Systematic review: Effects, design choices, and context of pay-for-performance in health care

The impact of a pay-for-performance system on timing to hip fracture surgery: experience from the Lazio Region (Italy)

Background

A tariff modulation mechanisms has been introduced in some Italian regions with the aim of reducing inappropriate admissions and improving quality of care. In response to a regional act, hospitals in Lazio adopted a clinical pathway for elderly patients with hip fracture and introduced a compensation system based on the quality of health care, as in a pay-for-performance model. The objective of the present study was to compare the proportion of surgery for hip fracture performed within 48 hours of admission among Lazio hospitals according to different payment systems, before and after the implementation of the regional act.

Methods

A retrospective cohort study of patients aged 65 years and over, residing in the Lazio region and admitted to an acute care hospital for hip fracture before (1 July 2008 - 30 June 2009) and after (1 July 2010 - 30 June 2011) the pay-for-performance act. The proportion of surgeries performed within 48 h of hospital arrival was calculated. An adjusted multivariate regression analysis was applied to assess the effect of hospital payment type on the likelihood of surgery within 48 h of hospital arrival.

Results

The share of patients with hip fracture that had surgery within 48 hours was 11.7% before the introduction of the pay-for-performance act and 22.2% after. The proportion of early hip fracture operations increased after the pay-for-performance act, regardless of hospital payment type. The largest increase of surgery within 48 h occurred in private hospitals (adjusted Relative Risk = 2.80, p < 0.001).

Conclusions

The introduction of a compensation system based on health care quality is associated with improved quality of care for elderly patients with hip fracture, especially in hospitals that only use the Diagnosis Related Group system.

Effect of pay-for-performance incentives on quality of care in small practices with electronic health records: a randomized trial

IMPORTANCE

Most evaluations of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives have focused on large-group practices. Thus, the effect of P4P in small practices, where many US residents receive care, is largely unknown. Furthermore, whether electronic health records (EHRs) with chronic disease management capabilities support small-practice response to P4P has not been studied.

OBJECTIVE

To assess the effect of P4P incentives on quality in EHR-enabled small practices in the context of an established quality improvement initiative.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

A cluster-randomized trial of small (<10 clinicians) primary care clinics in New York City from April 2009 through March 2010. A city program provided all participating clinics with the same EHR software with decision support and patient registry functionalities and quality improvement specialists offering technical assistance.

INTERVENTIONS

Incentivized clinics were paid for each patient whose care met the performance criteria, but they received higher payments for patients with comorbidities, who had Medicaid insurance, or who were uninsured (maximum payments: $200/patient; $100,000/clinic). Quality reports were given quarterly to both the intervention and control groups.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Comparison of differences in performance improvement, from the beginning to the end of the study, between control and intervention clinics for aspirin or antithrombotic prescription, blood pressure control, cholesterol control, and smoking cessation interventions. Mixed-effects logistic regression was used to account for clustering of patients within clinics, with a treatment by time interaction term assessing the statistical significance of the effect of the intervention.

RESULTS

Participating clinics (n = 42 for each group) had similar baseline characteristics, with a mean of 4592 (median, 2500) patients at the intervention group clinics and 3042 (median, 2000) at the control group clinics. Intervention clinics had greater adjusted absolute improvement in rates of appropriate antithrombotic prescription (12.0% vs 6.1%, difference: 6.0% [95% CI, 2.2% to 9.7%], P = .001 for interaction term), blood pressure control (no comorbidities: 9.7% vs 4.3%, difference: 5.5% [95% CI, 1.6% to 9.3%], P = .01 for interaction term; with diabetes mellitus: 9.0% vs 1.2%, difference: 7.8% [95% CI, 3.2% to 12.4%], P = .007 for interaction term; with diabetes mellitus or ischemic vascular disease: 9.5% vs 1.7%, difference: 7.8% [95% CI, 3.0% to 12.6%], P = .01 for interaction term), and in smoking cessation interventions (12.4% vs 7.7%, difference: 4.7% [95% CI, -0.3% to 9.6%], P = .02 for interaction term). Intervention clinics performed better on all measures for Medicaid and uninsured patients except cholesterol control, but no differences were statistically significant.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

Among small EHR-enabled clinics, a P4P incentive program compared with usual care resulted in modest improvements in cardiovascular care processes and outcomes. Because most proposed P4P programs are intended to remain in place more than a year, further research is needed to determine whether this effect increases or decreases over time.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT00884013.

Experiences of general practices with a participatory pay-for-performance program: a qualitative study in primary care

The involvement of target users in the design choices of a pay-for-performance program may enhance its impact, but little is known about the views of participants in these programs. To explore general practices' experiences with pay-for-performance in primary care we conducted a qualitative study in general practices in the Netherlands. Thirty out of 65 general practices participating in a pay-for-performance program, stratified for bonus, were invited for a semistructured interview on feasibility, feedback and the bonus, spending of the bonus, unintended consequences, and future developments. Content analysis was used to process the resulting transcripts. We included 29 practices. The feasibility of the pay-for-performance program was questioned due to the substantial time investment. The feedback on clinical care, practice management and patient experience was mostly discussed in the team, and used for improvement plans, but was also qualified as annoying for one GP and for another GP it brought feelings of insecurity. Most practices considered the bonus a stimulus to improve quality of care, in addition to compensation for their effort and time invested. Distinctive performance features were not displayed, for instance, on a website. The bonus was mainly spent on new equipment or team building. Practices referred to gaming and focusing on those aspects that were incentivised ('tunnel vision') as unintended consequences. Future developments should be directed to absolute thresholds, new indicators to keep the process going, and an independent audit. Linking a part of the bonus to innovation was also suggested. The participants thought the pay-for-performance program was a labour-intensive positive breakthrough to stimulate quality improvement, but warned of unintended consequences of the program and the sustainability of the indicator set.

A Conceptual Framework for Understanding and Reducing Overuse by Primary Care Providers

Primary care providers frequently recommend, administer, or prescribe health care services that are unlikely to benefit their patients. Yet little is known about how to reduce provider overuse behavior. In the absence of a theoretically grounded causal framework, it is difficult to predict the contexts under which different types of interventions to reduce provider overuse will succeed and under which they will fail. In this article, we present a framework based on the theory of planned behavior that is designed to guide overuse research and intervention development. We describe categories of primary care provider beliefs that lead to the formation of intentions to assess the appropriateness of services, and propose factors that may affect whether the presence of assessment intentions results in an appropriate recommendation. Interventions that have been commonly used to address provider overuse behavior are reviewed within the context of the framework.

Palliative treatment of colorectal cancer in Germany: cost of care and quality of life

INTRODUCTION

To estimate the costs of palliative care for colorectal cancer (CRC) from the perspective of German statutory health insurance and to measure the patients' quality of life (QoL) for a 2-year time period.

METHODS

A prospective observational multicentre study was carried out to estimate the direct costs of care over a 2-year period. Case report forms, medical records, and claims data were all applied to document medical and resource usage data in real-world settings. QoL was measured by using the Short Form-12 Health Survey.

RESULTS

In total 101 patients (mean age 67.09 ± 11.13 years, 68 % male) from 12 different settings were included. The mean costs per patient during the 1st and 2nd years were calculated to be 42,361€ and 32,023€, respectively. Highest mean costs were calculated for the second quarter, which reached an amount of 12,900€ (95 % CI: 11,127€-14,673€). Mean physical summary scores and mean mental summary scores were 41.8 and 49.7, respectively.

DISCUSSION

This is the first study assessing the costs of palliative care and the quality of life of patients with CRC in real-world health-care delivery in Germany. It could be shown that CRC treatment represents an enormous economic burden to the German health-care system. Increased efforts in promoting effective and efficient treatment options, or performance-based medication reimbursement schemes, might be helpful in reducing the costs.

Impact of pay-for-performance on management of diabetes: a systematic review

OBJECTIVES

To review and synthesize published evidence of pay-for-performance (P4P) effects on management of diabetes.

METHODS

Databases including Ovid MEDLINE, EMbase, PubMed, The Cochrane Library (Issue 3, 2012) were comprehensively searched for the effects of P4P programs in terms of patient outcomes and physician behaviors. Studies covering detailed data were included and synthesized. The quality of the body of evidence for each quality indicator was determined using Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) system.

