Conditioning and cognition

Molecular mechanisms underpinning deconditioning-update in fear memory

Traumatic experiences are closely associated with some psychiatric conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder. Deconditioning-update promotes robust and long-lasting attenuation of aversive memories. The deconditioning protocol consists of applying weak/neutral footshocks during reactivations, so that the original tone-shock association is replaced by an innocuous stimulus that does not produce significant fear response. Here, we present the molecular bases that can support this mechanism. To this end, we used pharmacological tools to inhibit the activity of ionotropic glutamate receptors (NMDA-GluN2B and CP-AMPA), the activity of proteases (calpains), and the receptors that control intracellular calcium storage (IP3 receptors), as well as the endocannabinoid system (CB1). Our results indicate that blocking these molecular targets prevents fear memory update by deconditioning. Therefore, this study uncovered the molecular substrate of deconditioning-update strategy, and, broadly, shed new light on the traumatic memory destabilization mechanisms that might be used to break the boundaries regarding reconsolidation-based approaches to deal with maladaptive memories.

Fear Reduced Through Unconditional Stimulus Deflation Is Behaviorally Distinct From Extinction and Differentially Engages the Amygdala

Background

Context fear memory can be reliably reduced by subsequent pairings of that context with a weaker shock. This procedure shares similarities with extinction learning: both involve extended time in the conditioning chamber following training and reduce context-elicited fear. Unlike extinction, this weak-shock exposure has been hypothesized to engage reconsolidation-like processes that weaken the original memory.

Methods

We directly compared the weak-shock procedure with extinction using male and female Long Evans rats.

Results

Both repeated weak-shock exposure and extinction resulted in decreased context freezing relative to animals that received context fear conditioning but no subsequent context exposure. Conditioning with the weak shock was not enough to form a persistent context-shock association on its own, suggesting that the weak-shock procedure does not create a new memory. Weak-shock exposure in a new context can still reduce freezing elicited by the training context, suggesting that it reduces responding through a different process than extinction, which does not transcend context. Finally, reduced fear behavior produced through both extinction and weak-shock exposure was mirrored by reduced zif268 expression in the basolateral amygdala. However, only the weak-shock procedure resulted in changes in lysine-48 polyubiquitin tagging in the synapse of the basolateral amygdala, suggesting that this procedure produced long-lasting changes in synaptic function within the basolateral amygdala.

Conclusions

These results suggest that the weak-shock procedure does not rely on the creation of a new inhibitory memory, as in extinction, and instead may alter the original representation of the shock to reduce fear responding.

Using internal memory representations in associative learning to study hallucination-like phenomenon

Studies of Pavlovian conditioning have enriched our understanding of how relations among events can adaptively guide behavior through the formation and use of internal mental representations. In this review, we illustrate how internal representations flexibly integrate new updated information in reinforcer revaluation to influence relationships to impact actions and outcomes. We highlight representation-mediated learning to show the similarities in properties and functions between internally generated and directly activated representations, and how normal perception of internal representations could contribute to hallucinations. Converging evidence emerges from recent behavioral and neural activation studies using animal models of schizophrenia as well as clinical studies in patients to support increased tendencies in these populations to evoke internal representations from prior associative experience that approximate hallucination-like percepts. The heightened propensity is dependent on dopaminergic activation which is known to be sensitive to hippocampal overexcitability, a condition that has been observed in patients with psychosis. This presents a network that overlaps with cognitive neural circuits and offers a fresh approach for the development of therapeutic interventions targeting psychosis.

Mental imagery in animals: Learning, memory, and decision-making in the face of missing information

When we open our eyes, we see a world filled with objects and events. Yet, due to occlusion of some objects by others, we only have partial perceptual access to the events that transpire around us. I discuss the body of research on mental imagery in animals. I first cover prior studies of mental rotation in pigeons and imagery using working memory procedures first developed for human studies. Next, I discuss the seminal work on a type of learning called mediated conditioning in rats. I then provide more in-depth coverage of work from my lab suggesting that rats can use imagery to fill in missing details of the world that are expected but hidden from perception. We have found that rats make use of an active expectation (i.e., an image) of a hidden visual event. I describe the behavioral and neurobiological studies investigating the use of a mental image, its theoretical basis, and its connections to current human cognitive neuroscience research on episodic memory, imagination, and mental simulations. Collectively, the reviewed literature provides insight into the mechanisms that mediate the flexible use of an image during ambiguous situations. I position this work in the broader scientific and philosophical context surrounding the concept of mental imagery in human and nonhuman animals.

