2.5 times more protophones than gestures at 11 months. The results suggest vocalization, not gesture, is the predominant mode of communication in human infants in the first year.

Chimpanzee facial gestures and the implications for the evolution of language

Great ape manual gestures are described as communicative, flexible, intentional, and goal-oriented. These gestures are thought to be an evolutionary pre-cursor to human language. Conversely, facial expressions are thought to be inflexible, automatic, and derived from emotion. However, great apes can make a wide range of movements with their faces, and they may possess the control needed to gesture with their faces as well as their hands. We examined whether chimpanzee facial expressions possess the four important gesture properties and how they compare to manual gestures. To do this, we quantified variables that have been previously described through largely qualitative means. Chimpanzee facial expressions met all four gesture criteria and performed remarkably similar to manual gestures. Facial gestures have implications for the evolution of language. If other mammals also show facial gestures, then the gestural origins of language may be much older than the human/great ape lineage.

Assessing joint commitment as a process in great apes

Many social animals interact jointly, but only humans experience a specific sense of obligation toward their co-participants, a joint commitment. However, joint commitment is not only a mental state but also a process that reveals itself in the coordination efforts deployed during entry and exit phases of joint action. Here, we investigated the presence and duration of such phases in N = 1,242 natural play and grooming interactions of captive chimpanzees and bonobos. The apes frequently exchanged mutual gaze and communicative signals prior to and after engaging in joint activities with conspecifics, demonstrating entry and exit phases comparable to those of human joint activities. Although rank effects were less clear, phases in bonobos were more moderated by friendship compared to phases in chimpanzees, suggesting bonobos were more likely to reflect patterns analogous to human “face management”. This suggests that joint commitment as process was already present in our last common ancestor with Pan.

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Great apes exchange signals and gaze before entering and exiting joint actions

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Joint action structure of both ape species resembles that of humans

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Coordinated joint action phases indicate an underlying joint commitment

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Social bonds affect joint action structure more in bonobos than in chimpanzees

Connecting primate gesture to the evolutionary roots of language: A systematic review

Comparative psychology provides important contributions to our understanding of the origins of human language. The presence of common features in human and nonhuman primate communication can be used to suggest the evolutionary trajectories of potential precursors to language. However, to do so effectively, our findings must be comparable across diverse species. This systematic review describes the current landscape of data available from studies of gestural communication in human and nonhuman primates that make an explicit connection to language evolution. We found a similar number of studies on human and nonhuman primates, but that very few studies included data from more than one species. As a result, evolutionary inferences remain restricted to comparison across studies. We identify areas of focus, bias, and apparent gaps within the field. Different domains have been studied in human and nonhuman primates, with relatively few nonhuman primate studies of ontogeny and relatively few human studies of gesture form. Diversity in focus, methods, and socio-ecological context fill important gaps and provide nuanced understanding, but only where the source of any difference between studies is transparent. Many studies provide some definition for their use of gesture; but definitions of gesture, and in particular, criteria for intentional use, are absent in the majority of human studies. We find systematic differences between human and nonhuman primate studies in the research scope, incorporation of other modalities, research setting, and study design. We highlight eight particular areas in a call to action through which we can strengthen our ability to investigate gestural communication's contribution within the evolutionary roots of human language.

Multicomponent and multisensory communicative acts in orang-utans may serve different functions

From early infancy, human face-to-face communication is multimodal, comprising a plethora of interlinked communicative and sensory modalities. Although there is also growing evidence for this in nonhuman primates, previous research rarely disentangled production from perception of signals. Consequently, the functions of integrating articulators (i.e. production organs involved in multicomponent acts) and sensory channels (i.e. modalities involved in multisensory acts) remain poorly understood. Here, we studied close-range social interactions within and beyond mother-infant pairs of Bornean and Sumatran orang-utans living in wild and captive settings, to examine use of and responses to multicomponent and multisensory communication. From the perspective of production, results showed that multicomponent acts were used more than the respective unicomponent acts when the presumed goal did not match the dominant outcome for a specific communicative act, and were more common among non-mother-infant dyads and Sumatran orang-utans. From the perception perspective, we found that multisensory acts were more effective than the respective unisensory acts, and were used more in wild compared to captive populations. We argue that multisensory acts primarily facilitate effectiveness, whereas multicomponent acts become relevant when interaction outcomes are less predictable. These different functions underscore the importance of distinguishing between production and perception in studies of communication.

