Decision-making under risk conditions is susceptible to interference by a secondary executive task

Decision-making under stress: Executive functions, analytical intelligence, somatic markers, and personality traits in young adults

The main goal of the study was to scrutinize mediating and moderating mechanisms identified in line with the predictions of Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) and Dual Process Theory of the effect of acute stress on decision making. The sample group of the research comprised of 61 (31 females, 30 males) healthy university students aged between 18 and 23 (x̄ = 21, SD = 1.28). Data measurement tools were Skin Conductance Response Measurement, Iowa Gambling Test, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Wechsler Memory Scale-III Spatial Span Subtest, Stroop Test TBAG Form, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Matrix Reasoning Subtest, Stress Rating Scale, The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Big Five Personality Traits Scale, Ways of Coping Inventory, Beck Depression Inventory. The findings indicated that acute stress gives rise to decision-making failures by suppressing the SCR emphasized in SMH and mental processes defined in System 2. Furthermore, neuroticism had a moderating role in the relationship between stress and decision-making. Accordingly, the abovementioned theories cannot separately be sufficient to explain decision-making under stress; but, the predictions of these theories can complement each other to thoroughly make out the physiological and cognitive mechanisms of decision-making.

Dual-tasking modulates movement speed but not value-based choices during walking

Value-based decision-making often occurs in multitasking scenarios relying on both cognitive and motor processes. Yet, laboratory experiments often isolate these processes, thereby neglecting potential interactions. This isolated approach reveals a dichotomy: the cognitive process by which reward influences decision-making is capacity-limited, whereas the influence of motor cost is free of such constraints. If true, dual-tasking should predominantly impair reward processing but not affect the impact of motor costs. To test this hypothesis, we designed a decision-making task in which participants made choices to walk toward targets for rewards while navigating past an obstacle. The motor cost to reach these rewards varied in real-time. Participants either solely performed the decision-making task, or additionally performed a secondary pitch-recall task. Results revealed that while both reward and motor costs influenced decision-making, the secondary task did not affect these factors. Instead, dual-tasking slowed down participants' walking, thereby reducing the overall reward rate. Hence, contrary to the prediction that the added cognitive demand would affect the weighing of reward or motor cost differentially, these processes seem to be maintained at the expense of slowing down the motor system. This slowdown may be indicative of interference at the locomotor level, thereby underpinning motor-cognitive interactions during decision-making.

Motives for Cannabis Use and Risky Decision Making Influence Cannabis Use Trajectories in Teens

The current study will examine the interactive effects of motives for cannabis use (i.e., health or recreational) and risky decision making (DM) on cannabis use trajectories among adolescents. Data from 171 adolescents, aged 14-17 at the initial visit (baseline), were prospectively analyzed across five time points approximately six months apart. Latent growth curve modeling and linear regression analyses were used. We found a significant interactive effect of "recreational motives" and risky DM on the rate of cannabis use over time. Specifically, among those less likely to use cannabis for recreational purposes, riskier DM was associated with a faster increase in the rate of use over time relative to those with lower risky DM. Additionally, a significant main effect showed that those with a greater proclivity to use cannabis for health purposes had higher initial levels of use at baseline and faster increases in the rate of use over time. Regardless of risky DM, using cannabis for health purposes is associated with faster increases in cannabis use escalation. Additionally, risky DM does impact the association between recreational motives for use and cannabis use trajectories. Future work should examine these associations with additional motives for cannabis use that have been previously validated within the literature.

Understanding the multi-modal affective expression of net language in computer-mediated communication

The fast development of technology and the popularity and prevalence of social media are constantly changing people's way of living especially their communication patterns. Computer-mediated communication facilitates human contact. Meanwhile, net language becomes widely accepted by computer-mediated communicators. Originating from the text-based form, net language evolves into a multi-modal physical form with a combination of texts, symbols, emojis, pictures and other forms of messages. The multi-modality of net language gives rise to difficulties for hearers or readers of the computer-mediated communication to understand the hidden message due to the ambiguous and polysemic nature of symbols. To clarify hearer's understanding and ensure the smooth conduct of computer-mediated communication, the conceptual blending theory will be useful in processing the multi-modal net language. With a four-space network and three operation mechanism, the emergent meaning will be constructed.

