Neural Elements for Predictive Coding

The QBIT Theory of Consciousness

The QBIT theory is an attempt toward solving the problem of consciousness based on empirical evidence provided by various scientific disciplines including quantum mechanics, biology, information theory, and thermodynamics. This theory formulates the problem of consciousness in the following four questions, and provides preliminary answers for each question: Question 1: What is the nature of qualia?

ANSWER

A quale is a superdense pack of quantum information encoded in maximally entangled pure states. Question 2: How are qualia generated?

ANSWER

When a pack of quantum information is compressed beyond a certain threshold, a quale is generated. Question 3: Why are qualia subjective?

ANSWER

A quale is subjective because a pack of information encoded in maximally entangled pure states are essentially private and unshareable. Question 4: Why does a quale have a particular meaning?

ANSWER

A pack of information within a cognitive system gradually obtains a particular meaning as it undergoes a progressive process of interpretation performed by an internal model installed in the system. This paper introduces the QBIT theory of consciousness, and explains its basic assumptions and conjectures.

Stronger perceptual filling-in of spatiotemporal information in the blind spot compared with artificial gaps

Complete visual information about a scene and the objects within it is often not available to us. For example, objects may be partly occluded by other objects or have sections missing. In the retinal blind spot, there are no photoreceptors and visual input is not detected. However, owing to perceptual filling-in by the visual system we often do not perceive these gaps. There is a lack of consensus on how much of the mechanism for perceptual filling-in is similar in the case of a natural scotoma, such as the blind spot, and artificial scotomata, such as sections of the stimulus being physically removed. Part of the difficulty in assessing this relationship arises from a lack of direct comparisons between the two cases, with artificial scotomata being tested in different locations in the visual field compared with the blind spot. The peripheral location of the blind spot may explain its enhanced filling-in compared with artificial scotomata, as reported in previous studies. In the present study, we directly compared perceptual filling-in of spatiotemporal information in the blind spot and artificial gaps of the same size and eccentricity. We found stronger perceptual filling-in in the blind spot, suggesting improved filling-in for the blind spot reported in previous studies cannot be simply attributed to its peripheral location.

Active inference under visuo-proprioceptive conflict: Simulation and empirical results

It has been suggested that the brain controls hand movements via internal models that rely on visual and proprioceptive cues about the state of the hand. In active inference formulations of such models, the relative influence of each modality on action and perception is determined by how precise (reliable) it is expected to be. The ‘top-down’ affordance of expected precision to a particular sensory modality is associated with attention. Here, we asked whether increasing attention to (i.e., the precision of) vision or proprioception would enhance performance in a hand-target phase matching task, in which visual and proprioceptive cues about hand posture were incongruent. We show that in a simple simulated agent—based on predictive coding formulations of active inference—increasing the expected precision of vision or proprioception improved task performance (target matching with the seen or felt hand, respectively) under visuo-proprioceptive conflict. Moreover, we show that this formulation captured the behaviour and self-reported attentional allocation of human participants performing the same task in a virtual reality environment. Together, our results show that selective attention can balance the impact of (conflicting) visual and proprioceptive cues on action—rendering attention a key mechanism for a flexible body representation for action.

Top-down versus bottom-up attention differentially modulate frontal-parietal connectivity

The moment-to-moment focus of our mind's eye results from a complex interplay of voluntary and involuntary influences on attention. Previous neuroimaging studies suggest that the brain networks of voluntary versus involuntary attention can be segregated into a frontal-versus-parietal or a dorsal-versus-ventral partition-although recent work suggests that the dorsal network may be involved in both bottom-up and top-down attention. Research with nonhuman primates has provided evidence that a key distinction between top-down and bottom-up attention may be the direction of connectivity between frontal and parietal areas. Whereas typical fMRI connectivity analyses cannot disambiguate the direction of connections, dynamic causal modeling (DCM) can model directionality. Using DCM, we provide new evidence that directed connections within the dorsal attention network are differentially modulated for voluntary versus involuntary attention. These results suggest that the intraparietal sulcus exerts a baseline inhibitory effect on the frontal eye fields that is strengthened during exogenous orienting and attenuated during endogenous orienting. Furthermore, the attenuation from endogenous attention occurs even with salient peripheral cues when those cues are known to be counter predictive. Thus, directed connectivity between frontal and parietal regions of the dorsal attention network is highly influenced by the type of attention that is engaged.

GABA-ergic Dynamics in Human Frontotemporal Networks Confirmed by Pharmaco-Magnetoencephalography

