Determined to conform: Disbelief in free will increases conformity

At freedom's edge: Belief in free will during the COVID-19 pandemic

Among life-and-death health concerns surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic were frustrations about the loss of personal freedom due to emergency quarantine. To test these perceptions, two studies examined whether belief in free will was resilient during different points of the pandemic. In Study 1, conducted in 2020, participants completed a writing task describing their lives before the COVID-19 pandemic, during the COVID-19 pandemic while under emergency quarantine, and during the COVID-19 pandemic while under state re-openings. Following each task, they completed belief in free will measures. Results indicated that free will beliefs were higher before the pandemic than during emergency quarantine. Free will beliefs were also greater during state re-opening than during emergency quarantine. Belief in free will did not differ between pre-pandemic and state re-opening. Study 2 replicated and extended these effects two years later. These findings highlight the brief loss of freedom during COVID-19 as well as the resiliency of agentic control.

Free to be Healthy? Free Will Beliefs are Positively Associated With Health Behavior

Previous research has demonstrated that a stronger belief in free will contributes to a variety of socially desirable behaviors. We assessed the correlation between free will beliefs and health behaviors. Four studies (N = 1172) provide evidence that belief in free will is positively associated with health protective behaviors (e.g., physical activity, fruit and vegetable consumption, low fat diet) and negatively associated with health risk behaviors (e.g., alcohol consumption, smoking, unhealthy snacking). In relation to the respective health protective and health risk behaviors, we found free will beliefs were more strongly correlated with physical activity and alcohol consumption, respectively. We also found free will beliefs were associated with key social cognition determinants (e.g., attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, and intention). Overall, our results suggest that belief in free will can have important consequences for health behavior. This contributes to current theorizing about the implications of believing in free will.

The role of free will beliefs in social behavior: Priority areas for future research

Recent research has examined the consequences that holding views about free will has on social behavior. Specifically, through manipulating people's belief in free will, researchers have tested the psychological and behavioral consequences of free will belief change. However, findings of such manipulations have been shown to be relatively small and inconsistent. The purpose of this paper is to outline four key areas for researchers in this area to consider. We believe considering these areas will give a more nuanced understanding of the role of free will beliefs.

Climbing the Invisible Ladder: Attenuating Belief in Free Will Reduces Subjective Perceptions of Social Mobility

Can belief in free will alter our perceptions of social mobility? Five studies manipulated free will beliefs and assessed subjective individual social mobility (Study 1), subjective social status across time (Study 2), objective social class 10 years (Study 3) and 20 years (Study 4) into the future, and counterbalanced subjective and objective social mobility measures (Study 5). Challenging free will beliefs reduced subjective perceptions of upward mobility in Study 1 and led to lower perceptions of subjective social status in the distant, but not in near future in Study 2. Studies 3 and 4 found that threatening free will beliefs did not influence perceptions of future objective social class. Study 5 revealed that weakening free will beliefs affected subjective and objective social mobility, with the latter under specific boundary conditions. The differential effects of belief in free will on perceived social mobility are discussed.

Manipulating Belief in Free Will and Its Downstream Consequences: A Meta-Analysis

Ever since some scientists and popular media put forward the idea that free will is an illusion, the question has risen what would happen if people stopped believing in free will. Psychological research has investigated this question by testing the consequences of experimentally weakening people's free will beliefs. The results of these investigations have been mixed, with successful experiments and unsuccessful replications. This raises two fundamental questions: Can free will beliefs be manipulated, and do such manipulations have downstream consequences? In a meta-analysis including 145 experiments (95 unpublished), we show that exposing individuals to anti-free will manipulations decreases belief in free will and increases belief in determinism. However, we could not find evidence for downstream consequences. Our findings have important theoretical implications for research on free will beliefs and contribute to the discussion of whether reducing people's belief in free will has societal consequences.

