Development and Validation of the Scientific Reasoning Scale

Numeric social-media posts engage people with climate science

Innumeracy (lack of math skills) among nonscientists often leads climate scientists and others to avoid communicating numbers due to concerns that the public will not understand them and may disengage. However, people often report preferring to receive numbers; providing them also can improve decisions. Here, we demonstrated that the presence vs. absence of at least one Arabic integer in climate-related social-media posts increased sharing up to 31.7% but, counter to hypothesis, decreased liking of messages 5.2% in two preregistered observational studies (climate scientists on Twitter, N  > 8 million Tweets; climate subreddit, N  > 17,000 posts and comments). We speculated that the decreased liking was due, not to reduced engagement, but to more negative feelings towards climate-related content described with numeric precision. A preregistered within-participant experiment (N = 212) then varied whether climate consequences were described using Arabic integers (e.g. "90%") or another format (e.g. verbal terms, "almost all"). The presence of Arabic integers about consequences led to more sharing, wanting to find out more, and greater trust and perceptions of an expert messenger; perceived trust and expertise appeared to mediate effects on sharing and wanting to find out more. Arabic integers about consequences again led to more negative feelings about the Tweets as if numbers clarified the dismaying magnitude of climate threats. Our results indicate that harnessing the power of numbers could increase public trust and concern regarding this defining issue of our time. Communicators, however, should also consider counteracting associated negative feelings-that could halt action-by providing feasible solutions to increase people's self-efficacy.

Turkish Adaptation, Reliability, and Validity Study of the Vaccine Acceptance Instrument

This research study aimed to assess the reliability and validity of the Turkish version of the Vaccine Acceptance Instrument (VAI). The VAI is a 20-item Likert-type scale, with responses ranging across seven points. A systematic approach was followed to translate the scale into Turkish, involving translation, expert panel evaluation, back-translation, and pilot testing. The Vaccine Acceptance Instrument and a sociodemographic data form were used for data collection. The reliability of the scale was tested by test-retest analysis, and its internal reliability was examined by Cronbach's alpha test. The factor structure was examined using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was employed to assess the scale's fit. Overall, 229 participants were included in the study. In test-retest reliability analysis, the intraclass correlation coefficient of the scale was 0.992 (95% CI: 0.987-0.996). The Cronbach's alpha value of the scale was 0.824. A four-factor structure was determined. The model had an acceptable fit [χ2/df = 380.04/164 (2,317) p < 0.001, CFI = 0.91, GFI = 0.90, AGFI = 0.906, NFI = 0.90, RMSEA = 0.076]. The mean total VAI score was 112.71 ± 17.02. The low education level of the mother, being a housewife, and parents not having the COVID-19 vaccine were statistically significantly associated with a low scale score and low vaccine acceptance (p < 0.05). The Turkish adaptation of the VAI demonstrated satisfactory levels of validity and reliability following rigorous testing.

Susceptibility to poor arguments: The interplay of cognitive sophistication and attitudes

Despite everyday argumentation being crucial to human communication and decision-making, the cognitive determinants of argument evaluation are poorly known. This study examined how attitudes and aspects of cognitive sophistication, i.e., thinking styles and scientific literacy, relate to people's acceptance of poorly justified arguments (e.g., unwarranted appeals to naturalness) on controversial topics (e.g., genetically modified organisms (GMOs)). The participants were more accepting of poorly justified arguments that aligned with their attitudes compared to those that opposed their attitudes, and this was true regardless of one's thinking styles or level of scientific literacy. Still, most of the examined aspects of cognitive sophistication were also positively related to fallacy detection. The strongest cognitive predictors of correctly recognizing the fallacies were one's scientific reasoning ability and active open-mindedness. The results thus imply that decreasing misleading attitude effects, and increasing certain aspects of analytic and scientific thinking, could improve argumentation.

How people decide who is correct when groups of scientists disagree

Uncertainty that arises from disputes among scientists seems to foster public skepticism or noncompliance. Communication of potential cues to the relative performance of contending scientists might affect judgments of which position is likely more valid. We used actual scientific disputes-the nature of dark matter, sea level rise under climate change, and benefits and risks of marijuana-to assess Americans' responses (n = 3150). Seven cues-replication, information quality, the majority position, degree source, experience, reference group support, and employer-were presented three cues at a time in a planned-missingness design. The most influential cues were majority vote, replication, information quality, and experience. Several potential moderators-topical engagement, prior attitudes, knowledge of science, and attitudes toward science-lacked even small effects on choice, but cues had the strongest effects for dark matter and weakest effects for marijuana, and general mistrust of scientists moderately attenuated top cues' effects. Risk communicators can take these influential cues into account in understanding how laypeople respond to scientific disputes, and improving communication about such disputes.

