Executive function plays a role in coordinating different perspectives, particularly when one’s own perspective is involved

"Picture this from there": spatial perspective-taking in developmental visuospatial disorder and developmental coordination disorder

Introduction

Either Developmental Visuospatial Disorder (DVSD) and Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD) present with difficulties in visuospatial processing, even though entailing different degrees of impairment. Among the visuospatial domain, spatial perspective taking is essential to interact with the environment and is significantly involved in many daily activities (e.g., environment navigation and spatial orienting). Notwithstanding, no previous studies have investigated this spatial domain in children with DVSD and limited evidence is available regarding DCD. Consistent with a transdiagnostic approach, the first goal of the present study was to compare spatial perspective taking abilities of these groups, also including a control group of not diagnosed peers (ND). Secondly, the role of different fine-motor and visuo-spatial predictors on the spatial perspective taking performance was considered.

Method

A total of 85 participants (DVSD = 26; DCD = 26; ND = 33), aged between 8 and 16 years old, were included in the study. Tasks assessing spatial perspective taking, fine-motor, visual imagery, and mental rotation skills, as well as visuo-spatial working memory were administered.

Results and Discussion

Overall, our results confirmed weaknesses in spatial perspective taking in both clinical groups, with the DVSD obtaining the lowest scores. Similarities and differences in the predictors accounting for the performance in the spatial perspective taking task emerged, suggesting the possible employment of different fine-motor or visuospatial strategies by group. Findings are discussed considering the potential impact they may have both in research and clinical practice.

Inhibition and cognitive flexibility are related to prediction of one's own future preferences in young British and Chinese children

The ability to shift from current to future perspective is pivotal to future-oriented cognition. With two distinct cultural groups, UK (N = 92) and China (N = 90), we investigated 3 to 5-year-olds' understanding of preference changes occurring within themselves and their peers (another child). We administered a battery of representative tasks of executive function and theory of mind to examine their underlying relationships with children's ability to predict future preferences. British 3-year-olds outperformed Chinese children in predicting future preferences, while no country differences were observed between the 4- and 5-year-olds. Across the UK and China, children were more accurate when predicting for their peers than for themselves. They were also more accurate when their current preferences were identified first, i.e. before answering questions about the future. Chinese children outperformed their British counterparts on inhibition and cognitive flexibility tasks whereas there were no Eastern and Western differences in their theory of mind abilities. After controlling for age and children's knowledge of generic adult preferences, children's performance in the inhibition and cognitive flexibility tasks were significantly correlated with the prediction of their own future preferences, but they were not significantly correlated when predicting for a peer. These results are discussed in relation to the conflicts between multiple perspectives and the cognitive correlates of future-oriented cognition.

Training self-other distinction facilitates perspective taking in young children

People sometimes commit 'egocentric errors', failing to ignore their own perspective when interpreting others' communication. Training imitation-inhibition, when participants perform the opposite action from another person, facilitates subsequent perspective-taking in adults. This study tested whether imitation-inhibition training also facilitates perspective-taking in 3- to 6-year-olds, an age where egocentric perspective may be particularly influential. Children participated in a 10-min imitation-inhibition, imitation, or non-social-inhibition training (white, n = 25 per condition, 33 female, period: 2018-2021), then the communicative-perspective-taking Director task. Training had a significant effect (F(2, 71) = 3.316, p = .042, η²  = .085): on critical trials, the imitation-inhibition-group selected the correct object more often than the other groups. Imitation-inhibition training specifically enhanced the perspective-taking process possibly by highlighting the distinction between self and other.

Cognitive Predictors of Social Interaction in Daily Contexts Among Children With Autism Spectrum Disorder

IMPORTANCE

Theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) are often used to explain social interaction deficits in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), but no behavioral studies have specifically examined their relationship.

OBJECTIVE

To investigate the cognitive correlates of social interaction in daily contexts by ToM as well as cool and hot EFs among children with ASD.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional study.

