Redefining the Role of Limbic Areas in Cortical Processing

Processing of Emotion in Functional Neurological Disorder

Emotions have traditionally been considered crucial in the development of functional neurological disorder, but the evidence underpinning this association is not clear. We aimed to summarize evidence for association between functional neurological disorder and emotions as formulated by Breuer and Freud in their conception of hysterical conversion. Based on a systematic literature search, we identified 34 controlled studies and categorized them into four groups: (i) autonomic arousal, (ii) emotion-motion interactions, (iii) social modulation of symptoms, and (iv) bodily awareness in FND. We found evidence for autonomic dysregulation in FND; convergent neuroimaging findings implicate abnormal limbic-motor interactions in response to emotional stimuli in FND. Our results do not provide enough empirical evidence for social modulation of the symptoms, but there is a clinical support for the role of suggestion and placebo in FND. Our results provide evidence for abnormal bodily awareness in FND. Based on these findings, we propose that functional neurological symptoms are forms of emotional reactions shaped into symptoms by previous experience with illness and possibly reinforced by actual social contexts. Additional research should investigate the effect of social context on the intensity of functional neurological symptoms and associated brain regions.

Primary Interoceptive Cortex Activity during Simulated Experiences of the Body

Studies of the classic exteroceptive sensory systems (e.g., vision, touch) consistently demonstrate that vividly imagining a sensory experience of the world-simulating it-is associated with increased activity in the corresponding primary sensory cortex. We hypothesized, analogously, that simulating internal bodily sensations would be associated with increased neural activity in primary interoceptive cortex. An immersive, language-based mental imagery paradigm was used to test this hypothesis (e.g., imagine your heart pounding during a roller coaster ride, your face drenched in sweat during a workout). During two neuroimaging experiments, participants listened to vividly described situations and imagined "being there" in each scenario. In Study 1, we observed significantly heightened activity in primary interoceptive cortex (of dorsal posterior insula) during imagined experiences involving vivid internal sensations. This effect was specific to interoceptive simulation: It was not observed during a separate affect focus condition in Study 1 nor during an independent Study 2 that did not involve detailed simulation of internal sensations (instead involving simulation of other sensory experiences). These findings underscore the large-scale predictive architecture of the brain and reveal that words can be powerful drivers of bodily experiences.

Being a Beast Machine: The Somatic Basis of Selfhood

Modern psychology has long focused on the body as the basis of the self. Recently, predictive processing accounts of interoception (perception of the body 'from within') have become influential in accounting for experiences of body ownership and emotion. Here, we describe embodied selfhood in terms of 'instrumental interoceptive inference' that emphasises allostatic regulation and physiological integrity. We apply this approach to the distinctive phenomenology of embodied selfhood, accounting for its non-object-like character and subjective stability over time. Our perspective has implications for the development of selfhood and illuminates longstanding debates about relations between life and mind, implying, contrary to Descartes, that experiences of embodied selfhood arise because of, and not in spite of, our nature as 'beast machines'.

Growing a social brain

It has long been assumed that social animals, such as humans, are born with a brain system that has evolved to support social affiliation. However, the evidence does not necessarily support this assumption. Alternatively, social animals can be defined as those who cannot survive alone and rely on members from their group to regulate their ongoing physiology (or allostasis). The rather simple evolutionary constraint of social dependency for survival can be sufficient to make the social environment vitally salient, and to provide the ultimate driving force for socially crafted brain development and learning. In this Perspective, we propose a framework for sociality and specify a set of hypotheses on the mechanisms of social development and underlying neural systems. The theoretical shift proposed here implies that profound human characteristics, including but not limited to sociality, are acquired at an early age, while social interactions provide key wiring instructions that determine brain development.

When Words Hurt: Affective Word Use in Daily News Coverage Impacts Mental Health

Media exposure influences mental health symptomology in response to salient aversive events, like terrorist attacks, but little has been done to explore the impact of news coverage that varies more subtly in affective content. Here, we utilized an existing data set in which participants self-reported physical symptoms, depressive symptoms, and anxiety symptoms, and completed a potentiated startle task assessing their physiological reactivity to aversive stimuli at three time points (waves) over a 9-month period. Using a computational linguistics approach, we then calculated an average ratio of words with positive vs. negative affective connotations for only articles from news sources to which each participant self-reported being exposed over the prior 2 weeks at each wave of data collection. As hypothesized, individuals exposed to news coverage with more negative affective tone over the prior 2 weeks reported significantly greater physical and depressive symptoms, and had significantly greater physiological reactivity to aversive stimuli.