The impact of free will beliefs on implicit learning

A growing number of studies demonstrate that belief in free will (FWB) is dynamic, and can be reduced experimentally. Most of these studies assume that doing so has beneficial effects on behavior, as FWBs are thought to subdue unwanted automatic processes (e.g. racial stereotypes). However, relying on automatic processes can sometimes be advantageous, for instance during implicit learning (e.g. detecting and exploiting statistical regularities in the environment). In this registered report, we tested whether experimentally reducing FWBs positively affected implicit motor learning. We hypothesized that reducing FWBs would lead to both faster and stronger implicit learning, as measured using the alternating serial reaction time (ASRT) task. While we did show a manipulation effect on free will beliefs, there was no detectable effect on implicit learning processes. This finding adds to the growing body of evidence that free will belief manipulations do not meaningfully affect downstream behavior.

Automatic or controlled: How does disbelief in free will influence cognitive functioning?

Most people believe in free will. Past research has indicated that reducing this belief has numerous downstream consequences including everyday outcomes as well as neural and cognitive correlates associated with a reduction of self-control. However, the exact mechanisms through which a reduction in free will belief affects self-control are still a matter of investigation. In the present registered report, we used a task switching paradigm to examine whether reducing belief in free will makes people less controlled or whether it enhances their reliance on automatic impulses. Using Bayesian sequential analysis, we failed to conceptually replicate the previous link between free will belief and cognitive control. Our registered report plan mostly accumulated substantial evidence supporting the null hypothesis. That is, diminished belief in free will does neither impact control nor automaticity. Theoretical implications of this finding are discussed.

A longitudinal evaluation of free will related cognitions in obsessive-compulsive disorder

BACKGROUND

Individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) often feel compelled to perform (compulsive) behaviors, thus raising questions regarding their free will beliefs and experiences. In the present study, we investigated if free will related cognitions (free will beliefs or experiences) differed between OCD patients and healthy subjects and whether these cognitions predicted symptom changes after a one-year follow up.

METHODS

Sixty OCD outpatients were assessed for their beliefs in and experiences of free will at baseline and after one year of treatment. A subsample of 18 OCD patients had their beliefs compared to 18 age and gender matched healthy controls. A regression analysis was performed to investigate whether free will cognitions at baseline were able to predict long-term OCD severity scores.

RESULTS

Patients with OCD and healthy controls do not seem to differ in terms of their beliefs in free will (U = 156.0; p = 0.864). Nonetheless, we found significant negative correlation between (i) duration of illness and strength of belief in determinism (ρ = -0.317; p = 0.016), (ii) age and perception of having alternative possibilities (ρ = -0.275; p = 0.038), and (iii) symptoms' severity and perception of having alternative possibilities (ρ = -0.415; p = 0.001). On the other hand, the experience of being an owner of ones' actions was positive correlated with the severity of symptoms (ρ = 0.538; p < 0.001) and were able to predict the severity of OCD symptoms at the follow up assessment.

CONCLUSIONS

Older individuals or those with a greater severity of symptoms seem to have a perception of decreased free will. In addition, patients with a longer duration of illness tend to have a lower strength of belief in determinism. Finally, the experience of being the owner of the compulsions, along with the baseline severity of symptoms, can be a predictor of a worse outcome in the OCD sample.

Relating free will beliefs and attitudes

Most people believe in free will, which is foundational for our sense of agency and responsibility. Past research demonstrated that such beliefs are dynamic, and can be manipulated experimentally. Much less is known about free will attitudes (FWAs; do you value free will?), whether they are equally dynamic, and about their relation to free will beliefs (FWBs). If FWAs were strongly positive, people might be reluctant to revise their beliefs even in the face of strong evidence to do so. In this registered report, we developed a novel measure of FWAs and directly related FWBs and attitudes for the first time. We found FWBs and attitudes to be positively related, although to a lesser degree than determinism or dualism beliefs/attitudes. Nevertheless, an experimental manipulation technique aimed at reducing FWBs (Crick text) showed remarkably specific effects on FWBs only, and no effects on FWAs. Overall, these results provide valuable new insights into laypeople's views on free will by including a novel measure of FWAs. They also provide evidence for the validity of a common experimental technique that has been rightfully criticized in the literature lately.

