A neurocognitive theory of higher mental emergence: From anoetic affective experiences to noetic knowledge and autonoetic awareness

Decoding the language of fear: Unveiling objective and subjective indicators in rodent models through a systematic review and meta-analysis

While rodent models are vital for studying mental disorders, the underestimation of construct validity of fear indicators has led to limitations in translating to effective clinical treatments. Addressing this gap, we systematically reviewed 5054 articles from the 1960 s, understanding underlying theoretical advancement, and selected 68 articles with at least two fear indicators for a three-level meta-analysis. We hypothesized correlations between different indicators would elucidate similar functions, while magnitude differences could reveal distinct neural or behavioral mechanisms. Our findings reveal a shift towards using freezing behavior as the primary fear indicator in rodent models, and strong, moderate, and weak correlations between freezing and conditioned suppression ratios, 22-kHz ultrasonic vocalizations, and autonomic nervous system responses, respectively. Using freezing as a reference, moderator analysis shows treatment types and fear stages significantly influenced differences in magnitudes between two indicators. Our analysis supports a two-system model of fear in rodents, where objective and subjective fears could operate on a threshold-based mechanism.

The role of bodily self-consciousness in episodic memory of naturalistic events: an immersive virtual reality study

Recent studies suggest that the human body plays a critical role in episodic memory. Still, the precise relationship between bodily self-consciousness (BSC) and memory formation of specific events, especially in real-life contexts, remains a topic of ongoing research. The present study investigated the relationship between BSC and episodic memory (EM) using immersive virtual reality (VR) technology. Participants were immersed in an urban environment with naturalistic events, while their visuomotor feedback was manipulated in three within-subjects conditions: Synchronous, Asynchronous, and No-body. Our results show that asynchronous visuomotor feedback and not seeing one's body, compared to synchronous feedback, decrease the sense of self-identification, self-location and agency, and sense of presence. Moreover, navigating in the Asynchronous condition had a detrimental impact on incidental event memory, perceptual details, contextual association, subjective sense of remembering, and memory consolidation. In contrast, participants in the No-Body condition were only impaired in egocentric spatial memory and the sense of remembering at ten-day delay. We discuss these findings in relation to the role of bodily self-representation in space during event memory encoding. This study sheds light on the complex interplay between BSC, sense of presence, and episodic memory processes, and strengthens the potential of embodiment and VR technology in studying and enhancing human cognition.

Consciousness beyond the human case

There is growing interest in the relationship been AI and consciousness. Joseph LeDoux and Jonathan Birch thought it would be a good moment to put some of the big questions in this area to some leading experts. The challenge of addressing the questions they raised was taken up by Kristin Andrews, Nicky Clayton, Nathaniel Daw, Chris Frith, Hakwan Lau, Megan Peters, Susan Schneider, Anil Seth, Thomas Suddendorf, and Marie Vanderkerckhoeve.

Consciousness, Memory, and the Human Self: Commentary on "Consciousness as a Memory System" by Budson et al (2022)

Philosophical theories have attempted to shed light on the intricate relationships between consciousness and memory since long before this became a major theme in psychology and neuroscience. In the December 2022 issue of Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology , Budson, Richman, and Kensinger (2022) introduced a comprehensive theoretical framework pertaining to the origins of consciousness in relation to the memory system, its implications on our real-time perception of the world, and the neuroanatomical correlates underlying these phenomena. Throughout their paper, Budson et al (2022) focus on their theory's explanatory value regarding several clinical syndromes and experimental findings. In this commentary, we first summarize the theory presented by Budson and colleagues (2022). Then, we suggest a complementary approach of studying the relationships between consciousness and memory through the concept of the human self and its protracted representation through time (so-called mental time travel). Finally, we elaborate on Budson and colleagues' (2022) neuroanatomical explanation to their theory and suggest that adding the concepts of brain networks and cortical gradients may contribute to their theory's interpretability.

An integrative perspective on the role of touch in the development of intersubjectivity

Touch concerns a fundamental component of sociality. In this review, we examine the hypothesis that somatomotor development constitutes a crucial psychophysiological element in the ontogeny of intersubjectivity. An interdisciplinary perspective is provided on how the communication channel of touch contributes to the sense of self and extends to the social self. During gestation, the transformation of random movements into organized sequences of actions with sensory consequences parallels the development of the brain's functional architecture. Brain subsystems shaped by the coordinated activity of somatomotor circuits to support these first body-environment interactions are the first brain functional arrangements to develop. We propose that tactile self-referring behaviour during gestation constitutes a prototypic mode of interpersonal exchange that supports the subsequent development of intersubjective exchange. The reviewed research suggests that touch constitutes a pivotal bodily experience that in early stages builds and later filters self-other interactions. This view is corroborated by the fact that aberrant social-affective touch experiences appear fundamentally associated with attachment anomalies, interpersonal trauma, and personality disorders. Given the centrality of touch for the development of intersubjectivity and for psychopathological conditions in the social domain, dedicated research is urged to elucidate the role of touch in the evolution of subjective self-other coding.