RESULTS

Among 742 identified articles, 12 interrupted time series studies, 7 controlled before-after studies, and 2 cross-sectional studies were included. Additionally, 12 studies were further included for quantitative analysis. Results of meta-analysis showed that P4P produced generally positive effects in most indicators (eg, patients with records of total cholesterol or blood pressure). However, these results were inconsistent. The percentage of patients with HbA1c ≤ 7% or 53 mmol/mol showed a pooled odds ratio of 0.98 in patients, but a pooled mean difference of 19.71% in the physician groups. The odds ratios of receiving tests/reaching an outcome level were also diverse in patients (odds ratios ranged from 0.98 to 3.32). Besides, process indicators had higher rates of improvement than outcome indicators.

CONCLUSIONS

P4P programs have variable impacts on patient outcomes of diabetes as well as physician behaviors, with various effects from negligible to strongly beneficial. Considering the low quality of the included studies, this conclusion should be cautiously interpreted.

Does winning a pay-for-performance bonus improve subsequent quality performance? Evidence from the Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration

OBJECTIVE

To test whether receiving a financial bonus for quality in the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) stimulated subsequent quality improvement.

DATA

Hospital-level data on process-of-care quality from Hospital Compare for the treatment of acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, and pneumonia for 260 hospitals participating in the HQID from 2004 to 2006; receipt of quality bonuses in the first 3 years of HQID from the Premier Inc. website; and hospital characteristics from the 2005 American Hospital Association Annual Survey.

STUDY DESIGN

Under the HQID, hospitals received a 1 percent bonus on Medicare payments for scoring between the 80th and 90th percentiles on a composite quality measure, and a 2 percent bonus for scoring at the 90th percentile or above. We used a regression discontinuity design to evaluate whether hospitals with quality scores just above these payment thresholds improved more in the subsequent year than hospitals with quality scores just below the thresholds. In alternative specifications, we examined samples of hospitals scoring within 3, 5, and 10 percentage point "bandwidths" of the thresholds. We used a Generalized Linear Model to estimate whether the relationship between quality and lagged quality was discontinuous at the lagged thresholds required for quality bonuses.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

There were no statistically significant associations between receipt of a bonus and subsequent quality performance, with the exception of the 2 percent bonus for AMI in 2006 using the 5 percentage point bandwidth (0.8 percentage point increase, p<.01), and the 1 percent bonus for pneumonia in 2005 using all bandwidths (3.7 percentage point increase using the 3 percentage point bandwidth, p<.05).

CONCLUSIONS

We found little evidence that hospitals' receipt of quality bonuses was associated with subsequent improvement in performance. This raises questions about whether winning in pay-for-performance programs, such as Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, will lead to subsequent quality improvement.

Understanding the challenges of adjuvant treatment measurement and reporting in breast cancer: cancer treatment measuring and reporting

BACKGROUND

Healthcare accrediting organizations and insurers increasingly require reporting of clinical data, and cancer treatment is one area of enhanced scrutiny.

OBJECTIVES

To compare rates of received versus reported adjuvant breast cancer treatments, and to assess barriers to measuring and reporting treatments to the tumor registry (TR) of a high-volume medical center with both hospital-based and community-based oncologists.

RESEARCH DESIGN

We calculated rates of received treatments using data collected using chart abstraction (N=115) and compared these with rates of reported treatments from the TR (N=535). We conducted 31 indepth interviews with clinical and administrative informants. Asking about perceptions of the TR, current reporting methods, and reporting barriers. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using deductive and inductive methods.

RESULTS

: Rates of reported versus received treatments were radiation therapy after breast-conserving surgery 22% versus 84% (P < 0.0001); chemotherapy for stage 2 or 3: 17% versus 79% (P < 0.0001); hormonal therapy for stage 2 or 3: 1% versus 91% (P < 0.0001). Comparing community-based versus hospital-based oncologists' rates reported to the TR, we found the following differences: radiation therapy post-breast conserving surgery 12% versus 32% (< 0.0001); chemotherapy 8% versus 29% (< 0.0001); and hormonal therapy 0% versus 3% (0.09). We found 4 key barriers to measuring and reporting poor understanding about the TR, limited information technology capabilities, poor communication, and mistrust.

CONCLUSIONS

: Efforts to improve cancer care quality by improved treatment reporting must overcome key barriers, especially those involving information exchange and mistrust. Communications between the TR and oncology practices must improve to facilitate better treatment measurement and reporting.

Games for Health

How to reduce cost, improve quality, and improve customer engagement are top of mind for healthcare leaders. Healthcare organizations are developing and testing comprehensive engagement strategies to support consumers across the care continuum. In this environment some form of priority setting must occur, and it requires establishing connections between proposed innovation to a process of care and the outcomes. Digital tools offer a promise of meaningful measures that are affordable, embedded in the care delivery system and truly reflect patients’ experiences through the patient journey. This paper proposes a pragmatic path for building a business case for innovative digital health tools in community care settings. It overlays value model for healthcare IT investments with patient activation measures and innovation management techniques. It proposes that the intersection of system-generated measures and psychometric methods for data collection and analysis may lead to development of feasible patient engagement measures for healthcare.

Paying physician group practices for quality: A statewide quasi-experiment

This article presents the results of a unique quasi-experiment of the effects of a large-scale pay-for-performance (P4P) program implemented by a leading health insurer in Washington state during 2001-2007. The authors received external funding to provide an objective impact evaluation of the program. The program was unique in several respects: (1) It was designed dynamically, with two discrete intervention periods-one in which payment incentives were based on relative performance (the "contest" period) and a second in which payment incentives were based on absolute performance compared to achievable benchmarks. (2) The program was designed in collaboration with large multispecialty group practices, with an explicit run-in period to test the quality metrics. Public reporting of the quality scorecard for all participating medical groups was introduced 1 year before the quality incentive payment program's inception, and continued throughout 2002-2007. (3) The program was implemented in stages with distinct medical groups. A control group of comparable group practices also was assembled, and difference-in-differences methodology was applied to estimate program effects. Case mix measures were included in all multivariate analyses. The regression design permitted a contrast of intervention effects between the "contest" approach in the sub-period of 2003-2004 and the absolute standard, "achievable benchmarks of care" approach in sub-period 2005-2007. Most of the statistically significant quality incentive program coefficients were small and negative (opposite to program intent). A consistent pattern of differential intervention impact in the sub-periods did not emerge. Cumulatively, the probit regression estimates indicate that neither the quality scorecard nor the quality incentive payment program had a significant positive effect on general clinical quality. Based on key informant interviews with medical leaders, practicing physicians, and administrators of the participating groups, the authors conclude that several factors likely combined to dampen program effects: (1) modest size of the incentive; (2) use of rewards only, rather than a balance of rewards and penalties; (3) targeting incentive payments to the group, thus potentially weakening incentive effects at the individual level.

What can the past of pay-for-performance tell us about the future of Value-Based Purchasing in Medicare?

The Medicare program has implemented pay-for-performance (P4P), or Value-Based Purchasing, for inpatient care and for Medicare Advantage plans, and plans to implement a program for physicians in 2015. In this paper, we review evidence on the effectiveness of P4P and identify design criteria deemed to be best practice in P4P. We then assess the extent to which Medicare's existing and planned Value-Based Purchasing programs align with these best practices. Of the seven identified best practices in P4P program design, the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program is strongly aligned with two of the best practices, moderately aligned with three, weakly aligned with one, and has unclear alignment with one best practice. The Physician Value-Based Purchasing Modifier is strongly aligned with two of the best practices, moderately aligned with one, weakly aligned with three, and has unclear alignment with one of the best practices. The Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Program is strongly aligned with four of the best practices, moderately aligned with two, and weakly aligned with one of the best practices. We identify enduring gaps in P4P literature as it relates to Medicare's plans for Value-Based Purchasing and discuss important issues in the future of these implementations in Medicare.