Is Conceptual Diversity an Advantage for Scientific Inquiry? A Case Study on the Concept of 'Gesture' in Comparative Psychology

Growing scientific fields often involve multidisciplinary investigations in which the same concepts may have different meanings. Here, we examine the case of 'gesture' in comparative research to depict how conceptual diversity hidden by the label 'gesture' can lead to consistently divergent interpretations in humans and nonhuman primates. We show that definitions of 'gesture' drastically differ regarding the forms of a gesture and the cognitive processes inferred from it, and that these differences emerge from implicit assumptions which have pervasive consequences on the interpretations claimed by researchers. We then demonstrate that implicit assumptions about scientific concepts can be made explicit using a finite set of operational criteria. We argue that developing theoretical definitions systematically associated with operational conceptual boundaries would allow to tackle both the challenges of maintaining high internal coherence within studies and of improving comparability and replicability of scientific results. We thus offer an easy-to-implement conceptual tool that should help ground valid comparisons between studies and serve scientific inquiry.

The Method of Local Restriction: in search of potential great ape culture-dependent forms

Humans possess a perhaps unique type of culture among primates called cumulative culture. In this type of culture, behavioural forms cumulate changes over time, which increases their complexity and/or efficiency, eventually making these forms culture-dependent. As changes cumulate, culture-dependent forms become causally opaque, preventing the overall behavioural form from being acquired by individuals on their own; in other words, culture-dependent forms must be copied between individuals and across generations. Despite the importance of cumulative culture for understanding the evolutionary history of our species, how and when cumulative culture evolved is still debated. One of the challenges faced when addressing these questions is how to identify culture-dependent forms that result from cumulative cultural evolution. Here we propose a novel method to identify the most likely cases of culture-dependent forms. The 'Method of Local Restriction' is based on the premise that as culture-dependent forms are repeatedly transmitted via copying, these forms will unavoidably cumulate population-specific changes (due to copying error) and therefore must be expected to become locally restricted over time. When we applied this method to our closest living relatives, the great apes, we found that most known ape behavioural forms are not locally restricted (across domains and species) and thus are unlikely to be acquired via copying. Nevertheless, we found 25 locally restricted forms across species and domains, three of which appear to be locally unique (having been observed in a single population of a single species). Locally unique forms represent the best current candidates for culture-dependent forms in non-human great apes. Besides these rare exceptions, our results show that overall, ape cultures do not rely heavily on copying, as most ape behaviours appear across sites and/or species, rendering them unlikely to be culture-dependent forms resulting from cumulative cultural evolution. Yet, the locally restricted forms (and especially the three locally unique forms) identified by our method should be tested further for their potential reliance on copying social learning mechanisms (and in turn, for their potential culture-dependence). Future studies could use the Method of Local Restriction to investigate the existence of culture-dependent forms in other animal species and in the hominin archaeological record to estimate how widespread copying is in the animal kingdom and to postulate a timeline for the emergence of copying in our lineage.

Constructing a protolanguage: reconstructing prehistoric languages in a usage-based construction grammar framework

Construction grammar is an approach to language that posits that units and structures in language can be exhaustively described as pairings between form and meaning. These pairings are called constructions and can have different degrees of abstraction, i.e. they span the entire range from very concrete (armadillo, avocado) to very abstract constructions such as the ditransitive construction (I gave her a book). This approach has been applied to a wide variety of different areas of research in linguistics, such as how new constructions emerge and change historically. It has also been applied to investigate the evolutionary emergence of modern fully fledged language, i.e. the question of how systems of constructions can arise out of prelinguistic communication. In this paper, we review the contribution of usage-based construction grammar approaches to language change and language evolution to the questions of (i) the structure and nature of prehistoric languages and (ii) how constructions in prehistoric languages emerged out of non-linguistic or protolinguistic communication. In particular, we discuss the possibilities of using constructions as the main unit of analysis both in reconstructing predecessors of existing languages (protolanguages) and in formulating theories of how a potential predecessor of human language in general (protolanguage) must have looked like. This article is part of the theme issue 'Reconstructing prehistoric languages'.