To bridge the gap between preclinical cellular models of disease and in vivo imaging of human cognitive network dynamics, there is a pressing need for informative biophysical models. Here we assess dynamic causal models (DCM) of cortical network responses, as generative models of magnetoencephalographic observations during an auditory oddball roving paradigm in healthy adults. This paradigm induces robust perturbations that permeate frontotemporal networks, including an evoked 'mismatch negativity' response and transiently induced oscillations. Here, we probe GABAergic influences in the networks using double-blind placebo-controlled randomized-crossover administration of the GABA reuptake inhibitor, tiagabine (oral, 10 mg) in healthy older adults. We demonstrate the facility of conductance-based neural mass mean-field models, incorporating local synaptic connectivity, to investigate laminar-specific and GABAergic mechanisms of the auditory response. The neuronal model accurately recapitulated the observed magnetoencephalographic data. Using parametric empirical Bayes for optimal model inversion across both drug sessions, we identify the effect of tiagabine on GABAergic modulation of deep pyramidal and interneuronal cell populations. We found a transition of the main GABAergic drug effects from auditory cortex in standard trials to prefrontal cortex in deviant trials. The successful integration of pharmaco- magnetoencephalography with dynamic causal models of frontotemporal networks provides a potential platform on which to evaluate the effects of disease and pharmacological interventions.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Understanding human brain function and developing new treatments require good models of brain function. We tested a detailed generative model of cortical microcircuits that accurately reproduced human magnetoencephalography, to quantify network dynamics and connectivity in frontotemporal cortex. This approach identified the effect of a test drug (GABA-reuptake inhibitor, tiagabine) on neuronal function (GABA-ergic dynamics), opening the way for psychopharmacological studies in health and disease with the mechanistic precision afforded by generative models of the brain.

A Computational Theory of Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy from the "Bayesian Brain" Perspective

Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) was developed to combine methods from cognitive behavioral therapy and meditative techniques, with the specific goal of preventing relapse in recurrent depression. While supported by empirical evidence from multiple clinical trials, the cognitive mechanisms behind the effectiveness of MBCT are not well understood in computational (information processing) or biological terms. This article introduces a testable theory about the computational mechanisms behind MBCT that is grounded in "Bayesian brain" concepts of perception from cognitive neuroscience, such as predictive coding. These concepts regard the brain as embodying a model of its environment (including the external world and the body) which predicts future sensory inputs and is updated by prediction errors, depending on how precise these error signals are. This article offers a concrete proposal how core concepts of MBCT-(i) the being mode (accepting whatever sensations arise, without judging or changing them), (ii) decentering (experiencing thoughts and percepts simply as events in the mind that arise and pass), and (iii) cognitive reactivity (changes in mood reactivate negative beliefs)-could be understood in terms of perceptual and metacognitive processes that draw on specific computational mechanisms of the "Bayesian brain." Importantly, the proposed theory can be tested experimentally, using a combination of behavioral paradigms, computational modelling, and neuroimaging. The novel theoretical perspective on MBCT described in this paper may offer opportunities for finessing the conceptual and practical aspects of MBCT.

Threat Anticipation in Pulvinar and in Superficial Layers of Primary Visual Cortex (V1). Evidence from Layer-Specific Ultra-High Field 7T fMRI

The perceptual system gives priority to threat-relevant signals with survival value. In addition to the processing initiated by sensory inputs of threat signals, prioritization of threat signals may also include processes related to threat anticipation. These neural mechanisms remain largely unknown. Using ultra-high-field 7 tesla (7T) fMRI, we show that anticipatory processing takes place in the early stages of visual processing, specifically in the pulvinar and V1.

The perceptual system gives priority to threat-relevant signals with survival value. In addition to the processing initiated by sensory inputs of threat signals, prioritization of threat signals may also include processes related to threat anticipation. These neural mechanisms remain largely unknown. Using ultra-high-field 7 tesla (7T) fMRI, we show that anticipatory processing takes place in the early stages of visual processing, specifically in the pulvinar and V1. When anticipation of a threat-relevant fearful face target triggered false perception of not-presented target, there was enhanced activity in the pulvinar as well as in the V1 superficial-cortical-depth (layers 1–3). The anticipatory activity was absent in the LGN or higher visual cortical areas (V2–V4). The effect in V1 was specific to the perception of fearful face targets and did not generalize to happy face targets. A preliminary analysis showed that the connectivity between the pulvinar and V1 superficial-cortical-depth was enhanced during false perception of threat, indicating that the pulvinar and V1 may interact in preparation of anticipated threat. The anticipatory processing supported by the pulvinar and V1 may play an important role in non-sensory-input-driven anxiety states.

The hierarchically mechanistic mind: an evolutionary systems theory of the human brain, cognition, and behavior

The purpose of this review was to integrate leading paradigms in psychology and neuroscience with a theory of the embodied, situated human brain, called the Hierarchically Mechanistic Mind (HMM). The HMM describes the brain as a complex adaptive system that functions to minimize the entropy of our sensory and physical states via action-perception cycles generated by hierarchical neural dynamics. First, we review the extant literature on the hierarchical structure of the brain. Next, we derive the HMM from a broader evolutionary systems theory that explains neural structure and function in terms of dynamic interactions across four nested levels of biological causation (i.e., adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, and mechanism). We then describe how the HMM aligns with a global brain theory in neuroscience called the free-energy principle, leveraging this theory to mathematically formulate neural dynamics across hierarchical spatiotemporal scales. We conclude by exploring the implications of the HMM for psychological inquiry.

