Consciousness and Complexity during Unresponsiveness Induced by Propofol, Xenon, and Ketamine

Consciousness-specific dynamic interactions of brain integration and functional diversity

Prominent theories of consciousness emphasise different aspects of neurobiology, such as the integration and diversity of information processing within the brain. Here, we combine graph theory and dynamic functional connectivity to compare resting-state functional MRI data from awake volunteers, propofol-anaesthetised volunteers, and patients with disorders of consciousness, in order to identify consciousness-specific patterns of brain function. We demonstrate that cortical networks are especially affected by loss of consciousness during temporal states of high integration, exhibiting reduced functional diversity and compromised informational capacity, whereas thalamo-cortical functional disconnections emerge during states of higher segregation. Spatially, posterior regions of the brain’s default mode network exhibit reductions in both functional diversity and integration with the rest of the brain during unconsciousness. These results show that human consciousness relies on spatio-temporal interactions between brain integration and functional diversity, whose breakdown may represent a generalisable biomarker of loss of consciousness, with potential relevance for clinical practice.

How do diversity (entropy) and integration of activity across brain regions interact to support consciousness? Here the authors show that anaesthetised individuals and patients with disorders of consciousness exhibit overlapping reductions in both diversity and integration in the brain’s default mode network.

The ethics of psychedelic research in disorders of consciousness

This article provides an ethical analysis of psychedelic research involving disorders of consciousness patients. We apply two internationally accepted approaches for analyzing the ethics of human research, the Value-Validity Framework and Component Analysis, to a research program recently proposed by Scott and Carhart-Harris. We focus on Scott and Carhart-Harris's proposal, but the ethical frameworks outlined are applicable to other novel research protocols in the science of consciousness.

Degeneracy in hippocampal physiology and plasticity

Degeneracy, defined as the ability of structurally disparate elements to perform analogous function, has largely been assessed from the perspective of maintaining robustness of physiology or plasticity. How does the framework of degeneracy assimilate into an encoding system where the ability to change is an essential ingredient for storing new incoming information? Could degeneracy maintain the balance between the apparently contradictory goals of the need to change for encoding and the need to resist change towards maintaining homeostasis? In this review, we explore these fundamental questions with the mammalian hippocampus as an example encoding system. We systematically catalog lines of evidence, spanning multiple scales of analysis that point to the expression of degeneracy in hippocampal physiology and plasticity. We assess the potential of degeneracy as a framework to achieve the conjoint goals of encoding and homeostasis without cross-interferences. We postulate that biological complexity, involving interactions among the numerous parameters spanning different scales of analysis, could establish disparate routes towards accomplishing these conjoint goals. These disparate routes then provide several degrees of freedom to the encoding-homeostasis system in accomplishing its tasks in an input- and state-dependent manner. Finally, the expression of degeneracy spanning multiple scales offers an ideal reconciliation to several outstanding controversies, through the recognition that the seemingly contradictory disparate observations are merely alternate routes that the system might recruit towards accomplishment of its goals.

Leveraging Nonhuman Primate Multisensory Neurons and Circuits in Assessing Consciousness Theory

Both the global neuronal workspace (GNW) and integrated information theory (IIT) posit that highly complex and interconnected networks engender perceptual awareness. GNW specifies that activity recruiting frontoparietal networks will elicit a subjective experience, whereas IIT is more concerned with the functional architecture of networks than with activity within it. Here, we argue that according to IIT mathematics, circuits converging on integrative versus convergent yet non-integrative neurons should support a greater degree of consciousness. We test this hypothesis by analyzing a dataset of neuronal responses collected simultaneously from primary somatosensory cortex (S1) and ventral premotor cortex (vPM) in nonhuman primates presented with auditory, tactile, and audio-tactile stimuli as they are progressively anesthetized with propofol. We first describe the multisensory (audio-tactile) characteristics of S1 and vPM neurons (mean and dispersion tendencies, as well as noise-correlations), and functionally label these neurons as convergent or integrative according to their spiking responses. Then, we characterize how these different pools of neurons behave as a function of consciousness. At odds with the IIT mathematics, results suggest that convergent neurons more readily exhibit properties of consciousness (neural complexity and noise correlation) and are more impacted during the loss of consciousness than integrative neurons. Last, we provide support for the GNW by showing that neural ignition (i.e., same trial coactivation of S1 and vPM) was more frequent in conscious than unconscious states. Overall, we contrast GNW and IIT within the same single-unit activity dataset, and support the GNW.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT A number of prominent theories of consciousness exist, and a number of these share strong commonalities, such as the central role they ascribe to integration. Despite the important and far reaching consequences developing a better understanding of consciousness promises to bring, for instance in diagnosing disorders of consciousness (e.g., coma, vegetative-state, locked-in syndrome), these theories are seldom tested via invasive techniques (with high signal-to-noise ratios), and never directly confronted within a single dataset. Here, we first derive concrete and testable predictions from the global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory of consciousness. Then, we put these to the test by functionally labeling specific neurons as either convergent or integrative nodes, and examining the response of these neurons during anesthetic-induced loss of consciousness.

General Anesthesia: A Probe to Explore Consciousness

General anesthesia reversibly alters consciousness, without shutting down the brain globally. Depending on the anesthetic agent and dose, it may produce different consciousness states including a complete absence of subjective experience (unconsciousness), a conscious experience without perception of the environment (disconnected consciousness, like during dreaming), or episodes of oriented consciousness with awareness of the environment (connected consciousness). Each consciousness state may potentially be followed by explicit or implicit memories after the procedure. In this respect, anesthesia can be considered as a proxy to explore consciousness. During the recent years, progress in the exploration of brain function has allowed a better understanding of the neural correlates of consciousness, and of their alterations during anesthesia. Several changes in functional and effective between-region brain connectivity, consciousness network topology, and spatio-temporal dynamics of between-region interactions have been evidenced during anesthesia. Despite a set of effects that are common to many anesthetic agents, it is still uneasy to draw a comprehensive picture of the precise cascades during general anesthesia. Several questions remain unsolved, including the exact identification of the neural substrate of consciousness and its components, the detection of specific consciousness states in unresponsive patients and their associated memory processes, the processing of sensory information during anesthesia, the pharmacodynamic interactions between anesthetic agents, the direction-dependent hysteresis phenomenon during the transitions between consciousness states, the mechanisms of cognitive alterations that follow an anesthetic procedure, the identification of an eventual unitary mechanism of anesthesia-induced alteration of consciousness, the relationship between network effects and the biochemical or sleep-wake cycle targets of anesthetic agents, as well as the vast between-studies variations in dose and administration mode, leading to difficulties in between-studies comparisons. In this narrative review, we draw the picture of the current state of knowledge in anesthesia-induced unconsciousness, from insights gathered on propofol, halogenated vapors, ketamine, dexmedetomidine, benzodiazepines and xenon. We also describe how anesthesia can help understanding consciousness, we develop the above-mentioned unresolved questions, and propose tracks for future research.

