Taxing the Brain to Uncover Lying? Meta-analyzing the Effect of Imposing Cognitive Load on the Reaction-Time Costs of Lying

Intrinsic motivation in a virtual reality mock crime affects participants' willingness to invest more effort in deceptive interviews

In studies of investigative interviewing, it is not well understood how participant experience of mock-crime activities might affect participants' desire to perform (well) in subsequent interviews. In this study, we utilized two immersive virtual reality mock-crimes to examine if participants' intrinsic motivation (i.e., competence, autonomy, relatedness) while committing the virtual mock-crime affects their desire to perform well in interviews. We also examined if the self-reported feeling of presence during the virtual reality mock-crime is associated with participants' intrinsic motivation. We found significant positive associations between presence and all intrinsic motivation variables in both truth and lie conditions. We also found that competence and relatedness significantly predicted the self-reported effort to perform well in interviews. We discuss these results in the context of prior literature and provide recommendations for researchers on the design of mock-crime experiences.

Revisiting Deception in Breonna Taylor's Case: A Cognitive-Acoustic Approach

The present paper proposes an eclectic model for examining the cognitive load involved in detecting deception that benefits from the acoustic dimension as an exercise in cognitive forensic linguistics. The corpus used is composed of the legal confession transcripts of the Breonna Taylor's Case, a 26-year-old African-American woman worker who was shot dead by police officers in Louisville, Ky., in March 2020 during a crackdown on her apartment. The dataset comprises transcripts and recordings of the persons involved in the shooting event but have given unclear charges, and those accused of contributory negligence due to wanton misfiring. The data is analyzed based on the video interviews and reaction times (RT) as an application of the model proposed. The findings reveal that the episodes chosen and how they are analyzed exhibit that the modified ADCM along with the acoustic dimension provide a clear picture of cognitive load management in the course of constructing and producing lies.

Comparing end-effector position and joint angle feedback for online robotic limb tracking

Somatosensation greatly increases the ability to control our natural body. This suggests that supplementing vision with haptic sensory feedback would also be helpful when a user aims at controlling a robotic arm proficiently. However, whether the position of the robot and its continuous update should be coded in a extrinsic or intrinsic reference frame is not known. Here we compared two different supplementary feedback contents concerning the status of a robotic limb in 2-DoFs configuration: one encoding the Cartesian coordinates of the end-effector of the robotic arm (i.e., Task-space feedback) and another and encoding the robot joints angles (i.e., Joint-space feedback). Feedback was delivered to blindfolded participants through vibrotactile stimulation applied on participants' leg. After a 1.5-hour training with both feedbacks, participants were significantly more accurate with Task compared to Joint-space feedback, as shown by lower position and aiming errors, albeit not faster (i.e., similar onset delay). However, learning index during training was significantly higher in Joint space feedback compared to Task-space feedback. These results suggest that Task-space feedback is probably more intuitive and more suited for activities which require short training sessions, while Joint space feedback showed potential for long-term improvement. We speculate that the latter, despite performing worse in the present work, might be ultimately more suited for applications requiring long training, such as the control of supernumerary robotic limbs for surgical robotics, heavy industrial manufacturing, or more generally, in the context of human movement augmentation.

Cognitive control and dishonesty

Dishonesty is ubiquitous and imposes substantial financial and social burdens on society. Intuitively, dishonesty results from a failure of willpower to control selfish behavior. However, recent research suggests that the role of cognitive control in dishonesty is more complex. We review evidence that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se, but that it depends on individual differences in what we call one's 'moral default': for those who are prone to dishonesty, cognitive control indeed aids in being honest, but for those who are already generally honest, cognitive control may help them cheat to occasionally profit from small acts of dishonesty. Thus, the role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty is to override the moral default.

