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Yuki S, Sakurai Y, Yanagihara D. Rats adaptively seek information to accommodate a lack of information. Sci Rep 2023; 13:14417. [PMID: 37660167 PMCID: PMC10475048 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-41717-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/23/2023] [Accepted: 08/30/2023] [Indexed: 09/04/2023] Open
Abstract
Metacognition is the ability to adaptively control one's behavior by referring to one's own cognitive processes. It is thought to contribute to learning in situations where there is insufficient information available from the environment. Information-seeking behavior is a type of metacognition in which one confirms the necessary information only when one does not have the necessary and sufficient information to accomplish a task. The rats were required to respond to a nose poke hole on one wall of the experimental box for a certain period of time and then move to the opposite side at a specific time. Unfortunately, they were unable to match the timing when responding to the hole on one side. Therefore, they had to look back and confirm that now was the right time. The results obtained by analyzing these looking-back movements using a motion capture system showed that this behavior occurred frequently and rapidly in situations of insufficient information, such as in the early stages of learning, but was hardly observed and became slower as learning progressed. These results suggest that rats can adjust their behavior in response to a lack of information more flexibly than previously assumed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shoko Yuki
- Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 3-8-1, Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 153-8902, Japan.
| | - Yoshio Sakurai
- Graduate School of Brain Science, Doshisha University, 1-3, Tatara Miyakodani, Kyotanabe-shi, Kyoto, 610-0394, Japan
| | - Dai Yanagihara
- Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 3-8-1, Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 153-8902, Japan
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2
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Congratulations to Animal Cognition on its 50th birthday! Some thoughts on the last 50 years of animal cognition research. Anim Cogn 2023; 26:13-23. [PMID: 36264405 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-022-01706-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/02/2022] [Revised: 09/11/2022] [Accepted: 10/14/2022] [Indexed: 02/01/2023]
Abstract
In this article, the author reflects on some of the key issues that have arisen in comparative cognition and the role and impact of the journal Animal Cognition through its first 25 years by pretending to look back at this period from the year 2047. Successes within comparative cognition are described and the role that Animal Cognition has played in the growth of comparative cognition are discussed. Concerns are presented about issues that affect the opportunities that researchers have to work with nonhuman species and to produce good comparative cognitive science. Prescriptions for what the author hopes will happen next also are offered all in the lens of a prospectively imagined retrospective on this field.
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3
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Joo HR, Liang H, Chung JE, Geaghan-Breiner C, Fan JL, Nachman BP, Kepecs A, Frank LM. Rats use memory confidence to guide decisions. Curr Biol 2021; 31:4571-4583.e4. [PMID: 34473948 DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2021.08.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2021] [Revised: 05/29/2021] [Accepted: 08/03/2021] [Indexed: 12/20/2022]
Abstract
Memory enables access to past experiences to guide future behavior. Humans can determine which memories to trust (high confidence) and which to doubt (low confidence). How memory retrieval, memory confidence, and memory-guided decisions are related, however, is not understood. In particular, how confidence in memories is used in decision making is unknown. We developed a spatial memory task in which rats were incentivized to gamble their time: betting more following a correct choice yielded greater reward. Rat behavior reflected memory confidence, with higher temporal bets following correct choices. We applied machine learning to identify a memory decision variable and built a generative model of memories evolving over time that accurately predicted both choices and confidence reports. Our results reveal in rats an ability thought to exist exclusively in primates and introduce a unified model of memory dynamics, retrieval, choice, and confidence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hannah R Joo
- Medical Scientist Training Program, University of California, San Francisco, 513 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94143, USA; Kavli Institute for Fundamental Neuroscience, Center for Integrative Neuroscience, University of California, San Francisco, 675 Nelson Rising Lane, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Department of Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, 401 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco, 401 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA.
