1
|
Iwasaki S, Taniuchi T. Rats did not show evidence of prospective information-seeking: a pilot study. Front Behav Neurosci 2023; 17:1253780. [PMID: 38111475 PMCID: PMC10725935 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2023.1253780] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/12/2023] [Accepted: 11/20/2023] [Indexed: 12/20/2023] Open
Abstract
Information-seeking behavior often features in research on metacognition in non-human animals; some species seek more information when they do not know the location of a food reward. Rats are known to do this in situations of uncertainty, but it is still unclear if they seek information prospectively for solving a later problem. In this study, we investigated rats' information-seeking responses in two areas that presented different cognitive challenges (N = 4). In one area, a memory task was presented in which rats could access a cue for a food reward during the information-seeking phase of a trial, but the cue was removed before the subsequent test phase. In the other area, a discrimination task presented a cue that was available in both the information-seeking and the test phases, so that it was not necessary to seek information prospectively. The memory and discrimination test trials were given in quasi-random order (Experiment 1). Rats explored in the memory task area no more than in the discrimination task area during the information-seeking phase, even after extensive training. When they were exposed exclusively to the memory task over multiple sessions (Experiment 2), they developed a strategy of exploring the available object cues. In Experiment 3, rats were found to stay longer in an area, which had an object than in other, less potentially informative areas; they were sensitive to the presence of information. Although these results did not support the existence of prospective information-seeking in rats, they do not necessarily imply that rats lack related abilities. This consideration is due to the constraints of the small sample size and the limited scope of the testing environment. Accumulating not only positive but also negative evidence would further understanding of the factors influencing metacognitive responses in non-human animals.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sumie Iwasaki
- Institute of Human and Social Sciences, Kanazawa University, Kanazawa, Japan
| | - Tohru Taniuchi
- Institute of Human and Social Sciences, Kanazawa University, Kanazawa, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Smulders TV, Douglas LJ, Reza D, Male LH, Prysce A, Alix A, de Guzman Dodd A, Read JCA. Hoarding titmice predominantly use Familiarity, and not Recollection, when remembering cache locations. Anim Cogn 2023; 26:1929-1943. [PMID: 37865619 PMCID: PMC10769918 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-023-01829-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2023] [Revised: 09/05/2023] [Accepted: 09/29/2023] [Indexed: 10/23/2023]
Abstract
Scatter-hoarding birds find their caches using spatial memory and have an enlarged hippocampus. Finding a cache site could be achieved using either Recollection (a discrete recalling of previously experienced information) or Familiarity (a feeling of "having encountered something before"). In humans, these two processes can be distinguished using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. ROC curves for olfactory memory in rats have shown the hippocampus is involved in Recollection, but not Familiarity. We test the hypothesis that food-hoarding birds, having a larger hippocampus, primarily use Recollection to find their caches. We validate a novel method of constructing ROC curves in humans and apply this method to cache retrieval by coal tits (Periparus ater). Both humans and birds mainly use Familiarity in finding their caches, with lower contribution of Recollection. This contribution is not significantly different from chance in birds, but a small contribution cannot be ruled out. Memory performance decreases with increasing retention interval in birds. The ecology of food-hoarding Parids makes it plausible that they mainly use Familiarity in the memory for caches. The larger hippocampus could be related to associating cache contents and temporal context with cache locations, rather than Recollection of the spatial information itself.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Tom V Smulders
- Centre for Behaviour & Evolution and Biosciences Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4HH, UK.
- School of Psychology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4DR, UK.