The hierarchically mechanistic mind: A free-energy formulation of the human psyche

This article presents a unifying theory of the embodied, situated human brain called the Hierarchically Mechanistic Mind (HMM). The HMM describes the brain as a complex adaptive system that actively minimises the decay of our sensory and physical states by producing self-fulfilling action-perception cycles via dynamical interactions between hierarchically organised neurocognitive mechanisms. This theory synthesises the free-energy principle (FEP) in neuroscience with an evolutionary systems theory of psychology that explains our brains, minds, and behaviour by appealing to Tinbergen's four questions: adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, and mechanism. After leveraging the FEP to formally define the HMM across different spatiotemporal scales, we conclude by exploring its implications for theorising and research in the sciences of the mind and behaviour.

Auditory Predictions and Prediction Errors in Response to Self-Initiated Vowels

It has been suggested that speech production is accomplished by an internal forward model, reducing processing activity directed to self-produced speech in the auditory cortex. The current study uses an established N1-suppression paradigm comparing self- and externally initiated natural speech sounds to answer two questions: (1) Are forward predictions generated to process complex speech sounds, such as vowels, initiated via a button press? (2) Are prediction errors regarding self-initiated deviant vowels reflected in the corresponding ERP components? Results confirm an N1-suppression in response to self-initiated speech sounds. Furthermore, our results suggest that predictions leading to the N1-suppression effect are specific, as self-initiated deviant vowels do not elicit an N1-suppression effect. Rather, self-initiated deviant vowels elicit an enhanced N2b and P3a compared to externally generated deviants, externally generated standard, or self-initiated standards, again confirming prediction specificity. Results show that prediction errors are salient in self-initiated auditory speech sounds, which may lead to more efficient error correction in speech production.

Bayesian Filtering with Multiple Internal Models: Toward a Theory of Social Intelligence

To exhibit social intelligence, animals have to recognize whom they are communicating with. One way to make this inference is to select among internal generative models of each conspecific who may be encountered. However, these models also have to be learned via some form of Bayesian belief updating. This induces an interesting problem: When receiving sensory input generated by a particular conspecific, how does an animal know which internal model to update? We consider a theoretical and neurobiologically plausible solution that enables inference and learning of the processes that generate sensory inputs (e.g., listening and understanding) and reproduction of those inputs (e.g., talking or singing), under multiple generative models. This is based on recent advances in theoretical neurobiology-namely, active inference and post hoc (online) Bayesian model selection. In brief, this scheme fits sensory inputs under each generative model. Model parameters are then updated in proportion to the probability that each model could have generated the input (i.e., model evidence). The proposed scheme is demonstrated using a series of (real zebra finch) birdsongs, where each song is generated by several different birds. The scheme is implemented using physiologically plausible models of birdsong production. We show that generalized Bayesian filtering, combined with model selection, leads to successful learning across generative models, each possessing different parameters. These results highlight the utility of having multiple internal models when making inferences in social environments with multiple sources of sensory information.

Waves of prediction

Predictive processing (e.g., predictive coding) is a predominant paradigm in cognitive neuroscience. This Primer considers the various levels of commitment neuroscientists have to the neuronal process theories that accompany the principles of predictive processing. Specifically, it reviews and contextualises a recent PLOS Biology study of alpha oscillations and travelling waves. We will see that alpha oscillations emerge naturally under the computational architectures implied by predictive coding-and may tell us something profound about recurrent message passing in brain hierarchies. Specifically, the bidirectional nature of forward and backward waves speaks to opportunities to understand attention and how it nuances bottom-up and top-down influences.

Fitting predictive coding to the neurophysiological data

Recent neurophysiological data showing the effects of locomotion on neural activity in mouse primary visual cortex has been interpreted as providing strong support for the predictive coding account of cortical function. Specifically, this work has been interpreted as providing direct evidence that prediction-error, a distinguishing property of predictive coding, is encoded in cortex. This article evaluates these claims and highlights some of the discrepancies between the proposed predictive coding model and the neuro-biology. Furthermore, it is shown that the model can be modified so as to fit the empirical data more successfully.

Emergence of cognitive priming and structure building from the hierarchical interaction of canonical microcircuit models

The concept of connectionism states that higher cognitive functions emerge from the interaction of many simple elements. Accordingly, research on canonical microcircuits conceptualizes findings on fundamental neuroanatomical circuits as well as recurrent organizational principles of the cerebral cortex and examines the link between architectures and their associated functionality. In this study, we establish minimal canonical microcircuit models as elements of hierarchical processing networks. Based on a combination of descriptive time simulations and explanatory state-space mappings, we show that minimal canonical microcircuits effectively segregate feedforward and feedback information flows and that feedback information conditions basic processing operations in minimal canonical microcircuits. Further, we derive and examine two prototypical meta-circuits of cooperating minimal canonical microcircuits for the neurocognitive problems of priming and structure building. Through the application of these findings to a language network of syntax parsing, this study embodies neurocognitive research on hierarchical communication in light of canonical microcircuits, cell assembly theory, and predictive coding.