SETTING

Teaching hospitals, clinics, and developmental centers.

PARTICIPANTS

One hundred thirty-two children with ASD and their caregivers.

OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Measurements included the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, Theory of Mind Task Battery, Dimensional Change Card Sort, and Children's Gambling Task, respectively, for children's daily social interaction, ToM, cool EF, and hot EF. Pearson's correlation analyses and three hierarchical regression models were conducted to identify the significant predictors of daily social interaction while controlling for verbal comprehension, measured using the Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) of two Wechsler scales.

RESULTS

ToM and cool EF were significant cognitive predictors of social interaction in daily contexts in children with ASD whose verbal comprehension was average or above average.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

Our results suggest that ToM and cool EF are predictors of social interaction in daily contexts when considering children's verbal comprehension. Hot EF was not a significant predictor, contrary to our hypothesis. This behavioral study fills a research gap by enhancing the understanding of important cognitive correlates of social interaction in daily contexts for children with ASD to improve evaluation and intervention planning with this population. What This Article Adds: This study identified two cognitive predictors, ToM and cool EF, of social interaction in daily contexts for children with ASD. In addition to verbal comprehension, occupational therapy practitioners should assess ToM and cool EF to inform more comprehensive evaluation and intervention planning to improve social interaction in daily contexts for children with ASD.

Why is knowledge faster than (true) belief?

Phillips and colleagues convincingly argue that knowledge attribution is a faster, more automatic form of mindreading than belief attribution. However, they do not explain what it is about knowledge attribution that lends it this cognitive advantage. I suggest an explanation of the knowledge-attribution advantage that would also help to distinguish it from belief-based and minimalist alternatives.

Children understand subjective (undesirable) desires before they understand subjective (false) beliefs

Our folk psychology is built around the ascription of beliefs (and related cognitive states) and desires (and related conative states). How and when children develop a concept of these different kinds of propositional attitudes has been the subject of a long-standing debate. Asymmetry accounts assume that children develop a conception of desires earlier than they develop a concept of beliefs. In contrast, the symmetry account assumes that conceptions of both kinds of attitudes are based on the same underlying capacity to ascribe subjective perspectives. Accordingly, a genuine subjective understanding of desires develops in tandem with subjective belief understanding. So far, existing evidence that tested these two accounts remains inconclusive, with inconsistent findings resulting from diverging methods. Therefore, the current study tested between the two accounts in a more systematic way. First, we used a particularly clear test case-value-incompatible (wicked) desires. Such desires are strongly subjective because they are desirable only from the agent's perspective but not from an objective perspective. Second, we probed children's ascription of such desires in the most direct and simplified ways. Third, we directly compared children's desire understanding with their ascription of subjective beliefs. Results revealed that young children were better in reasoning about subjective desires than about subjective beliefs. Desire reasoning was not correlated with subjective belief reasoning, and children did not have more difficulties in reasoning about strongly subjective wicked desires than about neutral desires. All in all, these findings are not in line with the predictions of the symmetry account but speak in favor of the asymmetry account.

Are the classic false belief tasks cursed? Young children are just as likely as older children to pass a false belief task when they are not required to overcome the curse of knowledge

The question of when children understand that others have minds that can represent or misrepresent reality (i.e., possess a 'Theory of Mind') is hotly debated. This understanding plays a fundamental role in social interaction (e.g., interpreting human behavior, communicating, empathizing). Most research on this topic has relied on false belief tasks such as the 'Sally-Anne Task', because researchers have argued that it is the strongest litmus test examining one's understanding that the mind can misrepresent reality. Unfortunately, in addition to a variety of other cognitive demands this widely used measure also unnecessarily involves overcoming a bias that is especially pronounced in young children-the 'curse of knowledge' (the tendency to be biased by one's knowledge when considering less-informed perspectives). Three- to 6-year-old's (n = 230) false belief reasoning was examined across tasks that either did, or did not, require overcoming the curse of knowledge, revealing that when the curse of knowledge was removed three-year-olds were significantly better at inferring false beliefs, and as accurate as five- and six-year-olds. These findings reveal that the classic task is not specifically measuring false belief understanding. Instead, previously observed developmental changes in children's performance could be attributed to the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge. Similarly, previously observed relationships between individual differences in false belief reasoning and a variety of social outcomes could instead be the result of individual differences in the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge, highlighting the need to re-evaluate how best to interpret large bodies of research on false belief reasoning and social-emotional functioning.