Sex Differences in Cognitive Reflection: A Meta-Analysis

The current study presents a meta-analytic review of the differences between men and women in cognitive reflection (CR). The study also explores whether the type of CR test (i.e., numerical tests and verbal tests) moderates the relationship between CR and sex. The results showed that men score higher than women on CR, although the magnitude of these differences was small. We also found out that the type of CR test moderates the sex differences in CR, especially in the numerical tests. In addition, the results showed that the length of numerical tests (i.e., number of items) does not affect the differences between men and women in CR. Finally, the implications of these results are discussed, and future research is suggested.

I think, therefore I act, Revisited: Building a stronger foundation for risk analysis

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is a thinking style in which people engaged in judgment and decision-making actively seek out and then evaluate information in a manner that is intentionally disconnected from their prior beliefs and motivations and in line with self-perceptions of autonomy. Actively open-minded thinkers have been observed to make both more accurate judgments about the magnitude of risks and more evidence-based decisions under uncertainty in a wide range of situations such as climate change and politics. In addition, actively open-minded thinkers functioning in domains where they lack a desired level of knowledge are open to "outsourcing" the job of critical reasoning thinking to credible experts; in other words, they are better able to gauge who is trustworthy and then rely on the insights of these trustworthy others to help them reach a conclusion. We report results from a follow-up to research previously published in Risk Analysis that confirms these tenets in the context of COVID-19. We then extend these results to offer a series of recommendations for strengthening the process and outcomes of risk analysis: leveraging the latent norm of autonomy and personal agency that underpins AOT, activating or engaging with approaches to reasoning-such as decision structuring-that are in line with AOT, and working upstream and downstream of risk analysis to establish AOT as a norm of its own.

Complex interplay of science reasoning and vaccine hesitancy among parents in Shanghai, China

The psychosocial underpinnings of vaccine hesitancy are complex. Research is needed to pinpoint the exact reasons why people hesitate to vaccinate themselves or their children against vaccine-preventable diseases. One possible reason are concerns that arise from a misunderstanding of vaccine science. We examined the impact of scientific reasoning on vaccine hesitancy and human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination intent through a cross-sectional study of parents of vaccine-eligible children (N = 399) at immunization clinics in Shanghai, China. We assessed the relationship between science reasoning and both vaccine hesitancy and HPV vaccine acceptance using general additive models. We found a significant association between scientific reasoning and education level, with those with less than a high school education having a significantly lower scientific reasoning that those with a college education (ß = -1.31, p-value = 0.002). However, there was little evidence of a relationship between scientific reasoning and vaccine hesitancy. Scientific reasoning therefore appears not to exert primary influence on the formation of vaccine attitudes among the respondents surveyed. We suggest that research on vaccine hesitancy continues working to identify the styles of reasoning parents engage in when determining whether or not to vaccinate their children. This research could inform the development and implementation of tailored vaccination campaigns.

Psychological Distance to Science as a Predictor of Science Skepticism Across Domains

This article presents and tests psychological distance to science (PSYDISC) as a domain-general predictor of science skepticism. Drawing on the concept of psychological distance, PSYDISC reflects the extent to which individuals perceive science as a tangible undertaking conducted by people similar to oneself (social), with effects in the here (spatial) and now (temporal), and as useful and applicable in the real world (hypothetical distance). In six studies (two preregistered; total N = 1,630) and two countries, we developed and established the factor structure and validity of a scale measuring PSYDISC. Crucially, higher PSYDISC predicted skepticism beyond established predictors, across science domains. A final study showed that PSYDISC shapes real-world behavior (COVID-19 vaccination uptake). This work thus provides a novel tool to predict science skepticism, as well as a construct that can help to further develop a unifying framework to understand science skepticism across domains.