| | - Hexin Liang
- Neuroscience Graduate Program, The Solomon H. Snyder Department of Neuroscience, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, 725 N. Wolfe Street, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA
| | - Jason E Chung
- Kavli Institute for Fundamental Neuroscience, Center for Integrative Neuroscience, University of California, San Francisco, 675 Nelson Rising Lane, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Department of Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, 401 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco, 401 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Department of Neurological Surgery, University of California, San Francisco, 505 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94143, USA
| | - Charlotte Geaghan-Breiner
- Kavli Institute for Fundamental Neuroscience, Center for Integrative Neuroscience, University of California, San Francisco, 675 Nelson Rising Lane, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Department of Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, 401 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco, 401 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA
| | - Jiang Lan Fan
- Bioengineering Graduate Program, University of California, Berkeley/University of California, San Francisco, 1675 Owens Street, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA
| | - Benjamin P Nachman
- Physics Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA; Berkeley Institute of Data Science, University of California, Berkeley, 190 Doe Library, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
| | - Adam Kepecs
- Department of Psychiatry, Washington University School of Medicine, 660 S. Euclid Avenue, St. Louis, MO 63110, USA
| | - Loren M Frank
- Kavli Institute for Fundamental Neuroscience, Center for Integrative Neuroscience, University of California, San Francisco, 675 Nelson Rising Lane, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Department of Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, 401 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco, 401 Parnassus Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94158, USA; Howard Hughes Medical Institute, 4000 Jones Bridge Road, Chevy Chase, MD 20815, USA.
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Smith TR, Parrish AE, Creamer C, Rossettie M, Beran MJ. Capuchin monkeys (sometimes) go when they know: Confidence movements in Sapajus apella. Cognition 2020; 199:104237. [PMID: 32112968 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104237] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/20/2019] [Revised: 02/09/2020] [Accepted: 02/11/2020] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
To test for evidence of metacognition in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella), we analyzed confidence movements using a paradigm adapted from research with chimpanzees. Capuchin monkeys provide an interesting model species for the comparative assessment of metacognition as they show limited evidence of such cognitive-monitoring processes in a variety of metacognition paradigms. Here, monkeys were presented with a computerized delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) memory test in one location but were rewarded for correct responses in a separate location. Movements could be made from one location to the other at any time, but movements between a response and reward feedback may reflect confidence in the accuracy of the response. Critically, DMTS tests included occasional "no sample" trials where monkeys' performance was at chance when the trial started without a sample and a 1-s interval to the response options. We predicted that monkeys would (1) perform less accurately (and less confidently) at longer retention intervals, (2) move to the dispenser early more often on trials completed correctly than incorrectly, and (3) show a relation between faster response latency and early movements. Analyses of response times and "go" or "no go" confidence movements before feedback to the reward location suggested that the monkeys were capable of monitoring confidence in their responses. However, their confidence movements were less precise and less flexible than chimpanzees. Overall, this paradigm can reveal potential metacognitive abilities in nonhuman animals that otherwise demonstrate these abilities inconsistently.
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Templer VL. Slow Progress with the Most Widely Used Animal Model: Ten Years of Metacognition Research in Rats, 2009-2019. ANIMAL BEHAVIOR AND COGNITION 2019; 6:273-277. [PMID: 34056076 DOI: 10.26451/abc.06.04.07.2019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Until recently, demonstrations of metacognition in primates have been frequent and robust, while in rodents they have been few and equivocal. However, the past few years have seen a change in this trend with the introduction of novel methods to determine whether metacognitive responding is governed by internal or external sources of stimulus control in rats. Such studies suggest that like primates, rats can indeed use internal assessment of memory strengths to guide metacognitive responding. Strong behavioral paradigms suitable for rodents support the development of easily-accessible animal models for the neurobiology of metamemory and translational studies on diseases of memory. They also allow for a more complete comparative study of the evolution of metacognition, as the presence of this ability in rodents would suggest that metacognition evolved ~80 rather than ~25 million years ago.
