Seeing consciousness through the lens of memory

Interaction between the prefrontal and visual cortices supports subjective fear

It has been reported that threatening and non-threatening visual stimuli can be distinguished based on the multi-voxel patterns of haemodynamic activity in the human ventral visual stream. Do these findings mean that there may be evolutionarily hardwired mechanisms within early perception, for the fast and automatic detection of threat, and maybe even for the generation of the subjective experience of fear? In this human neuroimaging study, we presented participants ('fear' group: N = 30; 'no fear' group: N = 30) with 2700 images of animals that could trigger subjective fear or not as a function of the individual's idiosyncratic 'fear profiles' (i.e. fear ratings of animals reported by a given participant). We provide evidence that the ventral visual stream may represent affectively neutral visual features that are statistically associated with fear ratings of participants, without representing the subjective experience of fear itself. More specifically, we show that patterns of haemodynamic activity predictive of a specific 'fear profile' can be observed in the ventral visual stream whether a participant reports being afraid of the stimuli or not. Further, we found that the multivariate information synchronization between ventral visual areas and prefrontal regions distinguished participants who reported being subjectively afraid of the stimuli from those who did not. Together, these findings support the view that the subjective experience of fear may depend on the relevant visual information triggering implicit metacognitive mechanisms in the prefrontal cortex. This article is part of the theme issue 'Sensing and feeling: an integrative approach to sensory processing and emotional experience'.

Our brains sense the future through a new quantum-like implicit learning mechanism

BACKGROUND

Imagine if our brains could unconsciously predict future events. This study explores this concept, presenting evidence for an inherent 'foreseeing' ability, termed anomalous cognition (AC). We introduce a new experimentally verifiable approach to explain anomalous information anticipation (AIA), a type of AC, based on an innovative, quantum-like model of implicit learning, grounded in Nonlocal Plasticity Theory (NPT).

METHODS

Our research involved 203 participants using methods such as continuous flash suppression, random dot motion, and advanced 3D EEG neuroimaging, along with IBM quantum random event generators for precise measurements across 144 trials. These trials tested contingencies between undetectable sensory stimuli and dot movements, focusing on participants' prediction abilities. The design conditions were strictly experimental, violating fundamental classical learning principles, particularly reflex conditioning. If these principles were immutable, their violation would prevent any systematic behavioral changes, resulting in random responses. This violation was implemented through two quantum physics concepts: the mathematical principle of nonlocality and entanglement.

RESULTS

Despite the sensory stimulus being inaccessible, our results showed a significant prediction between the contingencies and an increase in AIA accuracy, with explained variances between 25 % and 48 %. EEG findings supported this, showing a positive link between brain activity in specific regions and AIA success. Electrochemical activations were detected in the posterior occipital cortex, the intraparietal sulcus, and the medial temporal gyri. AIA hits exceeded the threshold value corresponding to one standard deviation above the expected mean, showing moderate effect sizes in the experimental group (Cohen's d = 0.461). Analyzing the learning curve using the derivation technique, we identified the acceleration point of the wave function, indicating systematic implicit learning. This result showed that from repetition 63 onwards, AIA hits increased significantly.

CONCLUSIONS

The results suggest that, despite violating fundamental classical learning principles, cognitive processes produced changes in participants' responses susceptible to neuromodulation, considering quantum physics principles of nonlocality and entanglement (both present in NPT). We discuss (a) why the priming effect does not explain the significant results; (b) the potential discovery of a new form of quantum-like implicit learning, which could scientifically resolve phenomena associated with anomalous cognitions (e.g., AIA); and (c) future research directions, including potential applications and clinical impact.

A double-blind trial of decoded neurofeedback intervention for specific phobias

Aim

A new closed-loop fMRI method called multi-voxel neuro-reinforcement has the potential to alleviate the subjective aversiveness of exposure-based interventions by directly inducing phobic representations in the brain, outside of conscious awareness. The current study seeks to test this method as an intervention for specific phobia.

Methods

In a randomized, double-blind, controlled single-university trial, individuals diagnosed with at least two (1 target, 1 control) animal subtype specific phobias were randomly assigned (1:1:1) to receive 1, 3, or 5 sessions of multi-voxel neuro-reinforcement in which they were rewarded for implicit activation of a target animal representation. Amygdala response to phobic stimuli was assessed by study staff blind to target and control animal assignments. Pre-treatment to post-treatment differences were analyzed with a 2-way repeated-measures ANOVA.