Hippocampal projections to the anterior olfactory nucleus differentially convey spatiotemporal information during episodic odour memory

The hippocampus is essential for representing spatiotemporal context and establishing its association with the sensory details of daily life to form episodic memories. The olfactory cortex in particular shares exclusive anatomical connections with the hippocampus as a result of their common evolutionary history. Here we selectively inhibit hippocampal projections to the anterior olfactory nucleus (AON) during behavioural tests of contextually cued odour recall. We find that spatial odour memory and temporal odour memory are independently impaired following inhibition of distinct, topographically organized hippocampal-AON pathways. Our results not only reveal a longstanding unknown function for the AON but offer new mechanistic insights regarding the representation of odours in episodic memory.

Vegetarians' and omnivores' affective and physiological responses to images of food

Many vegetarians report that meat is unpleasant, but little else is known about their affective responses to meat and non-meat foods. Here we explored affective responses to food images in vegetarians and omnivores and tested the hypothesis that vegetarians have global differences in affective processing (e.g., increased disgust sensitivity). We presented pictures of different food items and recorded participants' affective experience while we recorded peripheral physiology. We found that vegetarians' self-reported experience of meat meal images was less pleasant than omnivores', but that other food images were equally pleasant across the two groups. Moreover, vegetarians and omnivores had strikingly similar physiological responses to all food images - including meat meals. We interpret these results from a psychological constructionist perspective, which posits that individuals conceptualize changes in their bodily states in ways that match their beliefs, such that increased sympathetic nervous system activity may be conceptualized as an experience of excitement about a delicious meat meal for omnivores but as an experience of displeasure for a vegetarian who believes meat is cruel, wasteful, impure, or unhealthy. This interpretation is consistent with emerging neuroscience evidence that the brain constructs experience by predicting and making meaning of internal sensations based on past experience and knowledge.

Pain-Related Expectation and Prediction Error Signals in the Anterior Insula Are Not Related to Aversiveness

The anterior insula has repeatedly been linked to the experience of aversive stimuli, such as pain. Previously, we showed that the anterior insula is involved in the integration of pain intensity and its prior expectation. However, it is unclear whether this integration occurs by a pain-specific expectation or a more general expectation of an aversive event. To dissociate these possibilities, we conducted an experiment using painful stimuli and aversive pictures with three levels of aversiveness on human male volunteers. Stimuli were preceded by a probabilistic, combined modality and intensity cue in a full factorial design. Subjective ratings of pain intensity and skin conductance responses were best explained by a combination of actual pain intensity and expected pain intensity. In addition, using fMRI, we investigated the neuronal implementation of the integration of prior expectation and pain intensity. Similar to subjective ratings and autonomic responses, the dorsal anterior insula represented pain intensity and expectations. The ventral anterior insula additionally represented the absolute difference of the two terms (i.e., the prediction error). The posterior insula only represented pain intensity. Importantly, the pattern observed in the anterior insula was only present if the cued modality was correct (i.e., expect pain); in case of an incorrect modality cue (i.e., expect aversive picture), the ventral anterior insula simply represented pain intensity. The stimulus expectation and prediction error specificity in the ventral anterior insula indicates the integration of expectation with painful stimuli in this area. Importantly, this pattern cannot be explained by aversiveness.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The anterior insula has been shown to integrate pain intensity and their expectation. However, it is unclear whether this integration is pain-specific or related more generally to an aversive event. To address this, we combined painful stimuli and aversive pictures with three levels of aversiveness. The ventral anterior insula represented pain intensity, expectation, and their absolute difference (i.e., the prediction error). Importantly, this pattern was only observed if the cued modality was correct. In case of an incorrect modality cue, this area simply represented as pain intensity. The stimulus expectation and prediction error specificity in the ventral anterior insula indicates the integration of expectation with painful stimuli in this area. Importantly, this pattern cannot be explained by aversiveness.

Emotion fingerprints or emotion populations? A meta-analytic investigation of autonomic features of emotion categories

The classical view of emotion hypothesizes that certain emotion categories have a specific autonomic nervous system (ANS) "fingerprint" that is distinct from other categories. Substantial ANS variation within a category is presumed to be epiphenomenal. The theory of constructed emotion hypothesizes that an emotion category is a population of context-specific, highly variable instances that need not share an ANS fingerprint. Instead, ANS variation within a category is a meaningful part of the nature of emotion. We present a meta-analysis of 202 studies measuring ANS reactivity during lab-based inductions of emotion in nonclinical samples of adults, using a random effects, multilevel meta-analysis and multivariate pattern classification analysis to test our hypotheses. We found increases in mean effect size for 59.4% of ANS variables across emotion categories, but the pattern of effect sizes did not clearly distinguish 1 emotion category from another. We also observed significant variation within emotion categories; heterogeneity accounted for a moderate to substantial percentage (i.e., I2 ≥ 30%) of variability in 54% of these effect sizes. Experimental moderators epiphenomenal to emotion, such as induction type (e.g., films vs. imagery), did not explain a large portion of the variability. Correction for publication bias reduced estimated effect sizes even further, increasing heterogeneity of effect sizes for certain emotion categories. These findings, when considered in the broader empirical literature, are more consistent with population thinking and other principles from evolutionary biology found within the theory of constructed emotion, and offer insights for developing new hypotheses to understand the nature of emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record

