Neural correlates of depth of strategic reasoning in medial prefrontal cortex

Neural mechanisms mediating degrees of strategic uncertainty

In social interactions, strategic uncertainty arises when the outcome of one’s choice depends on the choices of others. An important question is whether strategic uncertainty can be resolved by assessing subjective probabilities to the counterparts’ behavior, as if playing against nature, and thus transforming the strategic interaction into a risky (individual) situation. By means of functional magnetic resonance imaging with human participants we tested the hypothesis that choices under strategic uncertainty are supported by the neural circuits mediating choices under individual risk and deliberation in social settings (i.e. strategic thinking). Participants were confronted with risky lotteries and two types of coordination games requiring different degrees of strategic thinking of the kind ‘I think that you think that I think etc.’ We found that the brain network mediating risk during lotteries (anterior insula, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex) is also engaged in the processing of strategic uncertainty in games. In social settings, activity in this network is modulated by the level of strategic thinking that is reflected in the activity of the dorsomedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These results suggest that strategic uncertainty is resolved by the interplay between the neural circuits mediating risk and higher order beliefs (i.e. beliefs about others’ beliefs).

Computational neuroscience approaches to social cognition

How do we form impressions of people and groups and use these representations to guide our actions? From its inception, social neuroscience has sought to illuminate such complex forms of social cognition, and recently these efforts have been invigorated by the use of computational modeling. Computational modeling provides a framework for delineating specific processes underlying social cognition and relating them to neural activity and behavior. We provide a primer on the computational modeling approach and describe how it has been used to elucidate psychological and neural mechanisms of impression formation, social learning, moral decision making, and intergroup bias.

Social interaction recruits mentalizing and reward systems in middle childhood

Social cognition develops in the context of reciprocal social interaction. However, most neuroimaging studies of mentalizing have used noninteractive tasks that may fail to capture important aspects of real-world mentalizing. In adults, social-interactive context modulates activity in regions linked to social cognition and reward, but few interactive studies have been done with children. The current fMRI study examines children aged 8-12 using a novel paradigm in which children believed they were interacting online with a peer. We compared mental and non-mental state reasoning about a live partner (Peer) versus a story character (Character), testing the effects of mentalizing and social interaction in a 2 × 2 design. Mental versus Non-Mental reasoning engaged regions identified in prior mentalizing studies, including the temporoparietal junction, superior temporal sulcus, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, peer interaction, even in conditions without explicit mentalizing demands, activated many of the same mentalizing regions. Peer interaction also activated areas outside the traditional mentalizing network, including the reward system. Our results demonstrate that social interaction engages multiple neural systems during middle childhood and contribute further evidence that social-interactive paradigms are needed to fully capture how the brain supports social processing in the real world.

Let's chat: developmental neural bases of social motivation during real-time peer interaction

Humans are motivated to interact with each other, but the neural bases of social motivation have been predominantly examined in non-interactive contexts. Understanding real-world social motivation is of special importance during middle childhood (ages 8-12), a period when social skills improve, social networks grow, and social brain networks specialize. To assess interactive social motivation, the current study used a novel fMRI paradigm in which children believed they were chatting with a peer. The design targeted two phases of interaction: (1) Initiation, in which children engaged in a social bid via sharing a like or hobby, and (2) Reply, in which children received either an engaged ("Me too") or non-engaged ("I'm away") reply from the peer. On control trials, children were told that their answers were not shared and that they would receive either engaged ("Matched") or non-engaged ("Disconnected") replies from the computer. Results indicated that during Initiation and Reply, key components of reward circuitry (e.g., ventral striatum) were more active for the peer than the computer trials. In addition, during Reply, social cognitive regions were more activated by the peer, and this social cognitive specialization increased with age. Finally, the effect of engagement type on reward circuitry activation was larger for social than non-social trials, indicating developmental sensitivity to social contingency. These findings demonstrate that both reward and social cognitive brain systems support real-time social interaction in middle childhood. An interactive approach to understanding social reward has implications for clinical disorders, where social motivation is more affected in real-world contexts.

Causal evidence for task-specific involvement of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in human social cognition

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is a key hub of the 'social brain', but little is known about specific processes supported by this region. Using focal high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) and a social cognitive battery with differing demands on self-other processing, we demonstrate specific involvement of the dmPFC in tasks placing high demands on self-other processing. Specifically, excitatory (anodal) HD-tDCS enhanced the integration of external information into the self for explicit higher-order socio-cognitive tasks across cognitive domains; i.e. visual perspective taking (VPT) and episodic memory. These effects were task specific, as no stimulation effects were found for attributing mental states from the eyes or implicit VPT. Inhibitory (cathodal) HD-tDCS had weaker effects in the opposite direction towards reduced integration of external information into the self. We thus demonstrate for the first time a specific and causal role of the dmPFC in integrating higher-order information from others/external source into that of the self across cognitive domains.