Critical Thinking, Intelligence, and Unsubstantiated Beliefs: An Integrative Review

A review of the research shows that critical thinking is a more inclusive construct than intelligence, going beyond what general cognitive ability can account for. For instance, critical thinking can more completely account for many everyday outcomes, such as how thinkers reject false conspiracy theories, paranormal and pseudoscientific claims, psychological misconceptions, and other unsubstantiated claims. Deficiencies in the components of critical thinking (in specific reasoning skills, dispositions, and relevant knowledge) contribute to unsubstantiated belief endorsement in ways that go beyond what standardized intelligence tests test. Specifically, people who endorse unsubstantiated claims less tend to show better critical thinking skills, possess more relevant knowledge, and are more disposed to think critically. They tend to be more scientifically skeptical and possess a more rational-analytic cognitive style, while those who accept unsubstantiated claims more tend to be more cynical and adopt a more intuitive-experiential cognitive style. These findings suggest that for a fuller understanding of unsubstantiated beliefs, researchers and instructors should also assess specific reasoning skills, relevant knowledge, and dispositions which go beyond what intelligence tests test.

Communicating health information with visual displays

Well-designed visual displays have the power to convey health messages in clear, effective ways to non-experts, including journalists, patients and policymakers. Poorly designed visual displays, however, can confuse and alienate recipients, undermining health messages. In this Perspective, we propose a structured framework for effective visual communication of health information, using case examples of three common communication tasks: comparing treatment options, interpreting test results, and evaluating risk scenarios. We also show simple, practical ways to evaluate a design's success and guide improvements. The proposed framework is grounded in research on health risk communication, visualization and decision science, as well as our experience in communicating health data.

Scientific reasoning is associated with rejection of unfounded health beliefs and adherence to evidence-based regulations during the Covid-19 pandemic

Scientific reasoning and trust in science are two facets of science understanding. This paper examines the contribution of science understanding, over and above analytic thinking, to the endorsement of conspiracy and pseudoscientific beliefs about COVID-19 and behavioral intentions to engage in the recommended preventive behavior. We examined the direct and indirect effects of science understanding on normative health behavior in a representative sample of the Slovak population (N = 1024). The results showed more support for the indirect pathway: individuals with a better understanding of science generally had fewer epistemically suspect beliefs and as a consequence tended to behave more in line with the evidence-based guidelines and get vaccinated. Neither scientific reasoning nor trust in science directly predicted non-compliance with preventive measures, but analytic thinking correlated positively with non-compliance with preventive measures. The strongest predictor of epistemically suspect beliefs was trust in science, which also directly predicted the intention to get vaccinated against COVID-19. Therefore, reasoning about which experts or sources to believe (second-order scientific reasoning) has become more important than directly evaluating the original evidence (first-order scientific reasoning).

Supplementary information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04284-y.

Spirituality is associated with Covid-19 vaccination scepticism

Vaccine scepticism poses a significant global health risk, which has again become clear during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Previous research has identified spirituality as an important contributor to general vaccine scepticism. In the present manuscript, we assessed whether self-identified spirituality similarly contributes to scepticism towards Covid-19 vaccines, vaccine uptake, and indecisiveness in intention to be vaccinated. We conducted three studies online in the UK in late 2020, early 2021, and the summer 2021. In Studies 1 and 2 (N = 585), as expected, individuals who strongly identified as spiritual were more sceptical about Covid-19 vaccines. This association was explained by low faith in science, but not by conspiracy beliefs. Importantly, among the vaccinated participants, those who were more spiritual were more indecisive to get a Covid-19 vaccine. Using structural equation modelling (SEM), we further found that spirituality directly predicted lower likelihood of being vaccinated against Covid-19 (Study 3, N = 456). We also identified low science literacy as an additional predictor of Covid-19 scepticism, but not self-reported vaccine uptake. To conclude, spiritual beliefs are an important factor to consider when aiming to increase understanding of vaccine-related science scepticism and vaccination rejection.

Establishing an everyday scientific reasoning scale to learn how non-scientists reason with science

Scientific concepts and core ideas are fundamental for scientific inquiry and research. However, they are not always understood by non-scientists who encounter science in the media, conversations with friends, and other daily contexts. To assess how non-scientists reason with science in daily life, we extend the work described by Drummond and Fischhoff by developing an everyday scientific reasoning scale and demonstrating its ability to predict the use and application of daily scientific information. This article features three studies describing the development, validation, and use of the everyday scientific reasoning scale. Findings demonstrate an association between respondents' scores on the everyday science reasoning scale and their level of education and suggest that using daily scenarios for framing science facilitates the process of understanding scientific concepts. These results have important implications for communicating science in society and engaging diverse populations with science.