Emotion Perception as Conceptual Synchrony

Psychological research on emotion perception anchors heavily on an object perception analogy. We present static “cues,” such as facial expressions, as objects for perceivers to categorize. Yet in the real world, emotions play out as dynamic multidimensional events. Current theoretical approaches and research methods are limited in their ability to capture this complexity. We draw on insights from a predictive coding account of neural activity and a grounded cognition account of concept representation to conceive of emotion perception as a stream of synchronized conceptualizations between two individuals, which is supported and shaped by language. We articulate how this framework can illuminate the fundamental need to study culture, as well as other sources of conceptual variation, in unpacking conceptual synchrony in emotion. We close by suggesting that the conceptual system provides the necessary flexibility to overcome gaps in emotional synchrony.

Regional gray matter volume and structural network strength in somatic vs. non-somatic delusional disorders

BACKGROUND

Monothematic delusional disorders are characterized by a single tenacious belief. They provide a great opportunity to study underlying brain structures in the absence of confounding symptoms that accompany delusions in schizophrenia. Delusional beliefs include persecution, jealousy or somatic delusions including infestation. It is unclear whether specific delusional content is associated with distinct neural substrates.

METHODS

We used magnetic resonance imaging in patients presenting with somatic vs. non-somatic delusional disorders. Patients with delusional infestation (DI, n=18), and individuals with non-somatic delusional disorders (n=19) were included, together with healthy volunteers (n=20). Uni- and multivariate techniques for structural data analysis were applied to provide a comprehensive characterization of abnormal brain volume at both the regional and neural network level.

RESULTS

Patients with DI showed lower gray matter volume in thalamic, striatal (putamen), insular and medial prefrontal brain regions in contrast to non-somatic delusional disorders and healthy controls. Importantly, these differences were consistently detected at regional and network level. Compared to healthy controls, patients with delusional disorders other than DI showed lower gray matter volume in temporal cortical regions.

CONCLUSION

The data support the notion that dysfunctional somatosensory and peripersonal networks could mediate somatic delusions in patients with DI in contrast to delusional disorders without somatic content. The data also suggest putative content-specific neural signatures in delusional disorders and in delusion formation per se.

Seeing What You Feel: Affect Drives Visual Perception of Structurally Neutral Faces

Affective realism, the phenomenon whereby affect is integrated into an individual's experience of the world, is a normal consequence of how the brain processes sensory information from the external world in the context of sensations from the body. In the present investigation, we provided compelling empirical evidence that affective realism involves changes in visual perception (i.e., affect changes how participants see neutral stimuli). In two studies, we used an interocular suppression technique, continuous flash suppression, to present affective images outside of participants' conscious awareness. We demonstrated that seen neutral faces are perceived as more smiling when paired with unseen affectively positive stimuli. Study 2 also demonstrated that seen neutral faces are perceived as more scowling when paired with unseen affectively negative stimuli. These findings have implications for real-world situations and challenge beliefs that affect is a distinct psychological phenomenon that can be separated from cognition and perception.

Cross-modal and non-monotonic representations of statistical regularity are encoded in local neural response patterns

Current neurobiological models assign a central role to predictive processes calibrated to environmental statistics. Neuroimaging studies examining the encoding of stimulus uncertainty have relied almost exclusively on manipulations in which stimuli were presented in a single sensory modality, and further assumed that neural responses vary monotonically with uncertainty. This has left a gap in theoretical development with respect to two core issues: (i) are there cross-modal brain systems that encode input uncertainty in way that generalizes across sensory modalities, and (ii) are there brain systems that track input uncertainty in a non-monotonic fashion? We used multivariate pattern analysis to address these two issues using auditory, visual and audiovisual inputs. We found signatures of cross-modal encoding in frontoparietal, orbitofrontal, and association cortices using a searchlight cross-classification analysis where classifiers trained to discriminate levels of uncertainty in one modality were tested in another modality. Additionally, we found widespread systems encoding uncertainty non-monotonically using classifiers trained to discriminate intermediate levels of uncertainty from both the highest and lowest uncertainty levels. These findings comprise the first comprehensive report of cross-modal and non-monotonic neural sensitivity to statistical regularities in the environment, and suggest that conventional paradigms testing for monotonic responses to uncertainty in a single sensory modality may have limited generalizability.