Fooled twice: People cannot detect deepfakes but think they can

Hyper-realistic manipulations of audio-visual content, i.e., deepfakes, present new challenges for establishing the veracity of online content. Research on the human impact of deepfakes remains sparse. In a pre-registered behavioral experiment (N = 210), we show that (1) people cannot reliably detect deepfakes and (2) neither raising awareness nor introducing financial incentives improves their detection accuracy. Zeroing in on the underlying cognitive processes, we find that (3) people are biased toward mistaking deepfakes as authentic videos (rather than vice versa) and (4) they overestimate their own detection abilities. Together, these results suggest that people adopt a “seeing-is-believing” heuristic for deepfake detection while being overconfident in their (low) detection abilities. The combination renders people particularly susceptible to be influenced by deepfake content.

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People cannot reliably detect deepfakes

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Raising awareness and financial incentives do not improve people's detection accuracy

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People tend to mistake deepfakes as authentic videos (rather than vice versa)

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People overestimate their own detection deepfake abilities

Neural mechanisms of deliberate dishonesty: Dissociating deliberation from other control processes during dishonest behaviors

Numerous studies have sought proof of whether people are genuinely honest by testing whether cognitive control mechanisms are recruited during honest and dishonest behaviors. The underlying assumption is: Deliberate behaviors require cognitive control to inhibit intuitive responses. However, cognitive control during honest and dishonest behaviors can be required for other reasons than deliberation. Across 58 neuroimaging studies (1,211 subjects), we investigated different forms of honest and dishonest behaviors and demonstrated that many brain regions previously implicated in dishonesty may reflect more general cognitive mechanisms. We argue that the motivational/volitional dimension is central to deliberation and provide evidence that motivated dishonest behaviors recruit the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex. This work questions the view that cognitive control is a hallmark of dishonesty.

Do liars really remember what they lied upon? The impact of fabrication on memory

The present experiment aimed to examine how fabrication can affect memory. In particular, we examined whether different types of fabrication can lead to different mnemonic effects. A sample of 159 participants watched a video of a robbery and subsequently answered some questions about it. Participants were divided into three conditions: one group was instructed to tell the truth (i.e., truth-telling group), while the other two groups were instructed to lie either by partially distorting details (i.e., distortion group) or by completely making up wrong details of the event seen in the video (i.e., fabrication group). Two days later, participants completed a final memory test where they honestly answered recognition and recall questions concerning: (i) memory for the video and (ii) memory for having discussed details during the interview. Results showed that different types of fabrication affect liars' memory differently. Fabricators reported an undermining of memory for the event, whereas those who partially distorted details reported a higher impairment for the interview. Our findings showed that the effects of lying on liars' memory might be determined by the cognitive resources required to lie.

Different Neural Mechanisms Underlie Non-habitual Honesty and Non-habitual Cheating

There is a long-standing debate regarding the cognitive nature of (dis)honesty: Is honesty an automatic response or does it require willpower in the form of cognitive control in order to override an automatic dishonest response. In a recent study (Speer et al., 2020), we proposed a reconciliation of these opposing views by showing that activity in areas associated with cognitive control, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. These findings suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual's moral default. However, while our findings provided insights into the role of cognitive control in overriding a moral default, they did not reveal whether overriding honest default behavior (non-habitual dishonesty) is the same as overriding dishonest default behavior (non-habitual honesty) at the neural level. This speaks to the question as to whether cognitive control mechanisms are domain-general or may be context specific. To address this, we applied multivariate pattern analysis to compare neural patterns of non-habitual honesty to non-habitual dishonesty. We found that these choices are differently encoded in the IFG, suggesting that engaging cognitive control to follow the norm (that cheating is wrong) fundamentally differs from applying control to violate this norm.

Intention or Request: The Impact of Message Structures

This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes self-signaling or self-committing messages, the two message structures yield negligibly different results. However, when the messages of the game are neither self-signaling nor self-committing, we find that more subjects send messages suggesting cooperation with request than intention. Interestingly, subjects also deviate from their suggested actions more frequently with request than intention. We surmise lying aversion plays a prominent role in contributing to the differences in games where messages lack the self-committing property.