The effect of oxytocin on group formation and strategic thinking in men

Decision-making in groups is a remarkable and decisive element of human societies. Humans are able to organize themselves in groups, engage in collaborative decision-making processes and arrive at a binding agreement, even in the absence of unanimous consent. However, the transfer of decision-making autonomy requires a willingness to deliberately expose oneself to the decisions of others. A lack of trust in the abilities of others or of the underlying decision-making process, i.e. public trust, can lead to a breakdown of organizations in political or economic domains. Recent studies indicate that the biological basis of trust on an individual level is related to Oxytocin, an endogenous neuropeptide and hormone, which is also associated with pro-social behavior and positive conflict resolution. However, little is known about the effects of Oxytocin on the inclination of individuals to form or join groups and to deliberately engage in collaborative decision-making processes. Here, we show that intranasal administration of Oxytocin (n = 60) compared to placebo (n = 60) in males causes an adverse effect on the choice for forming groups in the presence of a competitive environment. In particular, Oxytocin negatively affects the willingness to work collaboratively in a p-Beauty contest game, whereas the effect is most pronounced for participants with relatively high strategic sophistication. Since our data provide initial evidence that Oxytocin has a positive effect on strategic thinking and performance in the p-Beauty contest game, we argue that the adverse effect on group formation might be rooted in an enhanced strategic sophistication of participants treated with Oxytocin.

"Betting on nature" or "betting on others": anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy

Uncertainty in the form of risk or ambiguity can arise from the interaction with nature and other players, while strategic uncertainty arises only in interactions with others. Here, we systematically compare binary decisions between a safe option and a potentially higher paying but uncertain option in four experimental conditions with the same potential monetary outcomes: coordination vs. anti coordination games, as well as risky and ambiguous lotteries. In each condition, we progressively increase the value of the safe option and measure subjects’ certainty equivalents (i.e., the specific safe payoff-threshold that makes a subject indifferent between the two options). We find that anti-coordination games and ambiguous lotteries elicit equally high aversion to uncertainty, relative to the other domains. In spite of this similarity, we find that subjects alternate between the safe and uncertain options much more frequently, thus displaying higher entropy, under anti-coordination relative to any of the other environments. These differences are predicted by theories of recursive reasoning in strategic games (e.g., thinking what others think we think etc.). Indeed, this can occur when interacting with intentional counterparts, but not with nature.

Profiling Online Poker Players: Are Executive Functions Correlated with Poker Ability and Problem Gambling?

Poker playing and responsible gambling both entail the use of the executive functions (EF), which are higher-level cognitive abilities. This study investigated if online poker players of different ability showed different performances in their EF and if so, which functions were the most discriminating for their playing ability. Furthermore, it assessed if the EF performance was correlated to the quality of gambling, according to self-reported questionnaires (PGSI, SOGS, GRCS). Three poker experts evaluated anonymized poker hand history files and, then, a trained professional administered an extensive neuropsychological test battery. Data analysis determined which variables of the tests correlated with poker ability and gambling quality scores. The highest correlations between EF test results and poker ability and between EF test results and gambling quality assessment showed that mostly different clusters of executive functions characterize the profile of the strong(er) poker player and those ones of the problem gamblers (PGSI and SOGS) and the one of the cognitions related to gambling (GRCS). Taking into consideration only the variables overlapping between PGSI and SOGS, we found some key predictive factors for a more risky and harmful online poker playing: a lower performance in the emotional intelligence competences (Emotional Quotient inventory Short) and, in particular, those grouped in the Intrapersonal scale (emotional self-awareness, assertiveness, self-regard, independence and self-actualization).

Neural congruence between intertemporal and interpersonal self-control: Evidence from delay and social discounting

Behavioral studies using delay and social discounting as indices of self-control and altruism, respectively, have revealed functional similarities between farsighted and social decisions. However, neural evidence for this functional link is lacking. Twenty-five young adults completed a delay and social discounting task during fMRI scanning. A spatiotemporal partial least squares analysis revealed that both forms of discounting were well characterized by a pattern of brain activity in areas comprising frontoparietal control, default, and mesolimbic reward networks. Both forms of discounting appear to draw on common neurocognitive mechanisms, regardless of whether choices involve intertemporal or interpersonal outcomes. We also observed neural profiles differentiating between high and low discounters. High discounters were well characterized by increased medial temporal lobe and limbic activity. In contrast, low discount rates were associated with activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and right temporoparietal junction. This pattern may reflect biological mechanisms underlying behavioral heterogeneity in discount rates.

Your perspective and my benefit: multiple lesion models of self-other integration strategies during social bargaining

Recursive social decision-making requires the use of flexible, context-sensitive long-term strategies for negotiation. To succeed in social bargaining, participants' own perspectives must be dynamically integrated with those of interactors to maximize self-benefits and adapt to the other's preferences, respectively. This is a prerequisite to develop a successful long-term self-other integration strategy. While such form of strategic interaction is critical to social decision-making, little is known about its neurocognitive correlates. To bridge this gap, we analysed social bargaining behaviour in relation to its structural neural correlates, ongoing brain dynamics (oscillations and related source space), and functional connectivity signatures in healthy subjects and patients offering contrastive lesion models of neurodegeneration and focal stroke: behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer's disease, and frontal lesions. All groups showed preserved basic bargaining indexes. However, impaired self-other integration strategy was found in patients with behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia and frontal lesions, suggesting that social bargaining critically depends on the integrity of prefrontal regions. Also, associations between behavioural performance and data from voxel-based morphometry and voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping revealed a critical role of prefrontal regions in value integration and strategic decisions for self-other integration strategy. Furthermore, as shown by measures of brain dynamics and related sources during the task, the self-other integration strategy was predicted by brain anticipatory activity (alpha/beta oscillations with sources in frontotemporal regions) associated with expectations about others' decisions. This pattern was reduced in all clinical groups, with greater impairments in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia and frontal lesions than Alzheimer's disease. Finally, connectivity analysis from functional magnetic resonance imaging evidenced a fronto-temporo-parietal network involved in successful self-other integration strategy, with selective compromise of long-distance connections in frontal disorders. In sum, this work provides unprecedented evidence of convergent behavioural and neurocognitive signatures of strategic social bargaining in different lesion models. Our findings offer new insights into the critical roles of prefrontal hubs and associated temporo-parietal networks for strategic social negotiation.