| | - Laura J Douglas
- Centre for Behaviour & Evolution and Biosciences Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4HH, UK
| | - Daniel Reza
- School of Psychology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4DR, UK
| | - Lucinda H Male
- Centre for Behaviour & Evolution and Biosciences Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4HH, UK
| | - Alexander Prysce
- School of Psychology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4DR, UK
| | - Amélie Alix
- Centre for Behaviour & Evolution and Biosciences Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4HH, UK
| | | | - Jenny C A Read
- Centre for Behaviour & Evolution and Biosciences Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4HH, UK
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Perdue BM, Evans TA, Beran MJ. Chimpanzees show some evidence of selectively acquiring information by using tools, making inferences, and evaluating possible outcomes. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0193229. [PMID: 29641519 PMCID: PMC5894953 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193229] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2017] [Accepted: 02/07/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about one's thinking or knowing what one knows. Research suggests that this ability is not unique to humans and may be shared with nonhuman animals. In particular, great apes have shown behaviors on a variety of tasks that are suggestive of metacognitive ability. Here we combine a metacognitive task, the information-seeking task, with tool use and variable forms of initial information provided to chimpanzees to explore how informational states impact behavioral responses in these apes. Three chimpanzees were presented with an apparatus that contained five locations where food could be hidden. If they pointed to the correct location, they received the reward, but otherwise they did not. We first replicated several existing findings using this method, and then tested novel hypotheses. The chimpanzees were given different types of information across the experiments. Sometimes, they were shown the location of the food reward. Other times, they were shown only one empty location, which was not useful information. The chimpanzees also could use a tool to search any of those locations before making a selection. Chimpanzees typically used the tool to search out the location of the reward when they could not already know where it was, but they did not use the tool when they already had been given that information. One chimpanzee made inferences about the location of hidden food, even when that food was never shown in that location. The final experiment involved hiding foods of differing preference values, and then presenting the chimpanzees with different initial knowledge states (i.e., where the best food was located, where the less-preferred food was located, or where no food was located). All chimpanzees used the tool when they needed to use it to find the best possible item on that trial, but responded by choosing a location immediately when they did not need the tool. This finding highlights that their behavior was not the result of a simple rule following such as pointing to where any food had been seen.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Bonnie M. Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Theodore A. Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Michael J. Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Iwasaki S, Watanabe S, Fujita K. Pigeons (Columba livia) know when they will need hints: prospective metacognition for reference memory? Anim Cogn 2017; 21:207-217. [DOI: 10.1007/s10071-017-1153-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/16/2017] [Revised: 11/19/2017] [Accepted: 12/07/2017] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
|
5
|
Templer VL, Lee KA, Preston AJ. Rats know when they remember: transfer of metacognitive responding across odor-based delayed match-to-sample tests. Anim Cogn 2017; 20:891-906. [PMID: 28669115 PMCID: PMC5709207 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-017-1109-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2016] [Revised: 06/15/2017] [Accepted: 06/23/2017] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
Metamemory entails cognitively assessing the strength of one's memories. We tested the ability of nine Long-Evans rats to distinguish between remembering and forgetting by presenting a decline option that allowed a four-choice odor-based delayed match to sample (DMTS) tests to be by-passed. Rats performed significantly better on tests they chose to take than on tests they were forced to take, indicating metacognitive responding. However, rather than control by internal mnemonic cues, one alternative explanation is that decline use is based on external test-specific cues that become associated with increased rewards overtime. To examine this possibility, we tested rats on three generalization tests in which external contingencies were inconsistent and therefore could not serve as discriminative cues. Rats transferred adaptive use of the decline response in tests that eliminated memory by presenting no sample, increased memory by presenting multiple samples, and both weakened and strengthened memory by varying the retention interval. Further, subjects chose to take or decline the test before encountering the memory test, providing evidence that rats based their metacognitive responding on internal cues rather than external ones. To our knowledge, this is the first robust evidence for metamemory in rats using the DMTS decline-test paradigm in which several possible sources of external stimulus control can be ruled out.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Victoria L Templer
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA.