Regional entropy of functional imaging signals varies differently in sensory and cognitive systems during propofol-modulated loss and return of behavioral responsiveness

The level and richness of consciousness depend on information integration in the brain. Altered interregional functional interactions may indicate disrupted information integration during anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. How anesthetics modulate the amount of information in various brain regions has received less attention. Here, we propose a novel approach to quantify regional information content in the brain by the entropy of the principal components of regional blood oxygen-dependent imaging signals during graded propofol sedation. Fifteen healthy individuals underwent resting-state scans in wakeful baseline, light sedation (conscious), deep sedation (unconscious), and recovery (conscious). Light sedation characterized by lethargic behavioral responses was associated with global reduction of entropy in the brain. Deep sedation with completely suppressed overt responsiveness was associated with further reductions of entropy in sensory (primary and higher sensory plus orbital prefrontal cortices) but not high-order cognitive (dorsal and medial prefrontal, cingulate, parietotemporal cortices and hippocampal areas) systems. Upon recovery of responsiveness, entropy was restored in the sensory but not in high-order cognitive systems. These findings provide novel evidence for a reduction of information content of the brain as a potential systems-level mechanism of reduced consciousness during propofol anesthesia. The differential changes of entropy in the sensory and high-order cognitive systems associated with losing and regaining overt responsiveness are consistent with the notion of "disconnected consciousness", in which a complete sensory-motor disconnection from the environment occurs with preserved internal mentation.

Assessment of phase-lag entropy, a new measure of electroencephalographic signals, for propofol-induced sedation

Background

Phase-lag entropy (PLE) was recently described as a measurement of temporal pattern diversity in the phase relationship between two electroencephalographic signals from prefrontal and frontal montages. This study was performed to evaluate the performance of PLE for assessing the depth of sedation.

Methods

Thirty adult patients undergoing upper limb surgery with a brachial plexus block were administered propofol by target-controlled infusion. The depth of sedation was assessed using the Observer’s Assessment of Alertness/Sedation (OAA/S) scale. The effect-site concentration (Ce) of propofol was initially started at 0.5 μg/ml and was increased in increments of 0.2 μg/ml until an OAA/S score of 1 was reached. Three minutes after the target Ce was reached, the PLE, bispectral index (BIS), and level of sedation were assessed. Correlations between the OAA/S score and PLE or BIS were determined. The prediction probabilities (P_k) of PLE and BIS were also analyzed.

Results

The PLE values were closely correlated with the OAA/S scores (Spearman’s Rho = 0.755; P < 0.001) to an extent comparable with the correlation between the BIS and OAA/S score (Spearman’s Rho = 0.788; P < 0.001). The P_k values of PLE and BIS were 0.731 and 0.718, respectively.

Conclusions

PLE is a new and reliable consciousness monitoring system for assessing the depth of sedation induced by propofol, which is comparable with the BIS.

Peri-personal space encoding in patients with disorders of consciousness and cognitive-motor dissociation

Behavioral assessments of consciousness based on overt command following cannot differentiate patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) from those who demonstrate a dissociation between intent/awareness and motor capacity: cognitive motor dissociation (CMD). We argue that delineation of peri-personal space (PPS) – the multisensory-motor space immediately surrounding the body – may differentiate these patients due to its central role in mediating human-environment interactions, and putatively in scaffolding a minimal form of selfhood. In Experiment 1, we determined a normative physiological index of PPS by recording electrophysiological (EEG) responses to tactile, auditory, or audio-tactile stimulation at different distances (5 vs. 75 cm) in healthy volunteers (N = 19). Contrasts between paired (AT) and summed (A + T) responses demonstrated multisensory supra-additivity when AT stimuli were presented near, i.e., within the PPS, and highlighted somatosensory-motor sensors as electrodes of interest. In Experiment 2, we recorded EEG in patients behaviorally diagnosed as DOC or putative CMD (N = 17, 30 sessions). The PPS-measure developed in Experiment 1 was analyzed in relation with both standard clinical diagnosis (i.e., Coma Recovery Scale; CRS-R) and a measure of neural complexity associated with consciousness. Results demonstrated a significant correlation between the PPS measure and neural complexity, but not with the CRS-R, highlighting the added value of the physiological recordings. Further, multisensory processing in PPS was preserved in putative CMD but not in DOC patients. Together, the findings suggest that indexing PPS allows differentiating between groups of patients whom both show overt motor impairments (DOC and CMD) but putatively distinct levels of awareness or motor intent.

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Behavioral assessments confound consciousness and motor output.

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We suggest that multisensory coding of actionable space may dissociate these two.

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We develop an electrophysiological marker of peri-personal space.

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Then use this marker to distinguish impairments in consciousness and motor output.

Multisensory perceptual awareness: Categorical or graded?

Neural evidence suggests that mechanisms associated with conscious access (i.e., the ability to report on a conscious state) are "all-or-none". Upon crossing some threshold, neural signals are globally broadcast throughout the brain and allow conscious reports. However, whether subjective experience (phenomenal consciousness) is categorical (i.e., transitioning abruptly from unconscious to conscious states) or graded (i.e., characterized by multiple intermediate states) remains an open question. To address this issue, we built a series of artificial neural networks containing distinct feedback connectivity from "multisensory" to "unisensory" cortices. In line with consciousness theories, we operationalized perceptual consciousness by the presence of feedback from higher-order nodes back to unisensory nodes which allow 'neural ignition' - a rapid, non-linear boost in response putatively leading to phenomenal consciousness. When simulating how these networks responded to unisensory and multisensory inputs, we found the fastest responses for multisensory presentations associated with multisensory feedback, and the slowest responses for multisensory presentations without feedback. Most interestingly, despite being built in line with "all-or-none" models of consciousness, multisensory stimuli associated with unisensory feedback (i.e., auditory or visual), and hence consistent with unisensory phenomenology according to theories of consciousness, generated intermediate reaction times. To extend these models to human perception and performance, we conducted extensive psychophysical testing in 29 subjects who each completed 10 h of a multisensory cue-congruency task. Consistent with the modeling results, we found that reaction times to multisensory cues reported as unisensory were intermediate between those of fully aware and fully unaware cues. These results support the existence of graded forms of phenomenological consciousness that can be instantiated by simple neural networks built in line with "all-or-none" models of consciousness.