Involuntary classroom transition moderates the effect of Present Hedonistic perspective on the belief in free will

Mitigation plans during the early stages of COVID-19 provided a unique, antagonistic environment in which drastic changes occurred quickly and did so with minimal freedom of choice (e.g., involuntary transition from in-person to online classroom). As such, individuals of different beliefs and perspectives would respond differently to these mitigations. We examined the interaction between the Present-Hedonistic (PH) perspective and involuntary classroom transition on the belief in free will (N = 131). PH-oriented individuals exhibit a strong desire for choice while also welcome new opportunities and change. Importantly, the perceived freedom of choice and capacity for change also serve as foundational constructs to the belief in free will. Our results revealed that involuntary transition weakened the free will belief in those with lower PH but did not affect those of higher PH orientation. These findings suggest that the interplay between the perception of choice and capacity for change account for how individuals responded to the COVID-19 pandemic mitigation plans.

Comparing the Psychometric Properties of Two Japanese-Translated Scales of the Free Will and Determinism-Plus Scale

The free will and determinism-plus scale (FAD-Plus) is one of the most widely used scales to assess the lay belief of people in the existence of free will and deterministic world views. Past research has translated FAD-Plus into various languages for non-English speaking populations, and there exist two Japanese translations of FAD-Plus: the FAD+ and the FAD-J. This study aimed to compare the psychometric properties of FAD+ and FAD-J. Results revealed that while both FAD+ and FAD-J consist of the same four subscales as the original FAD-Plus, some differences exist in the item-level psychometric characteristics. In general, as for the construct validity, although results supported that both scales can assess almost the same construct in terms of the functionalities, FAD-J tends to be slightly more likely to replicate the correlations obtained in the previous research.

Perceptions of free will and self-control in a medically relevant treatment recommendation scenario

Do provider perceptions of patient free will and treatment related self-control influence treatment recommendations and do such perceptions differ due to race? If so, such bias may be a mechanism for racial disparities in medical treatment recommendations. We hypothesized: (1) greater perceived patient free will would indirectly effect treatment recommendations for patients through increased perceived patient treatment related self-control; (2) participants would perceive greater free will for a hypothetical racial ingroup patient than outgroup patient; and (3) such effect would be exacerbated by greater levels of racial identity and racial bias. A 2 (Participant: Black vs. White) x 2 (Target: Black vs. White) x Continuous (Racial Identity/Racial Bias) between-subjects design supported hypothesis 1. Perceived patient free will predicted more rigorous treatment recommendations treatment related self-control. No evidence was found in support of hypotheses 2 and 3. Using a novel experimental design, this work demonstrates the importance of free will and self-control perceptions.

Awareness of societal emphasis on appearance decreases women's (but not men's) career aspiration: A serial mediation model

This research examined the association between awareness of societal emphasis on physical appearance and people's career aspiration and the process that linked the two. Specifically, we proposed that perceived societal emphasis on physical attractiveness would decrease women's career aspiration through decreased authenticity and perceived opportunity. A total of 349 college students (227 females) participated in the study. The results revealed that awareness of societal emphasis on physical attractiveness negatively predicted women's authenticity, and authenticity positively predicted perception of opportunity, which in turn predicted their career aspiration. However, this serial mediational model was not found in men. These findings suggest that socially prioritization of attractiveness can undermine women's strive for occupational prospects and add to a better understanding of women's growth and development.

Are mental disorders related to disbelief in free will? A systematic review

BACKGROUND

The nature and existence of free will have been debated for centuries. Since some psychiatric disorders are known to interfere with one's ability to control their actions and thoughts (e.g., schizophrenia), the investigation of the psychiatric facet of free will beliefs seems to be relevant. In this systematic review, we were interested in clarifying if and how having a mental disorder affects individuals' beliefs in free will by comparing psychiatric vs. non-psychiatric samples.

METHODS

A systematic search of MEDLINE, Web of Science, EMBASE, and PsycINFO databases was performed between 04 and 09 November 2020. The search strategy included "free will" and related constructs and terms related to DSM-5 mental disorders characterized by psychotic, compulsive, avoidant, or impulsive symptoms. Eligible designs of studies included case-control and cohort studies. Study selection took place in committee meetings consisting of six researchers. Quality assessment of the selected studies was performed through the Joanna Briggs Institute Appraisal Checklist for Case Control Studies.