Medial prefrontal cortical thinning mediates shifts in other-regarding preferences during adolescence

Adolescence is a time of significant cortical changes in the ‘social brain’, a set of brain regions involved in sophisticated social inference. However, there is limited evidence linking the structural changes in social brain to development of social behavior. The present study investigated how cortical development of the social brain relates to other-regarding behavior, in the context of fairness concerns. Participants aged between 9 to 23 years old responded to multiple rounds of ultimatum game proposals. The degree to which each participant considers fairness of intention (i.e., intention-based reciprocity) vs. outcome (i.e., egalitarianism) was quantified using economic utility models. We observed a gradual shift in other-regarding preferences from simple rule-based egalitarianism to complex intention-based reciprocity from early childhood to young adulthood. The preference shift was associated with cortical thinning of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and posterior temporal cortex. Meta-analytic reverse-inference analysis showed that these regions were involved in social inference. Importantly, the other-regarding preference shift was statistically mediated by cortical thinning in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Together these findings suggest that development of the ability to perform sophisticated other-regarding social inference is associated with the structural changes of specific social brain regions in late adolescence.

A causal account of the brain network computations underlying strategic social behavior

During competitive interactions, humans have to estimate the impact of their own actions on their opponent's strategy. Here we provide evidence that neural computations in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) and interconnected structures are causally involved in this process. By combining inhibitory continuous theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation with model-based functional MRI, we show that disrupting neural excitability in the rTPJ reduces behavioral and neural indices of mentalizing-related computations, as well as functional connectivity of the rTPJ with ventral and dorsal parts of the medial prefrontal cortex. These results provide a causal demonstration that neural computations instantiated in the rTPJ are neurobiological prerequisites for the ability to integrate opponent beliefs into strategic choice, through system-level interaction within the valuation and mentalizing networks.

Social Information Is Integrated into Value and Confidence Judgments According to Its Reliability

How much we like something, whether it be a bottle of wine or a new film, is affected by the opinions of others. However, the social information that we receive can be contradictory and vary in its reliability. Here, we tested whether the brain incorporates these statistics when judging value and confidence. Participants provided value judgments about consumer goods in the presence of online reviews. We found that participants updated their initial value and confidence judgments in a Bayesian fashion, taking into account both the uncertainty of their initial beliefs and the reliability of the social information. Activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of belief update. Analogous to how lower-level perceptual information is integrated, we found that the human brain integrates social information according to its reliability when judging value and confidence.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The field of perceptual decision making has shown that the sensory system integrates different sources of information according to their respective reliability, as predicted by a Bayesian inference scheme. In this work, we hypothesized that a similar coding scheme is implemented by the human brain to process social signals and guide complex, value-based decisions. We provide experimental evidence that the human prefrontal cortex's activity is consistent with a Bayesian computation that integrates social information that differs in reliability and that this integration affects the neural representation of value and confidence.

Neural coding of prior expectations in hierarchical intention inference

The ability to infer other people’s intentions is crucial for successful human social interactions. Such inference relies on an adaptive interplay of sensory evidence and prior expectations. Crucially, this interplay would also depend on the type of intention inferred, i.e., on how abstract the intention is. However, what neural mechanisms adjust the interplay of prior and sensory evidence to the abstractness of the intention remains conjecture. We addressed this question in two separate fMRI experiments, which exploited action scenes depicting different types of intentions (Superordinate vs. Basic; Social vs. Non-social), and manipulated both prior and sensory evidence. We found that participants increasingly relied on priors as sensory evidence became scarcer. Activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) reflected this interplay between the two sources of information. Moreover, the more abstract the intention to infer (Superordinate > Basic, Social > Non-Social), the greater the modulation of backward connectivity between the mPFC and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), resulting in an increased influence of priors over the intention inference. These results suggest a critical role for the fronto-parietal network in adjusting the relative weight of prior and sensory evidence during hierarchical intention inference.

Social Decision-Making and the Brain: A Comparative Perspective

The capacity and motivation to be social is a key component of the human adaptive behavioral repertoire. Recent research has identified social behaviors remarkably similar to our own in other animals, including empathy, consolation, cooperation, and strategic deception. Moreover, neurobiological studies in humans, nonhuman primates, and rodents have identified shared brain structures (the so-called 'social brain') apparently specialized to mediate such functions. Neuromodulators may regulate social interactions by 'tuning' the social brain, with important implications for treating social impairments. Here, we survey recent findings in social neuroscience from a comparative perspective, and conclude that the very social behaviors that make us human emerge from mechanisms shared widely with other animals, as well as some that appear to be unique to humans and other primates.

Autism does not limit strategic thinking in the "beauty contest" game

A popular hypothesis in developmental psychology is that individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have a specific impairment or developmental delay in their ability to reason about other people's mental processes, especially when this reasoning process is of a higher-order, recursive, or nested variety. One type of interpersonal interaction that involves this sort of complex reasoning about others' minds is an economic game, and because economic games have been extensively modeled in behavioral economics, they provide a unique testbed for a quantitative and precise analysis of cognitive functioning in ASD. This study specifically asked whether ASD is associated with strategic depth in the economic game known as The Beauty Contest, in which all players submit a number from 0 to 100, and the winner is the player who submits the number closest to 2/3 of the mean of all numbers submitted. Unexpectedly, the distribution of responses among adult participants with ASD reflected a level of strategic reasoning at least as deep as that of their neurotypical peers, with the same proportion of participants with ASD being characterized as "higher order" strategic players. Thus, whatever mentalistic reasoning abilities are necessary for typical performance in the context of this economic game appear to be largely intact, and therefore unlikely to be fundamental to persistent social dysfunction in ASD.