Excitatory versus inhibitory feedback in Bayesian formulations of scene construction

The selective attention for identification model (SAIM) is an established model of selective visual attention. SAIM implements translation-invariant object recognition, in scenes with multiple objects, using the parallel distributed processing (PDP) paradigm. Here, we show that SAIM can be formulated as Bayesian inference. Crucially, SAIM uses excitatory feedback to combine top-down information (i.e. object knowledge) with bottom-up sensory information. By contrast, predictive coding implementations of Bayesian inference use inhibitory feedback. By formulating SAIM as a predictive coding scheme, we created a new version of SAIM that uses inhibitory feedback. Simulation studies showed that both types of architectures can reproduce the response time costs induced by multiple objects-as found in visual search experiments. However, due to the different nature of the feedback, the two SAIM schemes make distinct predictions about the motifs of microcircuits mediating the effects of top-down afferents. We discuss empirical (neuroimaging) methods to test the predictions of the two inference architectures.

Multiscale integration: beyond internalism and externalism

We present a multiscale integrationist interpretation of the boundaries of cognitive systems, using the Markov blanket formalism of the variational free energy principle. This interpretation is intended as a corrective for the philosophical debate over internalist and externalist interpretations of cognitive boundaries; we stake out a compromise position. We first survey key principles of new radical (extended, enactive, embodied) views of cognition. We then describe an internalist interpretation premised on the Markov blanket formalism. Having reviewed these accounts, we develop our positive multiscale account. We argue that the statistical seclusion of internal from external states of the system-entailed by the existence of a Markov boundary-can coexist happily with the multiscale integration of the system through its dynamics. Our approach does not privilege any given boundary (whether it be that of the brain, body, or world), nor does it argue that all boundaries are equally prescient. We argue that the relevant boundaries of cognition depend on the level being characterised and the explanatory interests that guide investigation. We approach the issue of how and where to draw the boundaries of cognitive systems through a multiscale ontology of cognitive systems, which offers a multidisciplinary research heuristic for cognitive science.

Neuronal message passing using Mean-field, Bethe, and Marginal approximations

Neuronal computations rely upon local interactions across synapses. For a neuronal network to perform inference, it must integrate information from locally computed messages that are propagated among elements of that network. We review the form of two popular (Bayesian) message passing schemes and consider their plausibility as descriptions of inference in biological networks. These are variational message passing and belief propagation - each of which is derived from a free energy functional that relies upon different approximations (mean-field and Bethe respectively). We begin with an overview of these schemes and illustrate the form of the messages required to perform inference using Hidden Markov Models as generative models. Throughout, we use factor graphs to show the form of the generative models and of the messages they entail. We consider how these messages might manifest neuronally and simulate the inferences they perform. While variational message passing offers a simple and neuronally plausible architecture, it falls short of the inferential performance of belief propagation. In contrast, belief propagation allows exact computation of marginal posteriors at the expense of the architectural simplicity of variational message passing. As a compromise between these two extremes, we offer a third approach - marginal message passing - that features a simple architecture, while approximating the performance of belief propagation. Finally, we link formal considerations to accounts of neurological and psychiatric syndromes in terms of aberrant message passing.

Neuron density fundamentally relates to architecture and connectivity of the primate cerebral cortex

Studies of structural brain connectivity have revealed many intriguing features of complex cortical networks. To advance integrative theories of cortical organization, an understanding is required of how connectivity interrelates with other aspects of brain structure. Recent studies have suggested that interareal connectivity may be related to a variety of macroscopic as well as microscopic architectonic features of cortical areas. However, it is unclear how these features are inter-dependent and which of them most strongly and fundamentally relate to structural corticocortical connectivity. Here, we systematically investigated the relation of a range of microscopic and macroscopic architectonic features of cortical organization, namely layer III pyramidal cell soma cross section, dendritic synapse count, dendritic synapse density and dendritic tree size as well as area neuron density, to multiple properties of cortical connectivity, using a comprehensive, up-to-date structural connectome of the primate brain. Importantly, relationships were investigated by multi-variate analyses to account for the interrelations of features. Of all considered factors, the classical architectonic parameter of neuron density most strongly and consistently related to essential features of cortical connectivity (existence and laminar patterns of projections, area degree), and in conjoint analyses largely abolished effects of cellular morphological features. These results confirm neuron density as a central architectonic indicator of the primate cerebral cortex that is closely related to essential aspects of brain connectivity and is also highly indicative of further features of the architectonic organization of cortical areas, such as the considered cellular morphological measures. Our findings integrate several aspects of cortical micro- and macroscopic organization, with implications for cortical development and function.

The Anatomy of Inference: Generative Models and Brain Structure

To infer the causes of its sensations, the brain must call on a generative (predictive) model. This necessitates passing local messages between populations of neurons to update beliefs about hidden variables in the world beyond its sensory samples. It also entails inferences about how we will act. Active inference is a principled framework that frames perception and action as approximate Bayesian inference. This has been successful in accounting for a wide range of physiological and behavioral phenomena. Recently, a process theory has emerged that attempts to relate inferences to their neurobiological substrates. In this paper, we review and develop the anatomical aspects of this process theory. We argue that the form of the generative models required for inference constrains the way in which brain regions connect to one another. Specifically, neuronal populations representing beliefs about a variable must receive input from populations representing the Markov blanket of that variable. We illustrate this idea in four different domains: perception, planning, attention, and movement. In doing so, we attempt to show how appealing to generative models enables us to account for anatomical brain architectures. Ultimately, committing to an anatomical theory of inference ensures we can form empirical hypotheses that can be tested using neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and electrophysiological experiments.