RESULTS

After removing duplicates, a total of 12,218 titles/abstracts were screened. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were followed, and three articles were eventually selected.

CONCLUSIONS

It is not possible to provide unequivocal confirmation that having a mental disorder can or cannot affect someone's belief in free will. Studies with different mental disorders should be conducted in this field.

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW REGISTRATION

PROSPERO CRD42018109468.

Free to blame? Belief in free will is related to victim blaming

The more people believe in free will, the harsher their punishment of criminal offenders. A reason for this finding is that belief in free will leads individuals to perceive others as responsible for their behavior. While research supporting this notion has mainly focused on criminal offenders, the perspective of the victims has been neglected so far. We filled this gap and hypothesized that individuals' belief in free will is positively correlated with victim blaming-the tendency to make victims responsible for their bad luck. In three studies, we found that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they blame victims. Study 3 revealed that belief in free will is correlated with victim blaming even when controlling for just world beliefs, religious worldviews, and political ideology. The results contribute to a more differentiated view of the role of free will beliefs and attributed intentions.

Many Labs 5: Registered Replication of Vohs and Schooler (2008), Experiment 1

Does convincing people that free will is an illusion reduce their sense of personal responsibility? Vohs and Schooler (2008) found that participants reading from a passage “debunking” free will cheated more on experimental tasks than did those reading from a control passage, an effect mediated by decreased belief in free will. However, this finding was not replicated by Embley, Johnson, and Giner-Sorolla (2015), who found that reading arguments against free will had no effect on cheating in their sample. The present study investigated whether hard-to-understand arguments against free will and a low-reliability measure of free-will beliefs account for Embley et al.’s failure to replicate Vohs and Schooler’s results. Participants ( N = 621) were randomly assigned to participate in either a close replication of Vohs and Schooler’s Experiment 1 based on the materials of Embley et al. or a revised protocol, which used an easier-to-understand free-will-belief manipulation and an improved instrument to measure free will. We found that the revisions did not matter. Although the revised measure of belief in free will had better reliability than the original measure, an analysis of the data from the two protocols combined indicated that free-will beliefs were unchanged by the manipulations, d = 0.064, 95% confidence interval = [−0.087, 0.22], and in the focal test, there were no differences in cheating behavior between conditions, d = 0.076, 95% CI = [−0.082, 0.22]. We found that expressed free-will beliefs did not mediate the link between the free-will-belief manipulation and cheating, and in exploratory follow-up analyses, we found that participants expressing lower beliefs in free will were not more likely to cheat in our task.

Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will

A key source of support for the view that challenging people's beliefs about free will may undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that free will is an illusion increased cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (sample sizes of N = 162, N = 283, N = 268, N = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) anti-free-will prompts and free will beliefs and (2) free will beliefs and immoral behavior. Our primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating free will beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests.

The Illusion of Time: Testing the Bidirectional Relationship Between Belief in Free Will and Temporal Horizons

The current research examined the bidirectional relationship between belief in free will and perceptions of time. Studies 1 and 2 explored the association between free will beliefs (FWB) and future time perspective (FTP) in correlational and longitudinal studies, respectively. Results indicated a positive relationship between the two constructs. Study 3 manipulated FTP and assessed FWB. Study 4 manipulated FWB and assessed FTP about current goal-pursuit. While manipulating FTP did not directly influence FWB, attenuating FWB led participants to perceive time as more limited to accomplish their goals. Exploratory mediation suggests that the perception of increased paths to successful goal-pursuit accounts for this relationship. The interplay between FWB and FTP is discussed.

Addiction and Voluntariness: Five “Challenges” to Address in Moving the Discussion Forward

The question as to whether people with an addiction have control (and to what extent) over their addiction, and voluntarily decide to use substances is an ongoing source of controversy in the context of research on addiction, health policy and clinical practice. We describe and discuss a set of five challenges for further research into voluntariness (definition[s], measurement and study tools, first person perspectives, contextual understandings, and connections to broader frameworks) based on our own research experiences and those of others.