The Referential Problem Space revisited: An ecological hypothesis of the evolutionary and developmental origins of pointing

Pointing by great apes poses a significant challenge to contemporary theories about the evolutionary and developmental foundations of cognitive development, because pointing has long been viewed by theoreticians as an evolved, human-unique developmental stepping-stone to linguistic reference. Although reports of pointing by great apes have existed in the scientific literature for over a century, only in recent decades has it become clear that ape pointing is definitely an intentionally communicative signal, by the same criteria we adjudge human pointing to be intentionally communicative. Theoretical responses to this changed empirical landscape have generally taken the approach of asserting, without any direct evidence (indeed, in the absence of any possibility of direct evidence), that pointing by humans is psychologically distinct from and more cognitively complex than the pointing of apes. It is commonplace in the contemporary literature to appeal to imaginary, species-unique causal factors to account for human pointing, rendering a large body of contemporary theoretical work untestable with scientific methods: scientific arguments require the public availability of core theoretical entities. In this paper, I will analyze the circumstances of pointing by apes and humans and develop an alternative theoretical model of pointing that does not rely upon non-physical constructs. According to the view espoused, here, pointing develops as a solution to a particular kind of developmental problem, characterized by (a) a developing capacity for tool use, (b) barriers to direct action, and (c) a history of caregiver responsiveness. Pointing by both apes and humans is explicable without invoking imaginary, mental causes. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Bonobos engage in joint commitment

Joint action is central to human nature, enabling collectives to achieve goals otherwise unreachable by individuals. It is enabled by humans' capacity to understand and engage in joint commitments. Joint commitments are evidenced when partners in interrupted joint actions reengage one another. To date, there is no clear evidence whether nonhuman animals understand joint commitment, suggesting that only humans experience it. Here, we revisit this claim by interrupting bonobos engaged in social activities. Bonobos reliably resumed the activity, and the likelihood of resumption was higher for social compared to solitary activities. Furthermore, communicative efforts deployed to suspend and resume social activities varied depending on partners' social relationships and interactive roles. Our results suggest that bonobos, like humans, engage in joint commitment and have some awareness of the social consequences of breaking it.

Just kidding: the evolutionary roots of playful teasing

Accounts of teasing have a long history in psychological and sociological research, yet teasing itself is vastly underdeveloped as a topic of study. As a phenomenon that moves along the border between aggression and play, teasing presents an opportunity to investigate key foundations of social and mental life. Developmental studies suggest that preverbal human infants already playfully tease their parents by performing 'the unexpected,' apparently deliberately violating the recipient's expectations to create a shared humorous experience. Teasing behaviour may be phylogenetically old and perhaps an evolutionary precursor to joking. In this review, we present preliminary evidence suggesting that non-human primates also exhibit playful teasing. In particular, we argue that great apes display three types of playful teasing described in preverbal human infants: teasing with offer and withdrawal, provocative non-compliance and disrupting others' activities. We highlight the potential of this behaviour to provide a window into complex socio-cognitive processes such as attribution of others' expectations and, finally, we propose directions for future research and call for systematic studies of teasing behaviour in non-human primates.

Spontaneous (minimal) ritual in non-human great apes?

The potential for rituals in non-human great apes (apes) is an understudied topic. We derive a minimal definition of ritual and then examine the currently available evidence for it in untrained and non-enculturated apes. First, we examine whether such apes show evidence for the two main components of our minimal definition of ritual: symbolism and copying. Second, we examine if there are actual cases already identifiable today that may fit all aspects of our minimal definition of ritual-or whether there are at least cases that fit some aspects (proto-ritual). We find that apes are not likely to spontaneously practise minimal ritual, but we claim that the highest expected likelihood of occurrence is in the results-copying domain. Yet, we did not find actual cases of minimal ritual in apes-including those involving environmental results. We did, however, find some cases that may match at least part of our minimal ritual definition-which we termed proto-ritual. At least two out of three potential cases of such proto-rituals that we identified (rain dance, object-in-ear and surplus nest-making procedures) do revolve around results. Overall, apes do not show much, or very clear, evidence for even minimal ritual, but may sometimes show proto-ritual. However, dedicated ape ritual studies are currently lacking, and future work may identify ape ritual (or clearer cases of proto-ritual). We discuss the implications of our preliminary finding for inferences of ritual in the last common ancestor of humans and apes. This article is part of the theme issue 'Ritual renaissance: new insights into the most human of behaviours'.

