Intracortical Inhibition During Volitional Inhibition of Prepared Action

Neural correlates of cognitive control of reaching movements in the dorsal premotor cortex of rhesus monkeys

Canceling a pending movement is a hallmark of voluntary behavioral control because it allows us to quickly adapt to unattended changes either in the external environment or in our thoughts. The countermanding paradigm allows the study of inhibitory processes of motor acts by requiring the subject to withhold planned movements in response to an infrequent stop-signal. At present the neural processes underlying the inhibitory control of arm movements are mostly unknown. We recorded the activity of single units in the rostral and caudal portion of the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) of monkeys trained in a countermanding reaching task. We found that among neurons with a movement-preparatory activity, about one-third exhibit a modulation before the behavioral estimate of the time it takes to cancel a planned movement. Hence these neurons exhibit a pattern of activity suggesting that PMd plays a critical role in the brain networks involved in the control of arm movement initiation and suppression.

Electrophysiological Evidence for Different Inhibitory Mechanisms When Stopping or Changing a Planned Response

People are able to adapt their behavior to changing environmental contingencies by rapidly inhibiting or modifying their actions. Response inhibition is often studied in the stop-signal paradigm that requires the suppression of an already prepared motor response. Less is known about situations calling for a change of motor plans such that the prepared response has to be withheld but another has to be executed instead. In the present study, we investigated whether electrophysiological data can provide evidence for distinct inhibitory mechanisms when stopping or changing a response. Participants were instructed to perform in a choice RT task with two classes of embedded critical trials: Stop signals called for the inhibition of any response, whereas change signals required participants to inhibit the prepared response and execute another one instead. Under both conditions, we observed differences in go-stimulus processing, suggesting a faster response preparation in failed compared with successful inhibitions. In contrast to stop-signal trials, changing a response did not elicit the inhibition-related frontal N2 and did not modulate the parietal mu power decrease. The results suggest that compared with changing a response, additional frontal and parietal regions are engaged when having to inhibit a response.

A proactive mechanism for selective suppression of response tendencies

While most research on stopping action examines how an initiated response is stopped when a signal occurs (i.e., reactively), everyday life also calls for a mechanism to prepare to stop a particular response tendency (i.e., proactively and selectively). We hypothesized that human subjects can prepare to stop a particular response by proactively suppressing that response representation in the brain. We tested this by using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation and concurrent electromyography. This allowed us to interrogate the corticomotor excitability of specific response representations even before action ensued. We found that the motor evoked potential of the effector that might need to be stopped in the future was significantly reduced compared with when that effector was at rest. Further, this neural index of proactive and selective suppression predicted the subsequent selectivity with which the behavioral response was stopped. These results go further than earlier reports of reduced motor excitability when responses are stopped. They show that the control can be applied in advance (proactively) and also targeted at a particular response channel (selectively). This provides novel evidence for an active mechanism of suppression in the brain that is setup according to the subject's goals and even before action ensues.

From reactive to proactive and selective control: developing a richer model for stopping inappropriate responses

A better understanding of the neural systems underlying impulse control is important for psychiatry. Although most impulses are motivational or emotional rather than motoric per se, it is research into the neural architecture of motor response control that has made the greatest strides. This article reviews recent developments in the cognitive neuroscience of stopping responses. Most research of this kind has focused on reactive control-that is, how subjects stop a response outright when instructed by a signal. It is argued that reactive paradigms are limited as models of control relevant to psychiatry. Instead, a set of paradigms is advocated that begins to model proactive inhibitory control-that is, how a subject prepares to stop an upcoming response tendency. Proactive inhibitory control is generated according to the goals of the subject rather than by an external signal, and it can be selectively targeted at a particular response tendency. This may have wider validity than reactive control as an experimental model for stopping inappropriate responses.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation reveals dissociable mechanisms for global versus selective corticomotor suppression underlying the stopping of action

Stopping an initiated response is an essential function, investigated in many studies with go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms. These standard tests require rapid action cancellation. This appears to be achieved by a suppression mechanism that has "global" effects on corticomotor excitability (i.e., affecting task-irrelevant muscles). By contrast, stopping action in everyday life may require selectivity (i.e., targeting a specific response tendency without affecting concurrent action). We hypothesized that while standard stopping engages global suppression, behaviorally selective stopping engages a selective suppression mechanism. Accordingly, we measured corticomotor excitability of the task-irrelevant leg using transcranial magnetic stimulation while subjects stopped the hand. Experiment 1 showed that for standard (i.e., nonselective) stopping, the task-irrelevant leg was suppressed. Experiment 2 showed that for behaviorally selective stopping, there was no mean leg suppression. Experiment 3 directly compared behaviorally nonselective and selective stopping. Leg suppression occurred only in the behaviorally nonselective condition. These results argue that global and selective suppression mechanisms are dissociable. Participants may use a global suppression mechanism when speed is stressed; however, they may recruit a more selective suppression mechanism when selective stopping is behaviorally necessary and preparatory information is available. We predict that different fronto-basal-ganglia pathways underpin these different suppression mechanisms.