Computing hubs in the hippocampus and cortex

Neural computation occurs within large neuron networks in the dynamic context of varying brain states. Whether functions are performed by specific subsets of neurons and whether they occur in specific dynamical regimes remain poorly understood. Using high-density recordings in the hippocampus, medial entorhinal, and medial prefrontal cortex of the rat, we identify computing substates where specific computing hub neurons perform well-defined storage and sharing operations in a brain state-dependent manner. We retrieve distinct computing substates within each global brain state, such as REM and nonREM sleep. Half of recorded neurons act as computing hubs in at least one substate, suggesting that functional roles are not hardwired but reassigned at the second time scale. We identify sequences of substates whose temporal organization is dynamic and stands between order and disorder. We propose that global brain states constrain the language of neuronal computations by regulating the syntactic complexity of substate sequences.

Towards a Comprehensive Understanding of Anesthetic Mechanisms of Action: A Decade of Discovery

Significant progress has been made in the 21st century towards a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms of action of general anesthetics, coincident with progress in structural biology and molecular, cellular, and systems neuroscience. This review summarizes important new findings that include target identification through structural determination of anesthetic binding sites, details of receptors and ion channels involved in neurotransmission, and the critical roles of neuronal networks in anesthetic effects on memory and consciousness. These recent developments provide a comprehensive basis for conceptualizing pharmacological control of amnesia, unconsciousness, and immobility.

Evaluating Complexity of Fetal MEG Signals: A Comparison of Different Metrics and Their Applicability

In this work, we aim to investigate whether information based metrics of neural activity are a useful tool for the quantification of consciousness before and shortly after birth. Neural activity is measured using fetal magnetoencephalography (fMEG) in human fetuses and neonates. Based on recent theories on consciousness, information-based metrics are established to measure brain complexity and to assess different levels of consciousness. Different metrics (measures of entropy, compressibility and fractality) are, thus, explored in a reference population and their usability is evaluated. For comparative analysis, two fMEG channels were selected: one where brain activity was previously detected and one at least 15 cm away, that represented a control channel. The usability of each metric was evaluated and results from the brain and control channel were compared. Concerning the ease of use with fMEG data, Lempel-Ziv-Complexity (LZC) was evaluated as best, as it is unequivocal and needs low computational effort. The fractality measures have a high number of parameters that need to be adjusted prior to analysis and therefore forfeit comparability, while entropy measures require a higher computational effort and more parameters to adjust compared to LZC. Comparison of a channel with brain activity and a control channel in neonatal recordings showed significant differences in most complexity metrics. This clear difference can be seen as proof of concept for the usability of complexity metrics in fMEG. For fetal data, this comparison produced less clear results which can be related to leftover maternal signals included in the control channel. Further work is necessary to conclusively interpret results from the analysis of fetal recordings. Yet this study shows that complexity metrics can be used for fMEG data on early consciousness and the evaluation gives a guidance for future work. The inconsistency of results from different metrics highlights the challenges of working with complexity metrics as neural correlates of consciousness, as well as the caution one should apply to interpret them.

Is temporo-spatial dynamics the "common currency" of brain and mind? In Quest of "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience"

Neuroscience has made considerable progress in unraveling the neural correlates of mental phenomena like self, consciousness, and perception. However, the "common currency" shared between neuronal and mental activity, brain and mind, remains yet unclear. In this article, we propose that the dynamics of time and space provides a "common currency" that connects neuronal and mental features. Time and space are here understood in a dynamic context (as in contemporary physics): that is, in terms of the way the brain's spontaneous activity constructs its spatial and temporal relationships, for instance in terms of functional connectivity and different frequencies of fluctuations. Recruiting recent empirical evidence, we show that the different ways in which the spontaneous activity constructs its "inner time and space" are manifested in distinct mental features. Specifically, we demonstrate how spatiotemporal mechanisms like spatiotemporal repertoire, integration, and speed yield mental features like consciousness, self, and time speed perception. The focus on the brain's spatiotemporal mechanisms entails what we describe as "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience". Spatiotemporal Neuroscience conceives neuronal activity in terms of its temporo-spatial dynamics rather than its various functions (e.g., cognitive, affective, social, etc.) as in other branches of neuroscience (as distinguished from Cognitive, Affective, Cultural, Social, etc. Neuroscience). That allows Spatiotemporal Neuroscience to take into view the so-called 'spatio-temporality' of mental features including their non-causal, intrinsic and transformative relationship with neuronal features. In conclusion, Spatiotemporal Neuroscience opens the door to investigate and ultimately reveal the brain's own temporo-spatial dynamics as the hitherto missing "common currency" of neuronal and mental features.

Neural Correlates of Anesthesia in Newborn Mice and Humans

Monitoring the hypnotic component of anesthesia during surgeries is critical to prevent intraoperative awareness and reduce adverse side effects. For this purpose, electroencephalographic (EEG) methods complementing measures of autonomic functions and behavioral responses are in use in clinical practice. However, in human neonates and infants existing methods may be unreliable and the correlation between brain activity and anesthetic depth is still poorly understood. Here, we characterized the effects of different anesthetics on brain activity in neonatal mice and developed machine learning approaches to identify electrophysiological features predicting inspired or end-tidal anesthetic concentration as a proxy for anesthetic depth. We show that similar features from EEG recordings can be applied to predict anesthetic concentration in neonatal mice and humans. These results might support a novel strategy to monitor anesthetic depth in human newborns.

Phase lag entropy as a hypnotic depth indicator during propofol sedation

Phase lag entropy, an electro-encephalography-based hypnotic depth indicator, calculates diversity in temporal patterns of phase relationship. We compared the performance of phase lag entropy with the bispectral index™ in 30 patients scheduled for elective surgery. We initiated a target-controlled infusion of propofol using the Schnider model, and assessed sedation levels using the Modified Observer's Assessment of Alertness/Sedation scale every 30 s with each stepwise increase in the effect-site propofol concentration. Phase lag entropy and bispectral index values were recorded. The correlation coefficient and prediction probability between phase lag entropy or bispectral index and the sedation level or effect-site propofol concentration were analysed. We calculated baseline variabilities of phase lag entropy and bispectral index. In addition, we applied a non-linear mixed-effects model to obtain the pharmacodynamic relationships among the effect-site propofol concentration, phase lag entropy or bispectral index and sedation level. As sedation increased, phase lag entropy and bispectral index both decreased. The prediction probability values of phase lag entropy and bispectral index for sedation levels were 0.697 and 0.700 (p = 0.261) and for the effect-site concentration of propofol were 0.646 and 0.630 (p = 0.091), respectively. Baseline variability in phase lag entropy and bispectral index was 3.3 and 5.7, respectively. The predicted propofol concentrations, using the Schnider pharmacokinetic model, producing a 50% probability of moderate and deep sedation were 1.96 and 3.01 μg.ml^-1 , respectively. Phase lag entropy was found to be useful as a hypnotic depth indicator in patients receiving propofol sedation.