Fluid Intelligence and Cognitive Reflection in a Strategic Environment: Evidence from Dominance-Solvable Games

Dominance solvability is one of the most straightforward solution concepts in game theory. It is based on two principles: dominance (according to which players always use their dominant strategy) and iterated dominance (according to which players always act as if others apply the principle of dominance). However, existing experimental evidence questions the empirical accuracy of dominance solvability. In this study, we study the relationships between the key facets of dominance solvability and two cognitive skills, cognitive reflection, and fluid intelligence. We provide evidence that the behaviors in accordance with dominance and one-step iterated dominance are both predicted by one's fluid intelligence rather than cognitive reflection. Individual cognitive skills, however, only explain a small fraction of the observed failure of dominance solvability. The accuracy of theoretical predictions on strategic decision making thus not only depends on individual cognitive characteristics, but also, perhaps more importantly, on the decision making environment itself.

Understanding intentional actions from observers' viewpoints: A social neuroscience perspective

When we see others, we also try to 'see' their unobservable states of minds, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. We carefully monitor others' actions, as we assume that those actions are outward manifestations of their internal states. Actors and observers can have divergent views on the cause of the same actions. Critically, it is often the observers' view that affects important decisions in social life, from deciding the optimal level of cooperation to judging moral responsibility and court's decisions. Thus, the judgment about intentionality and agency in others' actions determines the way in which the observer deals with the actor. The primate brain has two separate neural systems that function in understanding others' actions and intentions. The mirror system is activated by others' visible actions and predicts their physical consequences in goal terms, whereas the mentalizing system is primarily involved in the prediction of others' intentions and upcoming actions regardless of whether others' actions are directly observable or not. The functional roles of the two systems have sometimes been described as mutually independent or even oppositional. I propose a hypothesis that the two systems may collaborate closely for judging the sense of other-agency.

Perceived live interaction modulates the developing social brain

Although children's social development is embedded in social interaction, most developmental neuroscience studies have examined responses to non-interactive social stimuli (e.g. photographs of faces). The neural mechanisms of real-world social behavior are of special interest during middle childhood (roughly ages 7-13), a time of increased social complexity and competence coinciding with structural and functional social brain development. Evidence from adult neuroscience studies suggests that social interaction may alter neural processing, but no neuroimaging studies in children have directly examined the effects of live social-interactive context on social cognition. In the current study of middle childhood, we compare the processing of two types of speech: speech that children believed was presented over a real-time audio-feed by a social partner and speech that they believed was recorded. Although in reality all speech was prerecorded, perceived live speech resulted in significantly greater neural activation in regions associated with social cognitive processing. These findings underscore the importance of using ecologically-valid and interactive methods to understand the developing social brain.

Over a Decade of Neuroeconomics: What Have We Learned?

At its inception, neuroeconomics promised to revolutionize economics. That promise has not yet been realized, and neuroeconomics has seen limited penetration into mainstream economics. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to declare that neuroeconomics has failed. Quite to the contrary, the yearly rate of neuroeconomics papers has roughly doubled since 2005. While the number of direct applications to economics remains limited, due to the infancy of the field, we have learned an amazing amount about how the brain makes decisions. In this article, we review some of the major topics that have emerged in neuroeconomics and highlight findings that we believe will form the basis for future applications to economics. When possible, we focus on existing applications to economics and future directions for that research.

Five-Year-Old Preschoolers' Sharing is Influenced by Anticipated Reciprocation

Whether children share in anticipation of future benefits returned by a partner is an interesting question. In this study, 5-year-old children and an adult partner played a sharing game, in which children donated first and the partner donated afterward. In Experiment 1, the partner's resources were more attractive than the child's. In the reciprocal condition, the child was told that s/he would be a recipient when the partner played as a donor. In the non-reciprocal condition, however, the child was told that an anonymous child would be the recipient when the partner donated. Results showed that children shared more with the partner when they knew that they would be a recipient later. In Experiment 2, the child was always the recipient when the partner donated, but the partner's resources were more desirable than the child's in the high-value condition, and less desirable in the low-value condition. We found that children were more generous when the partner's resources were valued higher. These findings demonstrate that 5-year-old preschoolers' sharing choices take into account the anticipated reciprocity of the recipient, suggesting either self-interested tactical sharing or direct reciprocity in advance of receiving. Specifically, they adjust their sharing behavior depending on whether a partner has the potential to reciprocate, and whether it is worth sharing relative to the value of the payback.

Beta- and gamma-band activity reflect predictive coding in the processing of causal events

In daily life, complex events are perceived in a causal manner, suggesting that the brain relies on predictive processes to model them. Within predictive coding theory, oscillatory beta-band activity has been linked to top-down predictive signals and gamma-band activity to bottom-up prediction errors. However, neurocognitive evidence for predictive coding outside lower-level sensory areas is scarce. We used magnetoencephalography to investigate neural activity during probability-dependent action perception in three areas pivotal for causal inference, superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, using bowling action animations. Within this network, Granger-causal connectivity in the beta-band was found to be strongest for backward top-down connections and gamma for feed-forward bottom-up connections. Moreover, beta-band power in TPJ increased parametrically with the predictability of the action kinematics-outcome sequences. Conversely, gamma-band power in TPJ and MPFC increased with prediction error. These findings suggest that the brain utilizes predictive-coding-like computations for higher-order cognition such as perception of causal events.