Correlations Among High School Students' Beliefs about Conspiracy, Authoritarianism, and Scientific Literacy

Studies consistently show the social impact of spreading epistemologically unfounded beliefs (or 'conspiracy beliefs'), including negative effects on public health. The present study identified correlations among epistemologically unfounded beliefs, authoritarianism, and scientific literacy in a representative sample of 303 Slovak secondary school students, using the Epistemologically Unfounded Beliefs Scale, Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale, and Scientific Reasoning Scale. Statistical analysis confirmed significant correlations among the three variables. The findings suggest that increasing scientific literacy could simultaneously reduce authoritarianism and epistemologically unfounded beliefs in secondary school students.

Superlatives, clickbaits, appeals to authority, poor grammar, or boldface: Is editorial style related to the credibility of online health messages?

Adolescents, as active online searchers, have easy access to health information. Much health information they encounter online is of poor quality and even contains potentially harmful health information. The ability to identify the quality of health messages disseminated via online technologies is needed in terms of health attitudes and behaviors. This study aims to understand how different ways of editing health-related messages affect their credibility among adolescents and what impact this may have on the content or format of health information. The sample consisted of 300 secondary school students (M_age = 17.26; SD_age = 1.04; 66.3% female). To examine the effects of manipulating editorial elements, we used seven short messages about the health-promoting effects of different fruits and vegetables. Participants were then asked to rate the message’s trustworthiness with a single question. We calculated second-order variable sensitivity as the derivative of the trustworthiness of a fake message from the trustworthiness of a true neutral message. We also controlled for participants’ scientific reasoning, cognitive reflection, and media literacy. Adolescents were able to distinguish overtly fake health messages from true health messages. True messages with and without editorial elements were perceived as equally trustworthy, except for news with clickbait headlines, which were less trustworthy than other true messages. The results were also the same when scientific reasoning, analytical reasoning, and media literacy were considered. Adolescents should be well trained to recognize online health messages with editorial elements characteristic of low-quality content. They should also be trained on how to evaluate these messages.

Promoting scientific literacy in evolution through citizen science

Evolutionary understanding is central to biology. It is also an essential prerequisite to understanding and making informed decisions about societal issues such as climate change. Yet, evolution is generally poorly understood by civil society and many misconceptions exist. Citizen science, which has been increasing in popularity as a means to gather new data and promote scientific literacy, is one strategy through which people could learn about evolution. However, despite the potential for citizen science to promote evolution learning opportunities, very few projects implement them. In this paper, we make the case for incorporating evolution education into citizen science, define key learning goals, and suggest opportunities for designing and evaluating projects in order to promote scientific literacy in evolution.

I Think, Therefore I Act: The Influence of Critical Reasoning Ability on Trust and Behavior During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) operates in three dimensions: it serves as a norm accounting for how one should search for and use information in judgment and decision making; it is a thinking style that one may adopt in accordance with the norm; and it sets standards for evaluating the thinking of others, particularly the trustworthiness of sources that claim authority. With the first and third dimensions in mind, we explore how AOT influences trust in public health experts, risk perceptions, and compliance with recommended behaviors aimed at slowing the spread and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using survey data from a nationally representative sample of Americans (N = 857), we tested whether AOT will lead people to place greater trust public health experts (H1). Because these experts have been consistently messaging that COVID-19 is a real and serious threat to public health, we also hypothesized that trust in experts would be positively associated with high perceived risk (H2), which should have a positive influence on (self-reported) compliance with CDC recommendations (H3). And because AOT is a self-directed thinking style, we also expected it to directly influence risk perceptions and, by extension, compliance (H4). Our results support all four hypotheses. We discuss the implications of these results for how risk communication and risk management efforts are designed and practiced.

Belief correlations with parental vaccine hesitancy: Results from a national survey

We conducted a nationally representative survey of parents’ beliefs and self‐reported behaviors regarding childhood vaccinations. Using Bayesian selection among multivariate models, we found that beliefs, even those without any vaccine or health content, predicted vaccine‐hesitant behaviors better than demographics, social network effects, or scientific reasoning. The multivariate structure of beliefs combined many types of ideation that included concerns about both conspiracies and side effects. Although they are not strongly related to vaccine‐hesitant behavior, demographics were key predictors of beliefs. Our results support some of the previously proposed pro‐vaccination messaging strategies and suggest some new strategies not previously considered.

