Centripetal and centrifugal forces in the moral circle: Competing constraints on moral learning

Responsibility to future generations: A strategy for combatting climate change across political divides

Individuals and governments often fail to take action to address climate change owing largely to widespread politicization of the issue and related discourse. In response to recent appeals for non-partisan approaches to pro-environmentalism, we propose that highlighting one's responsibility to future generations (RFG) could offer promise across the political spectrum. We argue that RFG may be effective because it is widely endorsed, uncorrelated with demographic indicators and less tied to political ideology compared to other forms of responsibility, such as personal responsibility for climate change mitigation. Across six main and seven supplementary studies (N = 161,633), we provide evidence for these claims. RFG is not only widely endorsed across countries and demographic groups but it also significantly predicts various measures of pro-environmental behaviour, both in correlational and pre-registered experimental contexts. These findings confirm established effects, reconcile inconsistencies and suggest prioritizing intergenerational responsibility may effectively reshape climate change narratives for the most resistant parties.

Intergenerational concern relates to constructive coping and emotional reactions to climate change via increased legacy concerns and environmental cognitive alternatives

As the threat of climate change looms large, and we experience first-hand the impacts of rapid global warming, researchers and clinicians emphasize the need to better understand the impact of these changes on our mental health. Existing research suggests that coping with and emotional reactions to climate change can promote action to adapt to and mitigate the impacts of climate change and reduce its negative impacts to one's mental health. In this pre-registered study (N = 771) we examined whether people who display extreme intergenerational concern would also constructively cope with climate change. Empirically-identified individuals showing high intergenerational concern reported more problem-focused and meaning-based coping, and less avoidant coping strategies with climate change. Further, even though they felt guilty, angry, sorrowful and isolated, these individuals also felt hopeful about the future. These effects were explained by increased concerns about one's legacy and higher access to environmental cognitive alternatives. By instilling values that highlight intergenerational concern as a key priority, we could thus not only increase pro-climate action, but also help individuals actively and constructively cope with changes produced by climate change.

An experimental study of information transparency and social preferences on donation behaviors: the self-signaling model

Certain segments of the population reply on charitable or other non-governmental organizations as their main source of support, with these organizations largely funded by those in society who can afford to give. The present study investigated to what extent information transparency influences donation decisions, and whether specific preferences for charities influences information seeking behavior. We recruited 114 participants via Prolific and employed a binary online Dictator Game to address these two study objectives. The results showed that participants' actual donation behavior was not influenced by their charity preference or the level of information transparency. However, they were more prone to seek out additional information when deciding about the most preferred category of charity. These results raise important questions as to whether the perceived anonymity of online choices may differ from choices carried out in person.

Subjective socioeconomic status and income inequality are associated with self-reported morality across 67 countries

Individuals can experience a lack of economic resources compared to others, which we refer to as subjective experiences of economic scarcity. While such experiences have been shown to shift cognitive focus, attention, and decision-making, their association with human morality remains debated. We conduct a comprehensive investigation of the relationship between subjective experiences of economic scarcity, as indexed by low subjective socioeconomic status at the individual level, and income inequality at the national level, and various self-reported measures linked to morality. In a pre-registered study, we analyze data from a large, cross-national survey (N = 50,396 across 67 countries) allowing us to address limitations related to cross-cultural generalizability and measurement validity in prior research. Our findings demonstrate that low subjective socioeconomic status at the individual level, and income inequality at the national level, are associated with higher levels of moral identity, higher morality-as-cooperation, a larger moral circle, and increased prosocial intentions. These results appear robust to several advanced control analyses. Finally, exploratory analyses indicate that observed income inequality at the national level is not a statistically significant moderator of the associations between subjective socioeconomic status and the included measures of morality. These findings have theoretical and practical implications for understanding human morality under experiences of resource scarcity.

Rational learners and parochial norms

Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However, another possibility is rational learning: given the available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) - were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2) we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial norms.

Social value at a distance: Higher identification with all of humanity is associated with reduced social discounting

How much we value the welfare of others has critical implications for the collective good. Yet, it is unclear what leads people to make more or less equal decisions about the welfare of those from whom they are socially distant. The current research sought to explore the psychological mechanisms that might underlie welfare judgements across social distance. Here, a social discounting paradigm was used to measure the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the social distance of its recipient increased. Across two cohorts (one discovery, one replication), we found that a more expansive identity with all of humanity was associated with reduced social discounting. Additionally, we investigated the specificity of this association by examining whether this relationship extended to delay discounting, the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the temporal distance to its receipt increases. Our findings suggest that the observed association with identity was unique to social discounting, thus underscoring a distinction in value-based decision-making processes across distances in time and across social networks. As data were collected during the COVID-19 pandemic, we also considered how stress associated with this global threat might influence welfare judgements across social distances. We found that, even after controlling for COVID-19 related stress, correlations between identity and social discounting held. Together, these findings elucidate the psychological processes that are associated with a more equal distribution of generosity.