Neural Basis of Strategic Decision Making

Human choice behaviors during social interactions often deviate from the predictions of game theory. This might arise partly from the limitations in the cognitive abilities necessary for recursive reasoning about the behaviors of others. In addition, during iterative social interactions, choices might change dynamically as knowledge about the intentions of others and estimates for choice outcomes are incrementally updated via reinforcement learning. Some of the brain circuits utilized during social decision making might be general-purpose and contribute to isomorphic individual and social decision making. By contrast, regions in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporal parietal junction (TPJ) might be recruited for cognitive processes unique to social decision making.

Interaction matters: A perceived social partner alters the neural processing of human speech

Mounting evidence suggests that social interaction changes how communicative behaviors (e.g., spoken language, gaze) are processed, but the precise neural bases by which social-interactive context may alter communication remain unknown. Various perspectives suggest that live interactions are more rewarding, more attention-grabbing, or require increased mentalizing-thinking about the thoughts of others. Dissociating between these possibilities is difficult because most extant neuroimaging paradigms examining social interaction have not directly compared live paradigms to conventional "offline" (or recorded) paradigms. We developed a novel fMRI paradigm to assess whether and how an interactive context changes the processing of speech matched in content and vocal characteristics. Participants listened to short vignettes--which contained no reference to people or mental states--believing that some vignettes were prerecorded and that others were presented over a real-time audio-feed by a live social partner. In actuality, all speech was prerecorded. Simply believing that speech was live increased activation in each participant's own mentalizing regions, defined using a functional localizer. Contrasting live to recorded speech did not reveal significant differences in attention or reward regions. Further, higher levels of autistic-like traits were associated with altered neural specialization for live interaction. These results suggest that humans engage in ongoing mentalizing about social partners, even when such mentalizing is not explicitly required, illustrating how social context shapes social cognition. Understanding communication in social context has important implications for typical and atypical social processing, especially for disorders like autism where social difficulties are more acute in live interaction.

Processing ambiguity in a linguistic context: decision-making difficulties in non-aphasic patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal degeneration

Some extent of ambiguity is ubiquitous in everyday conversations. For example, words have multiple meaning and very common pronouns, like “he” and “she” (anaphoric pronouns), have little meaning on their own and refer to a noun that has been previously introduced in the discourse. Ambiguity triggers a decision process that is not a subroutine of language processing but rather a more general domain resource. Therefore non-aphasic patients with limited decision-making capability can encounter severe limitation in language processing due to extra linguistic limitations. In the present study, we test patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal degeneration (bvFTD), focusing on anaphora as a paradigmatic example of ambiguity resolution in the linguistic domain. bvFTD is characterized by gray matter (GM) atrophy in prefrontal cortex, but relative sparing of peri-Sylvian cortex. A group of patients with parietal disease due to corticobasal syndrome (CBS) was also tested here in order to investigate the specific role of prefrontal cortex in the task employed in the current study. Participants were presented with a pair of sentences in which the first sentence contained two nouns while the second contained a pronoun. In the experimental (ambiguous) condition, both nouns are plausible referents of the pronoun, thus requiring decision-making resources. The results revealed that bvFTD patients are significantly less accurate than healthy seniors in identifying the correct referent of a pronoun in the ambiguous condition, although CBS patients were as accurate as healthy seniors. Imaging analyses related bvFTD patients’ performance to GM atrophy in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). These results suggest that bvFTD patients have difficulties in decision processes that involve the resolution of an ambiguity.

Being asked to tell an unpleasant truth about another person activates anterior insula and medial prefrontal cortex

"Truth" has been used as a baseline condition in several functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of deception. However, like deception, telling the truth is an inherently social construct, which requires consideration of another person's mental state, a phenomenon known as Theory of Mind. Using a novel ecological paradigm, we examined blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) responses during social and simple truth telling. Participants (n = 27) were randomly divided into two competing teams. Post-competition, each participant was scanned while evaluating performances from in-group and out-group members. Participants were asked to be honest and were told that their evaluations would be made public. We found increased BOLD responses in the medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral anterior insula and precuneus when participants were asked to tell social truths compared to simple truths about another person. At the behavioral level, participants were slower at responding to social compared to simple questions about another person. These findings suggest that telling the truth is a nuanced cognitive operation that is dependent on the degree of mentalizing. Importantly, we show that the cortical regions engaged by truth telling show a distinct pattern when the task requires social reasoning.

Beyond words: Pragmatic inference in behavioral variant of frontotemporal degeneration

When the message of a speaker goes beyond the literal or logical meaning of the sentences used, a pragmatic inference is required to understand the complete meaning of an utterance. Here we study one example of pragmatic inference, called scalar implicature. Such an inference is required when a weaker term "some" is used in a sentence like "Some of the students passed the exam" because the speaker presumably had a reason not to use a stronger term like "all". We investigated the comprehension of scalar implicatures in a group of 17 non-aphasic patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal degeneration (bvFTD) in order to test the contribution of non-linguistic decision-making ability and the role of prefrontal cortex in supporting the computation of pragmatic inferences. The results of two experiments point to a deficit in producing alternative interpretations beyond a logical reading. bvFTD patients thus prefer the narrowly literal or logical interpretation of a scalar term when they must generate a possible alternative interpretation by themselves, but patients prefer a pragmatic reading when offered a choice between the logical and the pragmatic interpretation of the same sentence. An imaging analysis links bvFTD patients' spontaneous tendency toward a narrowly logical interpretation with atrophy in ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our findings are consistent with the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis, which proposes that difficulty generating alternative interpretations of an utterance, rather than a frank inability to compute an inference, affects the comprehension of a scalar term.