Detecting faking-good response style in personality questionnaires with four choice alternatives

Deliberate attempts to portray oneself in an unrealistic manner are commonly encountered in the administration of personality questionnaires. The main aim of the present study was to explore whether mouse tracking temporal indicators and machine learning models could improve the detection of subjects implementing a faking-good response style when answering personality inventories with four choice alternatives, with and without time pressure. A total of 120 volunteers were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups and asked to respond to the Virtuous Responding (VR) validity scale of the PPI-R and the Positive Impression Management (PIM) validity scale of the PAI via a computer mouse. A mixed design was implemented, and predictive models were calculated. The results showed that, on the PIM scale, faking-good participants were significantly slower in responding than honest respondents. Relative to VR items, PIM items are shorter in length and feature no negations. Accordingly, the PIM scale was found to be more sensitive in distinguishing between honest and faking-good respondents, demonstrating high classification accuracy (80–83%).

Intuitive decision-making promotes rewarding prosocial others independent of the personality trait Honesty-Humility

Although past research has convincingly shown that rewarding prosocial individuals helps to establish high levels of cooperation, research investigating factors that promote rewarding others has been surprisingly rare. The present research addresses this gap and examines two factors that were shown in past research to play a role in prosocial behaviour. In a well-powered study (total N = 1003), we tested the impact of (a) a basic prosocial personality trait (the Honesty-Humility dimension from the HEXACO personality model) and (b) intuitive decision-making, as well as (c) their interaction, in rewarding prosocial individuals. We found that (1) intuition promotes rewarding prosocial others; (2) Honesty-Humility was not significantly related to rewarding prosocial others; and (3) that Honesty-Humility did not significantly moderate the effect of intuition on reward. Implications for the understanding of reciprocating others' prosocial behaviour are discussed.

Identifying Feigned Cognitive Impairment: Investigating the Utility of Diffusion Model Analyses

Forced-choice performance validity tests are routinely used for the detection of feigned cognitive impairment. The drift diffusion model deconstructs performance into distinct cognitive processes using accuracy and response time measures. It thereby offers a unique approach for gaining insight into examinees' speed-accuracy trade-offs and the cognitive processes that underlie their performance. The current study is the first to perform such analyses using a well-established forced-choice performance validity test. To achieve this aim, archival data of healthy participants, either simulating cognitive impairment in the Word Memory Test or performing it to the best of their ability, were analyzed using the EZ-diffusion model (N = 198). The groups differed in the three model parameters, with drift rate emerging as the best predictor of group membership. These findings provide initial evidence for the usefulness of the drift diffusion model in clarifying the cognitive processes underlying feigned cognitive impairment and encourage further research.

Cognitive control increases honesty in cheaters but cheating in those who are honest

Every day, we are faced with the conflict between the temptation to cheat for financial gains and maintaining a positive image of ourselves as being a "good person." While it has been proposed that cognitive control is needed to mediate this conflict between reward and our moral self-image, the exact role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty remains elusive. Here we identify this role, by investigating the neural mechanism underlying cheating. We developed a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating on a trial-by-trial basis in the MRI scanner. We found that activity in the nucleus accumbens promotes cheating, particularly for individuals who cheat a lot, while a network consisting of posterior cingulate cortex, temporoparietal junction, and medial prefrontal cortex promotes honesty, particularly in individuals who are generally honest. Finally, activity in areas associated with cognitive control (anterior cingulate cortex and inferior frontal gyrus) helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. Thus, our results suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual's moral default.

Dishonesty is more affected by BMI status than by short-term changes in glucose

There is evidence that human decision-making is affected by current body energy levels and physiological states. There is less clear evidence linking decision-making to long-term changes in energy, as those associated with obesity. We explore the link between energy, obesity and dishonesty by comparing the behaviour of obese and lean subjects when hungry or sated while playing an anonymous die-under-cup task. Participants performed the task either before or after breakfast. We find that short-term switches in energy have only a mild effect on dishonesty, as only lean females lie less when sated. By contrast, obese subjects lie more than lean subjects in both conditions, and they lie more to avoid the lowest payoff than to get the highest payoff. Our findings suggest that the observed patterns are more likely mediated by factors associated with obesity than by short term energy dynamics, and call for a better integration of the psychological, economic and biological drivers of moral behaviour.