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A computerized testing system for primates: Cognition, welfare, and the Rumbaughx. Behav Processes 2018; 156:37-50. [DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2017.12.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/26/2017] [Revised: 11/08/2017] [Accepted: 12/19/2017] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
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Osako Y, Sakurai Y, Hirokawa J. Subjective decision threshold for accurate visual detection performance in rats. Sci Rep 2018; 8:9357. [PMID: 29921866 PMCID: PMC6008337 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-27696-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2018] [Accepted: 06/07/2018] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
The dissociation between a subjective-criterion performance and forced performance in a sensory detection can provide critical insights into the neural correlates of sensory awareness. Here, we established a behavioral task for rats to test their spatial-visual cue detection ability, using a two alternative choice task with and without a third choice option where animals get rewards only in the objective absence of a visual cue. In the trials without the third option, spatial choice accuracy decreased from near perfect to near chance levels as the visual cue brightness decreased. In contrast, with the third option, the rats exhibited >90% spatial choice accuracy regardless of the cue brightness. The rats chose the third choice option less frequently when the cue was brighter, suggesting that rats have a generalized strategy to make spatial choices only when their internal detection criterion is met. Interestingly, even when the animals chose the third option, they could still significantly and correctly choose the direction of the visual stimuli if they were forced. Our data suggest that the rats' variable detection performance with identical set of stimuli is derived from stochastic processing of visual signals with a certain internal detection threshold rather than general motivational threshold.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuma Osako
- Laboratory of Neural Information, Graduate School of Brain Science, Doshisha University, 1-3 Tatara Miyakodani, Kyotanabe, Kyoto, 610-0394, Japan
| | - Yoshio Sakurai
- Laboratory of Neural Information, Graduate School of Brain Science, Doshisha University, 1-3 Tatara Miyakodani, Kyotanabe, Kyoto, 610-0394, Japan
| | - Junya Hirokawa
- Laboratory of Neural Information, Graduate School of Brain Science, Doshisha University, 1-3 Tatara Miyakodani, Kyotanabe, Kyoto, 610-0394, Japan.
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Lee KA, Preston AJ, Wise TB, Templer VL. Testing for Metacognitive Responding Using an Odor-based Delayed Match-to-Sample Test in Rats. J Vis Exp 2018. [PMID: 29985304 PMCID: PMC6101758 DOI: 10.3791/57489] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022] Open
Abstract
Metamemory involves the cognitive ability to assess the strength of one's memories. To explore the possibility of metamemory in non-human animals, numerous behavioral tasks have been created, many of which utilize an option to decline memory tests. To assess metamemory in rats, we utilized this decline-test option paradigm by adapting previous visual delayed-match-to-sample tests (DMTS)12 developed for primate species to an odor-based test suitable for rodents. First, rats are given a sample to remember by digging in a cup of scented sand. After a delay, the rat is presented with four distinctly scented cups, one of which contains the identical scent experienced during the sample; if this matching cup is selected, then the rat obtains a preferred, larger reward. Selection of any of the other three non-matching sand-filled scented cups results in no reward. Retention intervals are individually titrated such that subjects perform between 40 and 70% correct, therefore ensuring rats sometimes remember and sometimes forget the sample. Here, the operational definition of metamemory is the ability to distinguish between the presence and absence of memory through behavioral responding. Towards this end, on two-thirds of trials, a decline option is presented in addition to the four choice cups (choice trials). If the decline-test option- an unscented colored sand cup, is selected, the subject receives a smaller less-preferred reward and avoids the memory test. On the remaining third of trials, the decline-test option is not available (forced trials), causing subjects to guess the correct cup when the sample is forgotten. On choice tests, subjects that know when they remember should select the decline option when memory is weak rather than take the test and choose incorrectly. Therefore, significantly higher performance on chosen tests as compared to forced memory tests is indicative of the adaptive use of the decline-test response and metacognitive responding.
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Affiliation(s)
- Keith A Lee
- Department of Psychology, Providence College
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Perdue BM, Evans TA, Beran MJ. Chimpanzees show some evidence of selectively acquiring information by using tools, making inferences, and evaluating possible outcomes. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0193229. [PMID: 29641519 PMCID: PMC5894953 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193229] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2017] [Accepted: 02/07/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about one's thinking or knowing what one knows. Research suggests that this ability is not unique to humans and may be shared with nonhuman animals. In particular, great apes have shown behaviors on a variety of tasks that are suggestive of metacognitive ability. Here we combine a metacognitive task, the information-seeking task, with tool use and variable forms of initial information provided to chimpanzees to explore how informational states impact behavioral responses in these apes. Three chimpanzees were presented with an apparatus that contained five locations where food could be hidden. If they pointed to the correct location, they received the reward, but otherwise they did not. We first replicated several existing findings using this method, and then tested novel hypotheses. The chimpanzees were given different types of information across the experiments. Sometimes, they were shown the location of the food reward. Other times, they were shown only one empty location, which was not useful information. The chimpanzees also could use a tool to search any of those locations before making a selection. Chimpanzees typically used the tool to search out the location of the reward when they could not already know where it was, but they did not use the tool when they already had been given that information. One chimpanzee made inferences about the location of hidden food, even when that food was never shown in that location. The final experiment involved hiding foods of differing preference values, and then presenting the chimpanzees with different initial knowledge states (i.e., where the best food was located, where the less-preferred food was located, or where no food was located). All chimpanzees used the tool when they needed to use it to find the best possible item on that trial, but responded by choosing a location immediately when they did not need the tool. This finding highlights that their behavior was not the result of a simple rule following such as pointing to where any food had been seen.