Red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus) adapt their interspecific gestural communication to the recipient's behaviour

Sensitivity to recipient’s attention and responsiveness are critical markers of intentional communication. Although previous research showed that ape gestures can be intentional, few studies have yet addressed this question concerning monkeys. Here, we characterise the effect of a recipient’s presence, attentional state and responsiveness on the interspecific gestural communication of captive red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus). Previous reports showed that they produced learnt begging gestures towards a human recipient preferentially when the latter was facing them. We used here a novel setup that allows subjects to move around an experimenter and to use different modalities (visual and acoustic) to communicate. We found that when the recipient was not facing them, mangabeys moved to a position in the visual field of their recipient rather than using attention-getters. Interestingly, unlike apes, they did not elaborate their communication visually or acoustically when the experimenter did not respond favourably to their begging. However, our results may suggest that begging gestures were goal-directed, since mangabeys inhibited them when the experimenter was not available to answer immediately (i.e. give a reward). Overall, red-capped mangabeys’ interspecific visual communication presented intentionality features, but their use of begging gestures was less flexible than that of great apes in similar situations.

The evolutionary origins of natural pedagogy: Rhesus monkeys show sustained attention following nonsocial cues versus social communicative signals

The natural pedagogy hypothesis proposes that human infants preferentially attend to communicative signals from others, facilitating rapid cultural learning. In this view, sensitivity to such signals is a uniquely human adaptation and as such nonhuman animals should not produce or utilize these communicative signals. We test these evolutionary predictions by examining sensitivity to communicative cues in 206 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) using an expectancy looking time task modeled on prior work with infants. Monkeys observed a human actor who either made eye contact and vocalized to the monkey (social cue), or waved a fruit in front of her face and produced a tapping sound (nonsocial cue). The actor then either looked at an object (referential look) or looked toward empty space (look away). We found that, unlike human infants in analogous situations, rhesus monkeys looked longer at events following nonsocial cues, regardless of the demonstrator's subsequent looking behavior. Moreover younger and older monkeys showed similar patterns of responses across development. These results provide support for the natural pedagogy hypothesis, while also highlighting evolutionary changes in human sensitivity to communicative signals.

Crossing the Rubicon: Behaviorism, Language, and Evolutionary Continuity

Euan Macphail's work and ideas captured a pivotal time in the late 20th century when behavioral laws were considered to apply equally across vertebrates, implying equal intelligence, but it was also a time when behaviorism was challenged by the view that language was unique to humans, and bestowed a superior mental status. Subsequent work suggests greater continuity between humans and their forebears, challenging the Chomskyan assumption that language evolved in a single step ("the great leap forward") in humans. Language is now understood to be based on an amalgam of cognitive functions, including mental time travel, theory of mind, and what may be more broadly defined as imagination. These functions probably evolved gradually in hominin evolution and are present in varying degrees in non-human species. The blending of language into cognition provides for both interspecies differences in mental function, and continuity between humans and other species. What does seem to be special to humans is the ability to communicate the contents of imagination, although even this is not absolute, and is perhaps less adaptive than we like to think.

Must all signals be evolved? A proposal for a new classification of communicative acts

While signals in evolutionary biology are usually defined as "acts or traits that have evolved because of their effect on others", work on gestures and vocalizations in various animal taxa have revealed population- or even individual-specific meanings of social signals. These results strongly suggest that communicative acts that are like signals with regard to both form and function (meaning) can also be acquired ontogenetically, and we discuss direct evidence for such plasticity in captive settings with rich opportunities for repeated social interactions with the same individuals. Therefore, in addition to evolved signals, we can recognize invented signals that are acquired during ontogeny (either through ontogenetic ritualization or social transmission). Thus, both gestures and vocalizations can be inventions or innate adaptations. We therefore propose to introduce innate versus invented signals as major distinct categories, with invented signals subdivided into dyad-specific and cultural signals. We suggest that elements of some signals may have mixed origins, and propose criteria to recognize acquired features of signals. We also suggest that invented signals may be most common in species with intentional communication, consistent with their ubiquity in humans, and that the ability to produce them was a necessary condition for the evolution of language. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Linguistics > Evolution of Language Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition

Mammals living in more complex social groups typically have large brains for their body size and many researchers have proposed that the primary driver of the increase in brain size through primate and hominin evolution was the selection pressures associated with sociality. Many mammals, and especially primates, use flexible signals that show a high degree of voluntary control and these signals may play an important role in forming and maintaining social relationships between group members. However, the specific role that cognitive skills play in this complex communication, and how in turn this relates to sociality, is still unclear. The hypothesis for the communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition posits that cognitive demands behind the communication needed to form and maintain bonded social relationships in complex social settings drives the link between brain size and sociality. We review the evidence in support of this hypothesis and why key features of cognitively complex communication such as intentionality and referentiality should be more effective in forming and maintaining bonded relationships as compared with less cognitively complex communication. Exploring the link between cognition, communication and sociality provides insights into how increasing flexibility in communication can facilitate the emergence of social systems characterised by bonded social relationships, such as those found in non-human primates and humans. To move the field forward and carry out both within- and among-species comparisons, we advocate the use of social network analysis, which provides a novel way to describe and compare social structure. Using this approach can lead to a new, systematic way of examining social and communicative complexity across species, something that is lacking in current comparative studies of social structure.

Context-sensitive adjustment of pointing in great apes

Great apes are able to request objects from humans by pointing. It is unclear, however, whether this is an associated response to a certain set of cues (e.g. the presence and attention of a human addressee) or a communicative signal which can be adjusted to relevant aspects of the spatial and social context. In three experiments, we tested captive great apes’ flexible use of pointing gestures. We manipulated the communicative context so that the default pointing response of apes would have indicated an undesired object, either due to 1) the spatial arrangements of the target objects, 2) the perspective of the addressee or 3) the knowledge of the addressee about the target objects’ location. The results of the three experiments indicate that great apes can successfully adjust their pointing to the spatial configuration of the referent environment such as distance and location of food. However, we found no evidence that they take the perspective or the knowledge of the addressee into account when doing so. This implies that pointing in great apes is a context-sensitive, but maybe less versatile, communicative signal compared to human pointing.

Scratching beneath the surface: intentionality in great ape signal production

Despite important similarities having been found between human and animal communication systems, surprisingly little research effort has focussed on whether the cognitive mechanisms underpinning these behaviours are also similar. In particular, it is highly debated whether signal production is the result of reflexive processes, or can be characterized as intentional. Here, we critically evaluate the criteria that are used to identify signals produced with different degrees of intentionality, and discuss recent attempts to apply these criteria to the vocal, gestural and multimodal communicative signals of great apes and more distantly related species. Finally, we outline the necessary research tools, such as physiologically validated measures of arousal, and empirical evidence that we believe would propel this debate forward and help unravel the evolutionary origins of human intentional communication. This article is part of the theme issue 'What can animal communication teach us about human language?'

Social and ecological complexity is associated with gestural repertoire size of wild chimpanzees

Increasing our understanding of primate gestural communication can provide new insights into language evolution. A key question in primate communication is the association between the social relationships of primates and their repertoire of gestures. Such analyses can reveal how primates use their repertoire of gestural communication to maintain their networks of family and friends, much as humans use language to maintain their social networks. In this study we examined the association between the repertoire of gestures (overall, manual and bodily gestures, and gestures of different modalities) and social bonds (presence of reciprocated grooming), coordinated behaviors (travel, resting, co‐feeding), and the complexity of ecology (e.g. noise, illumination) and sociality (party size, audience), in wild East African chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii). A larger repertoire size of manual, visual gestures was associated with the presence of a relationship based on reciprocated grooming and increases in social complexity. A smaller repertoire of manual tactile gestures occurred when the relationship was based on reciprocated grooming. A smaller repertoire of bodily gestures occurred between partners who jointly traveled for longer. Whereas gesture repertoire size was associated with social complexity, complex ecology also influenced repertoire size. The evolution of a large repertoire of manual, visual gestures may have been a key factor that enabled larger social groups to emerge during evolution. Thus, the evolution of the larger brains in hominins may have co‐occurred with an increase in the cognitive complexity underpinning gestural communication and this, in turn, may have enabled hominins to live in more complex social groups.

Becoming human: human infants link language and cognition, but what about the other great apes?