A fast and general method to empirically estimate the complexity of brain responses to transcranial and intracranial stimulations

BACKGROUND

The Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI) was recently introduced to assess the capacity of thalamocortical circuits to engage in complex patterns of causal interactions. While showing high accuracy in detecting consciousness in brain-injured patients, PCI depends on elaborate experimental setups and offline processing, and has restricted applicability to other types of brain signals beyond transcranial magnetic stimulation and high-density EEG (TMS/hd-EEG) recordings.

OBJECTIVE

We aim to address these limitations by introducing PCI^ST, a fast method for estimating perturbational complexity of any given brain response signal.

METHODS

PCI^ST is based on dimensionality reduction and state transitions (ST) quantification of evoked potentials. The index was validated on a large dataset of TMS/hd-EEG recordings obtained from 108 healthy subjects and 108 brain-injured patients, and tested on sparse intracranial recordings (SEEG) of 9 patients undergoing intracranial single-pulse electrical stimulation (SPES) during wakefulness and sleep.

RESULTS

When calculated on TMS/hd-EEG potentials, PCI^ST performed with the same accuracy as the original PCI, while improving on the previous method by being computed in less than a second and requiring a simpler set-up. In SPES/SEEG signals, the index was able to quantify a systematic reduction of intracranial complexity during sleep, confirming the occurrence of state-dependent changes in the effective connectivity of thalamocortical circuits, as originally assessed through TMS/hd-EEG.

CONCLUSIONS

PCI^ST represents a fundamental advancement towards the implementation of a reliable and fast clinical tool for the bedside assessment of consciousness as well as a general measure to explore the neuronal mechanisms of loss/recovery of brain complexity across scales and models.

Cortical dynamics during psychedelic and anesthetized states induced by ketamine

Ketamine is a unique drug that has psychedelic and anesthetic properties in a dose-dependent manner. Recent studies have shown that ketamine anesthesia appears to maintain the spatiotemporal complexity of cortical activation evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation, while a psychedelic dose of ketamine is associated with increased spontaneous magnetoencephalographic signal diversity. However, a systematic investigation of the dose-dependent effects of ketamine on cortical complexity using the same modality is required. Furthermore, it is unknown whether the complexity level stabilizes or fluctuates over time for the duration of ketamine exposure. Here we investigated the spatiotemporal complexity of spontaneous high-density scalp electroencephalography (EEG) signals in healthy volunteers during alterations of consciousness induced by both subanesthetic and anesthetic doses of ketamine. Given the fast transient spectral dynamics, especially during the gamma-burst pattern after loss of consciousness, we employed a method based on Hidden Markov modeling to classify the EEG signals into a discrete set of brain states that correlated with different behavioral states. We characterized the spatiotemporal complexity specific for each brain state as measured through the Lempel-Ziv complexity algorithm. After controlling for signal diversity due to spectral changes, we found that the subanesthetic dose of ketamine is associated with an elevated complexity level relative to baseline, while the brain activity following an anesthetic dose of ketamine is characterized by alternating low and high complexity levels until stabilizing at a high level comparable to that during baseline. Thus, spatiotemporal complexity associated with ketamine-induced state transitions has features of general anesthesia, normal consciousness, and altered states of consciousness. These results improve our understanding of the complex pharmacological, neurophysiological, and phenomenological properties of ketamine.

Connectivity differences between consciousness and unconsciousness in non-rapid eye movement sleep: a TMS-EEG study

The neuronal connectivity patterns that differentiate consciousness from unconsciousness remain unclear. Previous studies have demonstrated that effective connectivity, as assessed by transcranial magnetic stimulation combined with electroencephalography (TMS-EEG), breaks down during the loss of consciousness. This study investigated changes in EEG connectivity associated with consciousness during non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep following parietal TMS. Compared with unconsciousness, conscious experiences during NREM sleep were associated with reduced phase-locking at low frequencies (<4 Hz). Transitivity and clustering coefficient in the delta and theta bands were also significantly lower during consciousness compared to unconsciousness, with differences in the clustering coefficient observed in scalp electrodes over parietal-occipital regions. There were no significant differences in Granger-causality patterns in frontal-to-parietal or parietal-to-frontal connectivity between reported unconsciousness and reported consciousness. Together these results suggest that alterations in spectral and spatial characteristics of network properties in posterior brain areas, in particular decreased local (segregated) connectivity at low frequencies, is a potential indicator of consciousness during sleep.

An Objective Exploration of Euthanasia and Adverse Events

Companion animal euthanasia is of great emotional, social, ethical, and medical significance because of the strong bond between pets and their owners. Few studies exist quantifying adverse events during and after euthanasia. Such events have profound effects on pet owners, veterinary professionals and veterinary patients. Best practices or standards of care have yet to be established. Companion animal euthanasia warrants further rigorous investigation regarding current veterinary medical practices due to its significant, complex, and far-reaching effects. Literature evaluating human euthanasia and assisted death in countries where such practices are legal can be a useful area of investigation and collaborative inquiry.

Effects of antiepileptic drugs on cortical excitability in humans: A TMS-EMG and TMS-EEG study

Brain responses to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) recorded by electroencephalography (EEG) are emergent noninvasive markers of neuronal excitability and effective connectivity in humans. However, the underlying physiology of these TMS-evoked EEG potentials (TEPs) is still heavily underexplored, impeding a broad application of TEPs to study pathology in neuropsychiatric disorders. Here we tested the effects of a single oral dose of three antiepileptic drugs with specific modes of action (carbamazepine, a voltage-gated sodium channel (VGSC) blocker; brivaracetam, a ligand to the presynaptic vesicle protein VSA2; tiagabine, a gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) reuptake inhibitor) on TEP amplitudes in 15 healthy adults in a double-blinded randomized placebo-controlled crossover design. We found that carbamazepine decreased the P25 and P180 TEP components, and brivaracetam the N100 amplitude in the nonstimulated hemisphere, while tiagabine had no effect. Findings corroborate the view that the P25 represents axonal excitability of the corticospinal system, the N100 in the nonstimulated hemisphere propagated activity suppressed by inhibition of presynaptic neurotransmitter release, and the P180 late activity particularly sensitive to VGSC blockade. Pharmaco-physiological characterization of TEPs will facilitate utilization of TMS-EEG in neuropsychiatric disorders with altered excitability and/or network connectivity.

