The Cognitive Neuroscience of True and False Memories

Probing the content of affective semantic memory following caregiving-related early adversity

Cognitive science has demonstrated that we construct knowledge about the world by abstracting patterns from routinely encountered experiences and storing them as semantic memories. This preregistered study tested the hypothesis that caregiving-related early adversities (crEAs) shape affective semantic memories to reflect the content of those adverse interpersonal-affective experiences. We also tested the hypothesis that because affective semantic memories may continue to evolve in response to later-occurring positive experiences, child-perceived attachment security will inform their content. The sample comprised 160 children (ages 6-12 at Visit 1; 87F/73 M), 66% of whom experienced crEAs (n = 105). At Visit 1, crEA exposure prior to study enrollment was operationalized as parental-reports endorsing a history of crEAs (abuse/neglect, permanent/significant parent-child separation); while child-reports assessed concurrent attachment security. A false memory task was administered online ∼2.5 years later (Visit 2) to probe the content of affective semantic memories-specifically attachment schemas. Results showed that crEA exposure (vs. no exposure) was associated with a higher likelihood of falsely endorsing insecure (vs. secure) schema scenes. Attachment security moderated the association between crEA exposure and insecure schema-based false recognition. Findings suggest that interpersonal-affective semantic schemas include representations of parent-child interactions that may capture the quality of one's own attachment experiences and that these representations shape how children remember attachment-relevant narrative events. Findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that these affective semantic memories can be modified by later experiences. Moving forward, the approach taken in this study provides a means of operationalizing Bowlby's notion of internal working models within a cognitive neuroscience framework. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Affective semantic memories representing insecure schema knowledge (child needs + needs-not-met) may be more salient, elaborated, and persistent among youths exposed to early caregiving adversity. All youths, irrespective of early caregiving adversity exposure, may possess affective semantic memories that represent knowledge of secure schemas (child needs + needs-met). Establishing secure relationships with parents following early-occurring caregiving adversity may attenuate the expression of insecure semantic memories, suggesting potential malleability. Affective semantic memories include schema representations of parent-child interactions that may capture the quality of one's own attachment experiences and shape how youths remember attachment-relevant events.

False memories in forensic psychology: do cognition and brain activity tell the same story?

One of the most important problems in forensic psychology is the impossibility of reliably discriminating between true and false memories when the only prosecution evidence comes from the memory of a witness or a victim. Unfortunately, both children and adults can be persuaded that they have been victims of past criminal acts, usually of a sexual nature. In adults, suggestion often occurs in the context of suggestive therapies based on the belief that traumatic events are repressed, while children come to believe and report events that never occurred as a result of repeated suggestive questioning. Cognitive Researchers have designed false memory paradigms (i.e., misinformation effect, Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, event implantation paradigm) to first form false memories and then determine whether it is possible to reliably differentiate between false and true memories. In the present study, we review the contribution of cognitive research to the formation of false memories and the neuropsychological approaches aimed to discriminate between true and false memories. Based on these results, we analyze the applicability of the cognitive and neuropsychological evidence to the forensic setting.

Reality monitoring and metacognitive judgments in a false-memory paradigm

How well do we distinguish between different memory sources when the information from imagination and perception is similar? And how do metacognitive (confidence) judgments differ across different sources of experiences? To study these questions, we developed a reality monitoring task using semantically related words from the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm of false memories. In an orientation phase, participants either perceived word pairs or had to voluntarily imagine the second word of a word pair. In a test phase, participants viewed words and had to judge whether the paired word was previously perceived, imagined, or new. Results revealed an interaction between memory source and judgment type on both response rates and confidence judgments: reality monitoring was better for new and perceived (compared to imagined) sources, and participants often incorrectly reported imagined experiences to be perceived. Individuals exhibited similar confidence between correct imagined source judgments and incorrect imagined sources reported to be perceived. Modeling results indicated that the observed judgments were likely due to an externalizing bias (i.e., a bias to judge the memory source as perceived). Additionally, we found that overall metacognitive ability was best in the perceived source. Together, these results reveal a source-dependent effect on response rates and confidence ratings, and provide evidence that observers are surprisingly prone to externalizing biases when monitoring their own memories.