A Neural Mechanism of Strategic Social Choice under Sanction-Induced Norm Compliance

In recent years, much has been learned about the representation of subjective value in simple, nonstrategic choices. However, a large fraction of our daily decisions are embedded in social interactions in which value guided decisions require balancing benefits for self against consequences imposed by others in response to our choices. Yet, despite their ubiquity, much less is known about how value computation takes place in strategic social contexts that include the possibility of retribution for norm violations. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to show that when human subjects face such a context connectivity increases between the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), implicated in the representation of other peoples’ thoughts and intentions, and regions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that are associated with value computation. In contrast, we find no increase in connectivity between these regions in social nonstrategic cases where decision-makers are immune from retributive monetary punishments from a human partner. Moreover, there was also no increase in TPJ-vmPFC connectivity when the potential punishment was performed by a computer programmed to punish fairness norm violations in the same manner as a human would. Thus, TPJ-vmPFC connectivity is not simply a function of the social or norm enforcing nature of the decision, but rather occurs specifically in situations where subjects make decisions in a social context and strategically consider putative consequences imposed by others.

Social preferences and cognitive reflection: evidence from a dictator game experiment

This paper provides experimental evidence on the relationship between social preferences and cognitive abilities, which we measure using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). We elicit social preferences by way of 24 dictatorial situations, in which the Dictator's choice sets include (i) standard Dictator games, where increasing the Dictator's payoff yields a loss for the Recipient, (ii) efficient Dictator games, where increasing the Dictator's payoff also increases that the Recipient's; as well as other situations in which (iii) either the Dictator's or (iv) the Recipient's monetary payoff is held constant. We partition our subject pool into three groups: reflective (scoring 2 or more in the CRT), impulsive (opting twice or more for the “intuitive” but wrong answers in the CRT) and the remainder. We find that impulsive Dictators show a marked inequity aversion attitude, especially in standard Dictator Games. By contrast, reflective Dictators show lower distributional concerns, except for the situations in which the Dictators' payoff is held constant. In this case, reflective Dictators give significantly more.

Pro-sociality and strategic reasoning in economic decisions

We study the relationship between pro-social preferences and strategic reasoning. These aspects are typically studied separately but little is known about their joint distribution. In an experiment, for each participant we elicit individual concerns toward pro-sociality-inequality aversion and efficiency-as well as the number of steps of reasoning through a guessing game. We report that self-regarding and pro-social participants exhibit similar levels of strategic reasoning, which supports the view that pro-sociality and strategic reasoning can be studied independently.

Progressive changes in hippocampal resting-state connectivity across cognitive impairment: a cross-sectional study from normal to Alzheimer disease

We investigate the changes in functional connectivity of the left and right hippocampus by comparing the resting-state low-frequency fluctuations in the blood oxygen level-dependent signal from these regions with relation to Alzheimer disease (AD) progression. AD patients were divided into subgroups based on the clinical dementia rating (CDR) scores. Patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) were also analyzed as an intermediate stage between normal controls and AD. We found that the total functional connectivity of both the right and left hippocampus was maintained during aMCI and the early stages of AD and that it decreased in the later stages of AD. However, when total functional connectivity was broken down into specific regions of the brain, we observed increased or decreased connectivity to specific regions beginning with aMCI. Direct correlation analysis in seeding the left hippocampus revealed a significant decrease in the functional connectivity with the posterior cingulate cortex region and lateral parietal areas, and an increase in functional connectivity in and the anterior cingulate cortex beginning with aMCI. In this study, we were able to quantify the deterioration of resting-state hippocampal connectivity with disease severity and formation of compensatory recruitment in the early stages of AD.

Neural mechanisms underlying human consensus decision-making

Consensus building in a group is a hallmark of animal societies, yet little is known about its underlying computational and neural mechanisms. Here, we applied a computational framework to behavioral and fMRI data from human participants performing a consensus decision-making task with up to five other participants. We found that participants reached consensus decisions through integrating their own preferences with information about the majority group members' prior choices, as well as inferences about how much each option was stuck to by the other people. These distinct decision variables were separately encoded in distinct brain areas-the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior superior temporal sulcus/temporoparietal junction, and intraparietal sulcus-and were integrated in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. Our findings provide support for a theoretical account in which collective decisions are made through integrating multiple types of inference about oneself, others, and environments, processed in distinct brain modules.

An integrative neural model of social perception, action observation, and theory of mind

In the field of social neuroscience, major branches of research have been instrumental in describing independent components of typical and aberrant social information processing, but the field as a whole lacks a comprehensive model that integrates different branches. We review existing research related to the neural basis of three key neural systems underlying social information processing: social perception, action observation, and theory of mind. We propose an integrative model that unites these three processes and highlights the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), which plays a central role in all three systems. Furthermore, we integrate these neural systems with the dual system account of implicit and explicit social information processing. Large-scale meta-analyses based on Neurosynth confirmed that the pSTS is at the intersection of the three neural systems. Resting-state functional connectivity analysis with 1000 subjects confirmed that the pSTS is connected to all other regions in these systems. The findings presented in this review are specifically relevant for psychiatric research especially disorders characterized by social deficits such as autism spectrum disorder.