Interplay of neuronal processes during response inhibition: results from a combined event-related potentials (ERPs)/transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study on methylphenidate

The neuronal processes underlying response inhibition are often studied using either event-related potentials (ERPs) or by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to investigate excitatory and inhibitory processes in the motor system. We performed a more refined analysis of response inhibition by combining both approaches with the aim of identifying an interplay between ERPs and TMS parameters. During a go/nogo task, motor system excitability was measured using TMS single and double pulses and brain electrical activity was recorded in healthy adults (n=14). Each participant completed two testing sessions, once on placebo and once on methylphenidate (double-blind, crossover design). Studying the effects of methylphenidate served as an example application for this combined approach. Developing regression models, inhibition-related TMS measures (e.g., short intracortical inhibition) and the contingent negative variation explained about 85% of the variance of the nogo-P3 under both MPH and placebo medication. The smaller the inhibitory effect in the motor system, the more terminal response control was required and the more resources were allocated for the evaluation of the inhibitory process, respectively, as indicated by a larger P3. Thus, an interplay between processes in the motor system (cortex) and control processes with sources in the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) may take place, acting complementarily to facilitate a correct nogo-response. While ERPs rather represent initiation and monitoring of inhibitory processes and response control, motor inhibition may be best analyzed using TMS. A combined ERP/TMS analysis may allow for the development of distinct models concerning the interplay of processes involved in response inhibition.

Motor cortex inhibition: a marker of ADHD behavior and motor development in children

OBJECTIVE

Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a childhood-onset behavioral diagnosis in which children often fail to meet age norms in development of motor control, particularly timed repetitive and sequential movements, motor overflow, and balance. The neural substrate of this motor delay may include mechanisms of synaptic inhibition in or adjacent to the motor cortex. The primary objective of this study was to determine whether transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)-evoked measures, particularly short interval cortical inhibition (SICI), in motor cortex correlate with the presence and severity of ADHD in childhood as well as with commonly observed delays in motor control.

METHODS

In this case-control study, behavioral ratings, motor skills, and motor cortex physiology were evaluated in 49 children with ADHD (mean age 10.6 years, 30 boys) and 49 typically developing children (mean age 10.5 years, 30 boys), all right-handed, aged 8-12 years. Motor skills were evaluated with the Physical and Neurological Examination for Subtle Signs (PANESS) and the Motor Assessment Battery for Children version 2. SICI and other physiologic measures were obtained using TMS in the left motor cortex.

RESULTS

In children with ADHD, mean SICI was reduced by 40% (p < 0.0001) and less SICI correlated with higher ADHD severity (r = -0.52; p = 0.002). Mean PANESS motor development scores were 59% worse in children with ADHD (p < 0.0001). Worse PANESS scores correlated modestly with less SICI (r = -.30; p = 0.01).

CONCLUSION

Reduced TMS-evoked SICI correlates with ADHD diagnosis and symptom severity and also reflects motor skill development in children.

Corticospinal excitability during preparation for an anticipatory action is modulated by the availability of visual information

To intercept rapidly moving objects, people must predict the right time to initiate their actions. The timing of movement initiation in interceptions is thought to be determined when a perceptual variable specifying time to contact reaches a criterion value. If a response needs to be aborted, the performer must make a decision before this moment. It has been recently shown that the minimal time to suppress an anticipatory action takes longer during motion extrapolation than during continuous visual information. In experiment 1, we sought to determine whether or not the availability of visual information would 1) affect the latency to inhibit an anticipatory action, and 2) modulate the level of excitability in the motor cortex (M1). The behavioral results showed that the absence of visual information prolonged the latency to stop the movement as previously reported. The neurophysiological data indicated that corticospinal excitability levels were affected by the availability of visual information. In experiment 2, we sought to verify whether corticospinal excitability levels would also differ between the two visual conditions when the task did not involve response suppression. The results of experiment 2 indicated that excitability levels did not differ between visual conditions. Overall, our findings indicated that the buildup of motor activation can also play a role in determining different latencies to inhibit an anticipatory action. They also suggest that the buildup of motor activation in the corticospinal pathways can be strategically modulated to the requirements of the task during continuous visual information.

How does neuroscience affect our conception of volition?

Although there is no clear concept of volition or the will, we do have intuitive ideas that characterize the will, agency, and voluntary behavior. Here I review results from a number of strands of neuroscientific research that bear upon our intuitive notions of the will. These neuroscientific results provide some insight into the neural circuits mediating behaviors that we identify as related to will and volition. Although some researchers contend that neuroscience will undermine our views about free will, to date no results have succeeded in fundamentally disrupting our common sense beliefs. Still, the picture emerging from neuroscience does raise new questions, and ultimately may put pressure on some intuitive notions about what is necessary for free will.

Postural and focal inhibition of voluntary movements prepared under various temporal constraints

Large disturbances arising from the moving segments (focal movement) are commonly counteracted by anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs). The aim of this study was to investigate how APAs - focal movement coordination changes under temporal constraint. Ten subjects were instructed to perform an arm raising movement in the reactive (simple reaction time) and predictive (anticipation-coincidence) tasks. A stop paradigm was applied to reveal the coordination. On some unexpected trials, a stop signal indicated to inhibit the movement; it occurred randomly at different delays (SOA) relative to the go signal in the reactive task, and at different delays prior to the focal response initiation in the predictive task. Focal movement was measured using contact switch, accelerometer and EMG from the anterior deltoid. APAs were quantified using centre of pressure displacement and EMG from three postural muscles. The inhibition rates as a function of the SOA produce psychometric functions where the bi-serial points allow the moment of the motor "command release" to be estimated. Repeated measures ANOVAs showed that APAs and focal movement were closely timed in the reactive task but distinct in a predictive task. Data were discussed according to two different models of coordination: (1) hierarchical model where APAs and focal movement are the results of a single motor command; (2) parallel model implying two independent motor commands. The data clearly favor the parallel model when the temporal constraint is low. The stop paradigm appears as a promising technique to explore APAs - focal movement coordination.