Pupil response patterns distinguish true from false memories

Memory is reconstructive and error-prone, which make memory illusions very common in everyday life. However, studying memory illusions can provide valuable insights into how memory works. Pupil response has emerged, in recent years, as an indicator of memory encoding and retrieval, however its validity as a measure of memory success is debated. In this study, we explored whether pupil response patterns can differentiate true from false memories and whether variations in the temporal dynamics of pupil response can elucidate the mechanisms underlying false memory creation. The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm was employed to generate false memories in two separate experiments involving visual and auditory stimuli. Pupil responses effectively differentiated true from false memories based on variations in pupil amplitude at different temporal components. This discrimination remained consistent across both experiments, with slightly stronger effects in the auditory condition, aligning with the more pronounced false memory effects in this condition. Notably, differential pupil responses between true and false memories varied based on the type of memory involved at recognition. These findings provide valuable insights into the cognitive processes underlying memory distortions, with implications for theoretical frameworks and real-world contexts.

Bridging the gap between believing and memory functions

Believing has recently been recognized as a fundamental brain function linking a person’s experience with his or her attitude, actions and predictions. In general, believing results from the integration of ambient information with emotions and can be reinforced or modulated in a probabilistic fashion by new experiences. Although these processes occur in the subliminal realm, humans can become aware of what they believe and express it verbally. We explain how believing is interwoven with memory functions in a multifaceted fashion. Linking the typically rapid and adequate reactions of a subject to what he/she believes is enabled by working memory. Perceptions are stored in episodic memory as beneficial or aversive events, while the corresponding verbal descriptions of what somebody believes are stored in semantic memory. After recall from memory of what someone believes, personally relevant information can be communicated to other people. Thus, memory is essential for maintaining what people believe.

False recalls, but not false recognitions, at the DRM paradigm are increased in subjects reporting insomnia symptoms: An online study

BACKGROUND

In insomnia, poor sleep is accompanied by several cognitive impairments affecting prefrontal functioning that could affect source-monitoring processes and contribute to false memories production. By using a modified version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM), we previously found that individuals suffering from insomnia produced more false memories than good sleepers adopting a free-recall task, especially for sleep-related stimuli. However, whether poor sleep affects false memory production in a task-dependent manner (i.e., free recall or recognition) remains unclear.

METHODS

Through an online research method, we adopted the classical DRM paradigm to investigate the production of false recalls and false recognitions in 32 subjects referring insomnia symptoms (IN group) and 37 good sleepers (GS group), addressing also executive functioning and source monitoring ability in both groups.

RESULTS

Compared to the GS group, the IN group produced more false memories (p = .002) and intrusions (p = .004) at the free recall task and showed a lower working memory index (p = .008). No between-groups differences emerged at the recognition task. Correlational analysis revealed significant associations between DRM performance, executive functioning and source monitoring (SM) variables. Moreover, false recalls were predicted by being in the presence of insomnia symptoms (p = .012) and intrusions by the number of correct responses to the Stroop task (p = .051) and SM task (p = .015), as well as by the presence of insomnia symptoms (p = .003).

CONCLUSIONS

Our data show that the presence of insomnia symptoms can influence false memories production. Furthermore, the evidence that free recall is more affected than recognition suggests that poor sleep mainly affects performance at more cognitively demanding tasks. Finally, correlational and regression analyses support the hypothesis of a link between false memories production and both the presence of insomnia symptoms and executive functioning impairments.