Functional Connectivity Between Anterior Insula and Key Nodes of Frontoparietal Executive Control and Salience Networks Distinguish Bipolar Depression From Unipolar Depression and Healthy Control Subjects

BACKGROUND

Patients with bipolar depression are characterized by dysregulation across the full spectrum of mood, differentiating them from patients with unipolar depression. The ability to switch neural resources among the default mode network, salience network, and executive control network (ECN) has been proposed as a key mechanism for adaptive mood regulation. The anterior insula is implicated in the modulation of functional network switching. Differential connectivity between anterior insula and functional networks may provide insights into pathophysiological differences between bipolar and unipolar mood disorders, with implications for diagnosis and treatment.

METHODS

Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging data were collected from 98 subjects (35 unipolar, 24 bipolar, and 39 healthy control subjects). Pearson correlations were computed between bilateral insula seed regions and a priori defined target regions from the default mode network, salience network, and ECN. After r-to-z transformation, a one-way multivariate analysis of covariance was conducted to identify significant differences in connectivity between groups. Post hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted and Bonferroni corrections were applied. Receiver-operating characteristics were computed to assess diagnostic sensitivity.

RESULTS

Patients with bipolar depression evidenced significantly altered right anterior insula functional connectivity with the inferior parietal lobule of the ECN relative to patients with unipolar depression and control subjects. Right anterior insula-inferior parietal lobule connectivity significantly discriminated patients with bipolar depression.

CONCLUSIONS

Impaired functional connectivity between the anterior insula and the inferior parietal lobule of the ECN distinguishes patients with bipolar depression from those with unipolar depression and healthy control subjects. This finding highlights a pathophysiological mechanism with potential as a therapeutic target and a clinical biomarker for bipolar disorder, exhibiting reasonable sensitivity and specificity.

Deconstructing arousal into wakeful, autonomic and affective varieties

Arousal plays a central role in a wide variety of phenomena, including wakefulness, autonomic function, affect and emotion. Despite its importance, it remains unclear as to how the neural mechanisms for arousal are organized across them. In this article, we review neuroscience findings for three of the most common origins of arousal: wakeful arousal, autonomic arousal, and affective arousal. Our review makes two overarching points. First, research conducted primarily in non-human animals underscores the importance of several subcortical nuclei that contribute to various sources of arousal, motivating the need for an integrative framework. Thus, we outline an integrative neural reference space as a key first step in developing a more systematic understanding of central nervous system contributions to arousal. Second, there is a translational gap between research on non-human animals, which emphasizes subcortical nuclei, and research on humans using non-invasive neuroimaging techniques, which focuses more on gross anatomical characterizations of cortical (e.g. network architectures including the default mode network) and subcortical structures. We forecast the importance of high-field neuroimaging in bridging this gap to examine how the various networks within the neural reference space for arousal operate across varieties of arousal-related phenomena.

Facial expression predictions as drivers of social perception

Emerging perspectives in neuroscience indicate that the brain functions predictively, constantly anticipating sensory input based on past experience. According to these perspectives, prediction signals impact perception, guiding and constraining experience. In a series of six behavioral experiments, we show that predictions about facial expressions drive social perception, deeply influencing how others are evaluated: individuals are judged as more likable and trustworthy when their facial expressions are anticipated, even in the absence of any conscious changes in felt affect. Moreover, the effect of predictions on social judgments extends to both real-world situations where such judgments have particularly high consequence (i.e., evaluating presidential candidates for an upcoming election), as well as to more basic perceptual processes that may underlie judgment (i.e., facilitated visual processing of expected expressions). The implications of these findings, including relevance for cross-cultural interactions, social stereotypes and mental illness, are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition

We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of predictive models: predictive coding (associated with internal Bayesian models and prediction error minimization), predictive processing (associated with radical connectionism and 'simple' embodiment) and predictive engagement (associated with enactivist approaches to cognition). We examine the concept of active inference under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In this context we consider Frith and Friston's proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.

Large-Scale Gradients in Human Cortical Organization

Recent advances in mapping cortical areas in the human brain provide a basis for investigating the significance of their spatial arrangement. Here we describe a dominant gradient in cortical features that spans between sensorimotor and transmodal areas. We propose that this gradient constitutes a core organizing axis of the human cerebral cortex, and describe an intrinsic coordinate system on its basis. Studying the cortex with respect to these intrinsic dimensions can inform our understanding of how the spectrum of cortical function emerges from structural constraints.