Assessing recurrent interactions in cortical networks: Modeling EEG response to transcranial magnetic stimulation

BACKGROUND

The basic mechanisms underlying the electroencephalograpy (EEG) response to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the human cortex are not well understood.

NEW METHOD

A state-space modeling methodology is developed to gain insight into the network nature of the TMS/EEG response. Cortical activity is modeled using a multivariariate autoregressive model with exogenous stimulation parameters representing the effect of TMS. An observation equation models EEG measurement of cortical activity. An expectation-maximization algorithm is developed to estimate the model parameters.

RESULTS

The methodology is used to assess two different hypotheses for the mechanisms underlying TMS/EEG in wakefulness and sleep. The integrated model hypothesizes that recurrent interactions between cortical regions are the source of TMS/EEG, while the segregated model hypothesizes that the TMS/EEG results from excitation of independent cortical oscillators. The results show that the relatively simple EEG response to TMS recorded during non-rapid-eye-movement sleep is described equally well by either the integrated or segregated model. However, the integrated model fits the more complex TMS/EEG of wakefulness much better than the segregated model.

COMPARISON WITH EXISTING METHOD(S)

Existing methods are limited to small numbers of cortical regions of interest or do not represent the effect of TMS. Our results are consistent with previous studies contrasting the complexity of TMS/EEG in wakefulness and sleep.

CONCLUSION

The new method strongly suggests that effective feedback connections between cortical regions are required to produce the TMS/EEG in wakefulness.

Evoked Alpha Power is Reduced in Disconnected Consciousness During Sleep and Anesthesia

Sleep and anesthesia entail alterations in conscious experience. Conscious experience may be absent (unconsciousness) or take the form of dreaming, a state in which sensory stimuli are not incorporated into conscious experience (disconnected consciousness). Recent work has identified features of cortical activity that distinguish conscious from unconscious states; however, less is known about how cortical activity differs between disconnected states and normal wakefulness. We employed transcranial magnetic stimulation–electroencephalography (TMS–EEG) over parietal regions across states of anesthesia and sleep to assess whether evoked oscillatory activity differed in disconnected states. We hypothesized that alpha activity, which may regulate perception of sensory stimuli, is altered in the disconnected states of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep and ketamine anesthesia. Compared to wakefulness, evoked alpha power (8–12 Hz) was decreased during disconnected consciousness. In contrast, in unconscious states of propofol anesthesia and non-REM (NREM) sleep, evoked low-gamma power (30–40 Hz) was decreased compared to wakefulness or states of disconnected consciousness. These findings were confirmed in subjects in which dream reports were obtained following serial awakenings from NREM sleep. By examining signatures of evoked cortical activity across conscious states, we identified novel evidence that suppression of evoked alpha activity may represent a promising marker of sensory disconnection.

Role of Network Science in the Study of Anesthetic State Transitions

The heterogeneity of molecular mechanisms, target neural circuits, and neurophysiologic effects of general anesthetics makes it difficult to develop a reliable and drug-invariant index of general anesthesia. No single brain region or mechanism has been identified as the neural correlate of consciousness, suggesting that consciousness might emerge through complex interactions of spatially and temporally distributed brain functions. The goal of this review article is to introduce the basic concepts of networks and explain why the application of network science to general anesthesia could be a pathway to discover a fundamental mechanism of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. This article reviews data suggesting that reduced network efficiency, constrained network repertoires, and changes in cortical dynamics create inhospitable conditions for information processing and transfer, which lead to unconsciousness. This review proposes that network science is not just a useful tool but a necessary theoretical framework and method to uncover common principles of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.

Disrupted neural variability during propofol-induced sedation and unconsciousness

Variability quenching is a widespread neural phenomenon in which trial-to-trial variability (TTV) of neural activity is reduced by repeated presentations of a sensory stimulus. However, its neural mechanism and functional significance remain poorly understood. Recurrent network dynamics are suggested as a candidate mechanism of TTV, and they play a key role in consciousness. We thus asked whether the variability-quenching phenomenon is related to the level of consciousness. We hypothesized that TTV reduction would be compromised during reduced level of consciousness by propofol anesthetics. We recorded functional magnetic resonance imaging signals of resting-state and stimulus-induced activities in three conditions: wakefulness, sedation, and unconsciousness (i.e., deep anesthesia). We measured the average (trial-to-trial mean, TTM) and variability (TTV) of auditory stimulus-induced activity under the three conditions. We also examined another form of neural variability (temporal variability, TV), which quantifies the overall dynamic range of ongoing neural activity across time, during both the resting-state and the task. We found that (a) TTM deceased gradually from wakefulness through sedation to anesthesia, (b) stimulus-induced TTV reduction normally seen during wakefulness was abolished during both sedation and anesthesia, and (c) TV increased in the task state as compared to resting-state during both wakefulness and sedation, but not anesthesia. Together, our results reveal distinct effects of propofol on the two forms of neural variability (TTV and TV). They imply that the anesthetic disrupts recurrent network dynamics, thus prevents the stabilization of cortical activity states. These findings shed new light on the temporal dynamics of neuronal variability and its alteration during anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.

Isoflurane and ketamine differentially influence spontaneous and evoked laminar electrophysiology in mouse V1

General anesthesia is ubiquitous in research and medicine, yet although the molecular mechanisms of anesthetics are well characterized, their ultimate influence on cortical electrophysiology remains unclear. Moreover, the influence that different anesthetics have on sensory cortexes at neuronal and ensemble scales is mostly unknown and represents an important gap in knowledge that has widespread relevance for neural sciences. To address this knowledge gap, this work explored the effects of isoflurane and ketamine/xylazine, two widely used anesthetic paradigms, on electrophysiological behavior in mouse primary visual cortex. First, multiunit activity and local field potentials were examined to understand how each anesthetic influences spontaneous activity. Then, the interlaminar relationships between populations of neurons at different cortical depths were studied to assess whether anesthetics influenced resting-state functional connectivity. Lastly, the spatiotemporal dynamics of visually evoked multiunit and local field potentials were examined to determine how each anesthetic alters communication of visual information. We found that isoflurane enhanced the rhythmicity of spontaneous ensemble activity at 10-40 Hz, which coincided with large increases in coherence between layer IV with superficial and deep layers. Ketamine preferentially increased local field potential power from 2 to 4 Hz, and the largest increases in coherence were observed between superficial and deep layers. Visually evoked responses across layers were diminished under isoflurane, and enhanced under ketamine anesthesia. These findings demonstrate that isoflurane and ketamine anesthesia differentially impact sensory processing in V1. NEW & NOTEWORTHY We directly compared electrophysiological responses in awake and anesthetized (isoflurane or ketamine) mice. We also proposed a method for quantifying and visualizing highly variable, evoked multiunit activity. Lastly, we observed distinct oscillatory responses to stimulus onset and offset in awake and isoflurane-anesthetized mice.