Mindreading in conversation

How is human social intelligence engaged in the course of ordinary conversation? Standard models of conversation hold that language production and comprehension are guided by constant, rapid inferences about what other agents have in mind. However, the idea that mindreading is a pervasive feature of conversation is challenged by a large body of evidence suggesting that mental state attribution is slow and taxing, at least when it deals with propositional attitudes such as beliefs. Belief attributions involve contents that are decoupled from our own primary representation of reality; handling these contents has come to be seen as the signature of full-blown human mindreading. However, mindreading in cooperative communication does not necessarily demand decoupling. We argue for a theoretical and empirical turn towards "factive" forms of mentalizing here. In factive mentalizing, we monitor what others do or do not know, without generating decoupled representations. We propose a model of the representational, cognitive, and interactive components of factive mentalizing, a model that aims to explain efficient real-time monitoring of epistemic states in conversation. After laying out this account, we articulate a more limited set of conversational functions for nonfactive forms of mentalizing, including contexts of meta-linguistic repair, deception, and argumentation. We conclude with suggestions for further research into the roles played by factive versus nonfactive forms of mentalizing in conversation.

Cognitive and Neuroanatomic Accounts of Referential Communication in Focal Dementia

The primary function of language is to communicate—that is, to make individuals reach a state of mutual understanding about a particular thought or idea. Accordingly, daily communication is truly a task of social coordination. Indeed, successful interactions require individuals to (1) track and adopt a partner’s perspective and (2) continuously shift between the numerous elements relevant to the exchange. Here, we use a referential communication task to study the contributions of perspective taking and executive function to effective communication in nonaphasic human patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). Similar to previous work, the task was to identify a target object, embedded among an array of competitors, for an interlocutor. Results indicate that bvFTD patients are impaired relative to control subjects in selecting the optimal, precise response. Neuropsychological testing related this performance to mental set shifting, but not to working memory or inhibition. Follow-up analyses indicated that some bvFTD patients perform equally well as control subjects, while a second, clinically matched patient group performs significantly worse. Importantly, the neuropsychological profiles of these subgroups differed only in set shifting. Finally, structural MRI analyses related patient impairment to gray matter disease in orbitofrontal, medial prefrontal, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, all regions previously implicated in social cognition and overlapping those related to set shifting. Complementary white matter analyses implicated uncinate fasciculus, which carries projections between orbitofrontal and temporal cortices. Together, these findings demonstrate that impaired referential communication in bvFTD is cognitively related to set shifting, and anatomically related to a social-executive network including prefrontal cortices and uncinate fasciculus.

Executive function underlies both perspective selection and calculation in Level-1 visual perspective taking

Previous research has suggested that the calculation of another’s perspective is cognitively efficient, whereas perspective selection (selection of a particular perspective, self or other) is associated with executive function, particularly inhibitory control. However, research has not previously tested how perspective calculation and selection may be associated with another key executive function, working memory. In the present study (N = 54 adult participants), we administered a Level-1 visual perspective task in a dual-task paradigm in which the secondary task required working memory. The results suggest that executive function is associated with both perspective calculation and perspective selection, contrary to previous evidence from similar dual-task studies that had used inhibitory control and attention-based secondary tasks. This contrast may suggest that working memory capacity facilitates perspective-taking. Furthermore, it may follow that the notion of simple perspective-taking is distinct from more the complex and cognitively demanding “theory of mind.” Research of this nature warrants further investigation.