Results

A total of 23 participants (69.6% female) were randomized to receive 1 (n=8), 3 (n=7), or 5 (n=7) sessions of multi-voxel neuro-reinforcement. Eighteen (n=6 each group) participants were analyzed for our primary outcome. After neuro-reinforcement, we observed an interaction indicating a significant decrease in amygdala response for the target phobia but not the control phobia. No adverse events or dropouts were reported as a result of the intervention.

Conclusion

Results suggest multi-voxel neuro-reinforcement can specifically reduce threat signatures in specific phobia. Consequently, this intervention may complement conventional psychotherapy approaches with a non-distressing experience for patients seeking treatment. This trial sets the stage for a larger randomized clinical trial to replicate these results and examine the effects on real-life exposure.

Clinical Trial Registration

The now-closed trial was prospectively registered at ClinicalTrials.gov with ID NCT03655262.

Metacognition as a window into subjective affective experience

When patients seek professional help for mental disorders, they often do so because of troubling subjective affective experiences. While these subjective states are at the center of the patient's symptomatology, scientific tools for studying them and their cognitive antecedents are limited. Here, we explore the use of concepts and analytic tools from the science of consciousness, a field of research that has faced similar challenges in having to develop robust empirical methods for addressing a phenomenon that has been considered difficult to pin down experimentally. One important strand is the operationalization of some relevant processes in terms of metacognition and confidence ratings, which can be rigorously studied in both humans and animals. By assessing subjective experience with similar approaches, we hope to develop new scientific approaches for studying affective processes and promoting psychological resilience in the face of debilitating emotional experiences.

Does Body Memory Exist? A Review of Models, Approaches and Recent Findings Useful for Neurorehabilitation

Over the past twenty years, scientific research on body representations has grown significantly, with Body Memory (BM) emerging as a prominent area of interest in neurorehabilitation. Compared to other body representations, BM stands out as one of the most obscure due to the multifaceted nature of the concept of "memory" itself, which includes various aspects (such as implicit vs. explicit, conscious vs. unconscious). The concept of body memory originates from the field of phenomenology and has been developed by research groups studying embodied cognition. In this narrative review, we aim to present compelling evidence from recent studies that explore various definitions and explanatory models of BM. Additionally, we will provide a comprehensive overview of the empirical settings used to examine BM. The results can be categorized into two main areas: (i) how the body influences our memories, and (ii) how memories, in their broadest sense, could generate and/or influence metarepresentations-the ability to reflect on or make inferences about one's own cognitive representations or those of others. We present studies that emphasize the significance of BM in experimental settings involving patients with neurological and psychiatric disorders, ultimately analyzing these findings from an ontogenic perspective.

The maps of meaning consciousness theory

In simple terms, consciousness is constituted by multiple goals for action and the continuous adjudication of such goals to implement action, which is referred to as the maps of meaning (MoM) consciousness theory. The MoM theory triangulates through three parallel corollaries: action (behavior), mechanism (morphology/pathophysiology), and goals (teleology). (1) An organism's consciousness contains fluid, nested goals. These goals are not intentionality, but intersectionality, via the Darwinian byproduct of embodiment meeting the world, i.e., Darwinian inclusive fitness or randomization and then survival of the fittest. (2) These goals are formed via a gradual descent under inclusive fitness and are the abstraction of a "match" between the evolutionary environment and the organism. (3) Human consciousness implements the brain efficiency hypothesis, genetics, epigenetics, and experience-crystallized efficiencies, not necessitating best or objective but fitness, i.e., perceived efficiency based on one's adaptive environment. These efficiencies are objectively arbitrary but determine the operation and level of one's consciousness, termed as extreme thrownness. (4) Since inclusive fitness drives efficiencies in the physiologic mechanism, morphology, and behavior (action) and originates one's goals, embodiment is necessarily entangled to human consciousness as it is at the intersection of mechanism or action (both necessitating embodiment) occurring in the world that determines fitness. (5) Perception is the operant process of consciousness and is the de facto goal adjudication process of consciousness. Goal operationalization is fundamentally efficiency-based via one's unique neuronal mapping as a byproduct of genetics, epigenetics, and experience. (6) Perception involves information intake and information discrimination, equally underpinned by efficiencies of inclusive fitness via extreme thrownness. Perception is not a 'frame rate' but Bayesian priors of efficiency based on one's extreme thrownness. (7) Consciousness and human consciousness are modular (i.e., a scalar level of richness, which builds up like building blocks) and dimensionalized (i.e., cognitive abilities become possibilities as the emergent phenomena at various modularities such as the stratified factors in factor analysis). (8) The meta dimensions of human consciousness seemingly include intelligence quotient, personality (five-factor model), richness of perception intake, and richness of perception discrimination, among other potentialities. (9) Future consciousness research should utilize factor analysis to parse modularities and dimensions of human consciousness and animal models.