Urges for food and money spill over into motor system excitability before action is taken

Much human behavior is driven by urges. Yet research into urges is hampered by a paucity of tools to objectively index their strength, timing and control. Here we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and concurrent electromyography to examine whether urges for food and money are detectable via motor system excitability. In Experiment 1, we used a naturalistic food paradigm to show that food items that were most strongly wanted elicited the largest motor excitability, even before participants knew which response to make to get them. In Experiment 2a, we replicated the results using money - motor excitability was greater for larger monetary amounts. In Experiment 2b we show that monetary amount does not modulate motor excitability when participants simply observe, without having to take action. As the chief effect occurred prior to the subject knowing which motor response to make, it is not merely related to response preparation, and as the effect was present only when action was required, it is not merely related to increased arousal. Instead, the increased motor excitability likely indexes the degree of motivation a subject has to perform an action. Thus, we have used TMS to demonstrate that urges for food and money 'spill over' into the motor system. This is likely mediated by interactions between the limbic system (including the orbital frontal cortex) and the motor system, probably at the level of the basal ganglia. Implications are discussed for theories of embodied cognition and for methodological progress in studying urge control.

The role of the cingulate cortex as neural generator of the N200 and P300 in a tactile response inhibition task

Both the N200 and P300, which are, for example, evoked by Go/Nogo or Stop-Signal tasks, have long been interpreted as indicators for inhibition processes. Such interpretations have recently been challenged, and interest in the exact neural generators of these brain responses is continuously growing. Using recent methodological advancements, source estimations for the N200 and P300 as evoked by a tactile response inhibition task were computed. Current density reconstructions were also calculated accounting for interindividual differences in head geometry by incorporating information from T1-weighted magnetic resonance images. To ease comparability with relevant paradigms, the task was designed to mimic important characteristics of both Go/Nogo and Stop-Signal tasks as prototypes for a larger set of paradigms probing response inhibition. A network of neural generators was revealed, which has previously been shown to act in concert with executive control processes and thus is in full agreement with observations from other modalities. Importantly, a spatial segregation of midcingulate sources was observed. Our experimental data indicate that a left anterior region of the midcingulate cortex (MCC) is a major neural generator of the N200, whereas the midcingulate generator of the P300 is located in the right posterior MCC. Analyses of the P300 also revealed several areas, which have previously been associated with motor functions, for example, the precentral region. Our data clearly suggest a neuroanatomical and therefore also functional dissociation of the N200 and P300, a finding that cannot easily be provided by other imaging techniques.

On the role of the striatum in response inhibition

BACKGROUND

Stopping a manual response requires suppression of the primary motor cortex (M1) and has been linked to activation of the striatum. Here, we test three hypotheses regarding the role of the striatum in stopping: striatum activation during successful stopping may reflect suppression of M1, anticipation of a stop-signal occurring, or a slower response build-up.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Twenty-four healthy volunteers underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while performing a stop-signal paradigm, in which anticipation of stopping was manipulated using a visual cue indicating stop-signal probability, with their right hand. We observed activation of the striatum and deactivation of left M1 during successful versus unsuccessful stopping. In addition, striatum activation was proportional to the degree of left M1 deactivation during successful stopping, implicating the striatum in response suppression. Furthermore, striatum activation increased as a function of stop-signal probability and was to linked to activation in the supplementary motor complex (SMC) and right inferior frontal cortex (rIFC) during successful stopping, suggesting a role in anticipation of stopping. Finally, trial-to-trial variations in response time did not affect striatum activation.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

The results identify the striatum as a critical node in the neural network associated with stopping motor responses. As striatum activation was related to both suppression of M1 and anticipation of a stop-signal occurring, these findings suggest that the striatum is involved in proactive inhibitory control over M1, most likely in interaction with SMC and rIFC.

Processing of global and selective stop signals: application of Donders' subtraction method to stop-signal task performance

This paper applied Donders' subtraction method to examine the processing of global and selective stop signals in the stop-signal paradigm. Participants performed on three different versions of the stop task: a global task and two selective tasks. A global task required participants to inhibit their response to a go signal whenever a stop signal was presented (Stop-a task). A selective stop task required participants to inhibit to one stop signal but not to the other (Stop-c task). Another selective stop task required them to inhibit when the response indicated by go and stop signals was the same but not when they were different (Stop-b task). Stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) was shortest for Stop-a and longest for Stop-b, with intermediate values for the Stop-c task. Additional control experiments that manipulated stop probability confirmed the robustness of global and selective stopping latencies even when the stop-signal probability varied. The current findings contribute to the conclusion that Donders' subtraction method provides a useful tool for estimating the durations of subprocesses that together comprise SSRT.