Pay-for-performance: impact on diabetes

Pay-for-performance schemes explicitly link provider remuneration to the quality of care provided, with the aims of modifying provider behavior and improving patient outcomes. If successful, pay-for-performance schemes could drive improvements in quality and efficiency of care. However, financial incentives could also erode providers' intrinsic motivation, narrow their focus, promote unethical behavior, and ultimately increase health care inequalities. Evidence from schemes implemented to date suggests that carefully designed pay-for-performance schemes that align sufficient rewards with clinical priorities can produce modest but significant improvements in processes of diabetic care and intermediate outcomes. There is limited evidence, however, on whether improvements in processes of care result in improved outcomes, in terms of patient satisfaction, reduced complications, and greater longevity. The lack of adequate control groups has limited research findings to date, and more robust studies are needed to explore both the potential long-term benefits of pay-for-performance schemes and their unintended consequences.

Assessment of a pay-for-performance program in primary care designed by target users

BACKGROUND

Evidence for pay-for-performance (P4P) has been searched for in the last decade as financial incentives increased to influence behaviour of health care professionals to improve quality of care. The effectiveness of P4P is inconclusive, though some reviews reported significant effects.

OBJECTIVE

To assess changes in performance after introducing a participatory P4P program.

DESIGN

An observational study with a pre- and post-measurement. Setting and subjects. Sixty-five general practices in the south of the Netherlands. Intervention. A P4P program designed by target users containing indicators for chronic care, prevention, practice management and patient experience (general practitioner's [GP] functioning and organization of care). Quality indicators were calculated for each practice. A bonus with a maximum of 6890 Euros per 1000 patients was determined by comparing practice performance with a benchmark.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Quality indicators for clinical care (process and outcome) and patient experience.

RESULTS

We included 60 practices. After 1 year, significant improvement was shown for the process indicators for all chronic conditions ranging from +7.9% improvement for cardiovascular risk management to +11.5% for asthma. Five outcome indicators significantly improved as well as patients' experiences with GP's functioning and organization of care. No significant improvements were seen for influenza vaccination rate and the cervical cancer screening uptake. The clinical process and outcome indicators, as well as patient experience indicators were affected by baseline measures. Smaller practices showed more improvement.

CONCLUSIONS

A participatory P4P program might stimulate quality improvement in clinical care and improve patient experiences with GP's functioning and the organization of care.

Health equity audits in general practice: a strategy to reduce health inequalities

BACKGROUND

This quality improvement project was set in Tower Hamlets, east London, with the aim of reducing health inequalities by ethnicity, age and gender in the management of three common chronic diseases.

METHODS

Routinely collected clinical data were extracted from practice computer systems using Morbidity Information Query and Export Syntax (MIQUEST) and Egton Medical Information Systems (EMIS) Web, between 2007 and 2010. Health equity audits for 38 practices in Tower Hamlets primary care trust (PCT) were constructed to cover key process and outcome measures for each of the three major chronic diseases: coronary heart disease (CHD), type 2 diabetes mellitus and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). The equity audit was disseminated to practices along with facilitation sessions.

RESULTS

We show evidence of baseline inequalities in each condition across the three east London PCTs. The intervention tracked four key indicators (cholesterol levels in CHD, blood pressure and haemoglobin A1c levels in diabetes and % smoking in COPD). Performance for physician-driven interventions improved, but smoking rates remained static. All ethnic groups showed improvement, but there was no evidence of a reduction in differences between ethnic groups. Reductions in gender and age group differences were noted in diabetes and CHD.

CONCLUSIONS

Using routine clinical data, it is possible to develop practice-level health equity reports. These can unmask previously hidden inequalities between groups, and promote discussion with practice teams to stimulate strategies for improvements in performance. Steady improvements in chronic disease management were observed, however, systematic differences between ethnic groups remain. We are not able to attribute observed changes to the audits. These reports illustrate the importance of collecting ethnicity data at practice level. Tools such as this audit can be adapted to monitor inequalities in primary care settings.

Key issues in the design of pay for performance programs

Pay for performance (P4P) is increasingly being used to stimulate healthcare providers to improve their performance. However, evidence on P4P effectiveness remains inconclusive. Flaws in program design may have contributed to this limited success. Based on a synthesis of relevant theoretical and empirical literature, this paper discusses key issues in P4P-program design. The analysis reveals that designing a fair and effective program is a complex undertaking. The following tentative conclusions are made: (1) performance is ideally defined broadly, provided that the set of measures remains comprehensible, (2) concerns that P4P encourages "selection" and "teaching to the test" should not be dismissed, (3) sophisticated risk adjustment is important, especially in outcome and resource use measures, (4) involving providers in program design is vital, (5) on balance, group incentives are preferred over individual incentives, (6) whether to use rewards or penalties is context-dependent, (7) payouts should be frequent and low-powered, (8) absolute targets are generally preferred over relative targets, (9) multiple targets are preferred over single targets, and (10) P4P should be a permanent component of provider compensation and is ideally "decoupled" form base payments. However, the design of P4P programs should be tailored to the specific setting of implementation, and empirical research is needed to confirm the conclusions.

An examination of pay-for-performance in general practice in Australia

OBJECTIVE

This study examines the impact of Australia's pay-for-performance (P4P) program for general practitioners (GPs). The voluntary program pays GPs A$40 and A$100 in addition to fee-for-service payment for providing patients recommended diabetes and asthma treatment over a year, and A$35 for screening women for cervical cancer who have not been screened in 4 years.

DESIGN

Three approaches were used to triangulate the program's impact: (1) analysis of trends in national claims for incentivized services pre- and postprogram implementation; (2) fixed effects panel regression models examining the impact of GPs' P4P program participation on provision of incentivized services; and (3) in-depth interviews to explore GPs' perceptions of their own response to the program.

RESULTS

There was a short-term increase in diabetes testing and cervical cancer screens after program implementation. The increase, however, was for all GPs. Neither signing onto the program nor claiming incentive payments was associated with increased diabetes testing or cervical cancer screening. GPs reported that the incentive did not influence their behavior, largely due to the modest payment and the complexity of tracking patients and claiming payment.

IMPLICATIONS

Monitoring and evaluating P4P programs is essential, as programs may not spark the envisioned impact on quality improvement.

Primary care and behavioral health practice size: the challenge for health care reform

INTRODUCTION

We investigated the size profile of US primary care and behavioral health physician practices since size may impact the ability to institute care management processes (CMPs) that can enhance care quality.

METHOD

We utilized 2009 claims data from a nationwide commercial insurer to estimate practice size by linking providers by tax identification number. We determined the proportion of primary care physicians, psychiatrists, and behavioral health providers practicing in venues of >20 providers per practice (the lower bound for current CMP practice surveys).

RESULTS

Among primary care physicians (n=350,350), only 2.1% of practices consisted of >20 providers. Among behavioral health practitioners (n=146,992) and psychiatrists (n=44,449), 1.3% and 1.0% of practices, respectively, had >20 providers. Sensitivity analysis excluding single-physician practices as "secondary" confirmed findings, with primary care and psychiatrist practices of >20 providers comprising, respectively, only 19.4% and 8.8% of practices (difference: P<0.0001). In secondary analyses, bipolar disorder was used as a tracer condition to estimate practice census for a high-complexity, high-cost behavioral health condition; only 1.3-18 patients per practice had claims for this condition.

CONCLUSIONS

The tax identification number method for estimating practice size has strengths and limitations that complement those of survey methods. The proportion of practices below the lower bound of prior CMP studies is substantial, and care models and policies will need to address the needs of such practices and their patients. Achieving a critical mass of patients for disorder-specific CMPs will require coordination across multiple small practices.

Reduced mortality with hospital pay for performance in England

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance programs are being adopted internationally despite little evidence that they improve patient outcomes. In 2008, a program called Advancing Quality, based on the Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration in the United States, was introduced in all National Health Service (NHS) hospitals in the northwest region of England (population, 6.8 million).

METHODS

We analyzed 30-day in-hospital mortality among 134,435 patients admitted for pneumonia, heart failure, or acute myocardial infarction to 24 hospitals covered by the pay-for-performance program. We used difference-in-differences regression analysis to compare mortality 18 months before and 18 months after the introduction of the program with mortality in two comparators: 722,139 patients admitted for the same three conditions to the 132 other hospitals in England and 241,009 patients admitted for six other conditions to both groups of hospitals.