The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis

Fueled by developments in computational neuroscience, there has been increasing interest in the underlying neurocomputational mechanisms of psychosis. One successful approach involves predictive coding and Bayesian inference. Here, inferences regarding the current state of the world are made by combining prior beliefs with incoming sensory signals. Mismatches between prior beliefs and incoming signals constitute prediction errors that drive new learning. Psychosis has been suggested to result from a decreased precision in the encoding of prior beliefs relative to the sensory data, thereby garnering maladaptive inferences. Here, we review the current evidence for aberrant predictive coding and discuss challenges for this canonical predictive coding account of psychosis. For example, hallucinations and delusions may relate to distinct alterations in predictive coding, despite their common co-occurrence. More broadly, some studies implicate weakened prior beliefs in psychosis, and others find stronger priors. These challenges might be answered with a more nuanced view of predictive coding. Different priors may be specified for different sensory modalities and their integration, and deficits in each modality need not be uniform. Furthermore, hierarchical organization may be critical. Altered processes at lower levels of a hierarchy need not be linearly related to processes at higher levels (and vice versa). Finally, canonical theories do not highlight active inference-the process through which the effects of our actions on our sensations are anticipated and minimized. It is possible that conflicting findings might be reconciled by considering these complexities, portending a framework for psychosis more equipped to deal with its many manifestations.

A multi-scale layer-resolved spiking network model of resting-state dynamics in macaque visual cortical areas

Cortical activity has distinct features across scales, from the spiking statistics of individual cells to global resting-state networks. We here describe the first full-density multi-area spiking network model of cortex, using macaque visual cortex as a test system. The model represents each area by a microcircuit with area-specific architecture and features layer- and population-resolved connectivity between areas. Simulations reveal a structured asynchronous irregular ground state. In a metastable regime, the network reproduces spiking statistics from electrophysiological recordings and cortico-cortical interaction patterns in fMRI functional connectivity under resting-state conditions. Stable inter-area propagation is supported by cortico-cortical synapses that are moderately strong onto excitatory neurons and stronger onto inhibitory neurons. Causal interactions depend on both cortical structure and the dynamical state of populations. Activity propagates mainly in the feedback direction, similar to experimental results associated with visual imagery and sleep. The model unifies local and large-scale accounts of cortex, and clarifies how the detailed connectivity of cortex shapes its dynamics on multiple scales. Based on our simulations, we hypothesize that in the spontaneous condition the brain operates in a metastable regime where cortico-cortical projections target excitatory and inhibitory populations in a balanced manner that produces substantial inter-area interactions while maintaining global stability.

The mammalian cortex fulfills its complex tasks by operating on multiple temporal and spatial scales from single cells to entire areas comprising millions of cells. These multi-scale dynamics are supported by specific network structures at all levels of organization. Since models of cortex hitherto tend to concentrate on a single scale, little is known about how cortical structure shapes the multi-scale dynamics of the network. We here present dynamical simulations of a multi-area network model at neuronal and synaptic resolution with population-specific connectivity based on extensive experimental data which accounts for a wide range of dynamical phenomena. Our model elucidates relationships between local and global scales in cortex and provides a platform for future studies of cortical function.

Attention or salience?

While attention is widely recognised as central to perception, the term is often used to mean very different things. Prominent theories of attention - notably the premotor theory - relate it to planned or executed eye movements. This contrasts with the notion of attention as a gain control process that weights the information carried by different sensory channels. We draw upon recent advances in theoretical neurobiology to argue for a distinction between attentional gain mechanisms and salience attribution. The former depends upon estimating the precision of sensory data, while the latter is a consequence of the need to actively engage with the sensorium. Having established this distinction, we consider the intimate relationship between attention and salience.

How Do Expectations Shape Perception?

Perception and perceptual decision-making are strongly facilitated by prior knowledge about the probabilistic structure of the world. While the computational benefits of using prior expectation in perception are clear, there are myriad ways in which this computation can be realized. We review here recent advances in our understanding of the neural sources and targets of expectations in perception. Furthermore, we discuss Bayesian theories of perception that prescribe how an agent should integrate prior knowledge and sensory information, and investigate how current and future empirical data can inform and constrain computational frameworks that implement such probabilistic integration in perception.

Am I Self-Conscious? (Or Does Self-Organization Entail Self-Consciousness?)

Is self-consciousness necessary for consciousness? The answer is yes. So there you have it-the answer is yes. This was my response to a question I was asked to address in a recent AEON piece (https://aeon.co/essays/consciousness-is-not-a-thing-but-a-process-of-inference). What follows is based upon the notes for that essay, with a special focus on self-organization, self-evidencing and self-modeling. I will try to substantiate my (polemic) answer from the perspective of a physicist. In brief, the argument goes as follows: if we want to talk about creatures, like ourselves, then we have to identify the characteristic behaviors they must exhibit. This is fairly easy to do by noting that living systems return to a set of attracting states time and time again. Mathematically, this implies the existence of a Lyapunov function that turns out to be model evidence (i.e., self-evidence) in Bayesian statistics or surprise (i.e., self-information) in information theory. This means that all biological processes can be construed as performing some form of inference, from evolution through to conscious processing. If this is the case, at what point do we invoke consciousness? The proposal on offer here is that the mind comes into being when self-evidencing has a temporal thickness or counterfactual depth, which grounds inferences about the consequences of my action. On this view, consciousness is nothing more than inference about my future; namely, the self-evidencing consequences of what I could do.