The impact of mild cognitive impairment on decision-making under explicit risk conditions: Evidence from the Personality and Total Health (PATH) Through Life longitudinal study

OBJECTIVE

Previous research has indicated that cognition and executive function are associated with decision-making, however the impact of mild cognitive impairment (MCI) on decision-making under explicit risk conditions is unclear. This cross-sectional study examined the impact of MCI, and MCI subtypes, on decision-making on the Game of Dice Task (GDT), among a cohort of older adults.

METHOD

Data from 245 older adult participants (aged 72-78 years) from the fourth assessment of the Personality and Total Health Through Life study were analyzed. A diagnostic algorithm identified 103 participants with MCI, with subtypes of single-domain amnestic MCI (aMCI-single; n = 38), multi-domain amnestic MCI (aMCI-multi; n = 31), and non-amnestic MCI (n = 33), who were compared with an age-, sex-, education-, and income-matched sample of 142 cognitively unimpaired older adults. Decision-making scores on the GDT (net score, single number choices, and strategy changes) were compared between groups using nonparametric tests.

RESULTS

Participants with MCI showed impaired performance on the GDT, with higher frequencies of single number choices and strategy changes. Analyses comparing MCI subtypes indicated that the aMCI-multi subtype showed increased frequency of single number choices compared to cognitively unimpaired participants. Across the sample of participants, decision-making scores were associated with measures of executive function (cognitive flexibility and set shifting).

CONCLUSION

MCI is associated with impaired decision-making performance under explicit risk conditions. Participants with impairments in multiple domains of cognition showed the clearest impairments. The GDT may have utility in discriminating between MCI subtypes.

Effects of mental fatigue on risk preference and feedback processing in risk decision-making

Mental fatigue is a common phenomenon in modern people, especially after a long period of mental work. Individuals frequently have to make critical decisions when in a mentally fatigued state. As an important and complex cognitive function, risk decision-making might be influenced by mental fatigue, which is consequent with increased distraction and poor information processing. However, how mental fatigue shapes individuals’ decision-making remains relatively unclear. The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of mental fatigue on risk decision-making performance and risk-preference in a simple gambling task, using both behavioral methods and event-related potential techniques. Forty young adults were divided into a mental fatigue group and a no-fatigue group and participated in the experiments. Results showed that individuals with mental fatigue tended to be more risk-averse than those without fatigue when facing risk options. The P300 amplitudes were smaller and FRN amplitudes were larger in the mental fatigue group than in the no-fatigue group. These findings provide insight into a relationship between mental fatigue and risk decision-making, from the perspective of the neurological mechanism.

Decision-making, cognitive functions, impulsivity, and media multitasking expectancies in high versus low media multitaskers

In several studies, individuals who reported to frequently multitask with different media displayed reduced cognitive performance, for example in fluid intelligence and executive functioning. These cognitive functions are relevant for making advantageous decisions under both objective risk (requiring reflection and strategical planning) and ambiguous risk (requiring learning from feedback). Thus, compared to low media multitaskers (LMMs), high media multitaskers (HMMs) may perform worse in both types of decision situations. The current study investigated HMMs and LMMs in a laboratory setting with the Game of Dice Task (GDT; objective risk), the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; ambiguous risk), various tests quantifying cognitive functions (logical reasoning, working memory, information processing, general executive functions), and self-report measures of impulsivity, media multitasking expectancies, and problematic Internet use. From 182 participants, 25 HMMs and 19 LMMs were identified using the Media Multitasking Index. Results show that HMMs compared to LMMs performed weaker on the IGT but not on the GDT. Furthermore, HMMs had slightly decreased performance in tests of logical reasoning and working memory capacity. HMMs tended to increased information processing speed but this difference was not significant. Furthermore, HMMs have more positive expectancies regarding media multitasking and reported higher tendencies toward problematic Internet use. HMMs and LMMs did not differ significantly with respect to impulsivity and executive functions. The results give a first hint that HMMs may have difficulties in decision-making under ambiguous but not under objective risk. HMMs may be more prone to errors in tasks that require feedback processing. However, HMMs appear not to be impaired in aspects of long-term strategic decision-making.