Explicit and implicit emotion regulation: a multi-level framework

The ability to adaptively regulate emotion is essential for mental and physical well-being. How should we organize the myriad ways people attempt to regulate their emotions? We explore the utility of a framework that distinguishes among four fundamental classes of emotion regulation strategies. The framework describes each strategy class in terms their behavioral characteristics, underlying psychological processes and supporting neural systems. A key feature of this multi-level framework is its conceptualization of the psychological processes in terms of two orthogonal dimensions that describe (i) the nature of the emotion regulation goal (ranging from to implicit to explicit) and (ii) the nature of the emotion change process (ranging from more automatic to more controlled). After describing the core elements of the framework, we use it to review human and animal research on the neural bases of emotion regulation and to suggest key directions for future research on emotion regulation.

The mind of plants: Thinking the unthinkable

Across all species, individuals thrive in complex ecological systems, which they rarely have complete knowledge of. To cope with this uncertainty and still make good choices while avoiding costly errors, organisms have developed the ability to exploit key features associated with their environment. That through experience, humans and other animals are quick at learning to associate specific cues with particular places, events and circumstances has long been known; the idea that plants are also capable of learning by association had never been proven until now. Here I comment on the recent paper that experimentally demonstrated associative learning in plants, thus qualifying them as proper subjects of cognitive research. Additionally, I make the point that the current fundamental premise in cognitive science—that we must understanding the precise neural underpinning of a given cognitive feature in order to understand the evolution of cognition and behavior—needs to be reimagined.

A System Computational Model of Implicit Emotional Learning

Nowadays, the experimental study of emotional learning is commonly based on classical conditioning paradigms and models, which have been thoroughly investigated in the last century. Unluckily, models based on classical conditioning are unable to explain or predict important psychophysiological phenomena, such as the failure of the extinction of emotional responses in certain circumstances (for instance, those observed in evaluative conditioning, in post-traumatic stress disorders and in panic attacks). In this manuscript, starting from the experimental results available from the literature, a computational model of implicit emotional learning based both on prediction errors computation and on statistical inference is developed. The model quantitatively predicts (a) the occurrence of evaluative conditioning, (b) the dynamics and the resistance-to-extinction of the traumatic emotional responses, (c) the mathematical relation between classical conditioning and unconditioned stimulus revaluation. Moreover, we discuss how the derived computational model can lead to the development of new animal models for resistant-to-extinction emotional reactions and novel methodologies of emotions modulation.

Learning history and cholinergic modulation in the dorsal hippocampus are necessary for rats to infer the status of a hidden event

Identifying statistical patterns between environmental stimuli enables organisms to respond adaptively when cues are later observed. However, stimuli are often obscured from detection, necessitating behavior under conditions of ambiguity. Considerable evidence indicates decisions under ambiguity rely on inference processes that draw on past experiences to generate predictions under novel conditions. Despite the high demand for this process and the observation that it deteriorates disproportionately with age, the underlying mechanisms remain unknown. We developed a rodent model of decision-making during ambiguity to examine features of experience that contribute to inference. Rats learned either a simple (positive patterning) or complex (negative patterning) instrumental discrimination between the illumination of one or two lights. During test, only one light was lit while the other relevant light was blocked from physical detection (covered by an opaque shield, rendering its status ambiguous). We found experience with the complex negative patterning discrimination was necessary for rats to behave sensitively to the ambiguous test situation. These rats behaved as if they inferred the presence of the hidden light, responding differently than when the light was explicitly absent (uncovered and unlit). Differential expression profiles of the immediate early gene cFos indicated hippocampal involvement in the inference process while localized microinfusions of the muscarinic antagonist, scopolamine, into the dorsal hippocampus caused rats to behave as if only one light was present. That is, blocking cholinergic modulation prevented the rat from inferring the presence of the hidden light. Collectively, these results suggest cholinergic modulation mediates recruitment of hippocampal processes related to past experiences and transfer of these processes to make decisions during ambiguous situations. Our results correspond with correlations observed between human brain function and inference abilities, suggesting our experiments may inform interventions to alleviate or prevent cognitive dysfunction. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Imagine that! Cue-evoked representations guide rat behavior during ambiguous situations

Mental imagery involves the perceptual-like experience of an event that is not physically present, or detected by the senses. Fast and Blaisdell (2011) reported that rats use the representation of an associatively retrieved event to guide behavior in ambiguous situations. Rats were reinforced for lever-pressing during 1 of 2 lights but not both lights. They were then tested with 1 light illuminated while the second light was either covered by an opaque shield (ambiguous) or uncovered and unlit (explicitly absent). Rats lever-pressed less when the second light was covered compared with unlit, suggesting that a representation of the ambiguously absent light guided their behavior. However, Dwyer and Burgess (2011) offered an alternative mechanism in which the explicit absence of a cue gains associative value during training. Covering the light at test could effectively remove these associative properties, resulting in a generalization decrement of behavior. The current experiments were designed to test contrasting predictions made by these 2 accounts. Experiment 1 empirically established that generalization decrement can occur when an element of a compound cue is presented alone at test, but this decrement is attenuated, rather than enhanced, when the absent element is covered. Experiment 2 utilized a conditioned inhibition procedure to demonstrate that rat behavior during cue ambiguity is driven by an associatively retrieved representation rather than by generalization decrement. Collectively, the results argue against a purely nonrepresentational associative account of behavior and support a role for associatively retrieved representations in rats.