Likeability and Expert Persuasion: Dislikeability Reduces the Perceived Persuasiveness of Expert Evidence

With the use of expert evidence increasing in civil and criminal trials, there is concern jurors' decisions are affected by factors that are irrelevant to the quality of the expert opinion. Past research suggests that the likeability of an expert significantly affects juror attributions of credibility and merit. However, we know little about the effects of expert likeability when detailed information about expertise is provided. Two studies examined the effect of an expert's likeability on the persuasiveness judgments and sentencing decisions of 456 jury-eligible respondents. Participants viewed and/or read an expert's testimony (lower vs. higher quality) before rating expert persuasiveness (via credibility, value, and weight), and making a sentencing decision in a Capitol murder case (death penalty vs. life in prison). Lower quality evidence was significantly less persuasive than higher quality evidence. Less likeable experts were also significantly less persuasive than either neutral or more likeable experts. This “penalty” for less likeable experts was observed irrespective of evidence quality. However, only perceptions of the foundational validity of the expert's discipline, the expert's trustworthiness and the clarity and conservativeness of the expert opinion significantly predicted sentencing decisions. Thus, the present study demonstrates that while likeability does influence persuasiveness, it does not necessarily affect sentencing outcomes.

Conspiratorial Beliefs and Cognitive Styles: An Integrated Look on Analytic Thinking, Critical Thinking, and Scientific Reasoning in Relation to (Dis)trust in Conspiracy Theories

The tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (implying secret and malevolent plots by scheming groups or individuals), incites growing decennial interest among psychological researchers (exploring the associated personality traits, worldviews and cognitive styles of people). The link between the conspiratorial beliefs and the cognitive styles remains of particular interest to scholars, requiring integrated theoretical considerations. This perspective article will focus on the relationship between the propensity to (dis)trust conspiracy theories and three cognitive styles: analytic thinking, critical thinking, and scientific reasoning. Analytic thinking (inclination toward slow and deliberate processing of information in a conscious effort to mitigate biases and reach objective understanding of facts), is a well-studied concept in the context of conspiratorial beliefs, while the negative mutual relationship seems well-evidenced. On the other hand, the evidence on the link with the critical thinking (readiness to consider, reason, appraise, review, and interpret facts to update existing beliefs) has only started to emerge in the last years. Finally, scientific reasoning (ability to apply principles of scientific inquiry to formulate, test, revise and update knowledge in accordance with new evidence), is the least studied of the three cognitive styles in relation to conspiracy theories. The present article will: (a) revise the (lack of) scientific consensus on the definitional and conceptual aspects (by providing theoretical framework); (b) summarize the state of the art on the subject (by providing overview of empirical evidence); (c) discuss directions for future research (especially in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic). An integrated perspective on the relationship between conspiratorial beliefs and cognitive styles of people, may serve to inspire future behavioral interventions.

The role of scientific reasoning and religious beliefs in use of complementary and alternative medicine

BACKGROUND

While previous research has shown that trust in complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) is linked with other unfounded beliefs (e.g. paranormal phenomena or pharmaceutical conspiracies) and that analytic thinking can help alter these beliefs, the role of the ability to evaluate evidence as a protective factor has not been established yet.

METHODS

A cross-sectional design with a hundred participants was used with self-report data from questionnaires and performance test. The dependent variables were the belief in CAM and use of CAM. Predictor variables were scientific reasoning (measured by Scientific Reasoning Scale), critical thinking dispositions (measured by Critical Thinking Disposition Instrument; UF-EMI), religious beliefs (measured by Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire), gender and age.

RESULTS

Scientific reasoning and religious faith independently predicted belief in alternative medicine, while the role of scientific reasoning in actual reported use of CAM diminished after religious faith, gender and age were introduced to the model.

CONCLUSION

The results highlight the fact that it is not enough to appeal to the general critical thinking of people, but we need to teach them some practical skills that would help them to evaluate evidence in other, health-unrelated, contexts as well.

Does Concrete Content Help People to Reason Scientifically?: Adaptation of Scientific Reasoning Scale

In this paper, we explored the scientific literacy of a general sample of the Slovak adult population and examined factors that might help or inhibit scientific reasoning, namely the content of the problems. In doing so, we also verified the assumption that when faced with real-life scientific problems, people do not necessarily apply decontextualized knowledge of methodological principles, but reason from the bottom up, i.e. by predominantly relying on heuristics based on what they already know or believe about the topic. One thousand and twelve adults completed three measures of scientific literacy (science knowledge, scientific reasoning, attitudes to science) and several other related constructs (numeracy, need for cognition, PISA tasks). In general, Slovak participants' performance on scientific reasoning tasks was fairly low and dependent on the context in which the problems were presented-there was a 63% success rate for a version with concrete problems and a 56% success rate for the decontextualized version. The main contribution of this study is a modification and validation of the scientific reasoning scale using a large sample size, which allows for more thorough testing of all components of scientific literacy.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11191-021-00207-0.