Integrated information in the EEG of preterm infants increases with family nurture intervention, age, and conscious state

A putative quantifier of consciousness, integrated information, was applied to preterm infant EEG data after novel pre-processing. Integrated information had a non-random structure as a function of the time lag over which it was computed. For most lags, it increased with age in early life, but even more so in infants exposed to Family Nurture Intervention (FNI), providing further evidence that FNI advances brain maturation in preterm infants. Also, it discriminated between conscious states (awake, REM sleep, NREM sleep), providing empirical support for the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness in human infants.

The non-transcranial TMS-evoked potential is an inherent source of ambiguity in TMS-EEG studies

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) excites populations of neurons in the stimulated cortex, and the resulting activation may spread to connected brain regions. The distributed cortical response can be recorded with electroencephalography (EEG). Since TMS also stimulates peripheral sensory and motor axons and generates a loud "click" sound, the TMS-evoked EEG potentials (TEPs) reflect not only neural activity induced by transcranial neuronal excitation but also neural activity due to somatosensory and auditory processing. In 17 healthy young individuals, we systematically assessed the contribution of multisensory peripheral stimulation to TEPs using a TMS-compatible EEG system. Real TMS was delivered with a figure-of-eight coil over the left para-median posterior parietal cortex or superior frontal gyrus with the coil being oriented perpendicularly or in parallel to the target gyrus. We also recorded the EEG responses evoked by realistic sham stimulation over the posterior parietal and superior frontal cortex, mimicking the auditory and somatosensory sensations evoked by real TMS. We applied state-of-the-art procedures to attenuate somatosensory and auditory confounds during real TMS, including the placement of a foam layer underneath the coil and auditory noise masking. Despite these precautions, the temporal and spatial features of the cortical potentials evoked by real TMS at the prefrontal and parietal site closely resembled the cortical potentials evoked by realistic sham TMS, both for early and late TEP components. Our findings stress the need to include a peripheral multisensory control stimulation in the design of TMS-EEG studies to enable a dissociation between truly transcranial and non-transcranial components of TEPs.

Informativeness of Auditory Stimuli Does Not Affect EEG Signal Diversity

Brain signal diversity constitutes a robust neuronal marker of the global states of consciousness. It has been demonstrated that, in comparison to the resting wakefulness, signal diversity is lower during unconscious states, and higher during psychedelic states. A plausible interpretation of these findings is that the neuronal diversity corresponds to the diversity of subjective conscious experiences. Therefore, in the present study we varied an information rate processed by the subjects and hypothesized that greater information rate will be related to richer and more differentiated phenomenology and, consequently, to greater signal diversity. To test this hypothesis speech recordings (excerpts from an audio-book) were presented to subjects at five different speeds (65, 83, 100, 117, and 135% of the original speed). By increasing or decreasing speed of the recordings we were able to, respectively, increase or decrease the presented information rate. We also included a backward (unintelligible) speech presentation and a resting-state condition (no auditory stimulation). We tested 19 healthy subjects and analyzed the recorded EEG signal (64 channels) in terms of Lempel-Ziv diversity (LZs). We report the following findings. First, our main hypothesis was not confirmed, as Bayes Factor indicates evidence for no effect when comparing LZs among five presentation speeds. Second, we found that LZs during the resting-state was greater than during processing of both meaningful and unintelligible speech. Third, an additional analysis uncovered a gradual decrease of diversity over the time-course of the experiment, which might reflect a decrease in vigilance. We thus speculate that higher signal diversity during the unconstrained resting-state might be due to a greater variety of experiences, involving spontaneous attention switching and mind wandering.

Dimensions of consciousness and the psychedelic state

It has often been suggested in the popular and academic literature that the psychedelic state qualifies as a higher state of consciousness relative to the state of normal waking awareness. This article subjects this proposal to critical scrutiny, focusing on the question of what it would mean for a state of consciousness to be 'higher'. We begin by considering the contrast between conscious contents and conscious global states. We then review the changes in conscious global state associated with psychedelic drug use, focusing on the effects of two serotonergic hallucinogens: psilocybin and lysergic acid diethylamide. Limiting our review to findings obtained from lab-based experiments and reported in peer-reviewed journals, we prioritize the more common and reliably induced effects obtained through subjective questionnaires and psychophysical measures. The findings are grouped into three broad categories (sensory perception, cognitive function, and experiences of unity) and demonstrate that although certain aspects of consciousness are improved or enhanced in the psychedelic state, many of the functional capacities that are associated with consciousness are seriously compromised. Psychedelic-induced states of consciousness are indeed remarkable in many ways, but it is inappropriate to regard them as 'higher' states of consciousness. The fact that psychedelics affect different aspects of consciousness in fundamentally different ways provides evidence against the unidimensional (or 'level-based') view of consciousness, and instead provides strong support for a multidimensional conception of conscious states. The final section of the article considers the implications of this analysis for two prominent theories of consciousness: the Global Workspace Theory and Integrated Information Theory.

Functional diversity of brain networks supports consciousness and verbal intelligence

How are the myriad stimuli arriving at our senses transformed into conscious thought? To address this question, in a series of studies, we asked whether a common mechanism underlies loss of information processing in unconscious states across different conditions, which could shed light on the brain mechanisms of conscious cognition. With a novel approach, we brought together for the first time, data from the same paradigm-a highly engaging auditory-only narrative-in three independent domains: anesthesia-induced unconsciousness, unconsciousness after brain injury, and individual differences in intellectual abilities during conscious cognition. During external stimulation in the unconscious state, the functional differentiation between the auditory and fronto-parietal systems decreased significantly relatively to the conscious state. Conversely, we found that stronger functional differentiation between these systems in response to external stimulation predicted higher intellectual abilities during conscious cognition, in particular higher verbal acuity scores in independent cognitive testing battery. These convergent findings suggest that the responsivity of sensory and higher-order brain systems to external stimulation, especially through the diversification of their functional responses is an essential feature of conscious cognition and verbal intelligence.