Do Self-Objectified Women Believe Themselves to Be Free? Sexual Objectification and Belief in Personal Free Will

The present study aims to investigate the indirect link between sexual objectification and belief in personal free will. We hypothesized that being subjected to objectifying commentary would lead women to self-objectify and, in turn, to perceive themselves as having less personal free will. In this study, 105 women were asked to sign up a website created for this study by providing a personal description and a photo. After signing up, they received feedback from a fictitious male user. Depending on the condition, the comment was neutral (baseline), focused on their description (non-objectifying) or focused on their physical appearance (objectifying). The results showed that participants in the objectifying condition (vs. non-objectifying vs. baseline) self-objectified (i.e., perceived themselves as lacking human mental states and more as an instrument vs. a human) and, in turn, believed that they had less personal free will. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings for educators and therapists are discussed.

Under Pressure: Examining Social Conformity With Computer and Robot Groups

OBJECTIVE

The authors investigate whether nonhuman agents, such as computers or robots, produce a social conformity effect in human operators and examine to what extent potential conformist behavior varies as a function of the human-likeness of the group members and the type of task that has to be performed.

BACKGROUND

People conform due to normative and/or informational motivations in human-human interactions, and conformist behavior is modulated by factors related to the individual as well as factors associated with the group, context, and culture. Studies have yet to examine whether nonhuman agents also induce social conformity.

METHOD

Participants were assigned to a computer, robot, or human group and completed both a social and analytical task with the respective group.

RESULTS

Conformity measures (percentage of times participants answered in line with agents on critical trials) subjected to a 3 × 2 mixed ANOVA showed significantly higher conformity rates for the analytical versus the social task as well as a modulation of conformity depending of the perceived agent-task fit.

CONCLUSION

Findings indicate that nonhuman agents were able to exert a social conformity effect, which was modulated further by the perceived match between agent and task type. Participants conformed to comparable degrees with agents during the analytical task but conformed significantly more strongly on the social task as the group's human-likeness increased.

APPLICATION

Results suggest that users may react differently to the influence of nonhuman agent groups with the potential for variability in conformity depending on the domain of the task.

On the Necessity of Consciousness for Sophisticated Human Action

In this essay, we aim to counter and qualify the epiphenomenalist challenge proposed in this special issue on the grounds of empirical and theoretical arguments. The current body of scientific knowledge strongly indicates that conscious thought is a necessary condition for many human behaviors, and therefore, consciousness qualifies as a cause of those behaviors. We review illustrative experimental evidence for the causal power of conscious thought while also acknowledging its natural limitations. We argue that it is implausible that the metabolic costs inherent to conscious processes would have evolved in humans without any adaptive benefits. Moreover, we discuss the relevance of conscious thought to the issue of freedom. Many accounts hold conscious thought as necessary and conducive to naturalistic conceptions of personal freedom. Apart from these theories, we show that the conscious perception of freedom and the belief in free will provide sources of interesting findings, beneficial behavioral effects, and new avenues for research. We close by proposing our own challenge via outlining the gaps that have yet to be filled to establish hard evidence of an epiphenomenal model of consciousness. To be sure, we appreciate the epiphenomenalist challenge as it promotes critical thinking and inspires rigorous research. However, we see no merit in downplaying the causal significance of consciousness a priori. Instead, we believe it more worthwhile to focus on the complex interplay between conscious and other causal processes.

No Differential Effects of Neural and Psychological Explanations of Psychopathy on Moral Behavior

Research in neurocriminology has explored the link between neural functions and structures and the psychopathic disposition. This online experiment aimed to assess the effect of communicating the neuroscience of psychopathy on the degree to which lay people exhibited attitudes characteristic of psychopathy in particular in terms of moral behavior. If psychopathy is blamed on the brain, people may feel less morally responsible for their own psychopathic tendencies. In the study, participants read false feedback about their own psychopathic traits supposedly inferred from their Facebook likes, described either in neurobiological or cognitive terms. Participants were randomly allocated to read that they either had above-average or below-average psychopathic traits. We found no support for the hypothesis that the neuroscientific explanation of psychopathy influences moral behavior. This casts doubt on the fear that communicating the neuroscience of psychopathy will promote psychopathic attitudes.

