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Lizza JP, Lazaridis C, Nowak PG. Defining Death: Toward a Biological and Ethical Synthesis. THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS : AJOB 2024:1-12. [PMID: 39018166 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2024.2371124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/19/2024]
Abstract
Much of the debate over the definition and criteria for determining our death has focused on disagreement over the correct biological account of death, i.e., what it means for any organism to die. In this paper, we argue that this exclusive focus on the biology of death is misguided, because it ignores ethical and social factors that bear on the acceptability of criteria for determining our death. We propose that attention shift from strictly biological considerations to ethical and social considerations that bear on the determination of what we call "civil death." We argue for acceptance of a neurological criterion for determining death on grounds that it is the most reasonable way to synthesize biological, ethical, and social considerations about our death..
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Nowak PG. Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2024; 45:109-131. [PMID: 38332427 PMCID: PMC10959770 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09656-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/27/2023] [Indexed: 02/10/2024]
Abstract
In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.
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Affiliation(s)
- Piotr Grzegorz Nowak
- Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044, Kraków, Poland.
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Shewmon DA. The Fundamental Concept of Death-Controversies and Clinical Relevance: The UDDA Revision Series. Neurology 2024; 102:e209196. [PMID: 38408293 DOI: 10.1212/wnl.0000000000209196] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2023] [Accepted: 12/18/2023] [Indexed: 02/28/2024] Open
Abstract
When the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) was recently in the process of revising the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), Neurology® ran a series of debates over certain controversial issues being deliberated. Omitted was a debate over the fundamental concept underlying brain death. In his introductory article, Bernat offered reasons for this omission: "It is not directly relevant to practicing neurologists who largely accept brain death, do not question its conceptual basis, …." In this article I argue the opposite: the fundamental concept of death is highly relevant to the clinical criteria and tests used to diagnose it. Moreover, most neurologists in fact disagree with the conceptual basis articulated by Bernat. Basically, there are 3 competing concepts of death: (1) biological: cessation of the integrative unity of the organism as a whole (endorsed by Bernat and the 1981 President's Commission), (2) psychological: cessation of the person, equated with a self-conscious mind (endorsed by half of neurologists), and (3) the vital work concept proposed by the 2008 President's Council on Bioethics. The first actually corresponds to a circulatory, not a neurologic, criterion. The second corresponds to a "higher brain" criterion. The third corresponds loosely to the UK's "brainstem death" criterion. In terms of the biological concept, current diagnostic guidelines entail a high rate of false-positive declarations of death, whereas in terms of the psychological concept, the same guidelines entail a high rate of false-negative declarations. Brainstem reflexes have nothing to do with any death concept (their role is putatively to guarantee irreversibility). By shining a spotlight on the deficiencies of the UDDA through attempting to revise it, the ULC may have unwittingly opened a Pandora's box of fresh scrutiny of the concept of death underlying the neurologic criterion-particularly on the part of state legislatures with irreconcilably opposed worldviews.
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Affiliation(s)
- D Alan Shewmon
- From the Departments of Neurology and Pediatrics, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA
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Molina-Pérez A, Bernat JL, Dalle Ave A. Inconsistency between the Circulatory and the Brain Criteria of Death in the Uniform Determination of Death Act. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2023; 48:422-433. [PMID: 37364165 PMCID: PMC10501178 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhad029] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/28/2023] Open
Abstract
The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) provides that "an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead." We show that the UDDA contains two conflicting interpretations of the phrase "cessation of functions." By one interpretation, what matters for the determination of death is the cessation of spontaneous functions only, regardless of their generation by artificial means. By the other, what matters is the cessation of both spontaneous and artificially supported functions. Because each UDDA criterion uses a different interpretation, the law is conceptually inconsistent. A single consistent interpretation would lead to the conclusion that conscious individuals whose respiratory and circulatory functions are artificially supported are actually dead, or that individuals whose brain is entirely and irreversibly destroyed may be alive. We explore solutions to mitigate the inconsistency.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - James L Bernat
- Geisel School of Medicine, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA
| | - Anne Dalle Ave
- The Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, USA
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Nowak PG, Stencel A. How many ways can you die? Multiple biological deaths as a consequence of the multiple concepts of an organism. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2022; 43:127-154. [PMID: 35859085 PMCID: PMC9477939 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-022-09583-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/03/2022] [Indexed: 05/13/2023]
Abstract
According to the mainstream position in the bioethical definition of death debate, death is to be equated with the cessation of an organism. Given such a perspective, some bioethicists uphold the position that brain-dead patients are dead, while others claim that they are alive. Regardless of the specific opinion on the status of brain-dead patients, the mere bioethical concept of death, according to many bioethicists, has the merit of being unanimous and univocal, as well as grounded in biology. In the present article, we challenge such a thesis. We provide evidence that theoretical biology operates with a plurality of equally valid organismic concepts, which imply different conclusions regarding the organismal status of a brain-dead patient. Moreover, the theoretical biology concepts of an organism are very distant from the view on an organism that appears by way of bioethicists theorizing on death. We conclude that if death is to be understood as the cessation of an organism, there is no single correct answer to the question of whether a brain-dead patient is alive or dead.