RESULTS

Risk-adjusted, absolute mortality for the conditions included in the pay-for-performance program decreased significantly, with an absolute reduction of 1.3 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.4 to 2.1; P=0.006) and a relative reduction of 6%, equivalent to 890 fewer deaths (95% CI, 260 to 1500) during the 18-month period. The largest reduction, for pneumonia, was significant (1.9 percentage points; 95% CI, 0.9 to 3.0; P<0.001), with nonsignificant reductions for acute myocardial infarction (0.6 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.4 to 1.7; P=0.23) and heart failure (0.6 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.6 to 1.8; P=0.30).

CONCLUSIONS

The introduction of pay for performance in all NHS hospitals in one region of England was associated with a clinically significant reduction in mortality. As compared with a similar U.S. program, the U.K. program had larger bonuses and a greater investment by hospitals in quality-improvement activities. Further research is needed on how implementation of pay-for-performance programs influences their effects. (Funded by the NHS National Institute for Health Research.).

Electronic quality measurement predicts outcomes in community acquired pneumonia

Using electronic medical data, we calculated emergency department physician performance and subsequent outcomes on a measure used in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' Physician Quality Reporting System. The measure assesses use of guideline recommended antibiotics for community acquired pneumonia. Physicians met measure criteria in 70.6% of cases at one institution. Among patients admitted to the hospital, measure compliant cases had a significantly shorter length of stay, lower costs and lower intensive care utilization than measure failures. For measure failures admitted to the hospital, antibiotic treatment was adjusted to be measure compliant within 48 hours in 57.1% of cases. Use of electronic performance measurement for antibiotic treatment of community acquired pneumonia identified variations in physician performance. Measure compliance correlated with significantly improved patient outcomes and lower costs.

Strategies to improve health coverage and narrow the equity gap in child survival, health, and nutrition

Implementation of innovative strategies to improve coverage of evidence-based interventions, especially in the most marginalised populations, is a key focus of policy makers and planners aiming to improve child survival, health, and nutrition. We present a three-step approach to improvement of the effective coverage of essential interventions. First, we identify four different intervention delivery channels--ie, clinical or curative, outreach, community-based preventive or promotional, and legislative or mass media. Second, we classify which interventions' deliveries can be improved or changed within their channel or by switching to another channel. Finally, we do a meta-review of both published and unpublished reviews to examine the evidence for a range of strategies designed to overcome supply and demand bottlenecks to effective coverage of interventions that improve child survival, health, and nutrition. Although knowledge gaps exist, several strategies show promise for improving coverage of effective interventions-and, in some cases, health outcomes in children-including expanded roles for lay health workers, task shifting, reduction of financial barriers, increases in human-resource availability and geographical access, and use of the private sector. Policy makers and planners should be informed of this evidence as they choose strategies in which to invest their scarce resources.

Effect of nonpayment for preventable infections in U.S. hospitals

BACKGROUND

In October 2008, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) discontinued additional payments for certain hospital-acquired conditions that were deemed preventable. The effect of this policy on rates of health care-associated infections is unknown.

METHODS

Using a quasi-experimental design with interrupted time series with comparison series, we examined changes in trends of two health care-associated infections that were targeted by the CMS policy (central catheter-associated bloodstream infections and catheter-associated urinary tract infections) as compared with an outcome that was not targeted by the policy (ventilator-associated pneumonia). Hospitals participating in the National Healthcare Safety Network and reporting data on at least one health care-associated infection before the onset of the policy were eligible to participate. Data from January 2006 through March 2011 were included. We used regression models to measure the effect of the policy on changes in infection rates, adjusting for baseline trends.

RESULTS

A total of 398 hospitals or health systems contributed 14,817 to 28,339 hospital unit-months, depending on the type of infection. We observed decreasing secular trends for both targeted and nontargeted infections long before the policy was implemented. There were no significant changes in quarterly rates of central catheter-associated bloodstream infections (incidence-rate ratio in the postimplementation vs. preimplementation period, 1.00; P=0.97), catheter-associated urinary tract infections (incidence-rate ratio, 1.03; P=0.08), or ventilator-associated pneumonia (incidence-rate ratio, 0.99; P=0.52) after the policy implementation. Our findings did not differ for hospitals in states without mandatory reporting, nor did it differ according to the quartile of percentage of Medicare admissions or hospital size, type of ownership, or teaching status.

CONCLUSIONS

We found no evidence that the 2008 CMS policy to reduce payments for central catheter-associated bloodstream infections and catheter-associated urinary tract infections had any measurable effect on infection rates in U.S. hospitals. (Funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.).

Assessing performance enhancing tools: experiences with the open performance review and appraisal system (OPRAS) and expectations towards payment for performance (P4P) in the public health sector in Tanzania

BACKGROUND

Health workers' motivation is a key determinant of the quality of health services, and poor motivation has been found to be an obstacle to service delivery in many low-income countries. In order to increase the quality of service delivery in the public sector in Tanzania, the Open Performance Review and Appraisal System (OPRAS) has been implemented, and a new results-based payment system, Payment for performance (P4P) is introduced in the health sector. This article addresses health workers' experiences with OPRAS, expectations towards P4P and how lessons learned from OPRAS can assist in the implementation of P4P. The broader aim is to generate knowledge on health workers' motivation in low-income contexts.

METHODS

A qualitative study design has been employed to elicit data on health worker motivation at a general level and in relation to OPRAS and P4P in particular. Focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews (IDIs) have been conducted with nursing staff, clinicians and administrators in the public health sector in a rural district in Tanzania. The study has an ethnographic backdrop based on earlier long-term fieldwork in Tanzania.

RESULTS

Health workers evaluated OPRAS and P4P in terms of the benefits experienced or expected from complying with the tools. The study found a general reluctance towards OPRAS as health workers did not see OPRAS as leading to financial gains nor did it provide feedback on performance. Great expectations were expressed towards P4P due to its prospects of topping up salaries, but the links between the two performance enhancing tools were unclear.

CONCLUSIONS

Health workers respond to performance enhancing tools based on whether the tools are found appropriate or yield any tangible benefits. The importance placed on salary and allowances forms the setting in which OPRAS operates. The expected addition to the salary through P4P has created a vigorous discourse among health workers attesting to the importance of the salary for motivation. Lessons learned from OPRAS can be utilized in the implementation of P4P and can enhance our knowledge on motivation and performance in the health services in low-income contexts such as Tanzania.

Pay-for-performance in the United Kingdom: impact of the quality and outcomes framework: a systematic review

PURPOSE

Primary care practices in the United Kingdom have received substantial financial rewards for achieving standards set out in the Quality and Outcomes Framework since April 2004. This article reviews the growing evidence for the impact of the framework on the quality of primary medical care.

METHODS

Five hundred seventy-five articles were identified by searching the MEDLINE, EMBASE, and PsycINFO databases, and from the reference lists of published reviews and articles. One hundred twenty-four relevant articles were assessed using a modified Downs and Black rating scale for 110 observational studies and a Critical Appraisal Skills Programme rating scale for 14 qualitative studies. Ninety-four studies were included in the review.

RESULTS

Quality of care for incentivized conditions during the first year of the framework improved at a faster rate than the preintervention trend and subsequently returned to prior rates of improvement. There were modest cost-effective reductions in mortality and hospital admissions in some domains. Differences in performance narrowed in deprived areas compared with nondeprived areas. Achievement for conditions outside the framework was lower initially and has worsened in relative terms since inception. Some doctors reported improved data recording and teamwork, and nurses enhanced specialist skills. Both groups believed that the person-centeredness of consultations and continuity were negatively affected. Patients' satisfaction with continuity declined, with little change in other domains of patient experience.

CONCLUSIONS

Observed improvements in quality of care for chronic diseases in the framework were modest, and the impact on costs, professional behavior, and patient experience remains uncertain. Further research is needed into how to improve quality across different domains, while minimizing costs and any unintended adverse effects of payment for performance schemes. Health care organizations should remain cautious about the benefits of similar schemes.