Interoceptive inference: From computational neuroscience to clinic

The central and autonomic nervous systems can be defined by their anatomical, functional and neurochemical characteristics, but neither functions in isolation. For example, fundamental components of autonomically mediated homeostatic processes are afferent interoceptive signals reporting the internal state of the body and efferent signals acting on interoceptive feedback assimilated by the brain. Recent predictive coding (interoceptive inference) models formulate interoception in terms of embodied predictive processes that support emotion and selfhood. We propose interoception may serve as a way to investigate holistic nervous system function and dysfunction in disorders of brain, body and behaviour. We appeal to predictive coding and (active) interoceptive inference, to describe the homeostatic functions of the central and autonomic nervous systems. We do so by (i) reviewing the active inference formulation of interoceptive and autonomic function, (ii) survey clinical applications of this formulation and (iii) describe how it offers an integrative approach to human physiology; particularly, interactions between the central and peripheral nervous systems in health and disease.

Illusory Motion Reproduced by Deep Neural Networks Trained for Prediction

The cerebral cortex predicts visual motion to adapt human behavior to surrounding objects moving in real time. Although the underlying mechanisms are still unknown, predictive coding is one of the leading theories. Predictive coding assumes that the brain's internal models (which are acquired through learning) predict the visual world at all times and that errors between the prediction and the actual sensory input further refine the internal models. In the past year, deep neural networks based on predictive coding were reported for a video prediction machine called PredNet. If the theory substantially reproduces the visual information processing of the cerebral cortex, then PredNet can be expected to represent the human visual perception of motion. In this study, PredNet was trained with natural scene videos of the self-motion of the viewer, and the motion prediction ability of the obtained computer model was verified using unlearned videos. We found that the computer model accurately predicted the magnitude and direction of motion of a rotating propeller in unlearned videos. Surprisingly, it also represented the rotational motion for illusion images that were not moving physically, much like human visual perception. While the trained network accurately reproduced the direction of illusory rotation, it did not detect motion components in negative control pictures wherein people do not perceive illusory motion. This research supports the exciting idea that the mechanism assumed by the predictive coding theory is one of basis of motion illusion generation. Using sensory illusions as indicators of human perception, deep neural networks are expected to contribute significantly to the development of brain research.

Active inference and the anatomy of oculomotion

Given that eye movement control can be framed as an inferential process, how are the requisite forces generated to produce anticipated or desired fixation? Starting from a generative model based on simple Newtonian equations of motion, we derive a variational solution to this problem and illustrate the plausibility of its implementation in the oculomotor brainstem. We show, through simulation, that the Bayesian filtering equations that implement 'planning as inference' can generate both saccadic and smooth pursuit eye movements. Crucially, the associated message passing maps well onto the known connectivity and neuroanatomy of the brainstem - and the changes in these messages over time are strikingly similar to single unit recordings of neurons in the corresponding nuclei. Furthermore, we show that simulated lesions to axonal pathways reproduce eye movement patterns of neurological patients with damage to these tracts.

Answering Schrödinger's question: A free-energy formulation

The free-energy principle (FEP) is a formal model of neuronal processes that is widely recognised in neuroscience as a unifying theory of the brain and biobehaviour. More recently, however, it has been extended beyond the brain to explain the dynamics of living systems, and their unique capacity to avoid decay. The aim of this review is to synthesise these advances with a meta-theoretical ontology of biological systems called variational neuroethology, which integrates the FEP with Tinbergen's four research questions to explain biological systems across spatial and temporal scales. We exemplify this framework by applying it to Homo sapiens, before translating variational neuroethology into a systematic research heuristic that supplies the biological, cognitive, and social sciences with a computationally tractable guide to discovery.

Computational Neuropsychology and Bayesian Inference

Computational theories of brain function have become very influential in neuroscience. They have facilitated the growth of formal approaches to disease, particularly in psychiatric research. In this paper, we provide a narrative review of the body of computational research addressing neuropsychological syndromes, and focus on those that employ Bayesian frameworks. Bayesian approaches to understanding brain function formulate perception and action as inferential processes. These inferences combine ‘prior’ beliefs with a generative (predictive) model to explain the causes of sensations. Under this view, neuropsychological deficits can be thought of as false inferences that arise due to aberrant prior beliefs (that are poor fits to the real world). This draws upon the notion of a Bayes optimal pathology – optimal inference with suboptimal priors – and provides a means for computational phenotyping. In principle, any given neuropsychological disorder could be characterized by the set of prior beliefs that would make a patient’s behavior appear Bayes optimal. We start with an overview of some key theoretical constructs and use these to motivate a form of computational neuropsychology that relates anatomical structures in the brain to the computations they perform. Throughout, we draw upon computational accounts of neuropsychological syndromes. These are selected to emphasize the key features of a Bayesian approach, and the possible types of pathological prior that may be present. They range from visual neglect through hallucinations to autism. Through these illustrative examples, we review the use of Bayesian approaches to understand the link between biology and computation that is at the heart of neuropsychology.