Nurturing Our Better Nature: A Proposal for Cognitive Integrity as a Foundation for Autonomous Living

As we account for the genetic and environmental influences on morally-relevant character traits like intellectual honesty, industriousness, and self-control, do we risk becoming ever less accountable to ourselves? Behavioral genetic research suggests that about half the variance in such character traits is likely attributable to heredity, and a small fraction to the shared family environment. The remaining 40-60% is explained by neither genes nor family upbringing. This raises the question: how active a role can individuals play in shaping their own character? What, if anything, can and should one do to take responsibility for the kind of person one becomes? This paper sketches a novel theoretical proposal for addressing these questions, by drawing on several previously disparate lines of research within behavior genetics, philosophy, and experimental psychology. Our core proposal concerns the metacognitive capacity to engage in active, reality-based cognition, as opposed to passive, stimulus-driven processing or an active pretense at cognition (i.e., self-deception). We review arguments and evidence indicating that human beings both can and should exercise this capacity, which we have termed "cognitive integrity." We argue that doing so can in a certain sense "set us free" of our genetic and environmental influences-not by rendering them irrelevant, but by giving us the awareness and motivation to manage them more responsibly. This perspective has important implications for guiding the development of psychosocial interventions, and for informing how we direct ourselves more generally, both as individuals and as a society.

A free will needs a free mind: Belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism differentially predict belief in free will and determinism

In this article, we show that lay people's beliefs about how minds relate to bodies are more complex than past research suggests, and that treating them as a multidimensional construct helps explain inconclusive findings from the literature regarding their relation to beliefs about whether humans possess a free will. In two studies, we found that items previously used to assess a unidimensional belief in how minds relate to bodies indeed capture two distinguishable constructs (belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism) that differently predict belief in free will and two types of determinism (Studies 1 and 2). Additionally, we found that two fundamental personality traits pertaining to people's preference for experiential versus rational information processing predict those metaphysical beliefs that were theorized to be based on subjective phenomenological experience and rational deliberation, respectively (Study 2). In sum, beliefs about mind-body relations are a multidimensional construct with unique predictive abilities.

Laypersons' Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism: New Insights Linking the Social Psychology and Experimental Philosophy Paradigms

We linked between the social psychology and experimental philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) What intuitions do people have about free will and determinism? (2) Do free will beliefs predict differences in free will and determinism intuitions? and (3) Is there more to free will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did so with certainty. Examining intuitions of prosociality, future orientation, learning, meaningfulness, human uniqueness, and well-being, ratings were highest in the indeterministic universe condition and lowest in the deterministic universe condition, both significantly different from the uncertain universe condition. Participants' free will beliefs had only weak impact on realism, happiness, and learning intuitions but did not reverse the general intuition favoring indeterminism and showed no impact on other intuitions.

Preschoolers' conformity (and its motivation) is linked to own and parents' personalities

Previous studies on conformity have primarily focused on factors that moderate conformity rates overall and paid little attention to explaining the individual differences. In this study, we investigate five-factor model personality traits of both parents and children and experimentally elicited conformity in 3.5-year-olds (N = 59) using an Asch-like paradigm with which we measure both overt conformity (public responses) and covert opinions (private beliefs after conformist responses): A correct covert opinion after an incorrect conformist response results from a socially normative motivation, whereas an incorrect covert opinion results from an informational motivation. Our data show (1) low parental extroversion is associated with participants' overall rate of conformity, (2) and low participant extroversion and high openness are associated with an informational instead of a normative motivation to conform. This suggests that sensitivity to the social context or social engagement level, as manifested through extroversion, could be an important factor in conformist behaviour. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? We all conform, from early in life - and even when we should know better We can conform for normative and informational motivations Some are more prone to conform than others What does this study add? This is the first study to take an individual differences approach to developmental conformity Social engagement (extroversion) is an important factor in conformity.