The perceived control model of falling: developing a unified framework to understand and assess maladaptive fear of falling

BACKGROUND

fear of falling is common in older adults and can have a profound influence on a variety of behaviours that increase fall risk. However, fear of falling can also have potentially positive outcomes for certain individuals. Without progressing our understanding of mechanisms underlying these contrasting outcomes, it is difficult to clinically manage fear of falling.

METHODS

this paper first summarises recent findings on the topic of fear of falling, balance and fall risk-including work highlighting the protective effects of fear. Specific focus is placed on describing how fear of falling influences perceptual, cognitive and motor process in ways that might either increase or reduce fall risk. Finally, it reports the development and validation of a new clinical tool that can be used to assess the maladaptive components of fear of falling.

RESULTS

we present a new conceptual framework-the Perceived Control Model of Falling-that describes specific mechanisms through which fear of falling can influence fall risk. The key conceptual advance is the identification of perceived control over situations that threaten one's balance as the crucial factor mediating the relationship between fear and increased fall risk. The new 4-item scale that we develop-the Updated Perceived Control over Falling Scale (UP-COF)-is a valid and reliable tool to clinically assess perceived control.

CONCLUSION

this new conceptualisation and tool (UP-COF) allows clinicians to identify individuals for whom fear of falling is likely to increase fall risk, and target specific underlying maladaptive processes such as low perceived control.

Blurred Lines: Memory, Perceptions, and Consciousness: Commentary on "Consciousness as a Memory System" by Budson et al (2022)

In the previous issue, Budson, Richman, and Kensinger (2022) put forth the intriguing proposal that consciousness may have evolved from the episodic memory system. In addition to providing a possible evolutionary trajectory for consciousness, I believe that viewing consciousness as an extension of memory in this way is particularly useful for understanding some of the puzzling temporal complexities that are inherent to consciousness. For example, due to neural transmission delays, our conscious experience must necessarily lag the outside world, which creates a paradox for both conscious perception (Do we see the past, rather than the present?) and action (How can we make rapid decisions if it takes so long to become conscious of something?). These paradoxes can be elegantly solved by treating consciousness as a memory system. Finally, the proposal put forth by Budson and colleagues (2022) aligns with the emerging perspective that consciousness, like memory, represents a narrative time line of events rather than any single instant. However, I believe that this conceptualization can be further extended to include not only the past, but also the future. In this way, consciousness can be provocatively viewed as the remembered past, present, and future.

A generative adversarial model of intrusive imagery in the human brain

The mechanisms underlying the subjective experiences of mental disorders remain poorly understood. This is partly due to long-standing over-emphasis on behavioral and physiological symptoms and a de-emphasis of the patient's subjective experiences when searching for treatments. Here, we provide a new perspective on the subjective experience of mental disorders based on findings in neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI). Specifically, we propose the subjective experience that occurs in visual imagination depends on mechanisms similar to generative adversarial networks that have recently been developed in AI. The basic idea is that a generator network fabricates a prediction of the world, and a discriminator network determines whether it is likely real or not. Given that similar adversarial interactions occur in the two major visual pathways of perception in people, we explored whether we could leverage this AI-inspired approach to better understand the intrusive imagery experiences of patients suffering from mental illnesses such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and acute stress disorder. In our model, a nonconscious visual pathway generates predictions of the environment that influence the parallel but interacting conscious pathway. We propose that in some patients, an imbalance in these adversarial interactions leads to an overrepresentation of disturbing content relative to current reality, and results in debilitating flashbacks. By situating the subjective experience of intrusive visual imagery in the adversarial interaction of these visual pathways, we propose testable hypotheses on novel mechanisms and clinical applications for controlling and possibly preventing symptoms resulting from intrusive imagery.

Atypical meta-memory evaluation strategy in schizophrenia patients

BACKGROUND

Previous research has reported that patients with schizophrenia would regard false memories with higher confidence, and this meta-memory deficit was suggested as a neurocognitive marker of schizophrenia. However, how schizophrenia patients determine their memory decision confidence has received scant consideration. This study, therefore, aimed to characterize the extent to which meta-memory evaluation strategy differs between schizophrenia patients and healthy individuals, and how such difference contributes to the patients' meta-memory performance.

METHODS

27 schizophrenia patients and 28 matched healthy controls performed a temporal-order judgement (TOJ) task, in which they judged which movie frame occurred earlier in an encoded video, and then made retrospective confidence rating. Mixed effect regression models were performed to assess the between-group metacognitive evaluation strategy difference and its relationship to clinical symptoms.