Does a diabetes annual review make a difference?

AIMS

To determine whether a diabetes annual review, independently of other care processes, is followed by improved patient clinical measurements.

METHODS

Audits conducted independently of the diabetes annual review were analysed for a time-trend in patient clinical measures. An interaction variable between the review and the year of audit was used to test for a change in gradient before and after a diabetes annual review. Each patient formed their own control.

RESULTS

The data included 9471 audits on 3397 patients from 92 practices, and diabetes annual reviews from 2003 to mid-2008. Percentages of patients with raised HbA(1c) , systolic blood pressure and lipids improved from first to last audit. Predicted means after a diabetes annual review for HbA(1c) decreased by 0.13% (1.0 mmol/mol), for HDL cholesterol increased by 0.04 mmol/L and for triglyceride decreased by 0.2 mmol/L. Predicted systolic and diastolic blood pressure, total cholesterol and urinary albumin:creatinine ratio did not change significantly.

CONCLUSIONS

Metabolic control improved over time but this was largely independently of the diabetes annual review, which appears to add little clinical value to existing New Zealand general practice care processes. Currently, general practitioners are paid to undertake a diabetes annual review and report the measurements collected. We would argue that payment needs to be directed to demonstrating appropriate changes in clinical management or achieving meaningful clinical goals, and that the annual review results should be part of systematic feedback to general practitioners, particularly directed at clinical inertia.

Healthcare financing systems for increasing the use of tobacco dependence treatment

BACKGROUND

We hypothesized that provision of financial assistance for smokers trying to quit, or reimbursement of their care providers, could lead to an increased rate of successful quit attempts.

OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of this review was to assess the impact of reducing the costs of providing or using smoking cessation treatment through healthcare financing interventions on abstinence from smoking. The secondary objectives were to examine the effects of different levels of financial support on the use and/or prescription of smoking cessation treatment and on the number of smokers making a quit attempt.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Tobacco Addiction Group Specialized Register in April 2012.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We considered randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled trials and interrupted time series studies involving financial benefit interventions to smokers or their healthcare providers or both.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two reviewers independently extracted data and assessed the quality of the included studies. Risk ratios (RR) were calculated for individual studies on an intention-to-treat basis and meta-analysis was performed using a random-effects model. We included economic evaluations when a study presented the costs and effects of two or more alternatives.

MAIN RESULTS

We found eleven trials involving financial interventions directed at smokers and healthcare providers.Full financial interventions directed at smokers had a statistically significant favourable effect on abstinence at six months or greater when compared to no intervention (RR 2.45, 95% CI 1.17 to 5.12, I² = 59%, 4 studies). There was also a significant effect of full financial interventions when compared to no interventions on the number of participants making a quit attempt (RR 1.11, 95% CI 1.04 to 1.32, I² = 15%) and use of smoking cessation treatment (NRT: RR 1.83, 95% CI 1.55 to 2.15, I² = 43%; bupropion: RR 3.22, 95% CI 1.41 to 7.34, I² = 71%; behavioural therapy: RR 1.77, 95% CI 1.19 to 2.65). There was no evidence of an effect on smoking cessation when we pooled two trials of financial incentives directed at healthcare providers (RR 1.16, CI 0.98 to 1.37, I² = 0%). Comparisons of full coverage with partial coverage, partial coverage with no coverage, and partial coverage with another partial coverage intervention did not detect significant effects. Comparison of full coverage with partial or no coverage resulted in costs per additional quitter ranging from $119 to $6450.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Full financial interventions directed at smokers when compared to no financial interventions increase the proportion of smokers who attempt to quit, use smoking cessation treatments, and succeed in quitting.  The absolute differences are small but the costs per additional quitter are low to moderate. We did not detect an effect on smoking cessation from financial incentives directed at healthcare providers. The methodological qualities of the included studies need to be taken into consideration when interpreting the results.

Lessons from healthcare providers' attitudes toward pay-for-performance: what should purchasers consider in designing and implementing a successful program?

We conducted a systematic review to summarize providers' attitudes toward pay-for-performance (P4P), focusing on their general attitudes, the effects of P4P, their favorable design and implementation methods, and concerns. An electronic search was performed in PubMed and Scopus using selected keywords including P4P. Two reviewers screened target articles using titles and abstract review and then read the full version of the screened articles for the final selections. In addition, one reference of screened articles and one unpublished report were also included. Therefore, 14 articles were included in this study. Healthcare providers' attitudes on P4P were summarized in two ways. First, we gathered their general attitudes and opinions regarding the effects of P4P. Second, we rearranged their opinions regarding desirable P4P design and implementation methods, as well as their concerns. This study showed the possibility that some healthcare providers still have a low level of awareness about P4P and might prefer voluntary participation in P4P. In addition, they felt that adequate quality indicators and additional support for implementation of P4P would be needed. Most healthcare providers also had serious concerns that P4P would induce unintended consequences. In order to conduct successful implementation of P4P, purchaser should make more efforts such as increasing providers' level of awareness about P4P, providing technical and educational support, reducing their burden, developing a cooperative relationship with providers, developing more accurate quality measures, and minimizing the unintended consequences.

Designing an effective pay-for-performance system in the Korean National Health Insurance

The challenge facing the Korean National Health Insurance includes what to spend money on in order to elevate the 'value for money.' This article reviewed the changing issues associated with quality of care in the Korean health insurance system and envisioned a picture of an effective pay-for-performance (P4P) system in Korea taking into consideration quality of care and P4P systems in other countries. A review was made of existing systematic reviews and a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development survey. An effective P4P in Korea was envisioned as containing three features: measures, basis for reward, and reward. The first priority is to develop proper measures for both efficiency and quality. For further improvement of quality indicators, an electronic system for patient history records should be built in the near future. A change in the level or the relative ranking seems more desirable than using absolute level alone for incentives. To stimulate medium- and small-scale hospitals to join the program in the next phase, it is suggested that the scope of application be expanded and the level of incentives adjusted. High-quality indicators of clinical care quality should be mapped out by combining information from medical claims and information from patient registries.

Improving blood pressure control through a clinical pharmacist outreach program in patients with diabetes mellitus in 2 high-performing health systems: the adherence and intensification of medications cluster randomized, controlled pragmatic trial

BACKGROUND

Even in high-performing health systems, some patients with diabetes mellitus have poor blood pressure (BP) control because of poor medication adherence and lack of medication intensification. We examined whether the Adherence and Intensification of Medications intervention, a pharmacist-led intervention combining elements found in efficacy studies to lower BP, improved BP among patients with diabetes mellitus with persistent hypertension and poor refill adherence or insufficient medication intensification in 2 high-performing health systems.

METHODS AND RESULTS

We conducted a prospective, multisite cluster randomized pragmatic trial with randomization of 16 primary care teams at 5 medical centers (3 Veterans Affairs and 2 Kaiser Permanente) to the Adherence and Intensification of Medications intervention or usual care. The primary outcome was relative change in systolic BP (SBP), comparing 1797 intervention with 2303 control team patients, from 6 months preceding to 6 months after the 14-month intervention period. We examined shorter-term changes in SBP as a secondary outcome. The mean SBP decrease from 6 months before to 6 months after the intervention period was ≈9 mm Hg in both arms. Mean SBPs of eligible intervention patients were 2.4 mm Hg lower (95% CI: -3.4 to -1.5; P<0.001) immediately after the intervention than those achieved by control patients.

CONCLUSIONS

The Adherence and Intensification of Medications program more rapidly lowered SBPs among intervention patients, but usual-care patients achieved equally low SBP levels by 6 months after the intervention period. These findings show the importance of evaluating in different real-life clinical settings programs found in efficacy trials to be effective before urging their widespread adoption in all settings.

CLINICAL TRIAL REGISTRATION

URL: http://clinicaltrials.gov. Unique identifier: NCT00495794.

Effect of a UK pay-for-performance program on ethnic disparities in diabetes outcomes: interrupted time series analysis

PURPOSE

We wanted to examine the long-term effects of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), a major pay-for-performance program in the United Kingdom, on ethnic disparities in diabetes outcomes.