Moral foundations, values, and judgments in extraordinary altruists

Donating a kidney to a stranger is a rare act of extraordinary altruism that appears to reflect a moral commitment to helping others. Yet little is known about patterns of moral cognition associated with extraordinary altruism. In this preregistered study, we compared the moral foundations, values, and patterns of utilitarian moral judgments in altruistic kidney donors (n = 61) and demographically matched controls (n = 58). Altruists expressed more concern only about the moral foundation of harm, but no other moral foundations. Consistent with this, altruists endorsed utilitarian concerns related to impartial beneficence, but not instrumental harm. Contrary to our predictions, we did not find group differences between altruists and controls in basic values. Extraordinary altruism generally reflected opposite patterns of moral cognition as those seen in individuals with psychopathy, a personality construct characterized by callousness and insensitivity to harm and suffering. Results link real-world, costly, impartial altruism primarily to moral cognitions related to alleviating harm and suffering in others rather than to basic values, fairness concerns, or strict utilitarian decision-making.

Psychological Science in the Wake of COVID-19: Social, Methodological, and Metascientific Considerations

The COVID-19 pandemic has extensively changed the state of psychological science from what research questions psychologists can ask to which methodologies psychologists can use to investigate them. In this article, we offer a perspective on how to optimize new research in the pandemic's wake. Because this pandemic is inherently a social phenomenon-an event that hinges on human-to-human contact-we focus on socially relevant subfields of psychology. We highlight specific psychological phenomena that have likely shifted as a result of the pandemic and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations of conducting research on these phenomena. After this discussion, we evaluate metascientific issues that have been amplified by the pandemic. We aim to demonstrate how theoretically grounded views on the COVID-19 pandemic can help make psychological science stronger-not weaker-in its wake.

A Behavioral Science Framework for Understanding College Campus Sexual Assault

We propose a behavioral-science approach to sexual assault on college campuses. In this framework, people commit assault when aspects of the immediate situation trigger certain psychological states. No set of mental processes or situational configurations is a precise predictor of assault. Instead, the interaction between mental processes and situational configurations predicts when sexual assault is more or less likely to occur. We begin with an illustrative story to show how a behavioral-science approach is relevant to sexual assault. Next, we map out a framework that suggests how behavioral theories of situations and mental processes have been or could be used to describe, predict, and develop ideas for the reduction of sexual assault. Relevant situational configurations include geographical configurations, local situational and informational cues, and situation-based power. Theories of mental processes include person perception, social norms, moral reasoning, and goals. Our framework can be used to demonstrate how "good" people can commit assault and how individuals can and will refrain from assault within institutions with a "bad" record. Compared with previous theories of sexual assault, a behavioral-science framework offers unique understanding and generative methods for addressing sexual assault on college campuses.

Tree-Huggers Versus Human-Lovers: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization Predict Valuing Nature Over Outgroups

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade-offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals ("tree-huggers") would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others ("human-lovers") would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero-sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree-huggers and human-lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree-huggers and human-lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one-third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree-huggers and human-lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree-huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members-thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds.

Heuristic thinking and altruism toward machines in people impacted by COVID-19

Autonomous machines are poised to become pervasive, but most treat machines differently: we are willing to violate social norms and less likely to display altruism toward machines. Here, we report an unexpected effect that those impacted by COVID-19—as measured by a post-traumatic stress disorder scale—show a sharp reduction in this difference. Participants engaged in the dictator game with humans and machines and, consistent with prior research on disasters, those impacted by COVID-19 displayed more altruism to other humans. Unexpectedly, participants impacted by COVID-19 displayed equal altruism toward human and machine partners. A mediation analysis suggests that altruism toward machines was explained by an increase in heuristic thinking—reinforcing prior theory that heuristic thinking encourages people to treat machines like people—and faith in technology—perhaps reflecting long-term consequences on how we act with machines. These findings give insight, but also raise concerns, for the design of technology.