Lay beliefs about scientists' relations with their employers

Lay beliefs about scientist-employer relations may affect public attitudes toward science. A representative sample of US residents characterized scientists' relations with one of four employers: federal government agency, large business corporation, advocacy group (nonprofit seeking to influence policy), or university. Overall, they held moderate views of how much scientists and employers shared motivations, interests, and values, and of whether employers tried to change-and succeeded in changing-how scientist employees did their scientific work. Judgments differed little across employers. Best predictors of these views were belief in scientific positivism, subjective knowledge of science, and age. These findings suggest scientific authority in the United States is not immediately threatened by public beliefs that employers skew their scientific employees' work, although that might differ for specific topics or demographic sub-groups.

The spread of fake science: Lexical concreteness, proximity, misinformation sharing, and the moderating role of subjective knowledge

The spread of science misinformation harms efforts to mitigate threats like climate change or coronavirus. Construal-level theory suggests that mediated messages can prime psychological proximity to threats, having consequences for behavior. Via two MTurk experiments, I tested a serial mediation process model predicting misinformation sharing from lexical concreteness, through psychological proximity and perceived threat. In Study 1, concrete misinformation primed psychological proximity which, in turn, increased perceived threat. Perceived threat then increased the likelihood that misinformation would be shared. Source credibility was also shown to positively influence misinformation sharing. Study 2 advanced this by showing this process was moderated by subjective knowledge. Specifically, the effect of perceived threat on misinformation sharing was stronger for those with higher subjective knowledge. Furthermore, the indirect effect of lexical concreteness on misinformation sharing was stronger for those with higher subjective knowledge. Results and limitations are discussed within the lens of construal-level theory and science communication.

Risk Perception: Reflections on 40 Years of Research

Numerous studies and practical experiences with risk have demonstrated the importance of risk perceptions for people's behavior. In this narrative review, we describe and reflect upon some of the lines of research that we feel have been important in helping us understand the factors and processes that shape people's risk perceptions. In our review, we propose that much of the research on risk perceptions to date can be grouped according to three dominant perspectives and, thus, approaches to study design; they are: the characteristics of hazards, the characteristics of risk perceivers, and the application of heuristics to inform risk judgments. In making these distinctions, we also highlight what we see as outstanding challenges for researchers and practitioners. We also highlight a few new research questions that we feel warrant attention.

How scientific reasoning correlates with health-related beliefs and behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic?

We examined whether scientific reasoning is associated with health-related beliefs and behaviors over and above general analytic thinking ability in the general public (N = 783, aged 18-84). Health-related beliefs included: anti-vaccination attitudes, COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, and generic health-related epistemically suspect beliefs. Scientific reasoning correlated with generic pseudoscientific and health-related conspiracy beliefs and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. Crucially, scientific reasoning was a stronger independent predictor of unfounded beliefs (including anti-vaccination attitudes) than general analytic thinking was; however, it had a more modest role in health-related behaviors.

Emotion and judgments of scientific research

Scientific research has the power to prompt strong emotional reactions. We investigated the relationship between such reactions and individuals' understanding and judgments of the research. Participants read an article describing recent cancer research and reported the extent to which it evoked six emotions: fear, anger, disgust, happiness, sadness, and surprise. We modeled these emotions two ways, either considering each separately or clustering them into two groups, for emotions with positive or negative valence. Even after controlling for the number of predictors, models based on the six separate emotions better predicted participants' subjective understanding of the research, judgments of its quality, and trust in the scientists who conducted it. Participants who reported more disgust also had more negative judgments of the research and the scientists, but these relationships were weaker when participants reported their emotions before making these judgments, rather than after. We discuss practical and ethical implications of these results.