METHODS

We undertook an interrupted time series analysis of electronic medical record data of diabetes patients registered with 29 family practices in South West London, United Kingdom. Main outcome measures were mean hemoglobin A(1c) (HbA(1c)), total cholesterol, and blood pressure.

RESULTS

The introduction of QOF was associated with initial accelerated improvements in systolic blood pressure in white and black patients, but these improvements were sustained only in black patients (annual decrease: -1.68 mm Hg; 95% CI, -2.41 to -0.95 mm Hg). Initial improvements in diastolic blood pressure in white patients (-1.01 mm Hg; 95% CI, -1.79 to -0.24 mm Hg) and in cholesterol in white (-0.13 mmol/L; 95% CI, -0.21 to -0.05 mmol/L) and black (-0.10 mmol/L; 95% CI, -0.20 to -0.01 mmol/L) patients were not sustained in the post-QOF period. There was no beneficial impact of QOF on HbA(1c) in any ethnic group. Existing disparities in risk factor control remained largely intact (for example; mean HbA(1c): white 7.5%, black 7.8%, south Asian 7.8%; P <.05) at the end of the study period.

CONCLUSION

A universal pay-for-performance scheme did not appear to address important disparities in chronic disease management over time. Targeted quality improvement strategies may be required to improve health care in vulnerable populations.

The association between fertility clinic performance and cycle volume: implications for public reporting of provider performance data

OBJECTIVE

To quantitatively determine the relationship between fertility clinic performance and cycle volume, and to assess the implications for public reporting of provider performance data.

DESIGN

Retrospective longitudinal analysis.

SETTING

Clinic.

PATIENT(S)

The study population included 307 U.S. assisted reproductive technology (ART) clinics that continuously reported performance data to the Centers for Disease Control from 2003 to 2008.

INTERVENTION(S)

None.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE(S)

Regression coefficients between pregnancy rate per cycle, live birth rate per cycle, or live birth rate per transfer and number of ART cycles performed.

RESULT(S)

Overall, there was no association found between a clinic's most recently reported success rate and its cycle volume. This finding was consistent across three time periods studied. Moreover, stratification analyses of clinics with greater than ±5%, ±10%, and ±20% change in success rates also found no association between clinic performance and cycle volume.

CONCLUSION(S)

As proxied by cycle volume data, patients seeking ART treatment do not seem to be influenced by positive or negative changes in a clinic's performance despite the public availability of this data. These results suggest that current public quality reporting encompassing success rates alone will not change patient behavior and therefore is insufficient to place salient competitive pressure on health care providers. Further research is necessary to define provider performance comprehensively and to determine the metrics, if any, to which patients respond.

Pragmatic research and outcomes in asthma and COPD

Asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) are common diseases which cause patients and society considerable difficulties. These are costly diseases which cause substantial morbidity and death. Health care policy makers have made improving outcomes in asthma and COPD a priority. Application of guideline recommended approaches to asthma and COPD care in the real-life setting has been emphasized but outcomes have not improved. Failure to improve outcomes may not be because of inconsistent applications of guideline recommendations, but rather because there are difficulties implementing the Expert Panel Report III (EPR 3) method for categorizing asthma severity and the Global Initiative for Obstructive Lung Disease (GOLD) method for diagnosing COPD. As these serve as the foundation for treatment recommendations for these diseases, alternative approaches should be considered for categorizing asthma severity and identifying COPD patients. Claims-based algorithms provide an intriguing option for identifying persistent asthma patients and symptomatic COPD patients in administrative databases. These methods could be used as the basis for pragmatic research, both retrospective and prospective, on assessing outcomes of guideline recommended treatment approaches in asthma and COPD. Important questions urgently need to be answered about how guideline recommended approaches regarding use of long-acting inhaled β-agonist/inhaled corticosteroid (LABA/ICS) in asthma and long-acting inhaled anti-muscarinic agent (LAMA) and LABA/ICS in COPD affect outcomes in real-life situations.

From documentation to the problem: controlling postoperative pain

PROBLEM

Adequate pain control continues to be an enigma in the face of the Joint Commission (TJC) well-intended pain management standards. Notable in the pain standards is the mandate to make pain the fifth vital sign to increase pain visibility and awareness.

METHOD

The following databases were searched: EBSCOHost, CINHAL, PubMed Central, Medline, and government/societies sites for guidelines on pain control. Various search terms used included pain, post operative pain, pain control, pain as the 5th vital sign, pain documentation, pain assessment, Joint Commission Pain Standard, PRN effectiveness, and pay-for-performance.

FINDINGS

Accredited facilities are mandated to have plans to assess for pain and evaluate pain management effectiveness. These mandates have necessitated a flurry of initiatives and programs by hospitals and healthcare facilities focusing on documentation processes to meet TJC compliance. Notable programs include Pain as the 5th Vital Sign and PRN (as needed) effectiveness documentation. Many facilities have programs to assess and document pain but lack programs that effectively control patient's pain.

CONCLUSION

This article is a call for facilities to refocus on pain control. A need to evaluate current programs by facilities is evident. Studies show that Pain as the 5(th) Vital Sign and PRN effectiveness documentation are not effective and invariably have not met the goals of TJC pain standard--adequate and effective pain control.

The use of three strategies to improve quality of care at a national level

BACKGROUND

Improving the quality of care is essential and a priority for patients, surgeons, and healthcare providers. Strategies to improve quality have been proposed at the national level either through accreditation standards or through national payment schemes; however, their effectiveness in improving quality is controversial.

QUESTIONS/PURPOSES

The purpose of this review was to address three questions: (1) does pay-for-performance improve the quality of care; (2) do surgical safety checklists improve the quality of surgical care; and (3) do practice guidelines improve the quality of care? These three strategies were chosen because there has been some research assessing their effectiveness in improving quality, and implementation had been attempted on a large scale such as entire countries.

METHODS

We performed a literature review from 1950 forward using Medline to identify Level I and II studies. We evaluated the three strategies and their effects on processes and outcomes of care. When possible, we examined strategy implementation, patients, and systems, including provider characteristics, which may affect the relationship between intervention and outcomes with a focus on factors that may have influenced effect size.

RESULTS

Pay-for-performance improved the process and to a lesser extent the outcome of care. Surgical checklists reduced morbidity and mortality. Explicit practice guidelines influenced the process and to a lesser extent the outcome of care. Although not definitively showed, clinician involvement during development of intervention and outcomes, with explicit strategies for communication and implementation, appears to increase the likelihood of positive results.

CONCLUSION

Although the cost-effectiveness of these three strategies is unknown, quality of care could be enhanced by implementing pay-for-performance, surgical safety checklists, and explicit practice guidelines. However, this review identified that the effectiveness of these strategies is highly context-specific.

Using financial incentives to improve value in orthopaedics

BACKGROUND

A variety of reforms to traditional approaches to provider payment and benefit design are being implemented in the United States. There is increasing interest in applying these financial incentives to orthopaedics, although it is unclear whether and to what extent they have been implemented and whether they increase quality or reduce costs.

QUESTIONS/PURPOSES

We reviewed and discussed physician- and patient-oriented financial incentives being implemented in orthopaedics, key challenges, and prerequisites to payment reform and value-driven payment policy in orthopaedics.

METHODS

We searched the MEDLINE database using as search terms various provider payment and consumer incentive models. We retrieved a total of 169 articles; none of these studies met the inclusion criteria. For incentive models known to the authors to be in use in orthopaedics but for which no peer-reviewed literature was found, we searched Google for further information.

RESULTS

Provider financial incentives reviewed include payments for reporting, performance, and patient safety and episode payment. Patient incentives include tiered networks, value-based benefit design, reference pricing, and value-based purchasing. Reform of financial incentives for orthopaedic surgery is challenged by (1) lack of a payment/incentive model that has demonstrated reductions in cost trends and (2) the complex interrelation of current pay schemes in today's fragmented environment. Prerequisites to reform include (1) a reliable and complete data infrastructure; (2) new business structures to support cost sharing; and (3) a retooling of patient expectations.

CONCLUSIONS

There is insufficient literature reporting the effects of various financial incentive models under implementation in orthopaedics to know whether they increase quality or reduce costs. National concerns about cost will continue to drive experimentation, and all anticipated innovations will require improved collaboration and data collection and reporting.