The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization

The science of emotion has been using folk psychology categories derived from philosophy to search for the brain basis of emotion. The last two decades of neuroscience research have brought us to the brink of a paradigm shift in understanding the workings of the brain, however, setting the stage to revolutionize our understanding of what emotions are and how they work. In this article, we begin with the structure and function of the brain, and from there deduce what the biological basis of emotions might be. The answer is a brain-based, computational account called the theory of constructed emotion.

Mirror trends of plasticity and stability indicators in primate prefrontal cortex

Research on plasticity markers in the cerebral cortex has largely focused on their timing of expression and role in shaping circuits during critical and normal periods. By contrast, little attention has been focused on the spatial dimension of plasticity-stability across cortical areas. The rationale for this analysis is based on the systematic variation in cortical structure that parallels functional specialization and raises the possibility of varying levels of plasticity. Here, we investigated in adult rhesus monkeys the expression of markers related to synaptic plasticity or stability in prefrontal limbic and eulaminate areas that vary in laminar structure. Our findings revealed that limbic areas are impoverished in three markers of stability: intracortical myelin, the lectin Wisteria floribunda agglutinin, which labels perineuronal nets, and parvalbumin, which is expressed in a class of strong inhibitory neurons. By contrast, prefrontal limbic areas were enriched in the enzyme calcium/calmodulin-dependent protein kinase II (CaMKII), known to enhance plasticity. Eulaminate areas have more elaborate laminar architecture than limbic areas and showed the opposite trend: they were enriched in markers of stability and had lower expression of the plasticity-related marker CaMKII. The expression of glial fibrillary acidic protein (GFAP), a marker of activated astrocytes, was also higher in limbic areas, suggesting that cellular stress correlates with the rate of circuit reshaping. Elevated markers of plasticity may endow limbic areas with flexibility necessary for learning and memory within an affective context, but may also render them vulnerable to abnormal structural changes, as seen in neurologic and psychiatric diseases.

Brain-Based Biomarkers for the Treatment of Depression: Evolution of an Idea

An ambition of depression biomarker research is to augment psychometric and cognitive assessment of clinically relevant phenomena with neural measures. Although such applications have been slow to arrive, we observe a steady evolution of the idea and anticipate emerging technologies with some optimism. To highlight critical themes and innovations in depression biomarker research, we take as our point of reference a specific research narrative. We begin with an early model of frontal-limbic dysfunction, which represents a conceptual shift from localized pathology to understanding symptoms as an emergent property of distributed networks. Over the decades, this model accommodates perspectives from neurology, psychiatry, clinical, and cognitive neuroscience, and preserves past insight as more complex methods become available. We also track the expanding mission of brain biomarker research: from the development of diagnostic tools to treatment selection algorithms, measures of neurocognitive functioning and novel targets for neuromodulation. To conclude, we draw from this particular research narrative future directions for biomarker research. We emphasize integration of measurement modalities to describe dynamic change in domain-general networks, and we speculate that a brain-based framework for psychiatric problems may dissolve classical diagnostic and disciplinary boundaries. (JINS, 2017, 23, 870-880).

Constructing emotion through simulation

Evidence increasingly suggests that simulations implement patterns of prior experience to construct one's current experience, whether that experience is oriented in the past, in the here and now, or in the future. Simulation is the mechanism by which the brain capitalizes on prior learning to efficiently navigate the situation at hand. This review examines the latest developments in theory and empirical research that address simulation during emotional phenomena. Integration of evidence across multiple literatures suggests that simulation accounts provide a unifying framework across many different emotional phenomena and highlights the importance of investigating dynamics, complexity, and variation in emotional experiences moving forward.

The Affective Core of Emotion: Linking Pleasure, Subjective Well-Being, and Optimal Metastability in the Brain

Arguably, emotion is always valenced-either pleasant or unpleasant-and dependent on the pleasure system. This system serves adaptive evolutionary functions; relying on separable wanting, liking, and learning neural mechanisms mediated by mesocorticolimbic networks driving pleasure cycles with appetitive, consummatory, and satiation phases. Liking is generated in a small set of discrete hedonic hotspots and coldspots, while wanting is linked to dopamine and to larger distributed brain networks. Breakdown of the pleasure system can lead to anhedonia and other features of affective disorders. Eudaimonia and well-being are difficult to study empirically, yet whole-brain computational models could offer novel insights (e.g., routes to eudaimonia such as caregiving of infants or music) potentially linking eudaimonia to optimal metastability in the pleasure system.