Agency Beliefs Over Time and Across Cultures: Free Will Beliefs Predict Higher Job Satisfaction

In three studies, we examined the relationship between free will beliefs and job satisfaction over time and across cultures. Study 1 examined 252 Taiwanese real-estate agents over a 3-months period. Study 2 examined job satisfaction for 137 American workers on an online labor market over a 6-months period. Study 3 extended to a large sample of 14,062 employees from 16 countries and examined country-level moderators. We found a consistent positive relationship between the belief in free will and job satisfaction. The relationship was above and beyond other agency constructs (Study 2), mediated by perceived autonomy (Studies 2-3), and stronger in countries with a higher national endorsement of the belief in free will (Study 3). We conclude that free-will beliefs predict outcomes over time and across cultures beyond other agency constructs. We call for more cross-cultural and longitudinal studies examining free-will beliefs as predictors of real-life outcomes.

Does belief in free will make us feel good and satisfied?

Background

Recent studies have shown that maintaining a strong belief in free will may be associated with well-being at the workplace (Stillman, Baumeister, Vohs, Lambert, Fincham, & Brawer, 2010), more frequent attainment of pursued goals and emotional stability (Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011).

Participants and procedure

Two studies were conducted to investigate to what extent belief in free will (as opposed to belief in determinism) may be a good predictor of subjective well-being and ill-being (poor health condition). Study 1 investigated a sample of employees (N = 214): 106 women and 108 men. The second research was conducted among 436 students: 236 women and 198 men.

Results

The results of study 1 showed that those who believe in free will are satisfied with their lives and feel healthy. The results of study 2 showed that those who believe in free will feel better (have more positive emotions) and are more satisfied with their lives than those who believe in determinism.

Conclusions

Belief in free will has the potential for improving subjective well-being and belief in determinism (fate) lowers subjective well-being. What is more, the current study has also confirmed the results obtained by other researchers (Paulhus & Carey, 1994, Carey & Paulhus, 2013). The reliability of the free will subscale was replicated. Also, we confirmed a positive correlation between belief in free will and unpredictability, and between fatalistic determinism and unpredictability. The results of the present research proved that there is a need to develop and to promote belief in free will in societies and social policies because it can increase well-being.

Learning to infer the time of our actions and decisions from their consequences

Research shows that people infer the time of their actions and decisions from their consequences. We asked how people know how much time to subtract from consequences in order to infer their actions and decisions. They could either subtract a fixed, default, time from consequences, or learn from experience how much time to subtract in each situation. In two experiments, participants' actions were followed by a tone, which was presented either immediately or after a delay. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the time of their actions; in Experiment 2, the time of their decisions to act. Both actions and decisions were judged to occur sooner or later as a function of whether consequences were immediate or delayed. Estimations tended to be shifted toward their consequences, but in some cases they were shifted away from them. Most importantly, in all cases participants learned progressively to adjust their estimations with experience.

Belief in free will affects causal attributions when judging others' behavior

Free will is a cornerstone of our society, and psychological research demonstrates that questioning its existence impacts social behavior. In six studies, we tested whether believing in free will is related to the correspondence bias, which reflects people's automatic tendency to overestimate the influence of internal as compared to external factors when interpreting others' behavior. All studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the strength of the belief in free will and the correspondence bias. Moreover, in two experimental studies, we showed that weakening participants' belief in free will leads to a reduction of the correspondence bias. Finally, the last study demonstrates that believing in free will predicts prescribed punishment and reward behavior, and that this relation is mediated by the correspondence bias. Overall, these studies show that believing in free will impacts fundamental social-cognitive processes that are involved in the understanding of others' behavior.