Design choices made by target users for a pay-for-performance program in primary care: an action research approach

Background

International interest in pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives to improve quality of health care is growing. Current programs vary in the methods of performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. One may assume that involvement of health care professionals in the goal setting and methods of quality measurement and subsequent payment schemes may enhance their commitment to and motivation for P4P programs and therefore the impact of these programs. We developed a P4P program in which the target users were involved in decisions about the P4P methods.

Methods

For the development of the P4P program a framework was used which distinguished three main components: performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. Based on this framework design choices were discussed in two panels of target users using an adapted Delphi procedure. The target users were 65 general practices and two health insurance companies in the South of the Netherlands.

Results

Performance measurement was linked to the Dutch accreditation program based on three domains (clinical care, practice management and patient experience). The general practice was chosen as unit of assessment. Relative standards were set at the 25^th percentile of group performance. The incentive for clinical care was set twice as high as the one for practice management and patient experience. Quality scores were to be calculated separately for all three domains, and for both the quality level and the improvement of performance. The incentive for quality level was set thrice as high as the one for the improvement of performance. For reimbursement, quality scores were divided into seven levels. A practice with a quality score in the lowest group was not supposed to receive a bonus. The additional payment grew proportionally for each extra group. The bonus aimed at was on average 5% to 10% of the practice income.

Conclusions

Designing a P4P program for primary care with involvement of the target users gave us an insight into their motives, which can help others who need to discuss similar programs. The resulting program is in line with target users' views and assessments of relevance and applicability. This may enhance their commitment to the program as was indicated by the growing number of voluntary participants after a successfully performed field test during the procedure. The elements of our framework can be very helpful for others who are developing or evaluating a P4P program.

Effect of financial relationships on the behaviors of health care professionals: a review of the evidence

This paper explores the empirical evidence regarding the impact financial relationships on the behavior of health care providers, specifically, physicians. We identify and synthesize peer-reviewed data addressing whether financial incentives are causally related to patient outcomes and health care costs. We cover three main areas where financial conflicts of interest arise and may have an observable relationship to health care practices: (1) physicians' roles as self-referrers, (2) insurance reimbursement schemes that create incentives for certain clinical choices over others, and (3) financial relationships between physicians and the drug and device industries. We found a well-developed scientific literature consisting of dozens of empirical studies, some that allow stronger causal inferences than others, but which altogether show that such financial conflicts of interests can, and sometimes do, impact physicians' clinical decisions. Further research is warranted to document the causal relationship of such changes on health outcomes and the cost of care, but the current base of evidence is sufficiently robust to motivate policy reform.

Physician practice responses to financial incentive programs: exploring the concept of implementation mechanisms

PURPOSE

To develop a framework for studying financial incentive program implementation mechanisms, the means by which physician practices and physicians translate incentive program goals into their specific office setting. Understanding how new financial incentives fit with the structure of physician practices and individual providers' work may shed some insight on the variable effects of physician incentives documented in numerous reviews and meta-analyses.

DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

Reviewing select articles on pay-for-performance evaluations to identify and characterize the presence of implementation mechanisms for designing, communicating, implementing, and maintaining financial incentive programs as well as recognizing participants' success and effects on patient care.

FINDINGS

Although uncommonly included in evaluations, evidence from 26 articles reveals financial incentive program sponsors and participants utilized a variety of strategies to facilitate communication about program goals and intentions, to provide feedback about participants' progress, and to assist-practices in providing recommended services. Despite diversity in programs' geographic locations, clinical targets, scope, and market context, sponsors and participants deployed common strategies. While these methods largely pertained to communication between program sponsors and participants and the provision of information about performance through reports and registries, they also included other activities such as efforts to engage patients and ways to change staff roles.

LIMITATIONS

This review covers a limited body of research to develop a conceptual framework for future research; it did not exhaustively search for new articles and cannot definitively link particular implementation mechanisms to outcomes.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Our results underscore the effects implementation mechanisms may have on how practices incorporate new programs into existing systems of care which implicates both the potential rewards from small changes as well as the resources which may be required to obtain buy-in and support.

ORIGINALITY/VALUE

We identify gaps in previous research regarding actual changes occurring in physician practices in response to physician incentive programs. We offer suggestions for future evaluation by proposing a framework for understanding implementation. Our model will assist future scholars in translating site-specific experiences with incentive programs into more broadly relevant guidance for practices by facilitating comparisons across seemingly disparate programs.

Effect of the Pay-for-Performance Program for Breast Cancer Care in Taiwan

PURPOSE

To evaluate the impact of the nationwide pay-for-performance (P4P) program for breast cancer care (BC-P4P) in Taiwan on care quality, patient survival, and recurrence.

STUDY DESIGN

A population-based observational study with cross-sectional design.

METHODS

Retrospective analysis of population-based cancer registration and claims data was used in this study. A total of 4,528 patients with stage I or II breast cancer diagnosed in 2002 or 2003 who received curative surgery were observed until the end of 2008. This study applied multivariate linear regression to explore the association between BC-P4P enrollment and quality of care. Cox regression was applied to examine the effect of BC-P4P enrollment on 5-year recurrence and overall survival among patients with breast cancer.

RESULTS

After controlling for age, stage, type of surgery, and other factors, BC-P4P enrollees were found to have received better quality care than nonenrollees (P = .001). Cox regression models also indicated that after controlling for patient characteristics, quality of care was related to better 5-year overall survival (odds ratio [OR], 0.212; P = .001) and recurrence (OR, 0.289; P < .001). Even when controlled by quality of care provided to patients and its interaction with status of BC-P4P enrollment, BC-P4P enrollment remained statistically significant regarding 5-year overall survival (OR, 0.167; P < .001) and recurrence (OR, 0.370; P = .002).

CONCLUSION

Patients with breast cancer enrolled in the BC-P4P program received better quality care and had better outcome than nonenrolled patients. Evidence from this study indicates that financial incentives in the payment design had a positive impact on outcome of breast cancer care.

Educating radiology residents in the new era: implementation and evaluation of online end-of-rotation examinations

RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of this report is to describe preliminary experience with an educational tool implemented to improve radiology education and documentation, in anticipation of upcoming changes from the American Board of Radiology and the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Monthly online end-of-rotation examinations were developed for junior radiology residents. Examinations were administered over a period of 6 months, after which satisfaction surveys were administered to residents and faculty members.

RESULTS

Satisfaction with end-of-rotation examinations was high for residents and faculty members, but the level of resident satisfaction was not statistically different when compared to that of residents who had taken fewer examinations.

CONCLUSIONS

End-of-rotation examinations are relatively straightforward to implement and facilitate recurring, structured, and meaningful resident evaluation and feedback. Future studies will explore whether examinations such as these result in improved clinical competency.

Pay-for-performance in disease management: a systematic review of the literature

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly implemented in the healthcare system to encourage improvements in healthcare quality. P4P is a payment model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting pre-established targets for delivery of healthcare services by financial incentives. Based on their performance, healthcare providers receive either additional or reduced payment. Currently, little is known about P4P schemes intending to improve delivery of chronic care through disease management. The objectives of this paper are therefore to provide an overview of P4P schemes used to stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease management and to provide insight into their effects on healthcare quality and costs.

METHODS

A systematic PubMed search was performed for English language papers published between 2000 and 2010 describing P4P schemes related to the implementation of disease management. Wagner's chronic care model was used to make disease management operational.

RESULTS

Eight P4P schemes were identified, introduced in the USA (n = 6), Germany (n = 1), and Australia (n = 1). Five P4P schemes were part of a larger scheme of interventions to improve quality of care, whereas three P4P schemes were solely implemented. Most financial incentives were rewards, selective, and granted on the basis of absolute performance. More variation was found in incented entities and the basis for providing incentives. Information about motivation, certainty, size, frequency, and duration of the financial incentives was generally limited. Five studies were identified that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare quality. Most studies showed positive effects of P4P on healthcare quality. No studies were found that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare costs.

CONCLUSION

The number of P4P schemes to encourage disease management is limited. Hardly any information is available about the effects of such schemes on healthcare quality and costs.

The effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians

BACKGROUND

The use of blended payment schemes in primary care, including the use of financial incentives to directly reward 'performance' and 'quality' is increasing in a number of countries. There are many examples in the US, and the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF) for general practitioners (GPs) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform. Despite the popularity of these schemes, there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care, or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care.

OBJECTIVES

The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) and to identify:i) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality;ii) the characteristics of patient populations for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives; andiii) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives.

SEARCH STRATEGY

We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Trials Register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library), MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychLIT, and ECONLIT. Searches of Internet-based economics and health economics working paper collections were also conducted. Finally, studies were identified through the reference lists of retrieved articles, websites of key organisations, and from direct contact with key authors in the field. Articles were included if they were published from 2000 to August 2009.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Randomised controlled trials (RCT), controlled before and after studies (CBA), and interrupted time series analyses (ITS) evaluating the impact of different financial interventions on the quality of care delivered by primary healthcare physicians (PCPs). Quality of care was defined as patient reported outcome measures, clinical behaviours, and intermediate clinical and physiological measures.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study quality, in consultation with two other review authors where there was disagreement. For each included study, we reported the estimated effect sizes and confidence intervals.

MAIN RESULTS

Seven studies were included in this review. Three of the studies evaluated single-threshold target payments, one examined a fixed fee per patient achieving a specified outcome, one study evaluated payments based on the relative ranking of medical groups' performance (tournament-based pay), one study examined a mix of tournament-based pay and threshold payments, and one study evaluated changing from a blended payments scheme to salaried payment. Three cluster RCTs examined smoking cessation; one CBA examined patients' assessment of the quality of care; one CBA examined cervical screening, mammography screening, and HbA1c; one ITS focused on four outcomes in diabetes; and one controlled ITS (a difference-in-difference design) examined cervical screening, mammography screening, HbA1c, childhood immunisation, chlamydia screening, and appropriate asthma medication. Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures, but not all. One study found no effect on quality of care. Poor study design led to substantial risk of bias in most studies. In particular, none of the studies addressed issues of selection bias as a result of the ability of primary care physicians to select into or out of the incentive scheme or health plan.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care. Implementation should proceed with caution and incentive schemes should be more carefully designed before implementation. In addition to basing incentive design more on theory, there is a large literature discussing experiences with these schemes that can be used to draw out a number of lessons that can be learned and that could be used to influence or modify the design of incentive schemes. More rigorous study designs need to be used to account for the selection of physicians into incentive schemes. The use of instrumental variable techniques should be considered to assist with the identification of treatment effects in the presence of selection bias and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In randomised trials, care must be taken in using the correct unit of analysis and more attention should be paid to blinding. Studies should also examine the potential unintended consequences of incentive schemes by having a stronger theoretical basis, including a broader range of outcomes, and conducting more extensive subgroup analysis. Studies should more consistently describe i) the type of payment scheme at baseline or in the control group, ii) how payments to medical groups were used and distributed within the groups, and iii) the size of the new payments as a percentage of total revenue. Further research comparing the relative costs and effects of financial incentives with other behaviour change interventions is also required.

An overview of reviews evaluating the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing healthcare professional behaviours and patient outcomes

BACKGROUND

There is considerable interest in the effectiveness of financial incentives in the delivery of health care. Incentives may be used in an attempt to increase the use of evidence-based treatments among healthcare professionals or to stimulate health professionals to change their clinical behaviour with respect to preventive, diagnostic and treatment decisions, or both. Financial incentives are an extrinsic source of motivation and exist when an individual can expect a monetary transfer which is made conditional on acting in a particular way. Since there are numerous reviews performed within the healthcare area describing the effects of various types of financial incentives, it is important to summarise the effectiveness of these in an overview to discern which are most effective in changing health professionals' behaviour and patient outcomes.

OBJECTIVES

To conduct an overview of systematic reviews that evaluates the impact of financial incentives on healthcare professional behaviour and patient outcomes.

METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library); Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE); TRIP; MEDLINE; EMBASE; Science Citation Index; Social Science Citation Index; NHS EED; HEED; EconLit; and Program in Policy Decision-Making (PPd) (from their inception dates up to January 2010). We searched the reference lists of all included reviews and carried out a citation search of those papers which cited studies included in the review. We included both Cochrane and non-Cochrane reviews of randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled clinical trials (CCTs), interrupted time series (ITSs) and controlled before and after studies (CBAs) that evaluated the effects of financial incentives on professional practice and patient outcomes, and that reported numerical results of the included individual studies. Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the methodological quality of each review according to the AMSTAR criteria. We included systematic reviews of studies evaluating the effectiveness of any type of financial incentive. We grouped financial incentives into five groups: payment for working for a specified time period; payment for each service, episode or visit; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care; and mixed or other systems. We summarised data using vote counting.

MAIN RESULTS

We identified four reviews reporting on 32 studies. Two reviews scored 7 on the AMSTAR criteria (moderate, score 5 to 7, quality) and two scored 9 (high, score 8 to 11, quality). The reported quality of the included studies was, by a variety of methods, low to moderate. Payment for working for a specified time period was generally ineffective, improving 3/11 outcomes from one study reported in one review. Payment for each service, episode or visit was generally effective, improving 7/10 outcomes from five studies reported in three reviews; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population was generally effective, improving 48/69 outcomes from 13 studies reported in two reviews; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care was generally effective, improving 17/20 reported outcomes from 10 studies reported in two reviews; and mixed and other systems were of mixed effectiveness, improving 20/31 reported outcomes from seven studies reported in three reviews. When looking at the effect of financial incentives overall across categories of outcomes, they were of mixed effectiveness on consultation or visit rates (improving 10/17 outcomes from three studies in two reviews); generally effective in improving processes of care (improving 41/57 outcomes from 19 studies in three reviews); generally effective in improving referrals and admissions (improving 11/16 outcomes from 11 studies in four reviews); generally ineffective in improving compliance with guidelines outcomes (improving 5/17 outcomes from five studies in two reviews); and generally effective in improving prescribing costs outcomes (improving 28/34 outcomes from 10 studies in one review).

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Financial incentives may be effective in changing healthcare professional practice. The evidence has serious methodological limitations and is also very limited in its completeness and generalisability. We found no evidence from reviews that examined the effect of financial incentives on patient outcomes.

Did changing primary care delivery models change performance? A population based study using health administrative data

BACKGROUND

Primary care reform in Ontario, Canada started with the introduction of new enrollment models, the two largest of which are Family Health Networks (FHNs), a capitation-based model, and Family Health Groups (FHGs), a blended fee-for-service model. The purpose of this study was to evaluate differences in performance between FHNs and FHGs and to compare performance before and after physicians joined these new primary care groups.

METHODS

This study used Ontario administrative claims data to compare performance measures in FHGs and FHNs. The study population included physicians who belonged to a FHN or FHG for at least two years. Patients were included in the analyses if they enrolled with a physician in the two years after the physician joined a FHN or FHG, and also if they saw the physician in a two year period prior to the physician joining a FHN or FHG. Performance was derived from the administrative data, and included measures of preventive screening for cancer (breast, cervical, colorectal) and chronic disease management (diabetes, heart failure, asthma).

RESULTS

Performance measures did not vary consistently between models. In some cases, performance approached current benchmarks (Pap smears, mammograms). In other cases it was improving in relation to previous measures (colorectal cancer screening). There were no changes in screening for cervical cancer or breast cancer after joining either a FHN or FHG. Colorectal cancer screening increased in both FHNs and FHGs. After enrolling in either a FHG or a FHN, prescribing performance measures for diabetes care improved. However, annual eye examinations decreased for younger people with diabetes after joining a FHG or FHN. There were no changes in performance measures for heart failure management or asthma care after enrolling in either a FHG or FHN.

CONCLUSIONS

Some improvements in preventive screening and diabetes management which were seen amongst people after they enrolled may be attributed to incentive payments offered to physicians within FHGs and FHNs. However, these primary care delivery models need to be compared with other delivery models and fee for service practices in order to describe more specifically what aspects of model delivery and incentives affect care.