The role of cognition and reinforcement sensitivity in older adult decision-making under explicit risk conditions

Introduction: Previous research has suggested that individual differences in executive functions, memory and reinforcement sensitivity are associated with performance on behavioral decision-making tasks. Decision-making performance may also decline with age, however there is a lack of research on the interplay of cognitive and affective processes, and their impact on older adult decision-making. This study examined associations between executive functions, memory and reinforcement sensitivity on the Game of Dice Task (a measure of decision-making under explicit risk) among older adults.Method: One thousand and two older adults without cognitive impairment (aged 72-78 years) participated as part of an Australian longitudinal cohort study (the Personality and Total Health Through Life study). Decision-making sub-types were identified through cluster analysis and multinomial logistic regression was used to assess associations with measures of cognition and reinforcement sensitivity.Results: Cluster analysis identified three decision-making sub-types, which we label "advantageous," "disadvantageous" and "switching." Multivariate analyses found that relative to the mid-performing "switching" sub-type, advantageous decision-makers were more likely to be younger, male and have higher scores on a test of verbal learning. Disadvantageous decision-makers were more likely to have poorer scores on some components of executive function (set shifting, but not working memory or inhibitory control), although this effect was partly attenuated by a measure of reinforcement sensitivity (reward responsiveness).Conclusion: These results indicate that specific components of learning and executive functions are influential in decision-making under explicit risk among a sample of older adults.

Stress Makes the Difference: Social Stress and Social Anxiety in Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

Stress and anxiety can both influence risk-taking in decision-making. While stress typically increases risk-taking, anxiety often leads to risk-averse choices. Few studies have examined both stress and anxiety in a single paradigm to assess risk-averse choices. We therefore set out to examine emotional decision-making under stress in socially anxious participants. In our study, individuals (N = 87) high or low in social anxiety completed an expanded variation of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). While inflating a balloon to a larger degree is rewarded, a possible explosion leads to (a) a loss of money and (b) it is followed by an emotional picture (i.e., a calm vs. an angry face). To induce stress before this task, participants were told that they would have to deliver a speech. We operationalized risk-taking by the number of pumps during inflation and its functionality by the amount of monetary gain. In addition, response times were recorded as an index of decisional conflict. Without the stressor, high socially anxious compared to low socially anxious participants did not differ in any of the dependent variables. However, under stress, the low socially anxious group took more risk and earned more money, while high socially anxious individuals remained more cautious and did not change their risk-taking under social stress. Overall, high socially anxious individuals made their decisions more hesitantly compared to low socially anxious individuals. Unexpectedly, there were no main effects or interactions with the valence of the emotional faces. This data shows that stress affects socially anxious individuals differently: in low socially anxious individuals stress fosters risk-taking, whereas high socially anxious individuals did not alter their behavior and remained risk-averse. The novel eBART is a promising research tool to examine the specific factors that influence decision-making.

Decision Making by People With Aphasia: A Comparison of Linguistic and Nonlinguistic Measures

Purpose Decision making involves multiple cognitive and linguistic processes. The extent to which these processes are involved depends, in part, on the conditions under which decision making is assessed. Because people with aphasia (PWA) have impaired language abilities and may also present with cognitive deficits, they may have difficulty during decision-making tasks. Yet little research exists on the decision-making abilities of PWA. Thus, the purposes of this study were to investigate the performance of PWA on linguistic and nonlinguistic decision-making measures and to explore the relationship between decision making and cognitive test performance. Method A quasi-experimental design was used to compare the performance of PWA (n = 16) and age- and education-matched control participants (n = 16) on three decision-making tasks: Making a Decision subtest from the Functional Assessment of Verbal Reasoning and Executive Strategies (linguistic decision-making task), Iowa Gambling Task (nonlinguistic decision-making task with ambiguity), and Game of Dice Task (nonlinguistic decision-making task without ambiguity). Participants also completed assessments of language, working memory, and executive functions. Scores on the three decision-making tasks were compared between groups, and cognitive influences on decision-making performance were examined using correlation analyses. Results PWA differed significantly from control participants on linguistic decision making, particularly when required to verbalize their rationale for making their decision. PWA and control participants did not differ significantly on measures of nonlinguistic decision making. Performance on multiple cognitive measures was correlated with performance on the linguistic reasoning task, as well as one of the nonlinguistic tasks (Game of Dice Task). Conclusions Decision-making tasks that are heavily dependent on language, such as those used in capacity assessments, may disadvantage PWA. Assessments of decision-making capacity should include communication supports for people with acquired communication disorders; further investigation in the areas of decision making and aphasia is needed.