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Affiliation(s)
- Piotr Grzegorz Nowak
- Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland
| | - Adrian Stencel
- Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland
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Iltis A. (Re)-Emerging Challenges in Christian Bioethics: Leading Voices in Christian Bioethics. CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 2022; 28:1-10. [PMID: 35992505 PMCID: PMC9383548 DOI: 10.1093/cb/cbab017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
This is the third installment in a Christian Bioethics series that gathers leading voices in Christian bioethics to examine the themes and issues they find most pressing. The papers address fundamental theoretical questions about the nature of Christian bioethics itself, long-standing ethical issues that remain significant today, including physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, the definition of death, the allocation of scarce resources, and finally, more futuristic questions regarding transhumanism. The contributions underscore the enduring significance of Christian engagement in bioethics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ana Iltis
- Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,USA
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Molina Pérez A. Brain death debates: from bioethics to epistemology. F1000Res 2022; 11:195. [PMID: 35844817 PMCID: PMC9253658 DOI: 10.12688/f1000research.109184.1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/08/2022] [Indexed: 09/05/2024] Open
Abstract
50 years after its introduction, brain death remains controversial among scholars. The debates focus on one question: is brain death a good criterion for determining death? This question has been answered from various perspectives: medical, metaphysical, ethical, and legal or political. Most authors either defend the criterion as it is, propose some minor or major revisions, or advocate abandoning it and finding better solutions to the problems that brain death was intended to solve when it was introduced. In short, debates about brain death have been characterized by partisanship, for or against. Here I plead for a non-partisan approach that has been overlooked in the literature: the epistemological or philosophy of science approach. Some scholars claim that human death is a matter of fact, a biological phenomenon whose occurrence can be determined empirically, based on science. We should take this claim seriously, whether we agree with it or not. The question is: how do we know that human death is a scientific matter of fact? Taking the epistemological approach means, among other things, examining how the determination of human death became an object of scientific inquiry, exploring the nature of the brain death criterion itself, and analysing the meaning of its core concepts such as "irreversibility" and "functions".
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Affiliation(s)
- Alberto Molina Pérez
- Institute for Advanced Social Studies, Spanish National Research Council (IESA–CSIC), Cordoba, 14004, Spain
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Molina Pérez A. Brain death debates: from bioethics to philosophy of science. F1000Res 2022; 11:195. [PMID: 35844817 PMCID: PMC9253658 DOI: 10.12688/f1000research.109184.2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
50 years after its introduction, brain death remains controversial among scholars. The debates focus on one question: is brain death a good criterion for determining death? This question has been answered from various perspectives: medical, metaphysical, ethical, and legal or political. Most authors either defend the criterion as it is, propose some minor or major revisions, or advocate abandoning it and finding better solutions to the problems that brain death was intended to solve when it was introduced. Here I plead for a different approach that has been overlooked in the literature: the philosophy of science approach. Some scholars claim that human death is a matter of fact, a biological phenomenon whose occurrence can be determined empirically, based on science. We should take this claim seriously, whether we agree with it or not. The question is: how do we know that human death is a scientific matter of fact? Taking the philosophy of science approach means, among other things, examining how the determination of human death became an object of scientific inquiry, exploring the nature of the brain death criterion itself, and analysing the meaning of its core concepts such as "irreversibility" and "functions".