Paired-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation during preparation for simple and choice reaction time tasks

Motor preparation for execution of both simple and choice reaction time tasks (SRT and CRT) involves enhancement of corticospinal excitability (CE). However, motor preparation also implies changes in inhibitory control that have thus far been much less studied. Short-interval intracortical inhibition (SICI) has been shown to decrease before CE increases. Therefore we reasoned that, if SICI contributes to inhibitory control of voluntary movement during the preparatory phase, it would be larger in CRT than in SRT because of the need to keep the movement unreleased until the uncertainty resolves on which task is required. We measured changes in SICI and in CE at different time points preceding motor reaction in normal subjects. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (spTMS) and paired-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (ppTMS) produced time-dependent changes in both SRT and CRT, with shortening when applied close to the presentation of the imperative signal ("early") and lengthening when applied near the expected reaction ("late"). In addition, at all stimulation time points, reaction time was shorter with ppTMS than that with spTMS, but there was no consistent association between the amount of SICI and reaction time changes. At early stimulation time points, CE was reduced in CRT but not in SRT. However, SICI in CRT was not different from SICI in SRT. At late stimulation time points, SICI decreased just before enhancement of CE. Our findings indicate that inhibitory circuits other than SICI are responsible for setting the level of CE at earlier parts of the reaction time period. Although the decrease in SICI may contribute to the increase in CE at the last part of the premotor period, the two phenomena are not dependent on each other.

Considerations for the use of a startling acoustic stimulus in studies of motor preparation in humans

Recent studies have used a loud (> 120 dB) startle-eliciting acoustic stimulus as a probe to investigate early motor response preparation in humans. The use of a startle in these studies has provided insight into not only the neurophysiological substrates underlying motor preparation, but also into the behavioural response strategies associated with particular stimulus-response sets. However, as the use of startle as a probe for preparation is a relatively new technique, a standard protocol within the context of movement paradigms does not yet exist. Here we review the recent literature using startle as a probe during the preparation phase of movement tasks, with an emphasis on how the experimental parameters affect the results obtained. Additionally, an overview of the literature surrounding the startle stimulus parameters is provided, and factors affecting the startle response are considered. In particular, we provide a review of the factors that should be taken into consideration when using a startling stimulus in human research.

Motor preparation is modulated by the resolution of the response timing information

In the present experiment, the temporal predictability of response time was systematically manipulated to examine its effect on the time course of motor pre-programming and release of the intended movement by an acoustic startle stimulus. Participants performed a ballistic right wrist extension task in four different temporal conditions: 1) a variable foreperiod simple RT task, 2) a fixed foreperiod simple RT task, 3) a low resolution countdown anticipation-timing task, and 4) a high resolution anticipation-timing task. For each task, a startling acoustic stimulus (124dB) was presented at several intervals prior to the "go" signal ("go" -150ms, -500ms, and -1500ms). Results from the startle trials showed that the time course of movement pre-programming was affected by the temporal uncertainty of the imperative "go" cue. These findings demonstrate that the resolution of the timing information regarding the response cue has a marked effect on the timing of movement preparation such that under conditions of low temporal resolution, participants plan the movement well in advance in accordance with the anticipated probability of onset of the cue, whereas movement preparation is delayed until less than 500ms prior to response time when continuous temporal information is provided.

Mechanisms and Dynamics of Cortical Motor Inhibition in the Stop-signal Paradigm: A TMS Study

The ability to stop ongoing motor responses in a split-second is a vital element of human cognitive control and flexibility that relies in large part on prefrontal cortex. We used the stop-signal paradigm to elucidate the engagement of primary motor cortex (M1) in inhibiting an ongoing voluntary motor response. The stop-signal paradigm taps the ability to flexibly countermand ongoing voluntary behavior upon presentation of a stop signal. We applied single-pulse TMS to M1 at several intervals following the stop signal to track the time course of excitability of the motor system related to generating and stopping a manual response. Electromyography recorded from the flexor pollicis brevis allowed quantification of the excitability of the corticospinal tract and the involvement of intracortical GABABergic circuits within M1, indexed respectively by the amplitude of the motor-evoked potential and the duration of the late part of the cortical silent period (SP). The results extend our knowledge of the neural basis of inhibitory control in three ways. First, the results revealed a dynamic interplay between response activation and stopping processes at M1 level during stop-signal inhibition of an ongoing response. Second, increased excitability of inhibitory interneurons that drives SP prolongation was evident as early as 134 msec following the instruction to stop. Third, this pattern was followed by a stop-related reduction of corticospinal excitability implemented around 180 after the stop signal. These findings point to the recruitment of GABABergic intracortical inhibitory circuits within M1 in stop-signal inhibition and support the notion of stopping as an active act of control.