Transcranial Alternating Current Stimulation Modulates Risky Decision Making in a Frequency-Controlled Experiment

In this study, we investigated the effect of transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) on voluntary risky decision making and executive control in humans. Stimulation was delivered online at 5 Hz (θ), 10 Hz (α), 20 Hz (β), and 40 Hz (γ) on the left and right frontal area while participants performed a modified risky decision-making task. This task allowed participants to voluntarily select between risky and certain decisions associated with potential gains or losses, while simultaneously measuring the cognitive control component (voluntary switching) of decision making. The purpose of this experimental design was to test whether voluntary risky decision making and executive control can be modulated with tACS in a frequency-specific manner. Our results revealed a robust effect of a 20-Hz stimulation over the left prefrontal area that significantly increased voluntary risky decision making, which may suggest a possible link between risky decision making and reward processing, underlined by β-oscillatory activity.

Gunslingers, poker players, and chickens 3: Decision making under mental performance pressure in junior elite athletes

BACKGROUND

Having investigated the decision making of world class elite and subelite athletes (see Parkin and Walsh, 2017; Parkin et al., 2017), here the abilities of those at the earliest stage of entry to elite sport are examined. Junior elite athletes have undergone initial national selection and are younger than athletes examined previously (mean age 13 years). Decision making under mental pressure is explored in this sample. During performance an athlete encounters a wide array of mental pressures; these include the psychological impact of errors, negative feedback, and requirements for sustained attention in a dynamic environment (Anshel and Wells, 2000; Mellalieu et al., 2009). Such factors increase the cognitive demands of the athletes, inducing distracting anxiety-related thoughts known as rumination (Beilock and Gray, 2007). Mental pressure has been shown to reduce performance of decision-making tasks where reward and loss contingencies are explicit, with a shift toward increased risk taking (Pabst et al., 2013; Starcke et al., 2011). Mental pressure has been shown to be detrimental to decision-making speed in comparison to physical stress, highlighting the importance of considering a range of different pressures encountered by athletes (Hepler, 2015).

OBJECTIVE

To investigate the influence of mental pressure on key indicators of decision making in junior elite athletes. This chapter concludes a wider project examining decision making across developmental stages in elite sport. The work further explores how psychological insights can be applied in an elite sporting environment and in particular tailored to the requirements of junior athletes.

METHODS

Seventeen junior elite athletes (10 males, mean age: 13.80 years) enrolled on a national youth athletic development program participated in the study. Performance across three categories of decision making was assessed under conditions of low and high mental pressure. Decision making under risk was measured via the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT; Rogers et al., 1999), decision making under uncertainty via the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), and fast reactive responses to perceptual stimuli via the Visual Search Task (Treisman, 1982). Mental pressure was induced with the addition of a concurrent verbal memory task, used to increase cognitive load and mimic the distracting effects of anxiety-related rumination.

RESULTS

In junior elite athletes, fast reactive responses to perceptual stimuli (on the Visual Search Task) were slower under conditions of mental pressure. For decision making under risk there was an interaction of mental pressure and gender on the amount of points gambled, under pressure there was a higher level of risk taking in male athletes compared to females. There was no influence of mental pressure on decision making under uncertainity. There were no significant correlations in the degree to which individual's responses changed under pressure across the three measures of decision making. When assessing the applicability of results based on group averages there were no junior elite athletes who showed an "average" response (within 1SD of the mean) to mental pressure across all the three decision-making tasks.

CONCLUSION

Mental pressure affects decision making in a sample of junior elite athletes, with a slowing of response times, and modulations to performance of decision making under risk that have a high requirement for working memory. In relation to sport, these findings suggest that novel situations that place high cognitive demands on the athlete may be particularly influenced by mental pressure. The application of this work in junior elite athletes included the feedback of individual results and the implementation of a decision-making taxonomy.