Impaired Reality Testing in Mice Lacking Phospholipase Cβ1: Observed by Persistent Representation-Mediated Taste Aversion

Hallucinations and delusions are the most prominent symptoms of schizophrenia and characterized by impaired reality testing. Representation-mediated taste aversion (RMTA) has been proposed as a potential behavioral assessment of reality testing and has been applied to a neurodevelopmental rat model of schizophrenia. However, the theory underlying this approach has not been generalized yet with any demonstration of impaired reality testing in other animal models of schizophrenia, such as genetically-modified mice. We devised a RMTA procedure for mice that combines a Pavlovian association protocol pairing odor conditioned stimulus (CS) with sugar reward unconditioned stimulus (US), and a conditioned taste aversion (CTA) method. In this RMTA paradigm, we compared performances of wild-type (PLCβ1+/+) mice and phospholipase C β1 knock-out (PLCβ1-/-) mice which are known as one of the genetic models for schizophrenia. With a minimal amount of initial odor-sugar associative training, both PLCβ1+/+ and PLCβ1-/- mice were able to form an aversion to the sugar reward when the odor CS predicting sugar was paired with nausea. With an extended initial training, however, only PLCβ1-/- mice could form a RMTA. This persistent RMTA displayed by PLCβ1-/- mice shows their inability to distinguish real sugar from the CS-evoked representation of sugar at a stage in associative learning where wild-type mice normally could differentiate the two. These results demonstrate an impaired reality testing first observed in a genetic mouse model of schizophrenia, and suggest that RMTA paradigm may, with general applicability, allow diverse biological approaches to impaired reality testing.

Abstract Context Representations in Primate Amygdala and Prefrontal Cortex

Neurons in prefrontal cortex (PFC) encode rules, goals, and other abstract information thought to underlie cognitive, emotional, and behavioral flexibility. Here we show that the amygdala, a brain area traditionally thought to mediate emotions, also encodes abstract information that could underlie this flexibility. Monkeys performed a task in which stimulus-reinforcement contingencies varied between two sets of associations, each defining a context. Reinforcement prediction required identifying a stimulus and knowing the current context. Behavioral evidence indicated that monkeys utilized this information to perform inference and adjust their behavior. Neural representations in both amygdala and PFC reflected the linked sets of associations implicitly defining each context, a process requiring a level of abstraction characteristic of cognitive operations. Surprisingly, when errors were made, the context signal weakened substantially in the amygdala. These data emphasize the importance of maintaining abstract cognitive information in the amygdala to support flexible behavior.

The Origins and Organization of Vertebrate Pavlovian Conditioning

Pavlovian conditioning is the process by which we learn relationships between stimuli and thus constitutes a basic building block for how the brain constructs representations of the world. We first review the major concepts of Pavlovian conditioning and point out many of the pervasive misunderstandings about just what conditioning is. This brings us to a modern redefinition of conditioning as the process whereby experience with a conditional relationship between stimuli bestows these stimuli with the ability to promote adaptive behavior patterns that did not occur before the experience. Working from this framework, we provide an in-depth analysis of two examples, fear conditioning and food-based appetitive conditioning, which include a description of the only partially overlapping neural circuitry of each. We also describe how these circuits promote the basic characteristics that define Pavlovian conditioning, such as error-correction-driven regulation of learning.

Neural Representations of Unconditioned Stimuli in Basolateral Amygdala Mediate Innate and Learned Responses

Stimuli that possess inherently rewarding or aversive qualities elicit emotional responses and also induce learning by imparting valence upon neutral sensory cues. Evidence has accumulated implicating the amygdala as a critical structure in mediating these processes. We have developed a genetic strategy to identify the representations of rewarding and aversive unconditioned stimuli (USs) in the basolateral amygdala (BLA) and have examined their role in innate and learned responses. Activation of an ensemble of US-responsive cells in the BLA elicits innate physiological and behavioral responses of different valence. Activation of this US ensemble can also reinforce appetitive and aversive learning when paired with differing neutral stimuli. Moreover, we establish that the activation of US-responsive cells in the BLA is necessary for the expression of a conditioned response. Neural representations of conditioned and unconditioned stimuli therefore ultimately connect to US-responsive cells in the BLA to elicit both innate and learned responses.