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining

One of the best-known and most replicated laboratory results in behavioral economics is that bargainers frequently reject low offers, even when it harms their material self-interest. This finding could have important implications for international negotiations on many problems facing humanity today, because models of international bargaining assume exactly the opposite: that policy makers are rational and self-interested. However, it is unknown whether elites who engage in diplomatic bargaining will similarly reject low offers because past research has been based almost exclusively on convenience samples of undergraduates, members of the general public, or small-scale societies rather than highly experienced elites who design and bargain over policy. Using a unique sample of 102 policy and business elites who have an average of 21 y of practical experience conducting international diplomacy or policy strategy, we show that, compared with undergraduates and the general public, elites are actually more likely to reject low offers when playing a standard "ultimatum game" that assesses how players bargain over a fixed resource. Elites with more experience tend to make even higher demands, suggesting that this tendency only increases as policy makers advance to leadership positions. This result contradicts assumptions of rational self-interested behavior that are standard in models of international bargaining, and it suggests that the adoption of global agreements on international trade, climate change, and other important problems will not depend solely on the interests of individual countries, but also on whether these accords are seen as equitable to all member states.

The social Bayesian brain: does mentalizing make a difference when we learn?

When it comes to interpreting others' behaviour, we almost irrepressibly engage in the attribution of mental states (beliefs, emotions…). Such "mentalizing" can become very sophisticated, eventually endowing us with highly adaptive skills such as convincing, teaching or deceiving. Here, sophistication can be captured in terms of the depth of our recursive beliefs, as in "I think that you think that I think…" In this work, we test whether such sophisticated recursive beliefs subtend learning in the context of social interaction. We asked participants to play repeated games against artificial (Bayesian) mentalizing agents, which differ in their sophistication. Critically, we made people believe either that they were playing against each other, or that they were gambling like in a casino. Although both framings are similarly deceiving, participants win against the artificial (sophisticated) mentalizing agents in the social framing of the task, and lose in the non-social framing. Moreover, we find that participants' choice sequences are best explained by sophisticated mentalizing Bayesian learning models only in the social framing. This study is the first demonstration of the added-value of mentalizing on learning in the context of repeated social interactions. Importantly, our results show that we would not be able to decipher intentional behaviour without a priori attributing mental states to others.

Someone has to give in: theta oscillations correlate with adaptive behavior in social bargaining

During social bargain, one has to both figure out the others' intentions and behave strategically in such a way that the others' behaviors will be consistent with one's expectations. To understand the neurobiological mechanisms underlying these behaviors, we used electroencephalography while subjects played as proposers in a repeated ultimatum game. We found that subjects adapted their offers to obtain more acceptances in the last round and that this adaptation correlated negatively with prefrontal theta oscillations. People with higher prefrontal theta activity related to a rejection did not adapt their offers along the game to maximize their earning. Moreover, between-subject variation in posterior theta oscillations correlated positively with how individual theta activity influenced the change of offer after a rejection, reflecting a process of behavioral adaptation to the others' demands. Interestingly, people adapted better their offers when they knew that they where playing against a computer, although the behavioral adaptation did not correlate with prefrontal theta oscillation. Behavioral changes between human and computer games correlated with prefrontal theta activity, suggesting that low adaptation in human games could be a strategy. Taken together, these results provide evidence for specific roles of prefrontal and posterior theta oscillations in social bargaining.

Sex differences in the neural basis of false-belief and pragmatic language comprehension

Increasing research evidence suggests that women are more advanced than men in pragmatic language comprehension and Theory of Mind (ToM), which is a cognitive component of empathy. We measured the hemodynamic responses of men and women while they performed a second-order false-belief (FB) task and a coherent story (CS) task. During the FB condition relative to the baseline (unlinked sentences [US]), we found convergent activity in ToM network regions, such as the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) bilaterally and precuneus, in both sexes. We also found a greater activity in the left medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and a greater deactivation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)/orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) bilaterally in women compared to men. However, we did not find difference in the brain activity between the sexes during the FB condition relative to the CS condition. The results suggest a significant overlap between neural bases of pragmatic language comprehension and ToM in both men and women. Taken together, these results are in line with the extreme male brain (EMB) hypothesis by demonstrating sex difference in the neural basis of ToM and pragmatic language, both of which are found to be impaired in individuals with Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC). In addition, the results also suggest that on average women use both cognitive empathy (dorsal mPFC) and affective empathy (vmPFC) networks more than men for false-belief reasoning.

With you or against you: social orientation dependent learning signals guide actions made for others

In social environments, it is crucial that decision-makers take account of the impact of their actions not only for oneself, but also on other social agents. Previous work has identified neural signals in the striatum encoding value-based prediction errors for outcomes to oneself; also, recent work suggests that neural activity in prefrontal cortex may similarly encode value-based prediction errors related to outcomes to others. However, prior work also indicates that social valuations are not isomorphic, with social value orientations of decision-makers ranging on a cooperative to competitive continuum; this variation has not been examined within social learning environments. Here, we combine a computational model of learning with functional neuroimaging to examine how individual differences in orientation impact neural mechanisms underlying 'other-value' learning. Across four experimental conditions, reinforcement learning signals for other-value were identified in medial prefrontal cortex, and were distinct from self-value learning signals identified in striatum. Critically, the magnitude and direction of the other-value learning signal depended strongly on an individual's cooperative or competitive orientation toward others. These data indicate that social decisions are guided by a social orientation-dependent learning system that is computationally similar but anatomically distinct from self-value learning. The sensitivity of the medial prefrontal learning signal to social preferences suggests a mechanism linking such preferences to biases in social actions and highlights the importance of incorporating heterogeneous social predispositions in neurocomputational models of social behavior.