Effects of mineralocorticoid-receptor stimulation on risk taking behavior in young healthy men and women

Risk taking is influenced by stress, with riskier decisions after exposure to an acute stressor and consecutively elevated cortisol levels. In the brain, cortisol acts on two receptors with different functional profiles: the glucocorticoid receptor (GR) and the mineralocorticoid receptor (MR). In the current study we investigated the effect of MR stimulation on risk taking behavior in 80 young healthy participants (40 women, mean age=23.9). We administered 0.4mg fludrocortisone, a MR agonist, in a between-subjects, placebo controlled design. Subsequently, participants conducted an established risk taking paradigm, the Balloon-Analogue-Risk-Task (BART). We also used two questionnaires to assess risk taking and decision behavior as trait measures. We found a treatment effect with riskier decisions in the fludrocortisone group. Furthermore, we found a sex effect with more risk taking in men. There was no statistically significant interaction between both factors. Our results indicate that acute MR stimulation leads to riskier decisions in women and men. Our findings argue for an important role of the MR in decision making processes.

Conceptual Knowledge Influences Decision Making Differently in Individuals with High or Low Cognitive Flexibility: An ERP Study

OBJECTIVE

Studies using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) have distinguished between good and bad decision makers and have provided an explanation for deficits in decision making. Previous studies have demonstrated a link between Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) performance and IGT performance, but the results were not consistent and failed to explain why WCST performance can predict IGT performance. The present study aimed to demonstrate that WCST performance can predict IGT performance and to identify the cognitive component of the WCST that affects IGT performance using event-related potentials (ERPs).

METHODS

In this study, 39 healthy subjects (5 subjects were excluded) were divided into a high group and a low group based on their global score on the WCST. A single-choice version of the IGT was used to eliminate the impact of retrieval strategies on the choice evaluation process and interference due to uncorrelated decks. Differences in the underlying neural mechanisms and explicit knowledge between the two groups during the three stages of the decision-making process were described.

RESULTS

Based on the information processing perspective, we divided the decision-making process into three stages: choice evaluation, response selection, and feedback processing. The behavioral results showed that the highly cognitively flexible participants performed better on the IGT and acquired more knowledge of the task. The ERP results showed that during the choice evaluation stage, the P300 recorded from central and parietal regions when a bad deck appeared was larger in the high group participants than in the low group participants. During the response selection stage, the effect of choice type was significant only in the frontal region in the high group, with a larger effect for passing. During the feedback evaluation stage, a larger FRN was evoked for a loss than for a win in the high group, whereas the FRN effect was absent in the low group.

CONCLUSION

Compared with the participants with low cognitive flexibility, the participants with high cognitive flexibility performed better on the IGT, acquired more knowledge of the task, and displayed more obvious somatic markers. The low group participants showed reduced working memory abilities during the choice evaluation stage. The appropriate somatic markers reflected by the DPN is formed only when conceptual knowledge is gained in the response selection stage. The absence of an FRN effect in the subjects who performed poorly on the WCST suggests a significant deficit in feedback learning and reward prediction.

Preference for Safe Over Risky Options in Binge Eating

Binge eating has been usually viewed as a loss of control and an impulsive behavior. But, little is known about the actual behavior of binging patients (prevalently women) in terms of basic decision-making under risk or under uncertainty. In healthy women, stressful cues bias behavior for safer options, raising the question of whether food cues that are perceived as threatening by binging patients may modulate patients’ behaviors towards safer options. A cross-sectional study was conducted with binging patients (20 bulimia nervosa (BN) and 23 anorexia nervosa binging (ANB) patients) and two control groups (22 non-binging restrictive (ANR) anorexia nervosa patients and 20 healthy participants), without any concomitant impulsive disorder. We assessed decisions under risk with a gambling task with known probabilities and decisions under uncertainty with the balloon analog risk taking task (BART) with unknown probabilities of winning, in three cued-conditions including neutral, binge food and stressful cues. In the gambling task, binging and ANR patients adopted similar safer attitudes and coherently elicited a higher aversion to losses when primed by food as compared to neutral cues. This held true for BN and ANR patients in the BART. After controlling for anxiety level, these safer attitudes in the food condition were similar to the ones under stress. In the BART, ANB patients exhibited a higher variability in their choices in the food compared to neutral condition. This higher variability was associated with higher difficulties to discard irrelevant information. All these results suggest that decision-making under risk and under uncertainty is not fundamentally altered in all these patients.