Human language has no parallel elsewhere in the animal kingdom. It is unique not only for its structural complexity but also for its inextricable interface with core cognitive capacities such as object representation, object categorization and abstract rule learning. Here, we (i) review recent evidence documenting how (and how early) language interacts with these core cognitive capacities in the mind of the human infant, and (ii) consider whether this link exists in non-human great apes-our closest genealogical cousins. Research with human infants demonstrates that well before they begin to speak, infants have already forged a link between language and core cognitive capacities. Evident by just three months of age, this language-cognition link unfolds in a rich developmental cascade, with each advance providing the foundation for subsequent, more precise and more powerful links. This link supports our species' capacity to represent and convey abstract concepts and to communicate beyond the immediate here and now. By contrast, although the communication systems of great apes are sophisticated in their own right, there is no conclusive evidence that apes establish reference, convey information declaratively or pass down communicative devices via cultural transmission. Thus, the evidence currently available reinforces the uniqueness of human language and the power of its interface to cognition. This article is part of the theme issue 'What can animal communication teach us about human language?'

Responses to dead and dying conspecifics and heterospecifics by wild mountain gorillas (Gorilla beringei beringei) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii)

Comparative ["evolutionary")] thanatology is devoted to investigating how animals respond to signs of death and dying, in conspecifics and other species. Responses to corpses often involve fear and confusion, and "deceased infant carrying" by females is widespread in nonhuman primates. Such behavior could result from "animacy detection malfunctions" (Gonçalves and Biro in Philos Trans R Soc (B) 373:20170263, 2018): corpses have attributes of animate agents, but-like objects-they do not act, but instead are acted upon by outside forces. Many or most nonhuman primates have core cognitive mechanisms for detecting animacy, but these might not resolve this paradox. Skeletons of conspecifics, seriously injured or ill individuals behaving oddly and not responding as expected to social acts and signals, and corpses, skeletons, and sick or injured individuals belonging to other species could trigger milder animacy detection malfunctions. A central question is whether any nonhuman primates learn from experience that death involves permanent loss of biological functionality and is universal. The relevant literature is mostly anecdotal or devoted to case studies, and this question is open. In response to calls for more information, I describe 25 cases of responses to corpses, skeletons, and mortally injured or ill individuals, both conspecifics and heterospecifics, seen during fieldwork on mountain gorillas (Gorilla beringei beringei) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii). Observations were generally consistent with the animacy detection malfunction hypothesis, although cases of prolonged deceased infant carrying are problematic. Also, one case in gorillas apparently involved sympathetic concern for a dying individual, and sympathetic concern might have occurred in a chimpanzee case.

Language, Memory, and Mental Time Travel: An Evolutionary Perspective

Language could not exist without memory, in all its forms: working memory for sequential production and understanding, implicit memory for grammatical rules, semantic memory for knowledge, and episodic memory for communicating personal experience. Episodic memory is part of a more general capacity for mental travel both forward and backward in time, and extending even into fantasy and stories. I argue that the generativity of mental time travel underlies the generativity of language itself, and could be the basis of what Chomsky calls I-language, or universal grammar (UG), a capacity for recursive thought independent of communicative language itself. Whereas Chomsky proposed that I-language evolved in a single step well after the emergence of Homo sapiens, I suggest that generative imagination, extended in space and time, has a long evolutionary history, and that it was the capacity to share internal thoughts, rather than the nature of the thoughts themselves, that more clearly distinguishes humans from other species.

Gesturing towards the future: cognition, big data, and the future of comparative gesture research

The field of ape gesture research has grown significantly in the past two decades, but progress on the question of gesture development has been limited by methodological and terminological disagreements, small sample sizes, and a lack of fine-grained longitudinal data. The main theories of gesture acquisition are often portrayed as mutually exclusive, but only some theories actually detail learning mechanisms, and differences in the level of analysis may help explain some of the apparent disagreements. Gesture research would benefit greatly from the articulation of more testable hypotheses. We propose two hypotheses that follow from dominant theories of gesture acquisition. We urge scholars to collect new data and leverage existing data in ways that maximize the potential for comparison across datasets and articulation with studies of other communicative modalities. Finally, we advocate for a transition away from using intentionality as a marker of the 'special status' of gesture, and towards using gesture as a window onto the lives and minds of apes.