Public scientific testimony in the scientific image

In this paper, I draw on philosophy of science to address a challenge for science communication. Empirical research indicates that some people who trust a meteorologist's report that they are in the path of a storm do not trust a climate scientist's report that we are on a path to global warming. Such selective skepticism about climate science exemplifies a more general challenge:A prominent response arising from the novel interdisciplinary science of science communication is a principle called Consensus Reporting. According to this principle, science reporters should, whenever feasible, report the scientific consensus or lack thereof for a reported scientific view. However, philosophy of science may offer a different perspective on the issue. This perspective is critical insofar as it indicates some inadequacies of Consensus Reporting. But it is also constructive insofar as it guides the development of an alternative principle, Justification Reporting, according to which science reporters should, whenever feasible, report aspects of the nature and strength of scientific justification or lack thereof for a reported scientific view. A central difference between these proposals is that Consensus Reporting appeals to the authority of the scientists whereas Justification Reporting appeals to the authority of scientific justification. As such, Justification Reporting reflects the image of science. The paper considers the philosophical and empirical motivation for Justification Reporting and its limitations. This includes prospects and problems for implementing it in a way that addresses The Challenge of Selective Uptake. From a methodological point of view, the paper illustrates how empirically informed philosophy of science may help address challenges for science communication.

Americans' views of scientists' motivations for scientific work

Scholars have not examined public views of scientific motivations directly, despite scientific authority implications. A US representative sample rated 11 motivations both descriptively (they do motivate scientists' work) and normatively (they should motivate scientists) for scientists employed by federal government agency, large business corporation, advocacy group (nonprofit seeking to influence policy), or university. Descriptive and normative ratings fell into extrinsic (money, fame, power, being liked, helping employer) and intrinsic (do good science, enjoy challenge, helping society and others) motivation factors; being independent and gaining respect were outliers. People saw intrinsic motivations as more common, but wanted intrinsic motivations to dominate extrinsic ones even more. Despite a few differences for extrinsic-motivation ratings, the lay public tended to see scientific work as similarly motivated regardless of the employer. Variance in perceived science motivations was explained by scientific beliefs (positivism, credibility) and knowledge (of facts and scientific reasoning), complemented by political ideology and religiosity.

How the public, and scientists, perceive advancement of knowledge from conflicting study results

Science often advances through disagreement among scientists and the studies they produce. For members of the public, however, conflicting results from scientific studies may trigger a sense of uncertainty that in turn leads to a feeling that nothing new has been learned from those studies. In several scenario studies, participants read about pairs of highly similar scientific studies with results that either agreed or disagreed, and were asked, “When we take the results of these two studies together, do we now know more, less, or the same as we did before about (the study topic)?” We find that over half of participants do not feel that “we know more” as the result of the two new studies when the second study fails to replicate the first. When the two study results strongly conflict (e.g., one finds a positive and the other a negative association between two variables), a non-trivial proportion of participants actually say that “we know less” than we did before. Such a sentiment arguably violates normative principles of statistical and scientific inference positing that new study findings can never reduce our level of knowledge (and that only completely uninformative studies can leave our level of knowledge unchanged). Drawing attention to possible moderating variables, or to sample size considerations, did not influence people’s perceptions of knowledge advancement. Scientist members of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, when presented with the same scenarios, were less inclined to say that nothing new is learned from conflicting study results.

Experiments in Lay Cues to the Relative Validity of Positions Taken by Disputing Groups of Scientists

Risk analysis and hazard management can prompt varied intra-scientific disputes, some which have or will become public, and thus potentially available for lay judgments of the relative validity of the positions taken. As attentive laypeople may include elites as well as the general public, understanding whether and how cues to credibility of disputing groups of scientists might shape those lay judgments can be important. Relevant literatures from philosophy, social studies of science, risk analysis, and elsewhere have identified potential cues, but not tested their absolute or relative effects. Two experiments with U.S. online panel members tested multiple cues (e.g., credentials, experience, majority opinions, research quality) across topics varying in familiarity subject to actual intra-science disputes (dark matter, marijuana, sea-level rise). If cues supported a position, laypeople were more likely to choose it as relatively more valid, with information quality, majority "vote," experience, and degree source as the strongest, and interest, demographic, and values similarity as the weakest, cues. These results were similar in overall rankings to those from implicit rankings of cue reliability ratings from an earlier U.S. online survey. Proposed moderators were generally nonsignificant, but topic familiarity and subjective topic knowledge tended to reduce cue effects. Further research to confirm and extend these findings can inform both theory about citizen engagement with scientific and risk disputes, and practice in communication about science and risk.