Managing temptation in obesity treatment: A neurobehavioral model of intervention strategies

Weight loss outcomes in lifestyle interventions for obesity are primarily a function of sustained adherence to a reduced-energy diet, and most lapses in diet adherence are precipitated by temptation from palatable food. The high nonresponse and relapse rates of lifestyle interventions suggest that current temptation management approaches may be insufficient for most participants. In this conceptual review, we discuss three neurobehavioral processes (attentional bias, temporal discounting, and the cold-hot empathy gap) that emerge during temptation and contribute to lapses in diet adherence. Characterizing the neurobehavioral profile of temptation highlights an important distinction between temptation resistance strategies aimed at overcoming temptation while it is experienced, and temptation prevention strategies that seek to avoid or minimize exposure to tempting stimuli. Many temptation resistance and temptation prevention strategies heavily rely on executive functions mediated by prefrontal systems that are prone to disruption by common occurrences such as stress, insufficient sleep, and even exposure to tempting stimuli. In contrast, commitment strategies are a set of devices that enable individuals to manage temptation by constraining their future choices, without placing heavy demands on executive functions. These concepts are synthesized in a conceptual model that categorizes temptation management approaches based on their intended effects on reward processing and degree of reliance on executive functions. We conclude by discussing the implications of our model for strengthening temptation management approaches in future lifestyle interventions, tailoring these approaches based on key individual difference variables, and suggesting high-priority topics for future research.

Monitoring supports performance in a dual-task paradigm involving a risky decision-making task and a working memory task

Performing two cognitively demanding tasks at the same time is known to decrease performance. The current study investigates the underlying executive functions of a dual-tasking situation involving the simultaneous performance of decision making under explicit risk and a working memory task. It is suggested that making a decision and performing a working memory task at the same time should particularly require monitoring—an executive control process supervising behavior and the state of processing on two tasks. To test the role of a supervisory/monitoring function in such a dual-tasking situation we investigated 122 participants with the Game of Dice Task plus 2-back task (GDT plus 2-back task). This dual task requires participants to make decisions under risk and to perform a 2-back working memory task at the same time. Furthermore, a task measuring a set of several executive functions gathered in the term concept formation (Modified Card Sorting Test, MCST) and the newly developed Balanced Switching Task (BST), measuring monitoring in particular, were used. The results demonstrate that concept formation and monitoring are involved in the simultaneous performance of decision making under risk and a working memory task. In particular, the mediation analysis revealed that BST performance partially mediates the influence of MCST performance on the GDT plus 2-back task. These findings suggest that monitoring is one important subfunction for superior performance in a dual-tasking situation including decision making under risk and a working memory task.

Impaired decision-making under risk in individuals with alcohol dependence

BACKGROUND

Alcohol dependence is associated with poor decision-making under ambiguity, that is, when decisions are to be made in the absence of known probabilities of reward and loss. However, little is known regarding decisions made by individuals with alcohol dependence in the context of known probabilities (decision under risk). In this study, we investigated the relative contribution of these distinct aspects of decision-making to alcohol dependence.

METHODS

Thirty recently detoxified and sober asymptomatic alcohol-dependent individuals and 30 healthy control participants were tested for decision-making under ambiguity (using the Iowa Gambling Task[IGT]) and decision-making under risk (using the Cups Task and Coin Flipping Task). We also tested their capacities for working memory storage (digit span forward) and dual tasking (operation span task).

RESULTS

Compared to healthy control participants, alcohol-dependent individuals made disadvantageous decisions on the IGT, reflecting poor decisions under ambiguity. They also made more risky choices on the Cups and Coin Flipping Tasks reflecting poor decision-making under risk. In addition, alcohol-dependent participants showed some working memory impairments, as measured by the dual tasking, and the degree of this impairment correlated with high-risk decision-making, thus suggesting a relationship between processes subserving working memory and risky decisions.