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bonnie M. Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Theodore A. Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Michael J. Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
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10
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Templer VL, Lee KA, Preston AJ. Rats know when they remember: transfer of metacognitive responding across odor-based delayed match-to-sample tests. Anim Cogn 2017; 20:891-906. [PMID: 28669115 PMCID: PMC5709207 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-017-1109-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2016] [Revised: 06/15/2017] [Accepted: 06/23/2017] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
Metamemory entails cognitively assessing the strength of one's memories. We tested the ability of nine Long-Evans rats to distinguish between remembering and forgetting by presenting a decline option that allowed a four-choice odor-based delayed match to sample (DMTS) tests to be by-passed. Rats performed significantly better on tests they chose to take than on tests they were forced to take, indicating metacognitive responding. However, rather than control by internal mnemonic cues, one alternative explanation is that decline use is based on external test-specific cues that become associated with increased rewards overtime. To examine this possibility, we tested rats on three generalization tests in which external contingencies were inconsistent and therefore could not serve as discriminative cues. Rats transferred adaptive use of the decline response in tests that eliminated memory by presenting no sample, increased memory by presenting multiple samples, and both weakened and strengthened memory by varying the retention interval. Further, subjects chose to take or decline the test before encountering the memory test, providing evidence that rats based their metacognitive responding on internal cues rather than external ones. To our knowledge, this is the first robust evidence for metamemory in rats using the DMTS decline-test paradigm in which several possible sources of external stimulus control can be ruled out.
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Affiliation(s)
- Victoria L Templer
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA.
| | - Keith A Lee
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA
| | - Aidan J Preston
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA
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11
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McBride EA. Small prey species’ behaviour and welfare: implications for veterinary professionals. J Small Anim Pract 2017; 58:423-436. [DOI: 10.1111/jsap.12681] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/15/2015] [Revised: 03/01/2017] [Accepted: 03/03/2017] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- E. Anne McBride
- School of Psychology; University of Southampton; Southampton, SO17 1BJ UK
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12
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Beran MJ, Menzel CR, Parrish AE, Perdue BM, Sayers K, Smith JD, Washburn DA. Primate cognition: attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, self-control, and metacognition as examples of cognitive control in nonhuman primates. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2016; 7:294-316. [PMID: 27284790 PMCID: PMC5173379 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1397] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/29/2016] [Revised: 04/21/2016] [Accepted: 04/28/2016] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Primate Cognition is the study of cognitive processes, which represent internal mental processes involved in discriminations, decisions, and behaviors of humans and other primate species. Cognitive control involves executive and regulatory processes that allocate attention, manipulate and evaluate available information (and, when necessary, seek additional information), remember past experiences to plan future behaviors, and deal with distraction and impulsivity when they are threats to goal achievement. Areas of research that relate to cognitive control as it is assessed across species include executive attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, metacognition, and self-control. Executive attention refers to the ability to control what sensory stimuli one attends to and how one regulates responses to those stimuli, especially in cases of conflict. Episodic memory refers to memory for personally experienced, autobiographical events. Prospective memory refers to the formation and implementation of future-intended actions, such as remembering what needs to be done later. Metacognition consists of control and monitoring processes that allow individuals to assess what information they have and what information they still need, and then if necessary to seek information. Self-control is a regulatory process whereby individuals forego more immediate or easier to obtain rewards for more delayed or harder to obtain rewards that are objectively more valuable. The behavioral complexity shown by nonhuman primates when given tests to assess these capacities indicates psychological continuities with human cognitive control capacities. However, more research is needed to clarify the proper interpretation of these behaviors with regard to possible cognitive constructs that may underlie such behaviors. WIREs Cogn Sci 2016, 7:294-316. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1397 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Charles R Menzel
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Audrey E Parrish
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Bonnie M Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, GA, USA
| | - Ken Sayers
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - David A Washburn