Frequency selectivity of echo responses in the mouse primary auditory cortex

In the primary auditory cortex (A1), neuronal ensembles are activated relative to anticipated sound events following rhythmic stimulation, but whether the echo responses of the neurons are related to their frequency selectivity remains unknown. Therefore, we used in vivo two-photon Ca²⁺ imaging to record the neuronal activities in the mouse A1 to elucidate the relationship between their echo responses and frequency selectivity. We confirmed the presence of echo responses in a subgroup of mouse Layer 2/3 A1 neurons following a train of rhythmic pure tone stimulation. After testing with a range of frequencies, we found that these echo responses occurred preferentially close to the best frequencies of the neurons. The local organization of the echo responses of the neurons was heterogeneous in the A1. Therefore, these results indicate that the observed echo responses of neurons within A1 are highly related to their frequency selectivity.

The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference

This paper considers functional integration in the brain from a computational perspective. We ask what sort of neuronal message passing is mandated by active inference-and what implications this has for context-sensitive connectivity at microscopic and macroscopic levels. In particular, we formulate neuronal processing as belief propagation under deep generative models. Crucially, these models can entertain both discrete and continuous states, leading to distinct schemes for belief updating that play out on the same (neuronal) architecture. Technically, we use Forney (normal) factor graphs to elucidate the requisite message passing in terms of its form and scheduling. To accommodate mixed generative models (of discrete and continuous states), one also has to consider link nodes or factors that enable discrete and continuous representations to talk to each other. When mapping the implicit computational architecture onto neuronal connectivity, several interesting features emerge. For example, Bayesian model averaging and comparison, which link discrete and continuous states, may be implemented in thalamocortical loops. These and other considerations speak to a computational connectome that is inherently state dependent and self-organizing in ways that yield to a principled (variational) account. We conclude with simulations of reading that illustrate the implicit neuronal message passing, with a special focus on how discrete (semantic) representations inform, and are informed by, continuous (visual) sampling of the sensorium.

AUTHOR SUMMARY

This paper considers functional integration in the brain from a computational perspective. We ask what sort of neuronal message passing is mandated by active inference-and what implications this has for context-sensitive connectivity at microscopic and macroscopic levels. In particular, we formulate neuronal processing as belief propagation under deep generative models that can entertain both discrete and continuous states. This leads to distinct schemes for belief updating that play out on the same (neuronal) architecture. Technically, we use Forney (normal) factor graphs to characterize the requisite message passing, and link this formal characterization to canonical microcircuits and extrinsic connectivity in the brain.

Network Configurations in the Human Brain Reflect Choice Bias during Rapid Face Processing

Network interactions are likely to be instrumental in processes underlying rapid perception and cognition. Specifically, high-level and perceptual regions must interact to balance pre-existing models of the environment with new incoming stimuli. Simultaneous electroencephalography (EEG) and fMRI (EEG/fMRI) enables temporal characterization of brain-network interactions combined with improved anatomical localization of regional activity. In this paper, we use simultaneous EEG/fMRI and multivariate dynamical systems (MDS) analysis to characterize network relationships between constitute brain areas that reflect a subject's choice for a face versus nonface categorization task. Our simultaneous EEG and fMRI analysis on 21 human subjects (12 males, 9 females) identifies early perceptual and late frontal subsystems that are selective to the categorical choice of faces versus nonfaces. We analyze the interactions between these subsystems using an MDS in the space of the BOLD signal. Our main findings show that differences between face-choice and house-choice networks are seen in the network interactions between the early and late subsystems, and that the magnitude of the difference in network interaction positively correlates with the behavioral false-positive rate of face choices. We interpret this to reflect the role of saliency and expectations likely encoded in frontal "late" regions on perceptual processes occurring in "early" perceptual regions.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Our choices are affected by our biases. In visual perception and cognition such biases can be commonplace and quite curious-e.g., we see a human face when staring up at a cloud formation or down at a piece of toast at the breakfast table. Here we use multimodal neuroimaging and dynamical systems analysis to measure whole-brain spatiotemporal dynamics while subjects make decisions regarding the type of object they see in rapidly flashed images. We find that the degree of interaction in these networks accounts for a substantial fraction of our bias to see faces. In general, our findings illustrate how the properties of spatiotemporal networks yield insight into the mechanisms of how we form decisions.

Laminar fMRI and computational theories of brain function

Recently developed methods for functional MRI at the resolution of cortical layers (laminar fMRI) offer a novel window into neurophysiological mechanisms of cortical activity. Beyond physiology, laminar fMRI also offers an unprecedented opportunity to test influential theories of brain function. Specifically, hierarchical Bayesian theories of brain function, such as predictive coding, assign specific computational roles to different cortical layers. Combined with computational models, laminar fMRI offers a unique opportunity to test these proposals noninvasively in humans. This review provides a brief overview of predictive coding and related hierarchical Bayesian theories, summarises their predictions with regard to layered cortical computations, examines how these predictions could be tested by laminar fMRI, and considers methodological challenges. We conclude by discussing the potential of laminar fMRI for clinically useful computational assays of layer-specific information processing.