Why do scientists disagree? Explaining and improving measures of the perceived causes of scientific disputes

There has been increasing attention to understanding how laypeople explain disagreements among scientists. In this article, we evaluate the factorial validity and scale/item functioning of a Science Dispute Reasons scale (Study 1) and test specific hypotheses about demographic, individual difference, and topic-related variables that may explain why some reasons are perceived to be more likely than others (Study 2). The final scale included 17 items grouped into three reason factors (Process/Competence, Interests/Values, and Complexity/Uncertainty), which is largely consistent with previous research. We find a mixed pattern of global and specific impacts on reason likelihood ratings from a range of variables including political ideology and conspiracist ideation (primary mediated through perceived credibility of science), science knowledge, and topic-related variables such as knowledge of and care about the dispute in question. Overall, science dispute reasons appear to be more strongly driven by attitudes and worldviews as opposed to objective knowledge and skills. These findings represent progress in understanding lay perceptions of the causes of scientific disputes, although much work remains. We discuss the implications of this work and directions for future research.

Lay Americans' views of why scientists disagree with each other

A survey experiment assessed response to five explanations of scientific disputes: problem complexity, self-interest, values, competence, and process choices (e.g. theories and methods). A US lay sample ( n = 453) did not distinguish interests from values, nor competence from process, as explanations of disputes. Process/competence was rated most likely and interests/values least; all, on average, were deemed likely to explain scientific disputes. Latent class analysis revealed distinct subgroups varying in their explanation preferences, with a more complex latent class structure for participants who had heard of scientific disputes in the past. Scientific positivism and judgments of science's credibility were the strongest predictors of latent class membership, controlling for scientific reasoning, political ideology, confidence in choice, scenario, education, gender, age, and ethnicity. The lack of distinction observed overall between different explanations, as well as within classes, raises challenges for further research on explanations of scientific disputes people find credible and why.

A survey instrument for measuring vaccine acceptance

Accurately measuring vaccine acceptance is important, especially under current conditions in which misinformation may increase public anxiety about vaccines and politicize vaccination policies. We integrated substantive knowledge, conceptualization and measurement expertise, and survey design principles to develop an instrument for measuring vaccine acceptance across the general public. Given this broad goal, we expect our novel instrument will complement, rather than replace, existing instruments designed specifically to measure parents' vaccine hesitancy. Our instrument measures five key facets of vaccine acceptance: (1) perceived safety of vaccines; (2) perceived effectiveness and necessity of vaccines; (3) acceptance of the selection and scheduling of vaccines; (4) positive values and affect toward vaccines; and (5) perceived legitimacy of authorities to require vaccinations. We report results of analyses demonstrating the reliability and validity of this instrument. High Cronbach's alpha values for five sub-scales and for the full scale indicate the instrument's reliability, and the consistent performance of expected predictors (i.e., trust in biologists, conspiratorial ideation, and political ideology) demonstrates the instrument's construct validity. Further, scientific reasoning increases vaccine acceptance among liberals but decreases vaccine acceptance among conservatives, which is consistent with motivated cognition. Also, trust in biologists has a stronger positive effect on vaccine acceptance among conservatives than among liberals, signaling a potentially promising means to reduce political polarization on vaccines and increase vaccine acceptance across the general public. We end by identifying key ways that public health researchers, science studies scholars, and health practitioners may employ the full (or short) version of our vaccine acceptance instrument.

Formal and Informal Learning and First-Year Psychology Students' Development of Scientific Thinking: A Two-Wave Panel Study

Scientific thinking is a predicate for scientific inquiry, and thus important to develop early in psychology students as potential future researchers. The present research is aimed at fathoming the contributions of formal and informal learning experiences to psychology students' development of scientific thinking during their 1st-year of study. We hypothesize that informal experiences are relevant beyond formal experiences. First-year psychology student cohorts from various European countries will be assessed at the beginning and again at the end of the second semester. Assessments of scientific thinking will include scientific reasoning skills, the understanding of basic statistics concepts, and epistemic cognition. Formal learning experiences will include engagement in academic activities which are guided by university authorities. Informal learning experiences will include non-compulsory, self-guided learning experiences. Formal and informal experiences will be assessed with a newly developed survey. As dispositional predictors, students' need for cognition and self-efficacy in psychological science will be assessed. In a structural equation model, students' learning experiences and personal dispositions will be examined as predictors of their development of scientific thinking. Commonalities and differences in predictive weights across universities will be tested. The project is aimed at contributing information for designing university environments to optimize the development of students' scientific thinking.