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Participants engaged in a dictator experiment with humans and computers

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We measured impact of COVID-19 using a PTSD scale

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COVID-19 led to increased heuristic thinking, faith in, and altruism with computers

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These findings raise opportunities and concerns for the design of future technology

Anthropomorphism in comparative affective science: Advocating a mindful approach

Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human-like capacities and traits to non-human entities. Anthropomorphism is ubiquitous in everyday life and in scientific domains, operating both implicitly and explicitly as a function of the human lens through which we view the world. A rich history of work in psychology, animal behavior, cognitive science, and philosophy has highlighted the negative and, to a lesser degree, the positive implications of anthropomorphism. In this article, we aim to provide a nuanced perspective of how anthropomorphism impacts the work of comparative affective science. Specifically, we discuss three domains of empirical inquiry in which lessons can be drawn about the benefits and pitfalls of anthropomorphism: responses to death, inequity aversion, and prosocial behavior. On balance, we advocate a mindful approach to anthropomorphizing in comparative affective science, and comparative science more generally.

Ideological differences in the expanse of the moral circle

Do clashes between ideologies reflect policy differences or something more fundamental? The present research suggests they reflect core psychological differences such that liberals express compassion toward less structured and more encompassing entities (i.e., universalism), whereas conservatives express compassion toward more well-defined and less encompassing entities (i.e., parochialism). Here we report seven studies illustrating universalist versus parochial differences in compassion. Studies 1a-1c show that liberals, relative to conservatives, express greater moral concern toward friends relative to family, and the world relative to the nation. Studies 2a-2b demonstrate these universalist versus parochial preferences extend toward simple shapes depicted as proxies for loose versus tight social circles. Using stimuli devoid of political relevance demonstrates that the universalist-parochialist distinction does not simply reflect differing policy preferences. Studies 3a-3b indicate these universalist versus parochial tendencies extend to humans versus nonhumans more generally, demonstrating the breadth of these psychological differences.

From 'having' to 'being': self-worth and the current crisis of American society

With growing inequality, the American dream is becoming less effective as a collective myth. With its focus on material success, competition and self-reliance, the intensified diffusion of neoliberal scripts of the self is leading the upper-middle class toward a mental health crisis while the working class and low-income groups do not have the resources needed to live the dream. African Americans, Latinos and undocumented immigrants, who are presumed to lack self-reliance, face more rigid boundaries. One possible way forward is broadening cultural membership by promoting new narratives of hope centered on a plurality of criteria of worth, 'ordinary universalism' and destigmatizing stigmatized groups.

Moral expansiveness short form: Validity and reliability of the MESx

Moral expansiveness refers to the range of entities (human and non-human) deemed worthy of moral concern and treatment. Previous research has established that the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) is a powerful predictor of altruistic moral decision-making and captures a unique dimension of moral cognition. However, the length of the full MES may be restrictive for some researchers. Here we establish the reliability and validity of a reduced moral expansiveness scale, the MESx. Consistent with the full version, the MESx is strongly associated with (but not reducible to) theoretically related constructs, such as endorsement of universalism values, identification with all humanity, and connectedness to nature. The MESx also predicted measures of altruistic moral decision-making to the same degree as the full MES. Further, the MESx passed tests of discriminant validity, was unrelated to political conservatism (unlike the full MES), only mildly associated with the tendency to provide socially desirable responses, and produced moderate reliability over time. We conclude that the MESx is a psychometrically valid alternative for researchers requiring a short measure of moral expansiveness.

Toward a Psychology of Moral Expansiveness

Theorists have long noted that people’s moral circles have expanded over the course of history, with modern people extending moral concern to entities—both human and nonhuman—that our ancestors would never have considered including within their moral boundaries. In recent decades, researchers have sought a comprehensive understanding of the psychology of moral expansiveness. We first review the history of conceptual and methodological approaches in understanding our moral boundaries, with a particular focus on the recently developed Moral Expansiveness Scale. We then explore individual differences in moral expansiveness, attributes of entities that predict their inclusion in moral circles, and cognitive and motivational factors that help explain what we include within our moral boundaries and why they may shrink or expand. Throughout, we highlight the consequences of these psychological effects for real-world ethical decision making.

Moral learning: Psychological and philosophical perspectives

The past 15years occasioned an extraordinary blossoming of research into the cognitive and affective mechanisms that support moral judgment and behavior. This growth in our understanding of moral mechanisms overshadowed a crucial and complementary question, however: How are they learned? As this special issue of the journal Cognition attests, a new crop of research into moral learning has now firmly taken root. This new literature draws on recent advances in formal methods developed in other domains, such as Bayesian inference, reinforcement learning and other machine learning techniques. Meanwhile, it also demonstrates how learning and deciding in a social domain-and especially in the moral domain-sometimes involves specialized cognitive systems. We review the contributions to this special issue and situate them within the broader contemporary literature. Our review focuses on how we learn moral values and moral rules, how we learn about personal moral character and relationships, and the philosophical implications of these emerging models.