A Laminar Organization for Selective Cortico-Cortical Communication

The neocortex is central to mammalian cognitive ability, playing critical roles in sensory perception, motor skills and executive function. This thin, layered structure comprises distinct, functionally specialized areas that communicate with each other through the axons of pyramidal neurons. For the hundreds of such cortico-cortical pathways to underlie diverse functions, their cellular and synaptic architectures must differ so that they result in distinct computations at the target projection neurons. In what ways do these pathways differ? By originating and terminating in different laminae, and by selectively targeting specific populations of excitatory and inhibitory neurons, these “interareal” pathways can differentially control the timing and strength of synaptic inputs onto individual neurons, resulting in layer-specific computations. Due to the rapid development in transgenic techniques, the mouse has emerged as a powerful mammalian model for understanding the rules by which cortical circuits organize and function. Here we review our understanding of how cortical lamination constrains long-range communication in the mammalian brain, with an emphasis on the mouse visual cortical network. We discuss the laminar architecture underlying interareal communication, the role of neocortical layers in organizing the balance of excitatory and inhibitory actions, and highlight the structure and function of layer 1 in mouse visual cortex.

Great Expectations: Is there Evidence for Predictive Coding in Auditory Cortex?

Predictive coding is possibly one of the most influential, comprehensive, and controversial theories of neural function. While proponents praise its explanatory potential, critics object that key tenets of the theory are untested or even untestable. The present article critically examines existing evidence for predictive coding in the auditory modality. Specifically, we identify five key assumptions of the theory and evaluate each in the light of animal, human and modeling studies of auditory pattern processing. For the first two assumptions - that neural responses are shaped by expectations and that these expectations are hierarchically organized - animal and human studies provide compelling evidence. The anticipatory, predictive nature of these expectations also enjoys empirical support, especially from studies on unexpected stimulus omission. However, for the existence of separate error and prediction neurons, a key assumption of the theory, evidence is lacking. More work exists on the proposed oscillatory signatures of predictive coding, and on the relation between attention and precision. However, results on these latter two assumptions are mixed or contradictory. Looking to the future, more collaboration between human and animal studies, aided by model-based analyses will be needed to test specific assumptions and implementations of predictive coding - and, as such, help determine whether this popular grand theory can fulfill its expectations.

What do we know about laminar connectivity?

In this brief review, I attempt an overview of the main components of anatomical laminar-level connectivity. These are: extrinsic outputs, excitatory and inhibitory intrinsic connectivity, and intrinsic inputs. Supporting data are biased from the visual system of nonhuman primates (NHPs), but I have drawn as much as possible from a broader span in order to treat the important issue of area-specific variability. In a second part, I briefly discuss laminar connectivity in the context of network organization (feedforward/feedback cortical connections, and the major types of corticothalamic connections). I also point out anatomical issues in need of clarification, including more systematic, whole brain coverage of tracer injections; more data on anterogradely labeled terminations; more complete, area-specific quantitative data about projection neurons, and quantitative data on terminal density and convergence. Postsynaptic targets are largely unknown, but their identification is essential for understanding the finer analysis and principles of laminar patterns. Laminar resolution MRI offers a promising new tool for exploring laminar connectivity: it is potentially fast and macro-scale, and allows for repeated investigation under different stimulus conditions. Conversely, anatomical resolution, although detailed beyond the current level of MRI visualization, offers a rich trove for experimental design and interpretation of fMRI activation patterns.

The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference

This paper considers functional integration in the brain from a computational perspective. We ask what sort of neuronal message passing is mandated by active inference-and what implications this has for context-sensitive connectivity at microscopic and macroscopic levels. In particular, we formulate neuronal processing as belief propagation under deep generative models. Crucially, these models can entertain both discrete and continuous states, leading to distinct schemes for belief updating that play out on the same (neuronal) architecture. Technically, we use Forney (normal) factor graphs to elucidate the requisite message passing in terms of its form and scheduling. To accommodate mixed generative models (of discrete and continuous states), one also has to consider link nodes or factors that enable discrete and continuous representations to talk to each other. When mapping the implicit computational architecture onto neuronal connectivity, several interesting features emerge. For example, Bayesian model averaging and comparison, which link discrete and continuous states, may be implemented in thalamocortical loops. These and other considerations speak to a computational connectome that is inherently state dependent and self-organizing in ways that yield to a principled (variational) account. We conclude with simulations of reading that illustrate the implicit neuronal message passing, with a special focus on how discrete (semantic) representations inform, and are informed by, continuous (visual) sampling of the sensorium.

AUTHOR SUMMARY

This paper considers functional integration in the brain from a computational perspective. We ask what sort of neuronal message passing is mandated by active inference-and what implications this has for context-sensitive connectivity at microscopic and macroscopic levels. In particular, we formulate neuronal processing as belief propagation under deep generative models that can entertain both discrete and continuous states. This leads to distinct schemes for belief updating that play out on the same (neuronal) architecture. Technically, we use Forney (normal) factor graphs to characterize the requisite message passing, and link this formal characterization to canonical microcircuits and extrinsic connectivity in the brain.