False memories formation is increased in individuals with insomnia

Previous studies suggest that sleep can influence false memories formation. Specifically, acute sleep loss has been shown to promote false memories production by impairing memory retrieval at subsequent testing. Surprisingly, the relationship between sleep and false memories has only been investigated in healthy subjects but not in individuals with insomnia, whose sleep is objectively impaired compared to healthy subjects. Indeed, this population shows several cognitive impairments involving prefrontal functioning that could affect source monitoring processes and contribute to false memories generation. Moreover, it has been previously reported that subjects with insomnia differentially process sleep‐related versus neutral stimuli. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to compare false memories production between individuals with insomnia symptoms and good sleepers, and to evaluate the possible influence of stimulus category (neutral versus sleep‐related) in the two groups. The results show that false memories are globally increased in participants reporting insomnia symptoms compared to good sleepers. A reduction in source monitoring ability was also observed in the former group, suggesting that an impairment of this executive function could be especially involved in false memories formation. Moreover, our data seem to confirm that false memories production in individuals with insomnia symptoms appears significantly modulated by stimulus category.

Entrainment enhances theta oscillations and improves episodic memory

Neural oscillations in the theta band have been linked to episodic memory, but it is unclear whether activity patterns that give rise to theta play a causal role in episodic retrieval. Here, we used rhythmic auditory and visual stimulation to entrain neural oscillations to assess whether theta activity contributes to successful memory retrieval. In two separate experiments, human subjects studied words and were subsequently tested on memory for the words ('item recognition') and the context in which each had been previously studied ('source memory'). Between study and test, subjects in the entrainment groups were exposed to audiovisual stimuli designed to enhance activity at 5.5 Hz, whereas subjects in the control groups were exposed to white noise (Expt. 1) or 14 Hz entrainment (Expt. 2). Theta entrainment selectively increased source memory performance in both studies. Electroencephalography (EEG) data in Expt. 2 revealed that theta entrainment resulted in band-specific enhancement of theta power during the entrainment period and during post-entrainment memory retrieval. These results demonstrate a direct link between theta activity and episodic memory retrieval. Targeted manipulation of theta activity could be a promising new approach to enhance theta activity and memory performance in healthy individuals and in patients with memory disorders.

Sleep and mindfulness meditation as they relate to false memory

By a systematic analysis of the current literature, we compare two states of sleep and meditation in terms of their role in the formation or suppression of Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory. We aim to suggest that the occurrence of false memory under these two states is a result of reinforcing some abilities and changes in cognitive systems which can ultimately improve some aspects of cognitive functions. In our analogy, we propose that: (1) both sleep and meditation may improve source monitoring ability whose failure is one of the most important mechanisms in producing false memories, and (2) despite improvement in source monitoring ability, adaptive cognitive processes, as mechanisms which are common in sleep and meditation, can still produce false memories. In conclusion, we propose that in spite of their contribution to false memory through adaptive processes, the beneficial role of sleep and meditation in cognition may be more prominent than their harmful role.

Controversy and debate: Memory-Based Methods Paper 1: the fatal flaws of food frequency questionnaires and other memory-based dietary assessment methods

There is an escalating debate over the value and validity of self-reported dietary intake as estimated by Food Frequency Questionnaires and other forms of memory-based dietary assessment methods. Proponents argue that despite limitations, memory-based methods provide valid and valuable information about consumed foods and beverages and therefore can be used to assess diet-disease relations. In fact, over the past 60 years, thousands of memory-based dietary research reports were used to inform public policy and establish the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. Yet, despite this impressive history, our position is that memory-based dietary assessment methods are invalid and inadmissible for scientific research and therefore cannot be used in evidence-based policy making. Herein, we present the empirical evidence and theoretic and philosophic perspectives that render data derived from memory-based methods both fatally flawed and pseudoscientific. First, the use of memory-based methods is founded upon two inter-related logical fallacies: a category error and reification. Second, human memory and recall are not valid instruments for scientific data collection. Third, in standard epidemiologic contexts, the measurement errors associated with self-reported data are nonfalsifiable because there is no way to ascertain if the reported foods and beverages match the respondent's actual consumption. Fourth, the assignment of nutrient and energy values to self-reported intake (i.e., the pseudoquantification of anecdotal data) is impermissible and violates the foundational tenets of measurement theory. Fifth, the proxy estimates created via pseudoquantification are often physiologically implausible and have little relation to actual nutrient and energy consumption. Finally, investigators engendered a fictional discourse on the health effects of dietary sugar, salt, fat and cholesterol when they failed to cite contrary evidence or address decades of research demonstrating the fatal measurement, analytic, and inferential flaws of memory-based dietary assessment methods.