Incentive salience attribution under reward uncertainty: A Pavlovian model

There is a vast literature on the behavioural effects of partial reinforcement in Pavlovian conditioning. Compared with animals receiving continuous reinforcement, partially rewarded animals typically show (a) a slower development of the conditioned response (CR) early in training and (b) a higher asymptotic level of the CR later in training. This phenomenon is known as the partial reinforcement acquisition effect (PRAE). Learning models of Pavlovian conditioning fail to account for it. In accordance with the incentive salience hypothesis, it is here argued that incentive motivation (or 'wanting') plays a more direct role in controlling behaviour than does learning, and reward uncertainty is shown to have an excitatory effect on incentive motivation. The psychological origin of that effect is discussed and a computational model integrating this new interpretation is developed. Many features of CRs under partial reinforcement emerge from this model.

Dual reward prediction components yield Pavlovian sign- and goal-tracking

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become a dominant paradigm for understanding animal behaviors and neural correlates of decision-making, in part because of its ability to explain Pavlovian conditioned behaviors and the role of midbrain dopamine activity as reward prediction error (RPE). However, recent experimental findings indicate that dopamine activity, contrary to the RL hypothesis, may not signal RPE and differs based on the type of Pavlovian response (e.g. sign- and goal-tracking responses). In this study, we address this discrepancy by introducing a new neural correlate for learning reward predictions; the correlate is called "cue-evoked reward". It refers to a recall of reward evoked by the cue that is learned through simple cue-reward associations. We introduce a temporal difference learning model, in which neural correlates of the cue itself and cue-evoked reward underlie learning of reward predictions. The animal's reward prediction supported by these two correlates is divided into sign and goal components respectively. We relate the sign and goal components to approach responses towards the cue (i.e. sign-tracking) and the food-tray (i.e. goal-tracking) respectively. We found a number of correspondences between simulated models and the experimental findings (i.e. behavior and neural responses). First, the development of modeled responses is consistent with those observed in the experimental task. Second, the model's RPEs were similar to dopamine activity in respective response groups. Finally, goal-tracking, but not sign-tracking, responses rapidly emerged when RPE was restored in the simulated models, similar to experiments with recovery from dopamine-antagonist. These results suggest two complementary neural correlates, corresponding to the cue and its evoked reward, form the basis for learning reward predictions in the sign- and goal-tracking rats.

A view of obesity as a learning and memory disorder

This articles describes how a cascade of associative relationships involving the sensory properties of foods, the nutritional consequences of their consumption, and perceived internal states may play an important role in the learned control of energy intake and body weight regulation. In addition, we describe ways in which dietary factors in the current environment can promote excess energy intake and body weight gain by degrading these relationships or by interfering with the neural substrates that underlie the ability of animals to use them to predict the nutritive or energetic consequences of intake. We propose that an expanded appreciation of the diversity of orosensory, gastrointestinal, and energy state signals about which animals learn, combined with a greater understanding of predictive relationships in which these cues are embedded, will help generate new information and novel approaches to addressing the current global problems of obesity and metabolic disease.

Human cognitive function and the obesogenic environment

Evidence is accumulating which suggests that, in addition to leading to unprecedented rates of obesity, the current food environment is contributing to the development of cognitive impairment and dementia. Recent experimental research indicates that many of the cognitive deficits associated with obesity involve fundamental inhibitory processes that have important roles in the control of food intake, implicating these cognitive impairments as a risk factor for weight gain. Here, we review experiments that link obesity with deficits in memory, attentional, and behavioral control and contemplate how these deficits may predispose individuals to overeat. Specifically, we discuss how deficits in inhibitory control may reduce one's ability to resist eating when confronted with the variety of foods and food cues that are ubiquitous in today's environment. Special attention is given to the importance of memory inhibition to the control of eating and appetitive behavior, and the role of the hippocampus in this process. We also discuss the potential etiology of both obesity and obesity-related cognitive impairment, highlighting non-human animal research which links both of these effects to the consumption of the modern "Western" diet that is high in saturated fats and simple carbohydrates. We conclude that part of what makes the current food environment "obesogenic" is the increased presence of food cues and the increased consumption of a diet which compromises our ability to resist those cues. Improving control over food-related cognitive processing may be useful not only for combating the obesity epidemic but also for minimizing the risk of serious cognitive disorder later in life.