Mixed emotions in the predictive brain

Understanding complex or mixed emotions first requires an exploration of the human nervous system underlying emotions, and indeed all experience. We review current research in neuroscience, which describes the brain as a predictive, internal model of the world that flexibly combines features from past experience to construct emotions. We argue that "mixed emotions" result when these features of past experience correspond to multiple emotion categories. Integrating event perception and cognitive linguistic theories, we propose that "mixed emotions" are perceived as an episode of distinct, linked emotional events due to attentional shifts which update the predicted model of experience. These proposed mechanisms have profound implications for the study of emotion; we conclude by suggesting methodological improvements for future research.

Evidence for a Large-Scale Brain System Supporting Allostasis and Interoception in Humans

Large-scale intrinsic brain systems have been identified for exteroceptive senses (e.g., sight, hearing, touch). We introduce an analogous system for representing sensations from within the body, called interoception, and demonstrate its relation to regulating peripheral systems in the body, called allostasis. Employing the recently introduced Embodied Predictive Interoception Coding (EPIC) model, we used tract-tracing studies of macaque monkeys, followed by two intrinsic functional magnetic resonance imaging samples (N = 280 and N = 270) to evaluate the existence of an intrinsic allostatic/interoceptive system in the human brain. Another sample (N = 41) allowed us to evaluate the convergent validity of the hypothesized allostatic/interoceptive system by showing that individuals with stronger connectivity between system hubs performed better on an implicit index of interoceptive ability related to autonomic fluctuations. Implications include insights for the brain's functional architecture, dissolving the artificial boundary between mind and body, and unifying mental and physical illness.

Functional connectivity dynamics during film viewing reveal common networks for different emotional experiences

Recent theoretical and empirical work has highlighted the role of domain-general, large-scale brain networks in generating emotional experiences. These networks are hypothesized to process aspects of emotional experiences that are not unique to a specific emotional category (e.g., "sadness," "happiness"), but rather that generalize across categories. In this article, we examined the dynamic interactions (i.e., changing cohesiveness) between specific domain-general networks across time while participants experienced various instances of sadness, fear, and anger. We used a novel method for probing the network connectivity dynamics between two salience networks and three amygdala-based networks. We hypothesized, and found, that the functional connectivity between these networks covaried with the intensity of different emotional experiences. Stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the medial amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across six different instances of the three emotion categories examined. Also, stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the ventrolateral amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across five out of the six different instances. Our findings demonstrate that a variety of emotional experiences are associated with dynamic interactions of domain-general neural systems.

Cardiovascular and autonomic reactivity to psychological stress: Neurophysiological substrates and links to cardiovascular disease

Psychologically stressful experiences evoke changes in cardiovascular physiology that may influence risk for cardiovascular disease (CVD). But what are the neural circuits and intermediate physiological pathways that link stressful experiences to cardiovascular changes that might in turn confer disease risk? This question is important because it has broader implications for our understanding of the neurophysiological pathways that link stressful and other psychological experiences to physical health. This review highlights selected findings from brain imaging studies of stressor-evoked cardiovascular reactivity and CVD risk. Converging evidence across these studies complements animal models and patient lesion studies to suggest that a network of cortical, limbic, and brainstem areas for central autonomic and physiological control are important for generating and regulating stressor-evoked cardiovascular reactivity via visceromotor and viscerosensory mechanisms. Emerging evidence further suggests that these brain areas may play a role in stress-related CVD risk, specifically by their involvement in mediating metabolically-dysregulated or extreme stressor-evoked cardiovascular reactions. Contextually, the research reviewed here offers an example of how brain imaging and health neuroscience methods can be integrated to address open and mechanistic questions about the neurophysiological pathways linking psychological stress and physical health.

Emergence of a hierarchical brain during infancy reflected by stepwise functional connectivity

The hierarchical nature of the brain's functional organization has long been recognized, but when and how this architecture emerges during development remains largely unknown. Here the development of the brain's hierarchical organization was characterized using a modified stepwise functional connectivity approach based on resting-state fMRI in a fully longitudinal sample of infants (N = 28, with scans after birth, and at 1 and 2 years) and adults. Results obtained by placing seeds in early sensory cortices revealed novel hierarchical patterns of adult brain organization ultimately converging in limbic, paralimbic, basal ganglia, and frontoparietal brain regions. These findings are remarkably consistent with predictive coding accounts of neural processing that place these regions at the top of predictive coding hierarchies. Infants gradually developed toward this architecture in a region- and step-dependent manner, and displayed many of the same regions as adults in top hierarchical positions, starting from 1 year of age. The findings further revealed patterns of inter-sensory connectivity likely reflecting the emergence and development of multisensory processing strategies during infancy, the strengths of which were correlated with early cognitive development scores. Hum Brain Mapp 38:2666-2682, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Dopamine depletion impairs gait automaticity by altering cortico-striatal and cerebellar processing in Parkinson's disease