Motivated malleability: Frontal cortical asymmetry predicts the susceptibility to social influence

Humans, just as many other animals, regulate their behavior in terms of approaching stimuli associated with pleasure and avoiding stimuli linked to harm. A person's current and chronic motivational direction - that is, approach versus avoidance orientation - is reliably reflected in the asymmetry of frontal cortical low-frequency oscillations. Using resting electroencephalography (EEG), we show that frontal asymmetry is predictive of the tendency to yield to social influence: Stronger right- than left-side frontolateral activation during a resting-state session prior to the experiment was robustly associated with a stronger inclination to adopt a peer group's judgments during perceptual decision-making (Study 1). We posit that this reflects the role of a person's chronic avoidance orientation in socially adjusted behavior. This claim was strongly supported by additional survey investigations (Studies 2a, 2b, 2c), all of which consistently revealed that trait avoidance was positively linked to the susceptibility to social influence. The present contribution thus stresses the relevance of chronic avoidance orientation in social conformity, refining (yet not contradicting) the longstanding view that socially influenced behavior is motivated by approach-related goals. Moreover, our findings valuably underscore and extend our knowledge on the association between frontal cortical asymmetry and a variety of psychological variables.

Communicating the Neuroscience of Psychopathy and Its Influence on Moral Behavior: Protocol of Two Experimental Studies

Neuroscience has identified brain structures and functions that correlate with psychopathic tendencies. Since psychopathic traits can be traced back to physical neural attributes, it has been argued that psychopaths are not truly responsible for their actions and therefore should not be blamed for their psychopathic behaviors. This experimental research aims to evaluate what effect communicating this theory of psychopathy has on the moral behavior of lay people. If psychopathy is blamed on the brain, people may feel less morally responsible for their own psychopathic tendencies and therefore may be more likely to display those tendencies. An online study will provide participants with false feedback about their psychopathic traits supposedly based on their digital footprint (i.e., Facebook likes), thus classifying them as having either above-average or below-average psychopathic traits and describing psychopathy in cognitive or neurobiological terms. This particular study will assess the extent to which lay people are influenced by feedback regarding their psychopathic traits, and how this might affect their moral behavior in online tasks. Public recognition of these potential negative consequences of neuroscience communication will also be assessed. A field study using the lost letter technique will be conducted to examine lay people's endorsement of neurobiological, as compared to cognitive, explanations of criminal behavior. This field and online experimental research could inform the future communication of neuroscience to the public in a way that is sensitive to the potential negative consequences of communicating such science. In particular, this research may have implications for the future means by which neurobiological predictors of offending can be safely communicated to offenders.

What Do You Believe In? French Translation of the FAD-Plus to Assess Beliefs in Free Will and Determinism and Their Relationship with Religious Practices and Personality Traits

The influence of (dis)belief in free will on prosocial behaviors and sense of control has attracted considerable interest over the last few years. The provision of relevant research tools to assess beliefs in free will and determinism for the community thus becomes a central endeavour. However, no relevant validated questionnaires are currently available to the French language community. Therefore, the present study was aimed at providing a valid French translation of the FAD-plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011), a questionnaire built to assess people’s beliefs in Free will and Determinism. Exploratory factor analysis of the data obtained in Sample 1 revealed a four factor model. Confirmatory factor analyses on the basis of Sample 2 data were conducted to compare the theoretical model advanced by Paulhus and Carey’s versus the model obtained in Sample 1. With only but a few modifications as compared to the original questionnaire, the questionnaire that we here propose appears to constitute a reliable tool for the French language community. We also examined the relationship between beliefs in free will, determinism and religious practices. We found that the more people are engaged in religious practices, the more they believe in determinism and in the inevitability of their future.

The Freedom to Pursue Happiness: Belief in Free Will Predicts Life Satisfaction and Positive Affect among Chinese Adolescents

A small amount of research has examined the association between the belief in free will and subjective well-being (SWB) among Western laypersons from individualist cultures. However, no study has examined this association among participants from collectivist cultures (e.g., Eastern Asian cultures). Therefore, in this study, we explored this association among two large, independent cohorts of Chinese adolescents (N₁ = 1,660; N₂ = 639; high school students). The belief in free will was measured by a self-reported questionnaire (Cohorts 1 and 2) and a two-alternative forced choice question regarding the existence of free will (Cohort 2). SWB included cognitive well-being (life satisfaction) and affective well-being (positive and negative affect) in both cohorts. Data analyses indicated that a stronger belief in free will was consistently associated with higher life satisfaction and positive affect in both cohorts. Our investigation provides evidence supporting the cultural generality of the positive effects of believing in free will on SWB.