Repeated Activation of a CS-US-Contingency Memory Results in Sustained Conditioned Responding

Individuals seem to differ in conditionability, i.e., the ease by which the contingent presentation of two stimuli will lead to a conditioned response. In contemporary learning theory, individual differences in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders are, among others, explained by individual differences in temperamental variables (Mineka and Zinbarg, 2006). One such individual difference variable is how people process a learning experience when the conditioning stimuli are no longer present. Repeatedly thinking about the conditioning experience, as in worry or rumination, might prolong the initial (fear) reactions and as such, might leave certain individuals more vulnerable to developing an anxiety disorder. However, in human conditioning research, relatively little attention has been devoted to the processing of a memory trace after its initial acquisition, despite its potential influences on subsequent performance. Post-acquisition processing can be induced by mental reiteration of a conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus (CS-US)-contingency. Using a human conditioned suppression paradigm, we investigated the effect of repeated activations of a CS-US-contingency memory on the level of conditioned responding at a later test. Results of three experiments showed more sustained responding to a "rehearsed" CS+ as compared to a "non-rehearsed" CS+. Moreover, the second experiment showed no effect of rehearsal when only the CS was rehearsed instead of the CS-US-contingency. The third experiment demonstrated that mental CS-US-rehearsal has the same effect regardless of whether it was cued by the CS and a verbal reference to the US or by a neutral signal, making the rehearsal "purely mental." In sum, it was demonstrated that post-acquisition activation of a CS-US-contingency memory can impact conditioned responding, underlining the importance of post-acquisition processes in conditioning. This might indicate that individuals who are more prone to mentally rehearse information condition more easily.

Rethinking the cognitive revolution from a neural perspective: how overuse/misuse of the term 'cognition' and the neglect of affective controls in behavioral neuroscience could be delaying progress in understanding the BrainMind

Words such as cognition, motivation and emotion powerfully guide theory development and the overall aims and goals of behavioral neuroscience research. Once such concepts are accepted generally as natural aspects of the brain, their influence can be pervasive and long lasting. Importantly, the choice of conceptual terms used to describe and study mental/neural functions can also constrain research by forcing the results into seemingly useful 'conceptual' categories that have no discrete reality in the brain. Since the popularly named 'cognitive revolution' in psychological science came to fruition in the early 1970s, the term cognitive or cognition has been perhaps the most widely used conceptual term in behavioral neuroscience. These terms, similar to other conceptual terms, have potential value if utilized appropriately. We argue that recently the term cognition has been both overused and misused. This has led to problems in developing a usable shared definition for the term and to promotion of possible misdirections in research within behavioral neuroscience. In addition, we argue that cognitive-guided research influenced primarily by top-down (cortical toward subcortical) perspectives without concurrent non-cognitive modes of bottom-up developmental thinking, could hinder progress in the search for new treatments and medications for psychiatric illnesses and neurobehavioral disorders. Overall, linkages of animal research insights to human psychology may be better served by bottom-up (subcortical to cortical) affective and motivational 'state-control' perspectives, simply because the lower networks of the brain are foundational for the construction of higher 'information-processing' aspects of mind. Moving forward, rapidly expanding new techniques and creative methods in neuroscience along with more accurate brain concepts, may help guide the development of new therapeutics and hopefully more accurate ways to describe and explain brain-behavior relationships.

Roles of aminergic neurons in formation and recall of associative memory in crickets

We review recent progress in the study of roles of octopaminergic (OA-ergic) and dopaminergic (DA-ergic) signaling in insect classical conditioning, focusing on our studies on crickets. Studies on olfactory learning in honey bees and fruit-flies have suggested that OA-ergic and DA-ergic neurons convey reinforcing signals of appetitive unconditioned stimulus (US) and aversive US, respectively. Our work suggested that this is applicable to olfactory, visual pattern, and color learning in crickets, indicating that this feature is ubiquitous in learning of various sensory stimuli. We also showed that aversive memory decayed much faster than did appetitive memory, and we proposed that this feature is common in insects and humans. Our study also suggested that activation of OA- or DA-ergic neurons is needed for appetitive or aversive memory recall, respectively. To account for this finding, we proposed a model in which it is assumed that two types of synaptic connections are strengthened by conditioning and are activated during memory recall, one type being connections from neurons representing conditioned stimulus (CS) to neurons inducing conditioned response and the other being connections from neurons representing CS to OA- or DA-ergic neurons representing appetitive or aversive US, respectively. The former is called stimulus–response (S–R) connection and the latter is called stimulus–stimulus (S–S) connection by theorists studying classical conditioning in vertebrates. Results of our studies using a second-order conditioning procedure supported our model. We propose that insect classical conditioning involves the formation of S–S connection and its activation for memory recall, which are often called cognitive processes.

The basolateral amygdala mediates the effects of cues associated with meal interruption on feeding behavior

Considerable evidence shows that environmental cues that signal food delivery when rats are food-deprived can substantially potentiate feeding later when rats are food-sated. Similarly, cues associated with meal interruption, food removal or impending food scarcity may also induce increased eating. For example, after learning the association between a discrete "interruption" stimulus and the unexpected termination of food trials, sated rats show enhanced food consumption when exposed to that stimulus. In Experiment 1, unlike sham-lesioned controls, rats with bilateral excitotoxic lesions of the basolateral amygdala (BLA) failed to display such cue-potentiated feeding. In Experiment 2, potentiation of feeding by an interruption signal was found to be food-specific. That is, a stimulus that signaled interruption of trials with one food but not trials with a second food later only facilitated consumption of the first food. These studies extend our knowledge of the psychological and neural processes underlying cue-induced feeding. Understanding these mechanisms may contribute our understanding of the etiology and treatment of binge eating disorders.