Intracranial EEG reveals a time- and frequency-specific role for the right inferior frontal gyrus and primary motor cortex in stopping initiated responses

Inappropriate response tendencies may be stopped via a specific fronto/basal ganglia/primary motor cortical network. We sought to characterize the functional role of two regions in this putative stopping network, the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the primary motor cortex (M1), using electocorticography from subdural electrodes in four patients while they performed a stop-signal task. On each trial, a motor response was initiated, and on a minority of trials a stop signal instructed the patient to try to stop the response. For each patient, there was a greater right IFG response in the beta frequency band ( approximately 16 Hz) for successful versus unsuccessful stop trials. This finding adds to evidence for a functional network for stopping because changes in beta frequency activity have also been observed in the basal ganglia in association with behavioral stopping. In addition, the right IFG response occurred 100-250 ms after the stop signal, a time range consistent with a putative inhibitory control process rather than with stop-signal processing or feedback regarding success. A downstream target of inhibitory control is M1. In each patient, there was alpha/beta band desynchronization in M1 for stop trials. However, the degree of desynchronization in M1 was less for successfully than unsuccessfully stopped trials. This reduced desynchronization on successful stop trials could relate to increased GABA inhibition in M1. Together with other findings, the results suggest that behavioral stopping is implemented via synchronized activity in the beta frequency band in a right IFG/basal ganglia network, with downstream effects on M1.

Having a goal to stop action is associated with advance control of specific motor representations

An important aspect of cognitive control consists in the ability to stop oneself from making inappropriate responses. In an earlier study we demonstrated that there are different mechanisms for stopping: global and selective [Aron, A. R., Verbruggen, F. (2008). Stop the presses: Dissociating a selective from a global mechanism for stopping. Psychological Science, 19(11) 1146-1153]. We argued that participants are more likely to use a global mechanism when speed is of the essence, whereas they are more likely to use a selective mechanism when they have foreknowledge of which response tendency they may need to stop. Here we further investigate the relationship between foreknowledge and selective stopping. In Experiment 1 we adapted the earlier design to show that individual differences in recall accuracy for the stopping goal correlate with the selectivity of the stopping. This confirms that encoding and using a foreknowledge memory cue is a key enabler for a selective stopping mechanism. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), to test the hypothesis that foreknowledge "sets up" a control set whereby control is applied onto the response representation that may need to be stopped in the future. We applied TMS to the left motor cortex and measured motor evoked potentials (MEPs) from the right hand while participants performed a similar behavioral paradigm as Experiment 1. In the foreknowledge period, MEPs were significantly reduced for trials where the right hand was the one that might need to be stopped relative to when it was not. This shows that having a goal of what response may need to be stopped in the future consists in applying advance control onto a specific motor representation.

Coding of visual space during motor preparation: Approaching objects rapidly modulate corticospinal excitability in hand-centered coordinates

Defensive behaviors, such as withdrawing your hand to avoid potentially harmful approaching objects, rely on rapid sensorimotor transformations between visual and motor coordinates. We examined the reference frame for coding visual information about objects approaching the hand during motor preparation. Subjects performed a simple visuomanual task while a task-irrelevant distractor ball rapidly approached a location either near to or far from their hand. After the distractor ball appearance, single pulses of transcranial magnetic stimulation were delivered over the subject's primary motor cortex, eliciting motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in their responding hand. MEP amplitude was reduced when the ball approached near the responding hand, both when the hand was on the left and the right of the midline. Strikingly, this suppression occurred very early, at 70-80 ms after ball appearance, and was not modified by visual fixation location. Furthermore, it was selective for approaching balls, since static visual distractors did not modulate MEP amplitude. Together with additional behavioral measurements, we provide converging evidence for automatic hand-centered coding of visual space in the human brain.

Changing the "when" and "what" of intended actions

Humans often have to modify the timing and/or type of their planned actions on the basis of new sensory information. In the present experiments, participants planned to make a right index finger keypress 3 s after a warning stimulus but on some trials were interrupted by a temporally unpredictable auditory tone prompting the same action (experiment 1) or a different action (experiment 2). In experiment 1, by comparing the reaction time (RT) to tones presented at different stages of the preparatory period to RT in a simple reaction time condition, we determined the cost of switching from an internally generated mode of response production to an externally triggered mode in situations requiring only a change in when an action is made (i.e., when the tone prompts the action at a different time from the intended time of action). Results showed that the cost occurred for interruption tones delivered 200 ms after a warning stimulus and remained relatively stable throughout most of the preparatory period with a reduction in the magnitude of the cost during the last 200 ms prior to the intended time of movement. In experiment 2, which included conditions requiring a change in both when and what action is produced on the tone, results show a larger cost when the switched to action is different from the action being prepared. We discuss our results in the light of neurophysiological experiments on motor preparation and suggest that intending to act is accompanied by a general inhibitory mechanism preventing premature motor output and a specific excitatory process pertaining to the intended movement. Interactions between these two mechanisms could account for our behavioral results.

Neural correlate of the contextual interference effect in motor learning: a kinematic analysis

The contextual interference (CI) effect affirms that learning is enhanced when interference during practice is high, such as when participants practice multiple tasks in a random order. Previous research showed a distinct response in the cortical motor (CM) regions of participants performing under high CI practice conditions compared with low CI conditions. Specifically, there was increased corticomotor activity in a high CI condition when participants practiced 3 arm tasks, each with specific spatial and temporal requirements. Using disruptive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), the authors' purpose was to determine whether CM is preferentially processing the spatial, temporal, or both parameters of the task during high CI practice. Participants were randomized to 1 of 6 practice conditions derived from 3 stimulation conditions (no TMS, TMS, sham TMS) and 2 CI conditions (blocked [low CI] and random [high CI]). The authors measured performance accuracy in movement timing (temporal) and amplitude (spatial) across practice and no-stimulation recall phases. TMS perturbation deterred learning of movement timing under random, but not blocked, practice order; the authors did not observe this in spatial parameter learning. The authors' data suggest that increased corticomotor activity during high CI practice may reflect preferential processing of the temporal parameter of the task.