| | - Keith A Lee
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA
| | - Aidan J Preston
- Department of Psychology, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI, 02918, USA
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Brown EK, Templer VL, Hampton RR. An assessment of domain-general metacognitive responding in rhesus monkeys. Behav Processes 2016; 135:132-144. [PMID: 27939856 DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2016.12.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2016] [Revised: 10/25/2016] [Accepted: 12/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition is the ability to monitor and control one's cognition. Monitoring may involve either public cues or introspection of private cognitive states. We tested rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a series of generalization tests to determine which type of cues control metacognition. In Experiment 1, monkeys learned a perceptual discrimination in which a "decline-test" response allowed them to avoid tests and receive a guaranteed small reward. Monkeys declined more difficult than easy tests. In Experiments 2-4, we evaluated whether monkeys generalized this metacognitive responding to new perceptual tests. Monkeys showed a trend toward generalization in Experiments 2 & 3, and reliable generalization in Experiment 4. In Experiments 5 & 6, we presented the decline-test response in a delayed matching-to-sample task. Memory tests differed from perceptual tests in that the appearance of the test display could not control metacognitive responding. In Experiment 6, monkeys made prospective metamemory judgments before seeing the tests. Generalization across perceptual tests with different visual properties and mixed generalization from perceptual to memory tests provide provisional evidence that domain-general, private cues controlled metacognition in some monkeys. We observed individual differences in generalization, suggesting that monkeys differ in use of public and private metacognitive cues.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Emily Kathryn Brown
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Downman Dr., Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
| | | | - Robert R Hampton
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Downman Dr., Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Beran MJ, Menzel CR, Parrish AE, Perdue BM, Sayers K, Smith JD, Washburn DA. Primate cognition: attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, self-control, and metacognition as examples of cognitive control in nonhuman primates. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2016; 7:294-316. [PMID: 27284790 PMCID: PMC5173379 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1397] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/29/2016] [Revised: 04/21/2016] [Accepted: 04/28/2016] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Primate Cognition is the study of cognitive processes, which represent internal mental processes involved in discriminations, decisions, and behaviors of humans and other primate species. Cognitive control involves executive and regulatory processes that allocate attention, manipulate and evaluate available information (and, when necessary, seek additional information), remember past experiences to plan future behaviors, and deal with distraction and impulsivity when they are threats to goal achievement. Areas of research that relate to cognitive control as it is assessed across species include executive attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, metacognition, and self-control. Executive attention refers to the ability to control what sensory stimuli one attends to and how one regulates responses to those stimuli, especially in cases of conflict. Episodic memory refers to memory for personally experienced, autobiographical events. Prospective memory refers to the formation and implementation of future-intended actions, such as remembering what needs to be done later. Metacognition consists of control and monitoring processes that allow individuals to assess what information they have and what information they still need, and then if necessary to seek information. Self-control is a regulatory process whereby individuals forego more immediate or easier to obtain rewards for more delayed or harder to obtain rewards that are objectively more valuable. The behavioral complexity shown by nonhuman primates when given tests to assess these capacities indicates psychological continuities with human cognitive control capacities. However, more research is needed to clarify the proper interpretation of these behaviors with regard to possible cognitive constructs that may underlie such behaviors. WIREs Cogn Sci 2016, 7:294-316. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1397 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Charles R Menzel
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Audrey E Parrish
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Bonnie M Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, GA, USA
| | - Ken Sayers
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - David A Washburn
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Church BA, Smith JD. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) modulate their use of an uncertainty response depending on risk. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ANIMAL LEARNING AND COGNITION 2016; 42:32-43. [PMID: 26551351 PMCID: PMC4710549 DOI: 10.1037/xan0000080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about thinking, and there has been a great deal of interest in how this ability manifests across primates. Based on much of the work to date, a tentative division has been drawn with New World monkeys on 1 side and Old World monkeys and apes on the other. Specifically, Old World monkeys, apes, and humans often show patterns reflecting metacognition, but New World monkeys typically do not, or show less convincing behavioral patterns. However, recent data suggest that this difference may relate to other aspects of some experimental tasks. For example, 1 possibility is that risk tolerance affects how capuchin monkeys, a New World primate species, tend to perform. Specifically, it has recently been argued that on tasks in which there are 2 or 3 options, the "risk" of guessing is tolerable for capuchins because there is a high probability of being correct even if they "know they do not know" or feel something akin to uncertainty. The current study investigated this possibility by manipulating the degree of risk (2-choices vs. 6-choices) and found that capuchin monkeys used the uncertainty response more on 6-choice trials than on 2-choice trials. We also found that rate of reward does not appear to underlie these patterns of performance, and propose that the degree of risk is modulating capuchin monkeys' use of the uncertainty response. Thus, the apparent differences between New and Old World monkeys in metacognition may reflect differences in risk tolerance rather than access to metacognitive states.
Collapse
|
9
|
Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Futch SE, Smith JD, Evans TA, Parrish AE. Go when you know: Chimpanzees' confidence movements reflect their responses in a computerized memory task. Cognition 2015; 142:236-46. [PMID: 26057831 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.05.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/23/2014] [Revised: 04/14/2015] [Accepted: 05/26/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Three chimpanzees performed a computerized memory task in which auditory feedback about the accuracy of each response was delayed. The delivery of food rewards for correct responses also was delayed and occurred in a separate location from the response. Crucially, if the chimpanzees did not move to the reward-delivery site before food was dispensed, the reward was lost and could not be recovered. Chimpanzees were significantly more likely to move to the dispenser on trials they had completed correctly than on those they had completed incorrectly, and these movements occurred before any external feedback about the outcome of their responses. Thus, chimpanzees moved (or not) on the basis of their confidence in their responses, and these confidence movements aligned closely with objective task performance. These untrained, spontaneous confidence judgments demonstrated that chimpanzees monitored their own states of knowing and not knowing and adjusted their behavior accordingly.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Language Research Center and Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, United States.