Propofol-induced unresponsiveness is associated with impaired feedforward connectivity in cortical hierarchy

BACKGROUND

Impaired consciousness has been associated with impaired cortical signal propagation after transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). We hypothesised that the reduced current propagation under propofol-induced unresponsiveness is associated with changes in both feedforward and feedback connectivity across the cortical hierarchy.

METHODS

Eight subjects underwent left occipital TMS coupled with high-density EEG recordings during wakefulness and propofol-induced unconsciousness. Spectral analysis was applied to responses recorded from sensors overlying six hierarchical cortical sources involved in visual processing. Dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of induced time-frequency responses and evoked response potentials were used to investigate propofol's effects on connectivity between regions.

RESULTS

Sensor space analysis demonstrated that propofol reduced both induced and evoked power after TMS in occipital, parietal, and frontal electrodes. Bayesian model selection supported a DCM with hierarchical feedforward and feedback connections. DCM of induced EEG responses revealed that the primary effect of propofol was impaired feedforward responses in cross-frequency theta/alpha-gamma coupling and within frequency theta coupling (F contrast, family-wise error corrected P<0.05). An exploratory analysis (thresholded at uncorrected P<0.001) also suggested that propofol impaired feedforward and feedback beta band coupling. Post hoc analyses showed impairments in all feedforward connections and one feedback connection from parietal to occipital cortex. DCM of the evoked response potential showed impaired feedforward connectivity between left-sided occipital and parietal cortex (T contrast P=0.004, Bonferroni corrected).

CONCLUSIONS

Propofol-induced loss of consciousness is associated with impaired hierarchical feedforward connectivity assessed by EEG after occipital TMS.

A transient cortical state with sleep-like sensory responses precedes emergence from general anesthesia in humans

During awake consciousness, the brain intrinsically maintains a dynamical state in which it can coordinate complex responses to sensory input. How the brain reaches this state spontaneously is not known. General anesthesia provides a unique opportunity to examine how the human brain recovers its functional capabilities after profound unconsciousness. We used intracranial electrocorticography and scalp EEG in humans to track neural dynamics during emergence from propofol general anesthesia. We identify a distinct transient brain state that occurs immediately prior to recovery of behavioral responsiveness. This state is characterized by large, spatially distributed, slow sensory-evoked potentials that resemble the K-complexes that are hallmarks of stage two sleep. However, the ongoing spontaneous dynamics in this transitional state differ from sleep. These results identify an asymmetry in the neurophysiology of induction and emergence, as the emerging brain can enter a state with a sleep-like sensory blockade before regaining responsivity to arousing stimuli.

General anesthesia is essential to modern medicine. It allows physicians to temporarily keep people in an unconscious state. When infusions of the anesthetic drug stop, patients gradually recover consciousness and awaken, a process called emergence. Previous studies using recordings of electrical activity in the brain have documented spontaneous changes during anesthesia. In addition, the way the brain responds to sounds or other stimulation is altered. How the brain switches between the anesthetized and awake states is not well understood.

Studying the changes that happen during emergence may help scientists learn how the brain awakens after anesthesia. A key question is whether the changes that occur during emergence are the reverse of what happens when someone is anesthetized, or whether it is a completely different process. Knowing this could help clinicians monitoring patients under anesthesia, and help scientists understand more about how the brain transitions into the awake state.

Now, Lewis et al. show that people go through a sleep-like state right before awakening from anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. In the experiments, recordings were made of the electrical activity in the brains of people emerging from anesthesia. One set of recordings was taken in people with epilepsy, who had electrodes implanted in their brains as part of their treatment. Similar recordings of brain electrical activity during emergence were also made on healthy volunteers using electrodes placed on their scalps. In both groups of people, Lewis et al. documented large changes in electrical activity in the brain’s response to sound in the minutes before emergence.

These patterns of electrical activity during emergence were similar to those seen in patients during a normal stage of sleep (stage 2). Patients who were about to wake up from general anesthesia had suppressed brain activity in response to sounds, such as their name. Moreover, this sleep-like state happened only during emergence, indicating it is a distinct process from going under anesthesia. The experiments also suggest that the brain may use a common process to wake up after sleep or anesthesia. More studies may help scientists understand this process and how to better care for patients who need anesthesia.

Apical Function in Neocortical Pyramidal Cells: A Common Pathway by Which General Anesthetics Can Affect Mental State

It has been argued that general anesthetics suppress the level of consciousness, or the contents of consciousness, or both. The distinction between level and content is important because, in addition to clarifying the mechanisms of anesthesia, it may help clarify the neural bases of consciousness. We assess these arguments in the light of evidence that both the level and the content of consciousness depend upon the contribution of apical input to the information processing capabilities of neocortical pyramidal cells which selectively amplify relevant signals. We summarize research suggesting that what neocortical pyramidal cells transmit information about can be distinguished from levels of arousal controlled by sub-cortical nuclei and from levels of prioritization specified by interactions within the thalamocortical system. Put simply, on the basis of the observations reviewed, we hypothesize that when conscious we have particular, directly experienced, percepts, thoughts, feelings and intentions, and that general anesthetics affect consciousness by interfering with the subcellular processes by which particular activities are selectively amplified when relevant to the current context.

Cortical Excitability and Interhemispheric Connectivity in Early Relapsing-Remitting Multiple Sclerosis Studied With TMS-EEG

Evoked potentials (EPs) are well established in clinical practice for diagnosis and prognosis in multiple sclerosis (MS). However, their value is limited to the assessment of their respective functional systems. Here, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) coupled with electroencephalography (TMS-EEG) to investigate cortical excitability and spatiotemporal dynamics of TMS-evoked neural activity in MS patients. Thirteen patients with early relapsing–remitting MS (RRMS) with a median Expanded Disability Status Scale (EDSS) of 1.0 (range 0–2.5) and 16 age- and gender-matched healthy controls received single-pulse TMS of left and right primary motor cortex (L-M1 and R-M1), respectively. Resting motor threshold for L-M1 and R-M1 was increased in MS patients. Latencies and amplitudes of N45, P70, N100, P180, and N280 TMS-evoked EEG potentials (TEPs) were not different between groups, except a significantly increased amplitude of the N280 TEP in the MS group, both for L-M1 and R-M1 stimulation. Interhemispheric signal propagation (ISP), estimated from the area under the curve of TEPs in the non-stimulated vs. stimulated M1, also did not differ between groups. In summary, findings show that ISP and TEPs were preserved in early-stage RRMS, except for an exaggerated N280 amplitude. Our findings indicate that TMS-EEG is feasible in testing excitability and connectivity in cortical neural networks in MS patients, complementary to conventional EPs. However, relevance and pathophysiological correlates of the enhanced N280 will need further study.