Impairments in motor automaticity cause patients with Parkinson's disease to rely on attentional resources during gait, resulting in greater motor variability and a higher risk of falls. Although dopaminergic circuitry is known to play an important role in motor automaticity, little evidence exists on the neural mechanisms underlying the breakdown of locomotor automaticity in Parkinson's disease. This impedes clinical management and is in great part due to mobility restrictions that accompany the neuroimaging of gait. This study therefore utilized a virtual reality gait paradigm in conjunction with functional MRI to investigate the role of dopaminergic medication on lower limb motor automaticity in 23 patients with Parkinson's disease that were measured both on and off dopaminergic medication. Participants either operated foot pedals to navigate a corridor ('walk' condition) or watched the screen while a researcher operated the paradigm from outside the scanner ('watch' condition), a setting that controlled for the non-motor aspects of the task. Step time variability during walk was used as a surrogate measure for motor automaticity (where higher variability equates to reduced automaticity), and patients demonstrated a predicted increase in step time variability during the dopaminergic "off" state. During the "off" state, subjects showed an increased blood oxygen level-dependent response in the bilateral orbitofrontal cortices (walk>watch). To estimate step time variability, a parametric modulator was designed that allowed for the examination of brain regions associated with periods of decreased automaticity. This analysis showed that patients on dopaminergic medication recruited the cerebellum during periods of increasing variability, whereas patients off medication instead relied upon cortical regions implicated in cognitive control. Finally, a task-based functional connectivity analysis was conducted to examine the manner in which dopamine modulates large-scale network interactions during gait. A main effect of medication was found for functional connectivity within an attentional motor network and a significant condition by medication interaction for functional connectivity was found within the striatum. Furthermore, functional connectivity within the striatum correlated strongly with increasing step time variability during walk in the off state (r=0.616, p=0.002), but not in the on state (r=-0.233, p=0.284). Post-hoc analyses revealed that functional connectivity in the dopamine depleted state within an orbitofrontal-striatal limbic circuit was correlated with worse step time variability (r=0.653, p<0.001). Overall, this study demonstrates that dopamine ameliorates gait automaticity in Parkinson's disease by altering striatal, limbic and cerebellar processing, thereby informing future therapeutic avenues for gait and falls prevention.

From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind

Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered under the predictive label. Here, we first present a basic review of neuroscientific, cognitive, and philosophical approaches to PP, to illustrate how these range from solidly cognitivist applications-with a firm commitment to modular, internalistic mental representation-to more moderate views emphasizing the importance of 'body-representations', and finally to those which fit comfortably with radically enactive, embodied, and dynamic theories of mind. Any nascent predictive processing theory (e.g., of attention or consciousness) must take into account this continuum of views, and associated theoretical commitments. As a final point, we illustrate how the Free Energy Principle (FEP) attempts to dissolve tension between internalist and externalist accounts of cognition, by providing a formal synthetic account of how internal 'representations' arise from autopoietic self-organization. The FEP thus furnishes empirically productive process theories (e.g., predictive processing) by which to guide discovery through the formal modelling of the embodied mind.

An active inference theory of allostasis and interoception in depression

In this paper, we integrate recent theoretical and empirical developments in predictive coding and active inference accounts of interoception (including the Embodied Predictive Interoception Coding model) with working hypotheses from the theory of constructed emotion to propose a biologically plausible unified theory of the mind that places metabolism and energy regulation (i.e. allostasis), as well as the sensory consequences of that regulation (i.e. interoception), at its core. We then consider the implications of this approach for understanding depression. We speculate that depression is a disorder of allostasis, whose myriad symptoms result from a 'locked in' brain that is relatively insensitive to its sensory context. We conclude with a brief discussion of the ways our approach might reveal new insights for the treatment of depression.This article is part of the themed issue 'Interoception beyond homeostasis: affect, cognition and mental health'.

Unexpected arousal modulates the influence of sensory noise on confidence

Human perception is invariably accompanied by a graded feeling of confidence that guides metacognitive awareness and decision-making. It is often assumed that this arises solely from the feed-forward encoding of the strength or precision of sensory inputs. In contrast, interoceptive inference models suggest that confidence reflects a weighted integration of sensory precision and expectations about internal states, such as arousal. Here we test this hypothesis using a novel psychophysical paradigm, in which unseen disgust-cues induced unexpected, unconscious arousal just before participants discriminated motion signals of variable precision. Across measures of perceptual bias, uncertainty, and physiological arousal we found that arousing disgust cues modulated the encoding of sensory noise. Furthermore, the degree to which trial-by-trial pupil fluctuations encoded this nonlinear interaction correlated with trial level confidence. Our results suggest that unexpected arousal regulates perceptual precision, such that subjective confidence reflects the integration of both external sensory and internal, embodied states.

Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain

We review a recent shift in conceptions of interoception and its relationship to hierarchical inference in the brain. The notion of interoceptive inference means that bodily states are regulated by autonomic reflexes that are enslaved by descending predictions from deep generative models of our internal and external milieu. This re-conceptualization illuminates several issues in cognitive and clinical neuroscience with implications for experiences of selfhood and emotion. We first contextualize interoception in terms of active (Bayesian) inference in the brain, highlighting its enactivist (embodied) aspects. We then consider the key role of uncertainty or precision and how this might translate into neuromodulation. We next examine the implications for understanding the functional anatomy of the emotional brain, surveying recent observations on agranular cortex. Finally, we turn to theoretical issues, namely, the role of interoception in shaping a sense of embodied self and feelings. We will draw links between physiological homoeostasis and allostasis, early cybernetic ideas of predictive control and hierarchical generative models in predictive processing. The explanatory scope of interoceptive inference ranges from explanations for autism and depression, through to consciousness. We offer a brief survey of these exciting developments.

This article is part of the themed issue ‘Interoception beyond homeostasis: affect, cognition and mental health’.

Hallucinations as top-down effects on perception

The problem of whether and how information is integrated across hierarchical brain networks embodies a fundamental tension in contemporary cognitive neuroscience, and by extension, cognitive neuropsychiatry. Indeed, the penetrability of perceptual processes in a 'top-down' manner by higher-level cognition-a natural extension of hierarchical models of perception-may contradict a strictly modular view of mental organization. Furthermore, some in the cognitive science community have challenged cognitive penetration as an unlikely, if not impossible, process. We review the evidence for and against top-down influences in perception, informed by a predictive coding model of perception and drawing heavily upon the literature of computational neuroimaging. We extend these findings to propose a way in which these processes may be altered in mental illness. We propose that hallucinations - perceptions without stimulus - can be understood as top-down effects on perception, mediated by inappropriate perceptual priors.

How the prefrontal executive got its stripes

Pathways from cortical and subcortical structures give the prefrontal cortex a panoramic view of the sensory environment and the internal milieu of motives and drives. The prefrontal cortex also receives privileged information from the output of the basal ganglia and cerebellum and innervates widely the inhibitory thalamic reticular nucleus that gates thalamo-cortical communication. Connections, in general, are strongly related to the systematic structural variation of the cortex that can be traced to development. Insights from development have profound implications for the special connections of the prefrontal cortex for executive control, learning and memory, and vulnerability in psychiatric and neurologic diseases.

On Cuteness: Unlocking the Parental Brain and Beyond

Cuteness in offspring is a potent protective mechanism that ensures survival for otherwise completely dependent infants. Previous research has linked cuteness to early ethological ideas of a 'Kindchenschema' (infant schema) where infant facial features serve as 'innate releasing mechanisms' for instinctual caregiving behaviours. We propose extending the concept of cuteness beyond visual features to include positive infant sounds and smells. Evidence from behavioural and neuroimaging studies links this extended concept of cuteness to simple 'instinctual' behaviours and to caregiving, protection, and complex emotions. We review how cuteness supports key parental capacities by igniting fast privileged neural activity followed by slower processing in large brain networks also involved in play, empathy, and perhaps even higher-order moral emotions.

A ventral salience network in the macaque brain

Successful navigation of the environment requires attending and responding efficiently to objects and conspecifics with the potential to benefit or harm (i.e., that have value). In humans, this function is subserved by a distributed large-scale neural network called the "salience network". We have recently demonstrated that there are two anatomically and functionally dissociable salience networks anchored in the dorsal and ventral portions of the human anterior insula (Touroutoglou et al., 2012). In this paper, we test the hypothesis that these two subnetworks exist in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). We provide evidence that a homologous ventral salience network exists in macaques, but that the connectivity of the dorsal anterior insula in macaques is not sufficiently developed as a dorsal salience network. The evolutionary implications of these finding are considered.

On the neural implausibility of the modular mind: Evidence for distributed construction dissolves boundaries between perception, cognition, and emotion

Firestone & Scholl (F&S) rely on three problematic assumptions about the mind (modularity, reflexiveness, and context-insensitivity) to argue cognition does not fundamentally influence perception. We highlight evidence indicating that perception, cognition, and emotion are constructed through overlapping, distributed brain networks characterized by top-down activity and context-sensitivity. This evidence undermines F&S's ability to generalize from case studies to the nature of perception.