CONCLUSIONS

These results suggest that alcohol-dependent individuals are impaired in their ability to decide optimally in multiple facets of uncertainty (i.e., both risk and ambiguity) and that at least some aspects of these deficits are linked to poor working memory processes.

Acute stress affects risk taking but not ambiguity aversion

Economic decisions are often made in stressful situations (e.g., at the trading floor), but the effects of stress on economic decision making have not been systematically investigated so far. The present study examines how acute stress influences economic decision making under uncertainty (risk and ambiguity) using financially incentivized lotteries. We varied the domain of decision making as well as the expected value of the risky prospect. Importantly, no feedback was provided to investigate risk taking and ambiguity aversion independent from learning processes. In a sample of 75 healthy young participants, 55 of whom underwent a stress induction protocol (Trier Social Stress Test for Groups), we observed more risk seeking for gains. This effect was restricted to a subgroup of participants that showed a robust cortisol response to acute stress (n = 26). Gambling under ambiguity, in contrast to gambling under risk, was not influenced by the cortisol response to stress. These results show that acute psychosocial stress affects economic decision making under risk, independent of learning processes. Our results further point to the importance of cortisol as a mediator of this effect.

The effect of cognitive load and patient race on physicians' decisions to prescribe opioids for chronic low back pain: a randomized trial

OBJECTIVE

To test the hypothesis that racial biases in opioid prescribing would be more likely under high levels of cognitive load, defined as the amount of mental activity imposed on working memory, which may come from environmental factors such as stressful conditions, chaotic workplace, staffing insufficiency, and competing demands, one's own psychological or physiological state, as well as from demands inherent in the task at hand.

DESIGN

Two (patient race: White vs Black) by two (cognitive load: low vs high) between-subjects factorial design.

SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS

Ninety-eight primary care physicians from the Veterans Affairs Healthcare System.

METHODS

Web-based experimental study. Physicians were randomly assigned to read vignettes about either a Black or White patient, under low vs high cognitive load, and to indicate their likelihood of prescribing opioids. High cognitive load was induced by having physicians perform a concurrent task under time pressure.

RESULTS

There was a three-way interaction between patient race, cognitive load, and physician gender on prescribing decisions (P = 0.034). Hypotheses were partially confirmed. Male physicians were less likely to prescribe opioids for Black than White patients under high cognitive load (12.5% vs 30.0%) and were more likely to prescribe opioids for Black than White patients under low cognitive load (30.8% vs 10.5%). By contrast, female physicians were more likely to prescribe opioids for Black than White patients in both conditions, with greater racial differences under high (39.1% vs 15.8%) vs low cognitive load (28.6% vs 21.7%).

CONCLUSIONS

Physician gender affected the way in which patient race and cognitive load influenced decisions to prescribe opioids for chronic pain. Future research is needed to further explore the potential effects of physician gender on racial biases in pain treatment, and the effects of physician cognitive load on pain treatment.

Iowa Gambling Task (IGT): twenty years after - gambling disorder and IGT

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) involves probabilistic learning via monetary rewards and punishments, where advantageous task performance requires subjects to forego potential large immediate rewards for small longer-term rewards to avoid larger losses. Pathological gamblers (PG) perform worse on the IGT compared to controls, relating to their persistent preference toward high, immediate, and uncertain rewards despite experiencing larger losses. In this contribution, we review studies that investigated processes associated with poor IGT performance in PG. Findings from these studies seem to fit with recent neurocognitive models of addiction, which argue that the diminished ability of addicted individuals to ponder short-term against long-term consequences of a choice may be the product of an hyperactive automatic attentional and memory system for signaling the presence of addiction-related cues (e.g., high uncertain rewards associated with disadvantageous decks selection during the IGT) and for attributing to such cues pleasure and excitement. This incentive-salience associated with gambling-related choice in PG may be so high that it could literally “hijack” resources [“hot” executive functions (EFs)] involved in emotional self-regulation and necessary to allow the enactment of further elaborate decontextualized problem-solving abilities (“cool” EFs). A framework for future research is also proposed, which highlights the need for studies examining how these processes contribute specifically to the aberrant choice profile displayed by PG on the IGT.