A gestural repertoire of 1- to 2-year-old human children: in search of the ape gestures

When we compare human gestures to those of other apes, it looks at first like there is nothing much to compare at all. In adult humans, gestures are thought to be a window into the thought processes accompanying language, and sign languages are equal to spoken language with all of its features. Some research firmly emphasises the differences between human gestures and those of other apes; however, the question about whether there are any commonalities is rarely investigated, and has mostly been confined to pointing gestures. The gestural repertoires of nonhuman ape species have been carefully studied and described with regard to their form and function-but similar approaches are much rarer in the study of human gestures. This paper applies the methodology commonly used in the study of nonhuman ape gestures to the gestural communication of human children in their second year of life. We recorded (n = 13) children's gestures in a natural setting with peers and caregivers in Germany and Uganda. Children employed 52 distinct gestures, 46 (89%) of which are present in the chimpanzee repertoire. Like chimpanzees, they used them both singly, and in sequences, and employed individual gestures flexibly towards different goals.

Gestural acquisition in great apes: the Social Negotiation Hypothesis

Scientific interest in the acquisition of gestural signalling dates back to the heroic figure of Charles Darwin. More than a hundred years later, we still know relatively little about the underlying evolutionary and developmental pathways involved. Here, we shed new light on this topic by providing the first systematic, quantitative comparison of gestural development in two different chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes verus and Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) subspecies and communities living in their natural environments. We conclude that the three most predominant perspectives on gestural acquisition-Phylogenetic Ritualization, Social Transmission via Imitation, and Ontogenetic Ritualization-do not satisfactorily explain our current findings on gestural interactions in chimpanzees in the wild. In contrast, we argue that the role of interactional experience and social exposure on gestural acquisition and communicative development has been strongly underestimated. We introduce the revised Social Negotiation Hypothesis and conclude with a brief set of empirical desiderata for instigating more research into this intriguing research domain.

Multimodal communication and language origins: integrating gestures and vocalizations

The presence of divergent and independent research traditions in the gestural and vocal domains of primate communication has resulted in major discrepancies in the definition and operationalization of cognitive concepts. However, in recent years, accumulating evidence from behavioural and neurobiological research has shown that both human and non-human primate communication is inherently multimodal. It is therefore timely to integrate the study of gestural and vocal communication. Herein, we review evidence demonstrating that there is no clear difference between primate gestures and vocalizations in the extent to which they show evidence for the presence of key language properties: intentionality, reference, iconicity and turn-taking. We also find high overlap in the neurobiological mechanisms producing primate gestures and vocalizations, as well as in ontogenetic flexibility. These findings confirm that human language had multimodal origins. Nonetheless, we note that in great apes, gestures seem to fulfil a carrying (i.e. predominantly informative) role in close-range communication, whereas the opposite holds for face-to-face interactions of humans. This suggests an evolutionary shift in the carrying role from the gestural to the vocal stream, and we explore this transition in the carrying modality. Finally, we suggest that future studies should focus on the links between complex communication, sociality and cooperative tendency to strengthen the study of language origins.

Orangutans' Comprehension of Zoo Keepers' Communicative Signals

Zoological institutions often encourage cooperative interactions between keepers and animals so as to promote animals' welfare. One useful technique has been conditioning training, whereby animals learn to respond to keepers' requests, which facilitates a number of, otherwise sensitive, daily routines. As various media have been used to convey keepers' instructions, the question remains of which modality is best to promote mutual understanding. Here, we explored this question with two captive female orangutans. In the first experiment, we compared orangutans' understanding of previously acquired instructions when those were performed with verbal signals only, gazes only, gestures only, and when all those modalities were combined. Our results showed that gestures were sufficient for successful comprehension by these two apes. In the second experiment, we asked whether this preference could be driven by the non-arbitrary relationship that gestures bear to what they refer to, through iconicity or pointing. Our results revealed that neither iconicity nor pointing helped the subjects comprehend the keepers' instructions. Our results indicate a preference for instructions given through gestural signals in two captive female orangutans, although its cause remains elusive. Future practice may encourage the use of gestures in communication between keepers and orangutans in general or potentially other animals.

Linguistic inferences without words

Contemporary semantics has uncovered a sophisticated typology of linguistic inferences, characterized by their conversational status and their behavior in complex sentences. This typology is usually thought to be specific to language and in part lexically encoded in the meanings of words. We argue that it is neither. Using a method involving "composite" utterances that include normal words alongside novel nonlinguistic iconic representations (gestures and animations), we observe successful "one-shot learning" of linguistic meanings, with four of the main inference types (implicatures, presuppositions, supplements, homogeneity) replicated with gestures and animations. The results suggest a deeper cognitive source for the inferential typology than usually thought: Domain-general cognitive algorithms productively divide both linguistic and nonlinguistic information along familiar parts of the linguistic typology.