Contextual, but not auditory, fear conditioning is disrupted by neurotoxic selective lesion of the basal nucleus of amygdala in rats

The basolateral amygdala complex (BLA) is involved in acquisition of contextual and auditory fear conditioning. However, the BLA is not a single structure but comprises a group of nuclei, including the lateral (LA), basal (BA) and accessory basal (AB) nuclei. While it is consensual that the LA is critical for auditory fear conditioning, there is controversy on the participation of the BA in fear conditioning. Hodological and neurophysiological findings suggest that each of these nuclei processes distinct information in parallel; the BA would deal with polymodal or contextual representations, and the LA would process unimodal or elemental representations. Thus, it seems plausible to hypothesize that the BA is required for contextual, but not auditory, fear conditioning. This hypothesis was evaluated in Wistar rats submitted to multiple-site ibotenate-induced damage restricted to the BA and then exposed to a concurrent contextual and auditory fear conditioning training followed by separated contextual and auditory conditioning testing. Differing from electrolytic lesion and lidocaine inactivation, this surgical approach does not disturb fibers of passage originating in other brain areas, restricting damage to the aimed nucleus. Relative to the sham-operated controls, rats with selective damage to the BA exhibited disruption of performance in the contextual, but not the auditory, component of the task. Thus, while the BA seems required for contextual fear conditioning, it is not critical for both an auditory-US association, nor for the expression of the freezing response.

Roles of octopaminergic and dopaminergic neurons in appetitive and aversive memory recall in an insect

Background

In insect classical conditioning, octopamine (the invertebrate counterpart of noradrenaline) or dopamine has been suggested to mediate reinforcing properties of appetitive or aversive unconditioned stimulus, respectively. However, the roles of octopaminergic and dopaminergic neurons in memory recall have remained unclear.

Results

We studied the roles of octopaminergic and dopaminergic neurons in appetitive and aversive memory recall in olfactory and visual conditioning in crickets. We found that pharmacological blockade of octopamine and dopamine receptors impaired aversive memory recall and appetitive memory recall, respectively, thereby suggesting that activation of octopaminergic and dopaminergic neurons and the resulting release of octopamine and dopamine are needed for appetitive and aversive memory recall, respectively. On the basis of this finding, we propose a new model in which it is assumed that two types of synaptic connections are formed by conditioning and are activated during memory recall, one type being connections from neurons representing conditioned stimulus to neurons inducing conditioned response and the other being connections from neurons representing conditioned stimulus to octopaminergic or dopaminergic neurons representing appetitive or aversive unconditioned stimulus, respectively. The former is called 'stimulus-response connection' and the latter is called 'stimulus-stimulus connection' by theorists studying classical conditioning in higher vertebrates. Our model predicts that pharmacological blockade of octopamine or dopamine receptors during the first stage of second-order conditioning does not impair second-order conditioning, because it impairs the formation of the stimulus-response connection but not the stimulus-stimulus connection. The results of our study with a cross-modal second-order conditioning were in full accordance with this prediction.

Conclusion

We suggest that insect classical conditioning involves the formation of two kinds of memory traces, which match to stimulus-stimulus connection and stimulus-response connection. This is the first study to suggest that classical conditioning in insects involves, as does classical conditioning in higher vertebrates, the formation of stimulus-stimulus connection and its activation for memory recall, which are often called cognitive processes.

Associative structure of fear memory after basolateral amygdala lesions in rats

The authors have recently demonstrated that rats with basolateral amygdala (BLA) lesions acquire Pavlovian fear conditioning after overtraining. However, it is not known whether the associative basis of Pavlovian fear memory acquired by rats with BLA lesions is similar to that of intact rats. Associations are typically formed between the conditional (CS) and unconditional (US) stimuli (stimulus-stimulus; S-S), although it is possible for stimuli to enter into association with the responses they produce (stimulus-response; S-R). Indeed, the central nucleus of the amygdala, which is essential for fear conditioning in rats with BLA lesions, may mediate S-R associations in some Pavlovian tasks. The authors therefore used a postconditioning US inflation procedure (i.e., exposure to intense footshock USs) to assess the contribution of S-S associations to fear conditioning after overtraining in rats with BLA lesions. In Experiment 1, intact rats that were overtrained and later inflated displayed elevated freezing levels when tested, indicating that S-S associations contribute to overtrained fear memories. Interestingly, neither neurotoxic BLA lesions nor temporary inactivation of the BLA during overtraining prevented the inflation effect (Experiment 2 and 3, respectively). These results reveal that S-S associations support Pavlovian fear memories after overtraining in both intact rats and rats with BLA lesions, and imply that the central nucleus of the amygdala encodes CS-US associations during fear conditioning.