An exploratory high-density EEG investigation of the misinformation effect: Attentional and recollective differences between true and false perceptual memories

The misinformation effect, a phenomenon in which eyewitness memories are altered via exposure to post-event misinformation, is one of the most important paradigms used to investigate the reconstructive nature of human memory. The aim of this study was to use the misinformation effect paradigm to investigate differences in attentional and recollective processing between true and false event memories. Nineteen participants completed a variant of the misinformation paradigm in which recognition responses to true and misinformation based event details embedded within a narrative context, were investigated using high-density (256-channel) EEG with a 1-day delay between event exposure and test. Source monitoring responses were used to isolate event-related-potentials (ERPs) associated with perceptual (i.e. event) source attributions. Temporal-spatial analyses of these ERPs showed evidence of an elevated P3b and Late-Positive Component, associated with stronger context-matching responses and recollective activity respectively, in true perceptual memories relative to false misinformation based ones. These findings represent the first retrieval focused EEG investigation of the misinformation effect and highlight the interplay between attention and retrieval processes in episodic memory recognition.

The Inadmissibility of What We Eat in America and NHANES Dietary Data in Nutrition and Obesity Research and the Scientific Formulation of National Dietary Guidelines

The Scientific Report of the 2015 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee was primarily informed by memory-based dietary assessment methods (M-BMs) (eg, interviews and surveys). The reliance on M-BMs to inform dietary policy continues despite decades of unequivocal evidence that M-BM data bear little relation to actual energy and nutrient consumption. Data from M-BMs are defended as valid and valuable despite no empirical support and no examination of the foundational assumptions regarding the validity of human memory and retrospective recall in dietary assessment. We assert that uncritical faith in the validity and value of M-BMs has wasted substantial resources and constitutes the greatest impediment to scientific progress in obesity and nutrition research. Herein, we present evidence that M-BMs are fundamentally and fatally flawed owing to well-established scientific facts and analytic truths. First, the assumption that human memory can provide accurate or precise reproductions of past ingestive behavior is indisputably false. Second, M-BMs require participants to submit to protocols that mimic procedures known to induce false recall. Third, the subjective (ie, not publicly accessible) mental phenomena (ie, memories) from which M-BM data are derived cannot be independently observed, quantified, or falsified; as such, these data are pseudoscientific and inadmissible in scientific research. Fourth, the failure to objectively measure physical activity in analyses renders inferences regarding diet-health relationships equivocal. Given the overwhelming evidence in support of our position, we conclude that M-BM data cannot be used to inform national dietary guidelines and that the continued funding of M-BMs constitutes an unscientific and major misuse of research resources.

Epilogue: continuing points of contention in the recovered memory debate

Four contentious issues in the recovered memory debate are explored. Volume contributors offer differing perspectives on the generalizability of laboratory research, on the role of emotion in memory, on the prevalence of false recoveries, and on the motivations that underlie differences in opinion, especially with regard to whether the debate ought to be framed within a larger sociopolitical context. The recovered memory debate is argued to center on two ethical concerns that happen to be in conflict, equality among groups on one hand and due process protections on the other. Additional movement toward reconciliation is possible with a fair assessment of all available evidence, with a mutual understanding of differing perspectives, and with civil discourse.