| | - Bonnie M Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, United States
| | - Sara E Futch
- Department of Psychology, Wofford College, United States
| | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, United States
| | - Theodore A Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, United States
| | - Audrey E Parrish
- Language Research Center and Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, United States
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Abstract
Metacognition, the monitoring of one's own mental states, is a fundamental aspect of human intellect. Despite tests in nonhuman animals suggestive of uncertainty monitoring, some authors interpret these results solely in terms of primitive psychological mechanisms and reinforcement regimes, where "reinforcement" is invariably considered to be the delivery and consumption of earned food rewards. Surprisingly, few studies have detailed the trial-by-trial behaviour of animals engaged in such tasks. Here we report ethology-based observations on a rhesus monkey completing sparse-dense discrimination problems, and given the option of escaping trials (i.e., responding "uncertain") at its own choosing. Uncertainty responses were generally made on trials of high objective difficulty, and were characterized by long latencies before beginning visible trials, long times taken for response, and, even after controlling for difficulty, high degrees of wavering during response. Incorrect responses were also common in trials of high objective difficulty, but were characterized by low degrees of wavering. This speaks to the likely adaptive nature of "hesitation," and is inconsistent with models which argue or predict implicit, inflexible information-seeking or "alternative option" behaviours whenever challenging problems present themselves, Confounding models which suggest that nonhuman behaviour in metacognition tasks is driven solely by food delivery/consumption, the monkey was also observed allowing pellets to accumulate and consuming them during and after trials of all response/outcome categories (i.e., whether correct, incorrect, or escaped). This study thus bolsters previous findings that rhesus monkey behaviour in metacognition tasks is in some respects disassociated from mere food delivery/consumption, or even the avoidance of punishment. These and other observations fit well with the evolutionary status and natural proclivities of rhesus monkeys, but weaken arguments that responses in such tests are solely associated with associative mechanisms, and instead suggest more derived and controlled cognitive processing. The latter interpretation appears particularly parsimonious given the neurological adaptations of primates, as well as their highly flexible social and ecological behaviour.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Ken Sayers
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, 3401 Panthersville Rd., Decatur GA 30034, USA
| | - Theodore A Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, 3401 Panthersville Rd., Decatur GA 30034, USA
| | - Emilie Menzel
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, 3401 Panthersville Rd., Decatur GA 30034, USA
| | - J David Smith
- Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, University at Buffalo, the State University of New York, 346 Park Hall, SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260, USA
| | - Michael J Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, 3401 Panthersville Rd., Decatur GA 30034, USA
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Beran MJ, Perdue BM, Smith JD. What are my chances? Closing the gap in uncertainty monitoring between rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ANIMAL LEARNING AND COGNITION 2014; 40:303-16. [PMID: 25368870 PMCID: PMC4215522 DOI: 10.1037/xan0000020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Previous studies have indicated that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) but not capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) respond to difficult or ambiguous situations by choosing not to respond or by seeking more information. Here we assessed whether a task with very low chance accuracy could diminish this species difference, presumably indicating that capuchins—compared to macaques—are less risk averse as opposed to less sensitive to signals of uncertainty. Monkeys searched for the largest of 6 stimuli on a computer screen. Trial difficulty was varied, and monkeys could choose to opt out of any trial. All rhesus monkeys, including some with no prior use of the uncertainty response, selectively avoided the most difficult trials. The majority of capuchins sometimes made uncertainty responses, but at lower rates than rhesus monkeys. Nonetheless, the presence of some adaptive uncertainty responding suggests that capuchins also experience uncertainty and can respond to it, though with less proficiency than macaque monkeys.