A limited role for mediodorsal thalamus in devaluation tasks

Six experiments were performed to determine the role of mediodorsal thalamus (MD) in the devaluation task, varying the type of contingencies (Pavlovian or operant), the number of reinforcers (one vs. two), and the order of experiments (in naïve or experimentally experienced rats). MD-lesioned rats were impaired in devaluation performance when switched between Pavlovian and operant devaluation tasks, but not when switched from one Pavlovian devaluation task to another Pavlovian devaluation task. MD lesions caused no devaluation impairment in a multiple-reinforcer Pavlovian devaluation task. These results suggest that MD lesions impair performance in devaluation tasks as a result of an inability to switch the form of associations made from one type of outcome-encoding association to another. This is in accord with previous literature suggesting that MD is needed for strategy set shifting. The results further suggest that MD is a necessary part of devaluation circuits only in cases in which previous associations need to be suppressed in order for new associations to be learned and control behavior, and otherwise the devaluation circuit does not require MD.

Cognitive versus stimulus-response theories of learning

In his 1948 address to the Division of Theoretical-Experimental Psychology of the American Psychological Association, Kenneth W. Spence discussed six distinctions between cognitive and stimulus-response (S-R) theories of learning. In this article, I first review these six distinctions and then focus on two of them in the context of my own research. This research concerns the specification of stimulus-stimulus associations in associative learning and the characterization of the neural systems underlying those associations. In the course of describing Spence's views and my research, I hope to communicate some of the richness of Spence's S-R psychology and its currency within modern scientific analyses of behavior.

Amount of training and cue-evoked taste-reactivity responding in reinforcer devaluation

In two experiments, rats received minimal (16) pairings of one auditory conditioned stimulus (CS) cue with a sucrose reinforcer, and extensive (112) pairings of another auditory CS with that reinforcer. After sucrose was devalued by pairing it with lithium chloride in some rats (Devalue groups) but not others (Maintain groups), taste reactivity (TR) and other responses to unflavored water were assessed in the presence of the auditory CSs alone. The minimally trained CS controlled substantially more evaluative TR responses than the extensively trained CS. Those TR responses were hedonic (positive) in the Maintain groups, but aversive (negative) in the Devalue groups. By contrast, food cup entry and other responses thought not to reflect evaluative taste processing were controlled more by the extensively trained cue. These responses were reduced by sucrose devaluation comparably, regardless of the amount of training. The results suggest rapid changes in the content of learning as conditioning proceeds. Early in training, CSs may be capable of activating preevaluative processing of an absent food reinforcer that includes information about its palatability, but that capability is lost as training proceeds.

A selective role for neuronal activity regulated pentraxin in the processing of sensory-specific incentive value

Neuronal activity regulated pentraxin (Narp) is a secreted neuronal product which clusters AMPA receptors and regulates excitatory synaptogenesis. Although Narp is selectively enriched in brain, its role in behavior is not known. As Narp is expressed prominently in limbic regions, we examined whether Narp deletion affects performance on tasks used to assess motivational consequences of food-rewarded learning. Narp knock-out (KO) mice were unimpaired in learning simple pavlovian discriminations, instrumental lever pressing, and in acquisition of at least two aspects of pavlovian incentive learning, conditioned reinforcement and pavlovian-instrumental transfer. In contrast, Narp deletion resulted in a substantial deficit in the ability to use specific outcome expectancies to modulate instrumental performance in a devaluation task. In this task, mice were trained to respond on two levers for two different rewards. After training, mice were prefed with one of the two rewards, devaluing it. Responding on both levers was then assessed in extinction. Whereas control mice showed a significant preference in responding on the lever associated with the nondevalued reward, Narp KO mice responded equally on both levers, failing to suppress responding on the lever associated with the devalued reward. Both groups consumed more of the nondevalued reward in a subsequent choice test, indicating Narp KO mice could distinguish between the rewards themselves. These data suggest Narp has a selective role in processing sensory-specific information necessary for appropriate devaluation performance, but not in general motivational effects of reward-predictive cues on performance.

