Integration to boundary in decisions between numerical sequences

The effect of perceptual organization on numerical and preference-based decisions shows inter-subject correlation

Individual differences in cognitive processing have been the subject of intensive research. One important type of such individual differences is the tendency for global versus local processing, which was shown to correlate with a wide range of processing differences in fields such as decision making, social judgments and creativity. Yet, whether these global/local processing tendencies are correlated within a subject across different domains is still an open question. To address this question, we develop and test a novel method to quantify global/local processing tendencies, in which we directly set in opposition the local and global information instead of instructing subjects to specifically attend to one processing level. We apply our novel method to two different domains: (1) a numerical cognition task, and (2) a preference task. Using computational modeling, we accounted for classical effects in choice and numerical-cognition. Global/local tendencies in both tasks were quantified using a salience parameter. Critically, the salience parameters extracted from the numerical cognition and preference tasks were highly correlated, providing support for robust perceptual organization tendencies within an individual.

Evidence integration and decision confidence are modulated by stimulus consistency

Evidence integration is a normative algorithm for choosing between alternatives with noisy evidence, which has been successful in accounting for vast amounts of behavioural and neural data. However, this mechanism has been challenged by non-integration heuristics, and tracking decision boundaries has proven elusive. Here we first show that the decision boundaries can be extracted using a model-free behavioural method termed decision classification boundary, which optimizes choice classification based on the accumulated evidence. Using this method, we provide direct support for evidence integration over non-integration heuristics, show that the decision boundaries collapse across time and identify an integration bias whereby incoming evidence is modulated based on its consistency with preceding information. This consistency bias, which is a form of pre-decision confirmation bias, was supported in four cross-domain experiments, showing that choice accuracy and decision confidence are modulated by stimulus consistency. Strikingly, despite its seeming sub-optimality, the consistency bias fosters performance by enhancing robustness to integration noise.

The Cognition/Metacognition Trade-Off

Integration to boundary is an optimal decision algorithm that accumulates evidence until the posterior reaches a decision boundary, resulting in the fastest decisions for a target accuracy. Here, we demonstrated that this advantage incurs a cost in metacognitive accuracy (confidence), generating a cognition/metacognition trade-off. Using computational modeling, we found that integration to a fixed boundary results in less variability in evidence integration and thus reduces metacognitive accuracy, compared with a collapsing-boundary or a random-timer strategy. We examined how decision strategy affects metacognitive accuracy in three cross-domain experiments, in which 102 university students completed a free-response session (evidence terminated by the participant's response) and an interrogation session (fixed number of evidence samples controlled by the experimenter). In both sessions, participants observed a sequence of evidence and reported their choice and confidence. As predicted, the interrogation protocol (preventing integration to boundary) enhanced metacognitive accuracy. We also found that in the free-response sessions, participants integrated evidence to a collapsing boundary-a strategy that achieves an efficient compromise between optimizing choice and metacognitive accuracy.

Control over sampling boosts numerical evidence processing in human decisions from experience

When acquiring information about choice alternatives, decision makers may have varying levels of control over which and how much information they sample before making a choice. How does control over information acquisition affect the quality of sample-based decisions? Here, combining variants of a numerical sampling task with neural recordings, we show that control over when to stop sampling can enhance (i) behavioral choice accuracy, (ii) the build-up of parietal decision signals, and (iii) the encoding of numerical sample information in multivariate electroencephalogram patterns. None of these effects were observed when participants could only control which alternatives to sample, but not when to stop sampling. Furthermore, levels of control had no effect on early sensory signals or on the extent to which sample information leaked from memory. The results indicate that freedom to stop sampling can amplify decisional evidence processing from the outset of information acquisition and lead to more accurate choices.

Computational modeling reveals strategic and developmental differences in the behavioral impact of reward across adolescence

Studies of reward effects on behavior in adolescence typically rely on performance metrics that confound myriad cognitive and non-cognitive processes, making it challenging to determine which process is impacted by reward. The present longitudinal study applied the diffusion decision model to a reward task to isolate the influence of reward on response caution from influences of processing and motor speed. Participants completed three annual assessments from early to middle adolescence (N = 387, 55% female, M_age  = 12.1 at Wave 1; M_age  = 13.1 at Wave 2, M_age  = 14.1 at Wave 3) and three annual assessments in late adolescence (M_ages  = 17.8, 18.9, 19.9). At each assessment, participants completed a two-choice reaction time task under conditions of no-reward and a block in which points were awarded for speeded accuracy. Reward reduced response caution at all waves, as expected, but had a greater impact as teens moved from early to middle adolescence. Simulations to identify optimal response caution showed that teens were overly cautious in early adolescence but became too focused on speed over accuracy by middle adolescence. By late adolescence, participants adopted response styles that maximized reward. Further, response style was associated with both internalizing and externalizing symptoms in early-to-middle adolescence, providing evidence for the construct validity of a diffusion model approach in this developmental period.

Concurrent visual working memory bias in sequential integration of approximate number

Previous work has shown bidirectional crosstalk between Working Memory (WM) and perception such that the contents of WM can alter concurrent percepts and vice versa. Here, we examine WM-perception interactions in a new task setting. Participants judged the proportion of colored dots in a stream of visual displays while concurrently holding location- and color information in memory. Spatiotemporally resolved psychometrics disclosed a modulation of perceptual sensitivity consistent with a bias of visual spatial attention towards the memorized location. However, this effect was short-lived, suggesting that the visuospatial WM information was rapidly deprioritized during processing of new perceptual information. Independently, we observed robust bidirectional biases of categorical color judgments, in that perceptual decisions and mnemonic reports were attracted to each other. These biases occurred without reductions in overall perceptual sensitivity compared to control conditions without a concurrent WM load. The results conceptually replicate and extend previous findings in visual search and suggest that crosstalk between WM and perception can arise at multiple levels, from sensory-perceptual to decisional processing.

Differentiating between integration and non-integration strategies in perceptual decision making

Many tasks used to study decision-making encourage subjects to integrate evidence over time. Such tasks are useful to understand how the brain operates on multiple samples of information over prolonged timescales, but only if subjects actually integrate evidence to form their decisions. We explored the behavioral observations that corroborate evidence-integration in a number of task-designs. Several commonly accepted signs of integration were also predicted by non-integration strategies. Furthermore, an integration model could fit data generated by non-integration models. We identified the features of non-integration models that allowed them to mimic integration and used these insights to design a motion discrimination task that disentangled the models. In human subjects performing the task, we falsified a non-integration strategy in each and confirmed prolonged integration in all but one subject. The findings illustrate the difficulty of identifying a decision-maker’s strategy and support solutions to achieve this goal.

The formation of preference in risky choice

A key question in decision-making is how people integrate amounts and probabilities to form preferences between risky alternatives. Here we rely on the general principle of integration-to-boundary to develop several biologically plausible process models of risky-choice, which account for both choices and response-times. These models allowed us to contrast two influential competing theories: i) within-alternative evaluations, based on multiplicative interaction between amounts and probabilities, ii) within-attribute comparisons across alternatives. To constrain the preference formation process, we monitored eye-fixations during decisions between pairs of simple lotteries, designed to systematically span the decision-space. The behavioral results indicate that the participants' eye-scanning patterns were associated with risk-preferences and expected-value maximization. Crucially, model comparisons showed that within-alternative process models decisively outperformed within-attribute ones, in accounting for choices and response-times. These findings elucidate the psychological processes underlying preference formation when making risky-choices, and suggest that compensatory, within-alternative integration is an adaptive mechanism employed in human decision-making.