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Abstract
Visual confidence refers to an observer's ability to judge the accuracy of her perceptual decisions. Even though confidence judgments have been recorded since the early days of psychophysics, only recently have they been recognized as essential for a deeper understanding of visual perception. The reluctance to study visual confidence may have come in part from obtaining convincing experimental evidence in favor of metacognitive abilities rather than just perceptual sensitivity. Some effort has thus been dedicated to offer different experimental paradigms to study visual confidence in humans and nonhuman animals. To understand the origins of confidence judgments, investigators have developed two competing frameworks. The approach based on signal decision theory is popular but fails to account for response times. In contrast, the approach based on accumulation of evidence models naturally includes the dynamics of perceptual decisions. These models can explain a range of results, including the apparently paradoxical dissociation between performance and confidence that is sometimes observed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pascal Mamassian
- Laboratoire des Systèmes Perceptifs, CNRS UMR 8248, 75005 Paris, France.,Institut d'Etude de la Cognition, Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, 75005 Paris, France;
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Rosati AG, Santos LR. Spontaneous Metacognition in Rhesus Monkeys. Psychol Sci 2016; 27:1181-91. [PMID: 27388917 DOI: 10.1177/0956797616653737] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2015] [Accepted: 05/16/2016] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition is the ability to think about thinking. Although monitoring and controlling one's knowledge is a key feature of human cognition, its evolutionary origins are debated. In the current study, we examined whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; N = 120) could make metacognitive inferences in a one-shot decision. Each monkey experienced one of four conditions, observing a human appearing to hide a food reward in an apparatus consisting of either one or two tubes. The monkeys tended to search the correct location when they observed this baiting event, but engaged in information seeking-by peering into a center location where they could check both potential hiding spots-if their view had been occluded and information seeking was possible. The monkeys only occasionally approached the center when information seeking was not possible. These results show that monkeys spontaneously use information about their own knowledge states to solve naturalistic foraging problems, and thus provide the first evidence that nonhumans exhibit information-seeking responses in situations with which they have no prior experience.
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Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Church BA, Smith JD. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) modulate their use of an uncertainty response depending on risk. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ANIMAL LEARNING AND COGNITION 2016; 42:32-43. [PMID: 26551351 PMCID: PMC4710549 DOI: 10.1037/xan0000080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about thinking, and there has been a great deal of interest in how this ability manifests across primates. Based on much of the work to date, a tentative division has been drawn with New World monkeys on 1 side and Old World monkeys and apes on the other. Specifically, Old World monkeys, apes, and humans often show patterns reflecting metacognition, but New World monkeys typically do not, or show less convincing behavioral patterns. However, recent data suggest that this difference may relate to other aspects of some experimental tasks. For example, 1 possibility is that risk tolerance affects how capuchin monkeys, a New World primate species, tend to perform. Specifically, it has recently been argued that on tasks in which there are 2 or 3 options, the "risk" of guessing is tolerable for capuchins because there is a high probability of being correct even if they "know they do not know" or feel something akin to uncertainty. The current study investigated this possibility by manipulating the degree of risk (2-choices vs. 6-choices) and found that capuchin monkeys used the uncertainty response more on 6-choice trials than on 2-choice trials. We also found that rate of reward does not appear to underlie these patterns of performance, and propose that the degree of risk is modulating capuchin monkeys' use of the uncertainty response. Thus, the apparent differences between New and Old World monkeys in metacognition may reflect differences in risk tolerance rather than access to metacognitive states.
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Assessment of metacognitive monitoring and control in baboons (Papio papio). Anim Cogn 2015; 18:1347-62. [PMID: 26232908 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-015-0907-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/16/2015] [Revised: 06/02/2015] [Accepted: 07/16/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition refers to the ability of an organism to evaluate its states of knowledge (metacognitive monitoring) and engage in appropriate information-seeking behaviors when a lack of knowledge is detected (metacognitive control). This study assessed metacognitive monitoring and control in three Guinea baboons (Papio papio). Monkeys were required to report on a touchscreen the location of two target stimuli that had previously appeared briefly on a grid. They could either respond directly or use a "Repeat" key providing an opportunity to repeat the target stimuli. In Experiment 1, the baboons used the Repeat key more frequently in difficult trials and transferred this use of the key to novel conditions. Two baboons showed higher accuracy when they declined using the key compared to Baseline trials in which the key was not available, suggesting accurate metacognitive monitoring judgments. The same two baboons were consistently faster at reporting the targets' locations after a repetition of the stimulus. In Experiment 2, the baboons had to choose between two Repeat keys, one for each target. Two baboons showed a preference for repeating the presentation of the less visible target, suggesting that they identified what information they lack. Overall, results support the hypothesis of metacognitive monitoring in baboons, and also provide limited evidence for metacognitive control. We propose that tests requiring subjects to choose between several metacognitive responses in computerized tasks provide a suitable new approach for studying targeted information-seeking behaviors in animals.