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Affiliation(s)
- Alberto Molina Pérez
- Institute for Advanced Social Studies, Spanish National Research Council (IESA–CSIC), Cordoba, 14004, Spain
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Carrasco MA, Valera L. Diagnosing death: the "fuzzy area" between life and decomposition. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2021; 42:1-24. [PMID: 33851346 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-021-09541-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/03/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
This paper aims to determine whether it is necessary to propose the extreme of putrefaction as the only unmistakable sign in diagnosing the death of the human organism, as David Oderberg does in a recent paper. To that end, we compare Oderberg's claims to those of other authors who align with him in espousing the so-called theory of hylomorphism but who defend either a neurological or a circulatory-respiratory criterion for death. We then establish which interpretation of biological phenomena is the most reasonable within the metaphysical framework of hylomorphism. In this regard, we hold that technology does not obscure the difference between life and death or confect metaphysically anomalous beings, such as living human bodies who are not organisms or animals of the human species who are informed by a vegetative soul, but instead demands a closer and more careful look at the "fuzzy area" between a healthy (living) organism and a decaying corpse. In the light of hylomorphism, we conclude that neurological and circulatory-respiratory criteria are not good instruments for diagnosing death, since they can offer only probabilistic prognoses of death. Of the two, brain death is further away from the moment of death as it merely predicts cardiac arrest that will likely result in death. Putrefaction, the criterion that Oderberg proposes, is at the opposite end of the fuzzy area. This is undoubtedly a true diagnosis of death, but it is not necessary to wait for putrefaction proper-a relatively late stage of decomposition-to be sure that death has already occurred. Rather, early cadaveric phenomena demonstrate that the matter composing a body is subject to the basic forces governing all matter in its environment and has thus succumbed to the universal current of entropy, meaning that the entropy-resisting activity has ceased to constitute an organismal unity. When this unity is lost, there is no possibility of return.
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Affiliation(s)
- María A Carrasco
- Centro de Bioética e Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile
| | - Luca Valera
- Centro de Bioética e Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile.
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Hershenov DB. Why psychological accounts of personal identity can accept a brain death criterion and biological definition of death. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2019; 40:403-418. [PMID: 31741164 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-019-09506-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion for the death of a human animal, then it is also the correct criterion for the death of a human person. What the nonidentity of persons and animals requires is only that they have distinct criteria for ceasing to exist.
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Affiliation(s)
- David B Hershenov
- Philosophy Department, University at Buffalo, 135 Park Hall University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, 14260-4150, USA.
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Bishop JP. When is somebody just some body? Ethics as first philosophy and the brain death debate. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2019; 40:419-436. [PMID: 31732828 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-019-09508-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/23/2023]
Abstract
I, along with others, have been critical of the social construction of brain death and the various social factors that led to redefining death from cardiopulmonary failure to irreversible loss of brain functioning, or brain death. Yet this does not mean that brain death is not the best threshold to permit organ harvesting-or, as people today prefer to call it, organ procurement. Here I defend whole-brain death as a morally legitimate line that, once crossed, is grounds for families to give permission for organ donation. I do so in five moves. First, I make the case that whole-brain death is a social construction that transformed one thing, coma dépassé, into another thing, brain death, as a result of social pressures. Second, I explore the way that the 1981 President's Commission tried to establish the epistemological certainty of brain death, hoping to avoid making arcane metaphysical claims and yet still utilizing metaphysical claims about human beings. Third, I explore the moral meaning of the social construction of a definition that cannot offer metaphysical certainty about the point at which somebody becomes just some body. Fourth, I describe how two moral communities-Jewish and Catholic-actually ground their metaphysical positions with regard to brain death in the normativity of prior social relations. Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the aesthetic-moral enterprise of the metaphysical-epistemological apparatus of brain death, concluding that only such an aesthetic-moral approach is sufficiently strong to stave off the utility-maximizing tendencies of late-modern Western cultures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jeffrey P Bishop
- Tenet Endowed Chair in Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University, Salus Center, 3545 Lafayette Ave., Room 527, Saint Louis, MO, 63104, USA.
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Curlin F. Brain death: new questions and fresh perspectives. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2019; 40:355-358. [PMID: 31729640 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-019-09507-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/20/2023]
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Sulmasy DP. Whole-brain death and integration: realigning the ontological concept with clinical diagnostic tests. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2019; 40:455-481. [PMID: 31696418 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-019-09504-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/23/2023]
Abstract
For decades, physicians, philosophers, theologians, lawyers, and the public considered brain death a settled issue. However, a series of recent cases in which individuals were declared brain dead yet physiologically maintained for prolonged periods of time has challenged the status quo. This signals a need for deeper reflection and reexamination of the underlying philosophical, scientific, and clinical issues at stake in defining death. In this paper, I consider four levels of philosophical inquiry regarding death: the ontological basis, actual states of affairs, epistemological standards, and clinical criteria for brain death. I outline several candidates for the states of affairs that may constitute death, arguing that we should strive for a single, unified ontological definition of death as a loss of integrated functioning as a unified organism, while acknowledging that two states of affairs (cardiopulmonary death and whole-brain death) may satisfy this concept. I argue that the clinical criteria for determining whole-brain death should be bolstered to meet the epistemic demand of sufficient certainty in defining death by adding indicators of cerebro-somatic dis-integration to the traditional triad of loss of consciousness, loss of brainstem function, and absence of confounding explanations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel P Sulmasy
- Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Healy 419, 3700 O Street NW, Washington, DC, 20057, USA.
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