How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account

To predict and explain the behavior of others, one must understand that their actions are determined not by reality but by their beliefs about reality. Classically, children come to understand beliefs, including false beliefs, at about 4-5 y of age, but recent studies using different response measures suggest that even infants (and apes!) have some skills as well. Resolving this discrepancy is not possible with current theories based on individual cognition. Instead, what is needed is an account recognizing that the key processes in constructing an understanding of belief are social and mental coordination with other persons and their (sometimes conflicting) perspectives. Engaging in such social and mental coordination involves species-unique skills and motivations of shared intentionality, especially as they are manifest in joint attention and linguistic communication, as well as sophisticated skills of executive function to coordinate the different perspectives involved. This shared intentionality account accords well with documented differences in the cognitive capacities of great apes and human children, and it explains why infants and apes pass some versions of false-belief tasks whereas only older children pass others.

Three-Year-Olds' Understanding of Desire Reports Is Robust to Conflict

In this paper, we present two experiments with 3-year-olds, exploring their interpretation of sentences about desires. A mature concept of desire entails that desires may conflict with reality and that different people may have conflicting desires. While previous literature is suggestive, it remains unclear whether young children understand that (a) agents can have counterfactual desires about current states of affairs and (b) agents can have desires that conflict with one's own desires or the desires of others. In this article, we test preschoolers' interpretation of want sentences, in order to better understand their ability to represent conflicting desires, and to interpret sentences reporting these desires. In the first experiment, we use a truth-value judgment task (TVJT) to assess 3-year-olds' understanding of want sentences when the subject of the sentence has a desire that conflicts with reality. In the second experiment, we use a game task to induce desires in the child that conflict with the desires of a competitor, and assess their understanding of sentences describing these desires. In both experiments, we find that 3-year-olds successfully interpret want sentences, suggesting that their ability to represent conflicting desires is adult-like at this age. Given that 3-year-olds generally display difficulty attributing beliefs to others that conflict with reality or with the child's own beliefs, these findings may further cast some doubt on the view that children's persistent difficulty with belief (think) is caused by these kinds of conflicts.

New Insights into the Inter-Individual Variability in Perspective Taking

This study aimed to test whether individual differences in perspective taking could be explained with two underpinning cognitive dimensions: The ability to handle the conflict between our egocentric perspective and another person’s perspective and the relative attentional focus during processing on the egocentric perspective versus another person’s perspective. We conducted cluster analyses on 346 participants who completed a visual perspective-taking task assessing performance on these two cognitive dimensions. Individual differences were best reduced by forming four clusters, or profiles, of perspective-takers. This partition reflected a high heterogeneity along both dimensions. In addition, deconstructing the perspective-taking performance into two distinct cognitive dimensions better predicted participants’ self-reported everyday life perspective-taking tendencies. Altogether, considering attentional focus and conflict handling as two potential sources of variability allows forming a two-dimensional space that enriches our understanding of the individual differences in perspective taking.

Changing ASD-ADHD symptom co-occurrence across the lifespan with adolescence as crucial time window: Illustrating the need to go beyond childhood

Literature on the co-occurrence between Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is strongly biased by a focus on childhood age. A review of the adolescent and adult literature was made on core and related symptoms of ADHD and ASD. In addition, an empirical approach was used including 17,173 ASD-ADHD symptom ratings from participants aged 0 to 84 years. Results indicate that ASD/ADHD constellations peak during adolescence and are lower in early childhood and old age. We hypothesize that on the border of the expected transition to independent adulthood, ASD and ADHD co-occur most because social adaptation and EF skills matter most. Lower correlations in childhood and older age may be due to more diffuse symptoms reflecting respectively still differentiating and de-differentiating EF functions. We plea for a strong research focus in adolescence which may -after early childhood- be a second crucial time window for catching-up pattern explaining more optimal outcomes. We discuss obstacles and oppportunities of a full lifespan approach into old age.