Stop and Go: The Neural Basis of Selective Movement Prevention

Converging lines of evidence show that volitional movement prevention depends on the right prefrontal cortex (PFC), especially the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Selective movement prevention refers to the rapid prevention of some, but not all, movement. It is unknown whether the IFG, or other prefrontal areas, are engaged when movement must be selectively prevented, and whether additional cortical areas are recruited. We used rapid event-related fMRI to investigate selective and nonselective movement prevention during performance of a temporally demanding anticipatory task. Most trials involved simultaneous index and middle finger extension. Randomly interspersed trials required the prevention of one, or both, finger movements. Regions of the right hemisphere, including the IFG, were active for selective and nonselective movement prevention, with an overlap in the inferior parietal cortex and the middle frontal gyrus. Selective movement prevention caused a significant delay in movement initiation of the other digit. These trials were associated with activation of the medial frontal cortex. The results provide support for a right-hemisphere network that temporarily “brakes” all movement preparation. When movement is selectively prevented, the supplementary motor cortex (SMA/pre-SMA) may participate in conflict resolution and subsequent reshaping of excitatory drive to the motor cortex.

Electrophysiological correlates of motor conversion disorder

In patients with a functional (psychogenic) paresis, motor conduction tests are, by definition, normal. We investigated whether these patients exhibit an abnormal motor excitability. Four female patients with a functional paresis of the left upper extremity were studied using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). We investigated motor thresholds, intracortical inhibition and intracortical facilitation at rest. Corticospinal excitability was evaluated by single pulse TMS during rest and during imagination of tonic index finger adductions. Data obtained from the affected first dorsal interosseous muscle were compared with the unaffected hand and with a healthy age-matched control group. Three patients demonstrated a flaccid paresis, one patient had a psychogenic dystonia. Motor thresholds, short interval intracortical inhibition and intracortical facilitation recorded from the affected side were normal. In healthy subjects, movement imagination produced an increase of corticospinal excitability. In the patients, motor imagery with the affected index finger resulted in a decrease of corticospinal excitability compared to rest, being significantly different from the unaffected side and from the control group. We suggest that suppression of corticospinal excitability during movement imagination is an electrophysiological correlate of the patients' inability to move voluntarily and provides some insight into the pathophysiology of this disorder.

Response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm

Response inhibition is a hallmark of executive control. The concept refers to the suppression of actions that are no longer required or that are inappropriate, which supports flexible and goal-directed behavior in ever-changing environments. The stop-signal paradigm is most suitable for the study of response inhibition in a laboratory setting. The paradigm has become increasingly popular in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and psychopathology. We review recent findings in the stop-signal literature with the specific aim of demonstrating how each of these different fields contributes to a better understanding of the processes involved in inhibiting a response and monitoring stopping performance, and more generally, discovering how behavior is controlled.

Abnormal motor excitability in patients with psychogenic paresis. A TMS study

BACKGROUND

Patients with motor conversion disorders present an inability to execute movements voluntarily, although central and peripheral motor pathways are normal. We speculated that this phenomenon could be due to an abnormal loss of excitatory drive on central motor areas.

METHODS

The effect of motor imagery on motor excitability was tested in a group of eight patients with a functional (psychogenic) hemiparesis and in an age-matched control group (n=8) by using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). TMS pulses were applied at rest and while subjects imagined a tonic index finger adduction. Amplitudes of motor evoked potentials (MEP) recorded from the first dorsal interosseous muscle were used as an indicator of motor excitability.

RESULTS

Motor thresholds and MEP amplitudes at rest were almost identical in the patient group and the control group. During motor imagery, MEP amplitudes increased by 200% in healthy subjects. In the patient group, motor imagery of the "paretic" index finger was associated with a mean MEP amplitude decrease of 37% compared with the MEP size at rest. Motor imagery of the unaffected index finger increased MEPs by 63% which was significantly different both from results in the control group and the "paretic" side.

CONCLUSIONS

We suggest that the paradoxical decrease of motor excitability during motor imagery is the electrophysiological correlate of a disturbed voluntary control in motor conversion disorder. The results further indicate that this abnormality is not restricted to the clinically affected body part.

Role of corticospinal suppression during motor preparation

Behavior arises from a constant competition between potential actions. For example, movements performed unimanually require selecting one hand rather than the other. Corticospinal (CS) excitability of the nonselected hand is typically decreased prior to movement initiation, suggesting that response selection may involve mechanisms that inhibit nonselected candidate movements. To examine this hypothesis, participants performed a reaction time task, responding with the left, right, or both indexes. Transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied over the right primary motor cortex (M1) to induce motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in a left hand muscle at various stages during response preparation. To vary the time of response selection, an imperative signal was preceded by a preparatory cue that was either informative or uninformative. Left MEPs decreased following the cue. Surprisingly, this decrease was greater when an informative cue indicated that the response might require the left hand than when it indicated a right hand response. In the uninformative condition, we did not observe additional attenuation of left MEP after an imperative indicating a right hand response. These results argue against the "deselection" hypothesis. Rather, CS suppression seems to arise from "impulse control" mechanisms that ensure that responses associated with potentially selected actions are not initiated prematurely.