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Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Futch SE, Smith JD, Evans TA, Parrish AE. Go when you know: Chimpanzees' confidence movements reflect their responses in a computerized memory task. Cognition 2015; 142:236-46. [PMID: 26057831 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.05.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/23/2014] [Revised: 04/14/2015] [Accepted: 05/26/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Three chimpanzees performed a computerized memory task in which auditory feedback about the accuracy of each response was delayed. The delivery of food rewards for correct responses also was delayed and occurred in a separate location from the response. Crucially, if the chimpanzees did not move to the reward-delivery site before food was dispensed, the reward was lost and could not be recovered. Chimpanzees were significantly more likely to move to the dispenser on trials they had completed correctly than on those they had completed incorrectly, and these movements occurred before any external feedback about the outcome of their responses. Thus, chimpanzees moved (or not) on the basis of their confidence in their responses, and these confidence movements aligned closely with objective task performance. These untrained, spontaneous confidence judgments demonstrated that chimpanzees monitored their own states of knowing and not knowing and adjusted their behavior accordingly.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Language Research Center and Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, United States.
| | - Bonnie M Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, United States
| | - Sara E Futch
- Department of Psychology, Wofford College, United States
| | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, United States
| | - Theodore A Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, United States
| | - Audrey E Parrish
- Language Research Center and Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, United States
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Vining AQ, Marsh HL. Information seeking in capuchins (Cebus apella): a rudimentary form of metacognition? Anim Cogn 2015; 18:667-81. [PMID: 25588604 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-015-0835-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/21/2014] [Revised: 12/23/2014] [Accepted: 01/05/2015] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
In previous research, great apes and rhesus macaques have demonstrated multiple apparently metacognitive abilities, whereas capuchin monkeys have not. The present experiment investigated whether at least a rudimentary form of metacognition might be demonstrated in capuchins if a simplified metacognitive task was used. Capuchins (Cebus apella) were required to locate a food reward hidden beneath one of two inverted cups that sat on a Plexiglas tray. In some conditions, the capuchins were shown where the food was hidden, in others they could infer its location, and in yet others they were not given information about the location of the food. On all trials, capuchins could optionally seek information about the food's location by looking up through the Plexiglas beneath the cups. In general, capuchins did this less often when they were shown the food reward, but not when they could infer the reward's location. These data suggest that capuchins-if metacognitive-only metacognitively control their information seeking in some conditions, particularly those in which information is presented in the visual domain. This may represent a rudimentary version of metacognitive control, in comparison with that seen in great apes and humans.
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Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Smith JD. What are my chances? Closing the gap in uncertainty monitoring between rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ANIMAL LEARNING AND COGNITION 2014; 40:303-16. [PMID: 25368870 PMCID: PMC4215522 DOI: 10.1037/xan0000020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Previous studies have indicated that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) but not capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) respond to difficult or ambiguous situations by choosing not to respond or by seeking more information. Here we assessed whether a task with very low chance accuracy could diminish this species difference, presumably indicating that capuchins—compared to macaques—are less risk averse as opposed to less sensitive to signals of uncertainty. Monkeys searched for the largest of 6 stimuli on a computer screen. Trial difficulty was varied, and monkeys could choose to opt out of any trial. All rhesus monkeys, including some with no prior use of the uncertainty response, selectively avoided the most difficult trials. The majority of capuchins sometimes made uncertainty responses, but at lower rates than rhesus monkeys. Nonetheless, the presence of some adaptive uncertainty responding suggests that capuchins also experience uncertainty and can respond to it, though with less proficiency than macaque monkeys.