Measuring the development of inhibitory control: The challenge of heterotypic continuity

Inhibitory control is thought to demonstrate heterotypic continuity, in other words, continuity in its purpose or function but changes in its behavioral manifestation over time. This creates major methodological challenges for studying the development of inhibitory control in childhood including construct validity, developmental appropriateness and sensitivity of measures, and longitudinal factorial invariance. We meta-analyzed 198 studies using measures of inhibitory control, a key aspect of self-regulation, to estimate age ranges of usefulness for each measure. The inhibitory control measures showed limited age ranges of usefulness owing to ceiling/floor effects. Tasks were useful, on average, for a developmental span of less than 3 years. This suggests that measuring inhibitory control over longer spans of development may require use of different measures at different time points, seeking to measure heterotypic continuity. We suggest ways to study the development of inhibitory control, with overlapping measurement in a structural equation modeling framework and tests of longitudinal factorial or measurement invariance. However, as valuable as this would be for the area, we also point out that establishing longitudinal factorial invariance is neither sufficient nor necessary for examining developmental change. Any study of developmental change should be guided by theory and construct validity, aiming toward a better empirical and theoretical approach to the selection and combination of measures.

Preschoolers understand the normativity of cooperatively structured competition

Human institutional practices often involve competition within a cooperative structure of mutually accepted rules. In a competitive game, for instance, we not only expect adherence to the rules of the game but also expect an opponent who tries to win and, thus, follows a rational game-playing strategy. We had 3- and 5-year-olds (N=48) play for a prize against an opponent (a puppet) who played either rationally (trying to win) or irrationally (helping the children to win) while either following or breaking the rules of the game. Both age groups performed costly protest against an opponent who followed the rules but played irrationally by helping the children to win. When facing a rule-breaking opponent, 3-year-olds protested only the rule breaches of an irrational opponent but not irrational play. Five-year-olds also protested the rule breaches of a rational opponent, but in contrast to the 3-year-olds, they protested irrational behavior even in the context of rule breaches. Moreover, many children, in particular 3-year-olds, refrained from protesting. These findings suggest that 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, fully understand the dual-level normative structure of cooperatively regulated competition.

Interaction without intent: the shape of the social world in Huntington's disease

Huntington's disease (HD) is an inherited neurodegenerative condition. Patients with this movement disorder can exhibit deficits on tasks involving Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to understand mental states such as beliefs and emotions. We investigated mental state inference in HD in response to ambiguous animations involving geometric shapes, while exploring the impact of symptoms within cognitive, emotional and motor domains. Forty patients with HD and twenty healthy controls described the events in videos showing random movements of two triangles (i.e. floating), simple interactions (e.g. following) and more complex interactions prompting the inference of mental states (e.g. one triangle encouraging the other). Relationships were explored between animation interpretation and measures of executive functioning, alexithymia and motor symptoms. Individuals with HD exhibited alexithymia and a reduced tendency to spontaneously attribute intentions to interacting triangles on the animations task. Attribution of intentions on the animations task correlated with motor symptoms and burden of pathology. Importantly, patients without motor symptoms showed similar ToM deficits despite intact executive functions. Subtle changes in ToM that are unrelated to executive dysfunction could therefore feature in basal ganglia disorders prior to motor onset.

Can emotions influence level-1 visual perspective taking?

Emotions and perspective-taking are ubiquitous in our daily social interactions, but little is known about the relation between the two. This study examined whether and how emotions can influence even the most basic forms of perspective-taking. Experiment 1 showed that guilt made participants more other-centered in a simple visual perspective-taking task while anger tended to make them more self-centered. These two emotions had, however, no effect on the ability to handle conflicting perspectives. Since the guilt induction method used in Experiment 1 also induced feelings of self-incompetence and shame, Experiment 2 aimed at isolating the effects of these concomitant feelings. Self-incompetence/shame reduced participants' ability to handle conflicting perspectives but did not influence attention allocation. In sum, these results highlight that emotions can affect even the simplest form of perspective-taking and that such influence can be brought about by the modulation of different cognitive mechanisms.