All or none hypothesis: a global-default mode that characterizes the brain and mind

It is proposed that the mind and brain often work at a gross level and only with fine tuning or inhibition act in a more differentiated manner, even when one might think the domains being issued the global command should be distinct. This applies to disparate findings in cognitive science and neuroscience in both children and adults. Thus, it is easier to switch everything, or nothing, than to switch one thing (the rule one is following or which button to press) but not the other. It is easier to issue the same command to both hands than to move only one hand. If one needs to respond to the opposite (or antonym) of a stimulus, one is faster if the correct response is to the side opposite the stimulus. People tend to think of the nervous system as sending out very precise commands only to the relevant recipient, but it appears that often the command goes out more globally and then parts of the system need to be inhibited from acting on the command.

Juggling with the brain - thought and action in the human motor system

Empirical findings from various research fields indicate that cognitive and motor processes are far less dissimilar than previously thought. The present chapter takes a neuroscientific perspective and offers evidence for similarities between cognition and action focusing on three key players of the classical motor system: the primary motor cortex, the cerebellum, and the premotor cortex. Briefly, although movement execution is apparently supported in part by the same cerebral resources engaged in cognitive processes, the three brain regions reviewed here are differentially engaged in more or less action-bound cognitive processes.

Automatic and controlled response inhibition: associative learning in the go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms

In 5 experiments, the authors examined the development of automatic response inhibition in the go/no-go paradigm and a modified version of the stop-signal paradigm. They hypothesized that automatic response inhibition may develop over practice when stimuli are consistently associated with stopping. All 5 experiments consisted of a training phase and a test phase in which the stimulus mapping was reversed for a subset of the stimuli. Consistent with the automatic-inhibition hypothesis, the authors found that responding in the test phase was slowed when the stimulus had been consistently associated with stopping in the training phase. In addition, they found that response inhibition benefited from consistent stimulus-stop associations. These findings suggest that response inhibition may rely on the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations after practice with consistent stimulus-stop mappings. Stimulus-stop mapping is typically consistent in the go/no-go paradigm, so automatic inhibition is likely to occur. However, stimulus-stop mapping is typically inconsistent in the stop-signal paradigm, so automatic inhibition is unlikely to occur. Thus, the results suggest that the two paradigms are not equivalent because they allow different kinds of response inhibition.

Stop the Presses

How does one control an inappropriate tendency? Many studies have investigated this question by measuring the speed with which subjects stop an initiated response. Yet the rapid stopping of an initiated response is apparently underpinned by a neurocognitive mechanism that has global effects on multiple tendencies. This limits such studies as models of cognitive control because they do not explain the selectivity of control over particular tendencies that is apparent in everyday life. We hypothesized that subjects employ a selective stopping mechanism when they have foreknowledge of which response to stop, but employ a global stopping mechanism when they do not have such foreknowledge. Comparing foreknowledge and noforeknowledge conditions, we show that when subjects have foreknowledge, stopping is indeed more selective, as evidenced by less of an effect on the concurrent execution of an alternative response; however, stopping is also slower when subjects have foreknowledge. Thus, selective and global mechanisms of stopping can be dissociated. We suggest that the selective mechanism is used when people maintain the goal of controlling particular responses, whereas the global mechanism is used when it is essential to stop quickly.

Modification of planned actions

To elucidate the time course and processes underlying pre-movement modification of planned actions, participants prepared to make an action at a time of their own choosing within a specified temporal window. In some conditions, participants prepared to make a single right index finger key press, whereas in others, they prepared to make a sequence of two key presses consisting of a right index finger key press followed by a right middle finger key press. On a proportion of trials, their internal preparation was interrupted by an auditory tone, in response to which they made either: the same action as they were intending, a different action requiring an additional effector (i.e. switch from preparing a single right index finger key press to executing a right index, middle finger sequence), or a different action requiring one less effector (i.e. switch from preparing a right index, middle finger sequence to executing a right index finger key press). For unmodified actions, switching from an internally generated to an externally triggered mode of response production produced a significant reaction time cost (RT cost) for both single and sequential actions, with the cost for single actions being significantly greater than that for sequential actions. Given that the RT cost did not increase as the complexity of the actions increased it is unlikely that the source of the cost is related to motor execution processes, and it is suggested that it may arise at a higher level cognitive stage of processing. In addition, reaction times to produce modified actions were significantly greater than those to produce unmodified actions. Finally, it took significantly longer to produce modified actions requiring one less effector than to produce modified actions requiring one more effector. We suggest that two time-consuming processes are involved in switching between internally generated and externally triggered actions that are modified or unmodified: a trigger switch cost when the same action has to be produced in response to an external trigger as opposed to an internal trigger, and a switch cost reflecting changes in the pattern of executed motor commands when modification is necessary. It is suggested that such processes may be mediated by regions of the frontal lobes.