RESULTS

Compared to the control group, the patients' confidence ratings were correlated more with the recent confidence history and less with the TOJ-related evidence. The degree of dependence on recent history of confidence was negatively correlated with the severity of positive symptoms. Furthermore, by controlling for the first-order TOJ performance, we observed that the patients discriminated correct memory decisions from the incorrect ones as accurately as the controls.

CONCLUSION

The present investigation revealed that schizophrenia patients tend to use more heuristics in making meta-memory evaluations, and such atypical strategy is related to their clinical symptoms. This study provides new insights into how schizophrenia patients perform meta-memory processes. Future research could consider examining such metacognitive deficits in light of other cognitive domains in psychosis.

Differential mechanisms underlie trace and delay conditioning in Drosophila

Two forms of associative learning-delay conditioning and trace conditioning-have been widely investigated in humans and higher-order mammals¹. In delay conditioning, an unconditioned stimulus (for example, an electric shock) is introduced in the final moments of a conditioned stimulus (for example, a tone), with both ending at the same time. In trace conditioning, a 'trace' interval separates the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus. Trace conditioning therefore relies on maintaining a neural representation of the conditioned stimulus after its termination (hence making distraction possible²), to learn the conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus contingency³; this makes it more cognitively demanding than delay conditioning⁴. Here, by combining virtual-reality behaviour with neurogenetic manipulations and in vivo two-photon brain imaging, we show that visual trace conditioning and delay conditioning in Drosophila mobilize R2 and R4m ring neurons in the ellipsoid body. In trace conditioning, calcium transients during the trace interval show increased oscillations and slower declines over repeated training, and both of these effects are sensitive to distractions. Dopaminergic activity accompanies signal persistence in ring neurons, and this is decreased by distractions solely during trace conditioning. Finally, dopamine D1-like and D2-like receptor signalling in ring neurons have different roles in delay and trace conditioning; dopamine D1-like receptor 1 mediates both forms of conditioning, whereas the dopamine D2-like receptor is involved exclusively in sustaining ring neuron activity during the trace interval of trace conditioning. These observations are similar to those previously reported in mammals during arousal⁵, prefrontal activation⁶ and high-level cognitive learning^7,8.

A First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience

Understanding the neural bases of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges of the natural sciences. Higher-order theories of consciousness are typically defended by assessments of neural activity in higher cortical regions during perception, often with disregard to the nature of the neural computations that these regions execute. We have sought to refocus the problem toward identification of those neural computations that are necessary for subjective experience with the goal of defining the sorts of neural architectures that can perform these operations. This approach removes reliance on behaviour and brain homologies for appraising whether non-human animals have the potential to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. Using two basic principles—first, subjective experience is dependent on complex processing executing specific neural functions and second, the structure-determines-function principle—we have reasoned that subjective experience requires a neural architecture consisting of stacked forward models that predict the output of neural processing from inputs. Given that forward models are dependent on appropriately connected processing modules that generate prediction, error detection and feedback control, we define a minimal neural architecture that is necessary (but not sufficient) for subjective experience. We refer to this framework as the hierarchical forward models algorithm. Accordingly, we postulate that any animal lacking this neural architecture will be incapable of subjective experience.

As soon as there was life, there was danger: the deep history of survival behaviours and the shallower history of consciousness

It is often said that fear is a universal innate emotion that we humans have inherited from our mammalian ancestors by virtue of having inherited conserved features of their nervous systems. Contrary to this common sense-based scientific point of view, I have argued that what we have inherited from our mammalian ancestors, and they from their distal vertebrate ancestors, and they from their chordate ancestors, and so forth, is not a fear circuit. It is, instead, a defensive survival circuit that detects threats, and in response, initiates defensive survival behaviours and supporting physiological adjustments. Seen in this light, the defensive survival circuits of humans and other mammals can be conceptualized as manifestations of an ancient survival function-the ability to detect danger and respond to it-that may in fact predate animals and their nervous systems, and perhaps may go back to the beginning of life. Fear, on the other hand, from my perspective, is a product of cortical cognitive circuits. This conception is not just of academic interest. It also has practical implications, offering clues as to why efforts to treat problems related to fear and anxiety are not more effective, and what might make them better. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

Implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness or consciousness as such