Collapse
|
12
|
Abstract
A growing literature considers whether animals have capacities that are akin to human metacognition (i.e., humans' capacity to monitor their states of uncertainty and knowing). Comparative psychologists have approached this question by testing a dolphin, pigeons, rats, monkeys, and apes using perception, memory, and food-concealment paradigms. As part of this consideration, some associative modelers have attempted to describe animals' "metacognitive" performances in low-level, associative terms-an important goal if achievable. The authors summarize the empirical and theoretical situation regarding these associative descriptions. The associative descriptions in the animal-metacognition literature fail to encompass important phenomena. The sharp focus on abstract, mathematical associative models creates serious interpretative problems. The authors compare these failed associative descriptions with an alternative theoretical approach within contemporary comparative psychology. The alternative approach has the potential to strengthen comparative psychology as an empirical science and integrate it more fully within the mainstream of experimental psychology and cognitive science.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- J David Smith
- Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
| | | | | |
Collapse
|
13
|
Supra-personal cognitive control and metacognition. Trends Cogn Sci 2014; 18:186-93. [PMID: 24582436 PMCID: PMC3989995 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.01.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 135] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/28/2013] [Revised: 01/07/2014] [Accepted: 01/22/2014] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
We propose a ‘dual systems’ framework for thinking about metacognition. System 1 metacognition is for ‘intra-personal’ cognitive control. System 2 metacognition is for ‘supra-personal’ cognitive control. The latter allows agents to share metacognitive representations. This sharing creates benefits for the group and facilitates cumulative culture.
The human mind is extraordinary in its ability not merely to respond to events as they unfold but also to adapt its own operation in pursuit of its agenda. This ‘cognitive control’ can be achieved through simple interactions among sensorimotor processes, and through interactions in which one sensorimotor process represents a property of another in an implicit, unconscious way. So why does the human mind also represent properties of cognitive processes in an explicit way, enabling us to think and say ‘I’m sure’ or ‘I’m doubtful’? We suggest that ‘system 2 metacognition’ is for supra-personal cognitive control. It allows metacognitive information to be broadcast, and thereby to coordinate the sensorimotor systems of two or more agents involved in a shared task.
Collapse
|
14
|
Sequential responding and planning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Anim Cogn 2012; 15:1085-94. [PMID: 22801861 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-012-0532-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2012] [Revised: 06/25/2012] [Accepted: 07/02/2012] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
Abstract
Previous experiments have assessed planning during sequential responding to computer generated stimuli by Old World nonhuman primates including chimpanzees and rhesus macaques. However, no such assessment has been made with a New World primate species. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are an interesting test case for assessing the distribution of cognitive processes in the Order Primates because they sometimes show proficiency in tasks also mastered by apes and Old World monkeys, but in other cases fail to match the proficiency of those other species. In two experiments, eight capuchin monkeys selected five arbitrary stimuli in distinct locations on a computer monitor in a learned sequence. In Experiment 1, shift trials occurred in which the second and third stimuli were transposed when the first stimulus was selected by the animal. In Experiment 2, mask trials occurred in which all remaining stimuli were masked after the monkey selected the first stimulus. Monkeys made more mistakes on trials in which the locations of the second and third stimuli were interchanged than on trials in which locations were not interchanged, suggesting they had already planned to select a location that no longer contained the correct stimulus. When mask trials occurred, monkeys performed at levels significantly better than chance, but their performance exceeded chance levels only for the first and the second selections on a trial. These data indicate that capuchin monkeys performed very similarly to chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys and appeared to plan their selection sequences during the computerized task, but only to a limited degree.
Collapse
|
15
|
Beran MJ, Smith JD. Information seeking by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Cognition 2011; 120:90-105. [PMID: 21459372 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.02.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 59] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/01/2010] [Revised: 02/17/2011] [Accepted: 02/20/2011] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
Animal metacognition is an active, growing research area, and one part of metacognition is flexible information-seeking behavior. In Roberts et al. (2009), pigeons failed an intuitive information-seeking task. They basically refused, despite multiple fostering experiments, to view a sample image before attempting to find its match. Roberts et al. concluded that pigeons' lack of an information-seeking capacity reflected their broader lack of metacognition. We report a striking species contrast to pigeons. Eight rhesus macaques and seven capuchin monkeys passed the Roberts et al. test of information seeking-often in their first testing session. Members of both primate species appreciated immediately the lack of information signaled by an occluded sample, and the need for an information-seeking response to manage the situation. In subsequent testing, macaques demonstrated flexible/varied forms of information management. Capuchins did not. The research findings bear on the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition across the vertebrates, and on the underlying psychological requirements for metacognitive and information-seeking performances.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Michael J Beran
- Georgia State University, University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30302, USA.
| | | |
Collapse
|