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Abstract
Human decision-making strategies are strongly influenced by an awareness of certainty or uncertainty (a form of metacognition) to increase the chances of making a right choice. Humans seek more information and defer choosing when they realize they have insufficient information to make an accurate decision, but whether animals are aware of uncertainty is currently highly contentious. To explore this issue, we examined how honey bees (Apis mellifera) responded to a visual discrimination task that varied in difficulty between trials. Free-flying bees were rewarded for a correct choice, punished for an incorrect choice, or could avoid choosing by exiting the trial (opting out). Bees opted out more often on difficult trials, and opting out improved their proportion of successful trials. Bees could also transfer the concept of opting out to a novel task. Our data show that bees selectively avoid difficult tasks they lack the information to solve. This finding has been considered as evidence that nonhuman animals can assess the certainty of a predicted outcome, and bees' performance was comparable to that of primates in a similar paradigm. We discuss whether these behavioral results prove bees react to uncertainty or whether associative mechanisms can explain such findings. To better frame metacognition as an issue for neurobiological investigation, we propose a neurobiological hypothesis of uncertainty monitoring based on the known circuitry of the honey bee brain.
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Beran MJ, Smith JD, Perdue BM. Language-trained chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) name what they have seen but look first at what they have not seen. Psychol Sci 2013; 24:660-6. [PMID: 23508741 DOI: 10.1177/0956797612458936] [Citation(s) in RCA: 53] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition can be defined as knowing what one knows, and the question of whether nonhuman animals are metacognitive has driven an intense debate. We tested 3 language-trained chimpanzees in an information-seeking task in which the identity of a food item was the critical piece of information needed to obtain the food. The chimpanzees could either report the identity of the food immediately or first check a container in which the food had been hidden. In two experiments, the chimpanzees were significantly more likely to visit the container first on trials in which they could not know its contents but were more likely to just name the food item without looking into the container on trials in which they had seen its contents. Thus, chimpanzees showed efficient information-seeking behavior that suggested they knew what they had or had not already seen when it was time to name a hidden item.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University. Atlanta, GA 30302, USA.
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Information-seeking behavior: exploring metacognitive control in pigeons. Anim Cogn 2012; 16:241-54. [PMID: 23065186 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-012-0569-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/23/2012] [Revised: 10/01/2012] [Accepted: 10/04/2012] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
Metacognitive control may occur if an organism seeks additional information when the available information for solving a problem is inadequate. Such information-seeking behavior has been documented in primates, but evidence of analogous behavior is less convincing in non-primates. In our study, we adopted a novel methodological approach. We presented pigeons with visual discriminations of varying levels of difficulty, and on special testing trials, we gave the birds the opportunity of making the discrimination easier. We initially trained pigeons on a discrimination between same and different visual arrays, each containing 12 items (low difficulty), 4 items (intermediate difficulty), or 2 items (high difficulty). We later provided an "Information" button that the pigeons could peck to increase the number of items in the arrays, thereby making the discrimination easier, plus a "Go" button which, when pecked, simply allowed the pigeons to proceed to their final discriminative response. Critically, our pigeons' choice of the "Information" button increased as the difficulty of the task increased. As well, some of our pigeons showed evidence of prompt and appropriate transfer of using the "Information" button to help them perform brand-new brightness and size discrimination tasks. Speculation as to the contents of pigeons' private mental states may be unwarranted, but our pigeons did objectively exhibit the kind of complex, flexible, and adaptive information-seeking behavior that is deemed to be involved in metacognitive control.
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Sequential responding and planning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Anim Cogn 2012; 15:1085-94. [PMID: 22801861 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-012-0532-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2012] [Revised: 06/25/2012] [Accepted: 07/02/2012] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
Abstract
Previous experiments have assessed planning during sequential responding to computer generated stimuli by Old World nonhuman primates including chimpanzees and rhesus macaques. However, no such assessment has been made with a New World primate species. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are an interesting test case for assessing the distribution of cognitive processes in the Order Primates because they sometimes show proficiency in tasks also mastered by apes and Old World monkeys, but in other cases fail to match the proficiency of those other species. In two experiments, eight capuchin monkeys selected five arbitrary stimuli in distinct locations on a computer monitor in a learned sequence. In Experiment 1, shift trials occurred in which the second and third stimuli were transposed when the first stimulus was selected by the animal. In Experiment 2, mask trials occurred in which all remaining stimuli were masked after the monkey selected the first stimulus. Monkeys made more mistakes on trials in which the locations of the second and third stimuli were interchanged than on trials in which locations were not interchanged, suggesting they had already planned to select a location that no longer contained the correct stimulus. When mask trials occurred, monkeys performed at levels significantly better than chance, but their performance exceeded chance levels only for the first and the second selections on a trial. These data indicate that capuchin monkeys performed very similarly to chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys and appeared to plan their selection sequences during the computerized task, but only to a limited degree.
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