Consciousness is multi-dimensional but is most often portrayed with a two-dimensional (2D) map that has global levels or states on one axis and phenomenal contents on the other. On this map, awareness is conflated either with general alertness or with phenomenal content. This contributes to ongoing difficulties in the scientific understanding of consciousness. Previously, I have proposed that consciousness as such or nondual awareness-a basic non-conceptual, non-propositional awareness in itself free of subject-object fragmentation-is a unique kind that cannot be adequately specified by this 2D map of states and contents. Here, I propose an implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness to be added as the z-axis to the existing 2D map of consciousness. This gradient informs about the degree to which nondual awareness is manifest in any experience, independent of the specifics of global state or local content. Alternatively, within the multi-dimensional state space model of consciousness, nondual awareness can be specified by several vectors, each representing one of its properties. In the first part, I outline nondual awareness or consciousness as such in terms of its phenomenal description, its function and its neural correlates. In the second part, I explore the implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness and how including it as an additional axis clarifies certain features of everyday dualistic experiences and is especially relevant for understanding the unitary and nondual experiences accessed via different contemplative methods, mind-altering substances or spontaneously.

Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and Opportunities

Psychedelic substances produce unusual and compelling changes in conscious experience that have prompted some to propose that psychedelics may provide unique insights explaining the nature of consciousness. At present, psychedelics, like other current scientific tools and methods, seem unlikely to provide information relevant to the so-called "hard problem of consciousness," which involves explaining how first-person experience can emerge. However, psychedelics bear on multiple "easy problems of consciousness," which involve relations between subjectivity, brain function, and behavior. In this review, we discuss common meanings of the term "consciousness" when used with regard to psychedelics and consider some models of the effects of psychedelics on the brain that have also been associated with explanatory claims about consciousness. We conclude by calling for epistemic humility regarding the potential for psychedelic research to aid in explaining the hard problem of consciousness while pointing to ways in which psychedelics may advance the study of many specific aspects of consciousness.

Content-specific vulnerability of recent episodic memories in Alzheimer's disease

Endel Tulving's episodic memory framework emphasizes the multifaceted re-experiencing of personal events. Indeed, decades of research focused on the experiential nature of episodic memories, usually treating recent episodic memory as a coherent experiential quality. However, recent insights into the functional architecture of the medial temporal lobe show that different types of mnemonic information are segregated into distinct neural pathways in brain circuits empirically associated with episodic memory. Moreover, recent memories do not fade as a whole under conditions of progressive neurodegeneration in these brain circuits, notably in Alzheimer's disease. Instead, certain memory content seem particularly vulnerable from the moment of their encoding while other content can remain memorable consistently across individuals and contexts. We propose that these observations are related to the content-specific functional architecture of the medial temporal lobe and consequently to a content-specific impairment of memory at different stages of the neurodegeneration. To develop Endel Tulving's inspirational legacy further and to advance our understanding of how memory function is affected by neurodegenerative conditions such as Alzheimer's disease, we postulate that it is compelling to focus on the representational content of recent episodic memories.

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The functional anatomy of episodic memory segregates different memory content.

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Alzheimer's disease may cause content-specific loss of recent memories

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Content-specific memorability across individuals changes with Alzheimer's disease.

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Content-specific assessment could provide new insights into episodic memory in health and disease

What emotions might be like in other animals

In this My word, Joseph LeDoux explores what the emotional lives of other mammals might be like. He proposes that better understanding of the brain mechanisms of emotional consciousness in humans might shed light on the kinds of conscious capacities that might be possible in non-human primates and non-primate mammals, given the kinds of brains they possess.

Psychological mechanisms and functions of 5-HT and SSRIs in potential therapeutic change: Lessons from the serotonergic modulation of action selection, learning, affect, and social cognition

Uncertainty regarding which psychological mechanisms are fundamental in mediating SSRI treatment outcomes and wide-ranging variability in their efficacy has raised more questions than it has solved. Since subjective mood states are an abstract scientific construct, only available through self-report in humans, and likely involving input from multiple top-down and bottom-up signals, it has been difficult to model at what level SSRIs interact with this process. Converging translational evidence indicates a role for serotonin in modulating context-dependent parameters of action selection, affect, and social cognition; and concurrently supporting learning mechanisms, which promote adaptability and behavioural flexibility. We examine the theoretical basis, ecological validity, and interaction of these constructs and how they may or may not exert a clinical benefit. Specifically, we bridge crucial gaps between disparate lines of research, particularly findings from animal models and human clinical trials, which often seem to present irreconcilable differences. In determining how SSRIs exert their effects, our approach examines the endogenous functions of 5-HT neurons, how 5-HT manipulations affect behaviour in different contexts, and how their therapeutic effects may be exerted in humans - which may illuminate issues of translational models, hierarchical mechanisms, idiographic variables, and social cognition.