The presence of visual gap affects the duration of stopping process

A milestone on which relies the voluntary control of behavior is the ability to shape our motor output to meet the needs of the context which we are continuously facing. Even though it is solidly established that contextual information influence movement generation few studies have so far explored their effects on inhibitory processes. We compared the inhibitory control of arm movements of ten healthy right-handed volunteers in a countermanding reaching paradigm with and without the presence of a temporal gap between the offset of the central target and the peripheral target appearance. We found that this perceptual gap reduces the reaction times of hand movements and, at the same time, increases the duration of the stop process, the stop signal reaction time. The two effects are not correlated implying that inhibition and execution of reaching movement are two independent processes influenced by a common factor: the disengagement of selective attention from the central target. Therefore our results support the idea of the existence of a link between spatial selective attention and inhibitory processes.

Mechanisms underlying functional changes in the primary motor cortex ipsilateral to an active hand

Performance of a unimanual hand motor task results in functional changes in both primary motor cortices (M1(ipsilateral) and M1(contralateral)). The neuronal mechanisms controlling the corticospinal output originated in M1(ipsilateral) and the resting hand during a unimanual task remain unclear. Here, we assessed functional changes within M1(ipsilateral) and in interhemispheric inhibition (IHI) associated with parametric increases in unimanual force. We measured motor-evoked potential (MEP) recruitment curves (RCs) and short-interval intracortical inhibition (SICI) in M1(ipsilateral), IHI from M1(contralateral) to M1(ipsilateral), and the influence of IHI over SICI using transcranial magnetic stimulation at rest and during 10, 30, and 70% of maximal right wrist flexion force. EMG from the left resting flexor carpi radialis (FCR) muscle was comparable across conditions. Left FCR MEP RCs increased, and SICI decreased with increasing right wrist force. Activity-dependent (rest and 10, 30, and 70%) left FCR maximal MEP size correlated with absolute changes in SICI. IHI decreased with increasing force at matched conditioned MEP amplitudes. IHI and SICI were inversely correlated at increasing forces. In the presence of IHI, SICI decreased at rest and 70% force. In summary, we found activity-dependent changes in (1) SICI in M1(ipsilateral), (2) IHI from M1(contralateral) to M1(ipsilateral), and (3) the influence of IHI over SICI in the left resting hand during force generation by the right hand. Our findings indicate that interactions between GABAergic intracortical circuits mediating SICI and interhemispheric glutamatergic projections between M1s contribute to control activity-dependent changes in corticospinal output to a resting hand during force generation by the opposite hand.

Motor cortex excitability changes during imagery of simple reaction time

Imagining motor actions is enough to enhance cortical motor excitability. However, the fact that execution of the motor task has to be inhibited should have a correlate on the extent of cortical excitability enhancement. Therefore, we examined the possible differences between real and motor imagery of simple reaction time tasks (SRT) in the facilitation of the motor-evoked potential (MEP) to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and in the reduction of short-interval intracortical inhibition (SICI) taking place before the movement onset. Thirteen healthy volunteers were requested to perform visual real or imaginary SRT tasks (rSRT and iSRT) with their dominant hand. For rSRT, subjects had to perform a rapid isometric squeeze as soon as possible after the imperative signal. For iSRT they had to imagine the same movement without actually doing it. Electromyographic (EMG) signals were recorded from the first dorsal interosseus (FDI) muscle. The mean EMG onset was calculated for each subject in rSRT trials. Single-and paired-pulse TMS (at an interstimulus interval of 2.5 ms) were applied at rest and at time intervals of -25, -50, -75, -100 and -125 ms before the expected real (rSRT) mean EMG onset. In rSRT there was a significant increase of MEP to single-pulseTMS at the intervals of -50 and -25 ms, and in iSRT at -50 ms in comparison to the rest condition. % SICI changes were significantly reduced at the intervals of -75, -50 and -25 ms, before EMG the onset in rSRT and at -50 and -25 in iSRT (P < 0.05) in comparison to % SICI changes at rest. The differences between MEPs to spTMS and MEP to ppTMS were significantly larger at rest, -125 and -100 ms intervals in rSRT, and at all intervals in iSRT. Imagining to move causes an increase in corticospinal excitability and a decrease in intracortical inhibition that follow a temporal profile similar to those observed with real movements. However, complete removal of SICI happened only in rSRT at the shortest intervals before the EMG onset. Such action may delineate new tool in motor rehabilitation of patients who have limitation to move.

Progress in Executive-Function Research

It has long been observed that damage to the frontal cortex affects a person's ability to control thought, behavior, and emotion while sometimes leaving fundamental processes such as vision, hearing, and long-term memory intact. Such observations have led theoreticians to suppose that a set of executive control functions exists, at the top of the hierarchy of mental processes. To study these executive functions and their relation to the frontal cortex and its subregions, researchers have long employed several now-classic cognitive tests in patients with brain damage. Yet until recently it has proved difficult to reliably localize the putative executive functions to discrete regions. This article illustrates how recent progress in executive-functions research has been driven by the coupling of sophisticated neuroscience techniques with advances in experimental psychology. Taking examples from recent studies, it shows how experimental tasks may be decomposed into cognitive components that can be localized to discrete—but structurally connected—brain regions. What emerges is a new ontology for executive function in terms of which cognitive components exist and of how, and when, they are recruited during task performance.