Behavioral functions of the mesolimbic dopaminergic system: an affective neuroethological perspective

The mesolimbic dopaminergic (ML-DA) system has been recognized for its central role in motivated behaviors, various types of reward, and, more recently, in cognitive processes. Functional theories have emphasized DA's involvement in the orchestration of goal-directed behaviors and in the promotion and reinforcement of learning. The affective neuroethological perspective presented here views the ML-DA system in terms of its ability to activate an instinctual emotional appetitive state (SEEKING) evolved to induce organisms to search for all varieties of life-supporting stimuli and to avoid harms. A description of the anatomical framework in which the ML system is embedded is followed by the argument that the SEEKING disposition emerges through functional integration of ventral basal ganglia (BG) into thalamocortical activities. Filtering cortical and limbic input that spreads into BG, DA transmission promotes the "release" of neural activity patterns that induce active SEEKING behaviors when expressed at the motor level. Reverberation of these patterns constitutes a neurodynamic process for the inclusion of cognitive and perceptual representations within the extended networks of the SEEKING urge. In this way, the SEEKING disposition influences attention, incentive salience, associative learning, and anticipatory predictions. In our view, the rewarding properties of drugs of abuse are, in part, caused by the activation of the SEEKING disposition, ranging from appetitive drive to persistent craving depending on the intensity of the affect. The implications of such a view for understanding addiction are considered, with particular emphasis on factors predisposing individuals to develop compulsive drug seeking behaviors.

Control of appetitive and aversive taste-reactivity responses by an auditory conditioned stimulus in a devaluation task: a FOS and behavioral analysis

Through associative learning, cues for biologically significant reinforcers such as food may gain access to mental representations of those reinforcers. Here, we used devaluation procedures, behavioral assessment of hedonic taste-reactivity responses, and measurement of immediate-early gene (IEG) expression to show that a cue for food engages behavior and brain activity related to sensory and hedonic processing of that food. Rats first received a tone paired with intraoral infusion of sucrose. Then, in the absence of the tone, the value of sucrose was reduced (Devalue group) by pairing sucrose with lithium chloride (LiCl), or maintained (Maintain group) by presenting sucrose and LiCl unpaired. Finally, taste-reactivity responses to the tone were assessed in the absence of sucrose. Devalue rats showed high levels of aversive responses and minimal appetitive responses, whereas Maintain rats exhibited substantial appetitive responding but little aversive responding. Control rats that had not received tone-sucrose pairings did not display either class of behaviors. Devalue rats showed greater FOS expression than Maintain rats in several brain regions implicated in devaluation task performance and the display of aversive responses, including the basolateral amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, gustatory cortex (GC), and the posterior accumbens shell (ACBs), whereas the opposite pattern was found in the anterior ACBs. Both Devalue and Maintain rats showed greater FOS expression than control rats in amygdala central nucleus, GC, and both subregions of ACBs. Thus, through associative learning, auditory cues for food gained access to neural processing in several brain regions importantly involved in the processing of taste memory information.

Concurrent excitors limit the extinction of conditioned fear in humans

In a human fear conditioning experiment, with on-line expectancy ratings and electrodermal responding as indices of fear, two neutral stimuli (pictures of geometric shapes) were first established as reliable predictors of an electric shock. In the subsequent extinction phase, the two stimuli were repeatedly presented in compound, without the shock. The final test phase consisted of individual stimulus presentations again, which resulted in a strong return of the conditioned responses. This effect was not observed in non-conditioned control stimuli. Hence, behavioral effects of extinction seem highly specific to the stimulus constellation that has gone through the extinction procedure. We argue that pharmacological, behavioral and/or cognitive manipulations that could prevent configural processing of stimulus constellations have direct clinical potential.

Intermittent hypoxia impairs performance of adult mice in the two-way shuttle box but not in the Morris water maze

We have previously found that neonatal intermittent hypobaric hypoxia exposure enhanced mouse spatial, but impaired associative, cognition. This study sought to investigate the effects of hypobaric hypoxia on adult mice cognition. Mice were exposed to 2, 5, 10, 15, or 25 days of intermittent hypoxia (IH; 4 hr/day) at 2 km (16.0% O2) or 5 km (10.8% O2) altitudes in a hypobaric chamber for the Morris water maze (MWM) test and exposed to IH for 2, 10, or 25 days for the shuttle-box test. Amino acid dynamics in vivo in the hippocampus and amygdala of mice exposed to 2 km hypoxia were analyzed by high-pressure liquid chromatography. The results in MWM task showed that IH-2d to -25d at 2 km or 5 km did not change the escape latencies of mice in the training test or the retention of platform in the probe test. In the shuttle-box task, however, IH-10d at 5 km significantly reduced mouse avoidances in the acquisition test on day 4, and IH-10d at 2 km reduced avoidances in the retention test; IH-25d at 5 km significantly reduced avoidances of mice throughout the acquisition days. Glutamate in the amygdala persisted in declining to 69% of baseline at 8 hr posthypoxia (P = 0.040 vs. GLU released during 30 min before hypoxia) during the posthypoxia stage. These results suggest that adult hypobaric IH impairs the hippocampal-independent, but not the hippocampal-dependent, task in mice. The different GLU releases in the hippocampus and amygdala in response to hypoxia are involved in the different behaviors.