Long-range temporal correlations in the brain distinguish conscious wakefulness from induced unconsciousness

Rhythmic neuronal synchronization across large-scale networks is thought to play a key role in the regulation of conscious states. Changes in neuronal oscillation amplitude across states of consciousness have been widely reported, but little is known about possible changes in the temporal dynamics of these oscillations. The temporal structure of brain oscillations may provide novel insights into the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness. To address this question, we examined long-range temporal correlations (LRTC) of EEG oscillation amplitudes recorded during both wakefulness and anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. Importantly, the time-varying EEG oscillation envelopes were assessed over the course of a sevoflurane sedation protocol during which the participants alternated between states of consciousness and unconsciousness. Both spectral power and LRTC in oscillation amplitude were computed across multiple frequency bands. State-dependent differences in these features were assessed using non-parametric tests and supervised machine learning. We found that periods of unconsciousness were associated with increases in LRTC in beta (15-30Hz) amplitude over frontocentral channels and with a suppression of alpha (8-13Hz) amplitude over occipitoparietal electrodes. Moreover, classifiers trained to predict states of consciousness on single epochs demonstrated that the combination of beta LRTC with alpha amplitude provided the highest classification accuracy (above 80%). These results suggest that loss of consciousness is accompanied by an augmentation of temporal persistence in neuronal oscillation amplitude, which may reflect an increase in regularity and a decrease in network repertoire compared to the brain's activity during resting-state consciousness.

Probing Electrophysiological Indices of Perceptual Awareness across Unisensory and Multisensory Modalities

The neural underpinnings of perceptual awareness have been extensively studied using unisensory (e.g., visual alone) stimuli. However, perception is generally multisensory, and it is unclear whether the neural architecture uncovered in these studies directly translates to the multisensory domain. Here, we use EEG to examine brain responses associated with the processing of visual, auditory, and audiovisual stimuli presented near threshold levels of detectability, with the aim of deciphering similarities and differences in the neural signals indexing the transition into perceptual awareness across vision, audition, and combined visual-auditory (multisensory) processing. More specifically, we examine (1) the presence of late evoked potentials (∼>300 msec), (2) the across-trial reproducibility, and (3) the evoked complexity associated with perceived versus nonperceived stimuli. Results reveal that, although perceived stimuli are associated with the presence of late evoked potentials across each of the examined sensory modalities, between-trial variability and EEG complexity differed for unisensory versus multisensory conditions. Whereas across-trial variability and complexity differed for perceived versus nonperceived stimuli in the visual and auditory conditions, this was not the case for the multisensory condition. Taken together, these results suggest that there are fundamental differences in the neural correlates of perceptual awareness for unisensory versus multisensory stimuli. Specifically, the work argues that the presence of late evoked potentials, as opposed to neural reproducibility or complexity, most closely tracks perceptual awareness regardless of the nature of the sensory stimulus. In addition, the current findings suggest a greater similarity between the neural correlates of perceptual awareness of unisensory (visual and auditory) stimuli when compared with multisensory stimuli.

Neural Correlates of Unconsciousness in Large-Scale Brain Networks

The biological basis of consciousness is one of the most challenging and fundamental questions in 21st century science. A related pursuit aims to identify the neural correlates and causes of unconsciousness. We review current trends in the investigation of physiological, pharmacological, and pathological states of unconsciousness at the level of large-scale functional brain networks. We focus on the roles of brain connectivity, repertoire, graph-theoretical techniques, and neural dynamics in understanding the functional brain disconnections and reduced complexity that appear to characterize these states. Persistent questions in the field, such as distinguishing true correlates, linking neural scales, and understanding differential recovery patterns, are also addressed.

Loss of consciousness is related to hyper-correlated gamma-band activity in anesthetized macaques and sleeping humans

Loss of consciousness can result from a wide range of causes, including natural sleep and pharmacologically induced anesthesia. Important insights might thus come from identifying neuronal mechanisms of loss and re-emergence of consciousness independent of a specific manipulation. Therefore, to seek neuronal signatures of loss of consciousness common to sleep and anesthesia we analyzed spontaneous electrophysiological activity recorded in two experiments. First, electrocorticography (ECoG) acquired from 4 macaque monkeys anesthetized with different anesthetic agents (ketamine, medetomidine, propofol) and, second, stereo-electroencephalography (sEEG) from 10 epilepsy patients in different wake-sleep stages (wakefulness, NREM, REM). Specifically, we investigated co-activation patterns among brain areas, defined as correlations between local amplitudes of gamma-band activity. We found that resting wakefulness was associated with intermediate levels of gamma-band coupling, indicating neither complete dependence, nor full independence among brain regions. In contrast, loss of consciousness during NREM sleep and propofol anesthesia was associated with excessively correlated brain activity, as indicated by a robust increase of number and strength of positive correlations. However, such excessively correlated brain signals were not observed during REM sleep, and were present only to a limited extent during ketamine anesthesia. This might be related to the fact that, despite suppression of behavioral responsiveness, REM sleep and ketamine anesthesia often involve presence of dream-like conscious experiences. We conclude that hyper-correlated gamma-band activity might be a signature of loss of consciousness common across various manipulations and independent of behavioral responsiveness.

Global structural integrity and effective connectivity in patients with disorders of consciousness

BACKGROUND

Previous studies have separately reported impaired functional, structural, and effective connectivity in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC). The perturbational complexity index (PCI) is a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) derived marker of effective connectivity. The global fractional anisotropy (FA) is a marker of structural integrity. Little is known about how these parameters are related to each other.

OBJECTIVE

We aimed at testing the relationship between structural integrity and effective connectivity.

METHODS

We assessed 23 patients with severe brain injury more than 4 weeks post-onset, leading to DOC or locked-in syndrome, and 14 healthy subjects. We calculated PCI using repeated single pulse TMS coupled with high-density electroencephalography, and used it as a surrogate of effective connectivity. Structural integrity was measured using the global FA, derived from diffusion weighted imaging. We used linear regression modelling to test our hypothesis, and computed the correlation between PCI and FA in different groups.

RESULTS

Global FA could predict 74% of PCI variance in the whole sample and 56% in the patients' group. No other predictors (age, gender, time since onset, behavioural score) improved the models. FA and PCI were correlated in the whole population (r = 0.86, p < 0.0001), the patients, and the healthy subjects subgroups.

CONCLUSION

We here demonstrated that effective connectivity correlates with structural integrity in brain-injured patients. Increased structural damage level decreases effective connectivity, which could prevent the emergence of consciousness.