Both High Cognitive Load and Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Over the Right Inferior Frontal Cortex Make Truth and Lie Responses More Similar

Deception scholars have argued that increasing the liar’s cognitive system artificially can produce deception cues. However, if too much load is imposed, the truth tellers’ performance can also be impaired. To address this issue, we designed a veracity task that incorporated a secondary task to increase cognitive load gradually. Also, because deception has been associated with activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC), we examined the influence of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of the IFC on performance. During stimulation, participants truthfully or deceptively indicated whether each of a number of statements shown on screen was true or not. Higher load decreased recall but not general compliance or response times (RTs). Truthful trials yielded higher compliance rates and faster RTs than deceptive trials except for the highest load level. Anodal right stimulation decreased compliance in truthful trials when participants were not overloaded. Truth telling was more vulnerable to cognitive load and tDCS than lying.

Use of mouse-tracking software to detect faking-good behavior on personality questionnaires: an explorative study

The aim of the present study was to explore whether kinematic indicators could improve the detection of subjects demonstrating faking-good behaviour when responding to personality questionnaires. One hundred and twenty volunteers were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups (honest unspeeded, faking-good unspeeded, honest speeded, and faking-good speeded). Participants were asked to respond to the MMPI-2 underreporting scales (L, K, S) and the PPI-R Virtuous Responding (VR) scale using a computer mouse. The collected data included T-point scores on the L, K, S, and VR scales; response times on these scales; and several temporal and spatial mouse parameters. These data were used to investigate the presence of significant differences between the two manipulated variables (honest vs. faking-good; speeded vs. unspeeded). The results demonstrated that T-scores were significantly higher in the faking-good condition relative to the honest condition; however, faking-good and honest respondents showed no statistically significant differences between the speeded and unspeeded conditions. Concerning temporal and spatial kinematic parameters, we observed mixed results for different scales and further investigations are required. The most consistent finding, albeit with small observed effects, regards the L scale, in which faking-good respondents took longer to respond to stimuli and outlined wider mouse trajectories to arrive at the given response.

Intuitive Honesty Versus Dishonesty: Meta-Analytic Evidence

Is self-serving lying intuitive? Or does honesty come naturally? Many experiments have manipulated reliance on intuition in behavioral-dishonesty tasks, with mixed results. We present two meta-analyses (with evidential value) testing whether an intuitive mind-set affects the proportion of liars (k = 73; n = 12,711) and the magnitude of lying (k = 50; n = 6,473). The results indicate that when dishonesty harms abstract others, promoting intuition causes more people to lie, log odds ratio = 0.38, p = .0004, and people to lie more, Hedges's g = 0.26, p < .0001. However, when dishonesty inflicts harm on concrete others, promoting intuition has no significant effect on dishonesty (p > .63). We propose one potential explanation: The intuitive appeal of prosociality may cancel out the intuitive selfish appeal of dishonesty, suggesting that the social consequences of lying could be a promising key to the riddle of intuition's role in honesty. We discuss limitations such as the relatively unbalanced distribution of studies using concrete versus abstract victims and the overall large interstudy heterogeneity.

The language of lies: a preregistered direct replication of Suchotzki and Gamer (2018; Experiment 2)

Is lying in a different language easier or more difficult? The Emotional Distance and the Cognitive Load hypothesis give competing answers. Suchotzki and Gamer measured the time native German speakers needed to initiate honest and deceptive answers to German and English questions. Lie-truth differences in RTs were much smaller for the foreign compared to the native language. In our preregistered replication study in native Dutch speakers, we found that lie-truth differences in RTs were moderately smaller when participants were tested in English than when tested in Dutch. These findings indicate that people struggle with quickly retrieving the truth in another language, and that foreign language use may diminish lie-truth differences.