Model averaging, optimal inference, and habit formation

Postulating that the brain performs approximate Bayesian inference generates principled and empirically testable models of neuronal function-the subject of much current interest in neuroscience and related disciplines. Current formulations address inference and learning under some assumed and particular model. In reality, organisms are often faced with an additional challenge-that of determining which model or models of their environment are the best for guiding behavior. Bayesian model averaging-which says that an agent should weight the predictions of different models according to their evidence-provides a principled way to solve this problem. Importantly, because model evidence is determined by both the accuracy and complexity of the model, optimal inference requires that these be traded off against one another. This means an agent's behavior should show an equivalent balance. We hypothesize that Bayesian model averaging plays an important role in cognition, given that it is both optimal and realizable within a plausible neuronal architecture. We outline model averaging and how it might be implemented, and then explore a number of implications for brain and behavior. In particular, we propose that model averaging can explain a number of apparently suboptimal phenomena within the framework of approximate (bounded) Bayesian inference, focusing particularly upon the relationship between goal-directed and habitual behavior.

Contradictory reasoning network: an EEG and FMRI study

Contradiction is a cornerstone of human rationality, essential for everyday life and communication. We investigated electroencephalographic (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in separate recording sessions during contradictory judgments, using a logical structure based on categorical propositions of the Aristotelian Square of Opposition (ASoO). The use of ASoO propositions, while controlling for potential linguistic or semantic confounds, enabled us to observe the spatial temporal unfolding of this contradictory reasoning. The processing started with the inversion of the logical operators corresponding to right middle frontal gyrus (rMFG-BA11) activation, followed by identification of contradictory statement associated with in the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG-BA47) activation. Right medial frontal gyrus (rMeFG, BA10) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, BA32) contributed to the later stages of process. We observed a correlation between the delayed latency of rBA11 response and the reaction time delay during inductive vs. deductive reasoning. This supports the notion that rBA11 is crucial for manipulating the logical operators. Slower processing time and stronger brain responses for inductive logic suggested that examples are easier to process than general principles and are more likely to simplify communication.

Multiplexing signals in reinforcement learning with internal models and dopamine

A fundamental challenge for computational and cognitive neuroscience is to understand how reward-based learning and decision-making are made and how accrued knowledge and internal models of the environment are incorporated. Remarkable progress has been made in the field, guided by the midbrain dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis and the underlying reinforcement learning framework, which does not involve internal models ('model-free'). Recent studies, however, have begun not only to address more complex decision-making processes that are integrated with model-free decision-making, but also to include internal models about environmental reward structures and the minds of other agents, including model-based reinforcement learning and using generalized prediction errors. Even dopamine, a classic model-free signal, may work as multiplexed signals using model-based information and contribute to representational learning of reward structure.

How social cognition can inform social decision making

Social decision-making is often complex, requiring the decision-maker to make inferences of others' mental states in addition to engaging traditional decision-making processes like valuation and reward processing. A growing body of research in neuroeconomics has examined decision-making involving social and non-social stimuli to explore activity in brain regions such as the striatum and prefrontal cortex, largely ignoring the power of the social context. Perhaps more complex processes may influence decision-making in social vs. non-social contexts. Years of social psychology and social neuroscience research have documented a multitude of processes (e.g., mental state inferences, impression formation, spontaneous trait inferences) that occur upon viewing another person. These processes rely on a network of brain regions including medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporal parietal junction, and precuneus among others. Undoubtedly, these social cognition processes affect social decision-making since mental state inferences occur spontaneously and automatically. Few studies have looked at how these social inference processes affect decision-making in a social context despite the capability of these inferences to serve as predictions that can guide future decision-making. Here we review and integrate the person perception and decision-making literatures to understand how social cognition can inform the study of social decision-making in a way that is consistent with both literatures. We identify gaps in both literatures-while behavioral economics largely ignores social processes that spontaneously occur upon viewing another person, social psychology has largely failed to talk about the implications of social cognition processes in an economic decision-making context-and examine the benefits of integrating social psychological theory with behavioral economic theory.

The neural circuitry of expertise: perceptual learning and social cognition

Amongst the most significant questions we are confronted with today include the integration of the brain's micro-circuitry, our ability to build the complex social networks that underpin society and how our society impacts on our ecological environment. In trying to unravel these issues one place to begin is at the level of the individual: to consider how we accumulate information about our environment, how this information leads to decisions and how our individual decisions in turn create our social environment. While this is an enormous task, we may already have at hand many of the tools we need. This article is intended to review some of the recent results in neuro-cognitive research and show how they can be extended to two very specific and interrelated types of expertise: perceptual expertise and social cognition. These two cognitive skills span a vast range of our genetic heritage. Perceptual expertise developed very early in our evolutionary history and is a highly developed part of all mammals' cognitive ability. On the other hand social cognition is most highly developed in humans in that we are able to maintain larger and more stable long term social connections with more behaviorally diverse individuals than any other species. To illustrate these ideas I will discuss board games as a toy model of social interactions as they include many of the relevant concepts: perceptual learning, decision-making, long term planning and understanding the mental states of other people. Using techniques that have been developed in mathematical psychology, I show that we can represent some of the key features of expertise using stochastic differential equations (SDEs). Such models demonstrate how an expert's long exposure to a particular context influences the information they accumulate in order to make a decision.These processes are not confined to board games, we are all experts in our daily lives through long exposure to the many regularities of daily tasks and social contexts.