Decision making under ambiguity but not under risk is related to problem gambling severity

The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between problem gambling severity and decision-making situations that vary in two degrees of uncertainty (probability of outcome is known: decision-making under risk; probability of outcome is unknown: decision-making under ambiguity). For this purpose, we recruited 65 gamblers differing in problem gambling severity and 35 normal controls. Decision-making under ambiguity was assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Card Playing Task (CPT). Decision-making under risk was assessed with the Coin Flipping Task (CFT) and the Cups Task. In addition, we included an examination of two working memory components (verbal storage and dual tasking). Results show that problem gamblers performed worse than normal controls on both ambiguous and risky decision-making. Higher problem gambling severity scores were associated with poorer performance on ambiguous decision-making tasks (IGT and CPT) but not decision-making under risk. Additionally, we found that dual task performance correlated positively with decision-making under risk (CFT and Cups tasks) but not with decision-making under ambiguity (IGT and CPT). These results suggest that impairments in decision-making under uncertain conditions of problem gamblers may represent an important neurocognitive mechanism in the maintenance of their problem gambling.

Risky decision making in adults with ADHD

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Risky decision making and disadvantageous choices constitute core characteristics of patients with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Consequences include negative psychosocial and health-related outcomes. However, risky decision making and its interrelations with emotional states in ADHD are poorly understood. Therefore, the authors investigated risky decision making without and after boredom induction in adults with and without ADHD.

METHODS

In study 1, ADHD patients (n = 15) and age/education matched controls (CG; n = 16) were compared on the Game of Dice Task (GDT), an established task measuring decision making in unambiguous situations. In study 2, ADHD patients (n = 14) and CG (n = 13) underwent boredom induction prior to the GDT.

RESULTS

In study 1, ADHD patients selected the disadvantageous alternatives significantly more often than CG. In study 2, no significant group differences were found due to an increase in risky decision making in CG following the boredom induction.

LIMITATIONS

Even if severity of depression did not affect our results, it may be necessary to compare GDT responses in ADHD patients with and without current depression.

CONCLUSIONS

Risk as a motor of disadvantageous decision making needs to be taken into account in therapeutic contexts as a maintenance factor of dysfunctional behaviour. The findings of study 2 are in line with postulated alterations of emotional state adjustment in ADHD. The link between decisions making and emotional regulation in ADHD needs further attention in research.

Anchor effects in decision making can be reduced by the interaction between goal monitoring and the level of the decision maker's executive functions

Models of decision making postulate that interactions between contextual conditions and characteristics of the decision maker determine decision-making performance. We tested this assumption by using a possible positive contextual influence (goals) and a possible negative contextual influence (anchor) in a risky decision-making task (Game of Dice Task, GDT). In this task, making advantageous choices is well known to be closely related to a specific decision maker variable: the individual level of executive functions. One hundred subjects played the GDT in one of four conditions: with self-set goal for final balance (n = 25), with presentation of an anchor (a fictitious Top 10 list, showing high gains of other participants; n = 25), with anchor and goal definition (n = 25), and with neither anchor nor goal setting (n = 25). Subjects in the conditions with anchor made more risky decisions irrespective of the negative feedback, but this anchor effect was influenced by goal monitoring and moderated by the level of the subjects' executive functions. The findings imply that impacts of situational influences on decision making as they frequently occur in real life depend upon the individual's cognitive abilities. Anchor effects can be overcome by subjects with good cognitive abilities.

Anticipatory stress interferes with utilitarian moral judgment

A recent study indicates that acute stress affects moral decision making (Youssef et al., in press). The current study examines whether results can be replicated using a different kind of stressor and a different kind of stress measurement. We induced stress in 25 participants with a cover-story of an anticipated speech. Another group of 25 participants was tested in a control condition. Stress levels and stress responses were assessed with questionnaires and heart rate. All participants performed a moral decision-making task describing moral dilemmas. These dilemmas were either personal or impersonal and each offered a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian option. Acutely stressed participants, compared to control participants, made fewer utilitarian judgments and needed longer for making a decision. Individual physiological stress response was related to fewer utilitarian judgments. Results are in line with those previously found although different instruments were used.