Approaching or Decentering? Differential Neural Networks Underlying Experiential Emotion Regulation and Cognitive Defusion

The current study investigated the bottom-up experiential emotion regulation in comparison to the cognitiveve top down-approach of cognitive defusion. Rooted in an experiential- and client-centered psychotherapeutic approach, experiential emotion regulation involves an active, non-intervening, accepting, open and welcoming approach towards the bodily felt affective experience in a welcoming, compassionate way, expressed in ‘experiential awareness’ in a first phase, and its verbalization or ‘experiential expression’ in a second phase. Defusion refers to the ability to observe one’s thoughts and feelings in a detached manner. Nineteen healthy participants completed an emotion regulation task during fMRI scanning by processing highly arousing negative events by images. Both experiential emotion regulation and cognitive defusion resulted in higher negative emotion compared to a ‘watch’ control condition. On the neurophysiological level, experiential emotion regulation recruited brain areas that regulate attention towards affective- and somatosensorial experience such as the anterior cingulate cortex, the paracingulate gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the prefrontal pole, areas underlying multisensory information integration (e.g., angular gyrus), and linking body states to emotion recognition and awareness (e.g., postcentral gyrus). Experiential emotion regulation, relative to the control condition, also resulted in a higher interaction between the anterior insular cortex and left amygdala while participants experienced less negative emotion. Cognitive defusion decreased activation in the subcortical areas such as the brainstem, the thalamus, the amygdala, and the hippocampus. In contrast to cognitive defusion, experiential emotion regulation relative to demonstrated greater activation in the left angular gyrus, indicating more multisensory information integration. These findings provide insight into different and specific neural networks underlying psychotherapy-based experiential emotion regulation and cognitive defusion.

Flights and Perchings of the BrainMind: A Temporospatial Approach to Psychotherapy

This article introduces a process-oriented approach for improving present moment conceptualization in psychotherapy that is in alignment with neuroscience: the Temporospatial movements of mind (TSMM) model. We elaborate on seven temporal movements that describe the moment-to-moment morphogenesis of emotional feelings and thoughts from inception to maturity. Temporal refers to the passage of time through which feelings and thoughts develop, and electromagnetic activity, that among other responsibilities, bind information across time. Spatial dynamics extend from an undifferentiated to three dimensional experiences of emotional and cognitive processes. Neurophysiologically, spatial refers to structures within the brain and their varying interactions with one another. This article culminates in the development of an atheoretical temporospatial grid that may help clinicians conceptualize where patients are in their cognitive and emotional development to further guide technique.

Consciousness generates agent action

Consciousness directs the actions of the agent for its own purposive gains. It re-organises a stimulus-response linear causality to deliver generative, creative agent action that evaluates the subsequent experience prospectively. This inversion of causality affords special properties of control that are not accounted for in integrated information theory (IIT), which is predicated on a linear, deterministic cause-effect model. IIT remains an incomplete, abstract, and disembodied theory without explanation of the psychobiology of consciousness that serves the vital agency the organism.

As soon as there was life, there was danger: the deep history of survival behaviours and the shallower history of consciousness

It is often said that fear is a universal innate emotion that we humans have inherited from our mammalian ancestors by virtue of having inherited conserved features of their nervous systems. Contrary to this common sense-based scientific point of view, I have argued that what we have inherited from our mammalian ancestors, and they from their distal vertebrate ancestors, and they from their chordate ancestors, and so forth, is not a fear circuit. It is, instead, a defensive survival circuit that detects threats, and in response, initiates defensive survival behaviours and supporting physiological adjustments. Seen in this light, the defensive survival circuits of humans and other mammals can be conceptualized as manifestations of an ancient survival function-the ability to detect danger and respond to it-that may in fact predate animals and their nervous systems, and perhaps may go back to the beginning of life. Fear, on the other hand, from my perspective, is a product of cortical cognitive circuits. This conception is not just of academic interest. It also has practical implications, offering clues as to why efforts to treat problems related to fear and anxiety are not more effective, and what might make them better. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

A computational neuroethology perspective on body and expression perception

Survival prompts organisms to prepare adaptive behavior in response to environmental and social threat. However, what are the specific features of the appearance of a conspecific that trigger such adaptive behaviors? For social species, the prime candidates for triggering defense systems are the visual features of the face and the body. We propose a novel approach for studying the ability of the brain to gather survival-relevant information from seeing conspecific body features. Specifically, we propose that behaviorally relevant information from bodies and body expressions is coded at the levels of midlevel features in the brain. These levels are relatively independent from higher-order cognitive and conscious perception of bodies and emotions. Instead, our approach is embedded in an ethological framework and mobilizes computational models for feature discovery.

What emotions might be like in other animals

In this My word, Joseph LeDoux explores what the emotional lives of other mammals might be like. He proposes that better understanding of the brain mechanisms of emotional consciousness in humans might shed light on the kinds of conscious capacities that might be possible in non-human primates and non-primate mammals, given the kinds of brains they possess.

Understanding Alzheimer's disease as a disorder of consciousness

People with Alzheimer's disease (AD) demonstrate a range of alterations in consciousness. Changes in awareness of cognitive deficit, self-awareness, and introspection are seen early in AD, and dysfunction of awareness and arousal progresses with increasing disease severity. However, heterogeneity of deficits between individuals and a lack of empirical studies in people with severe dementia highlight the importance of identifying and applying biomarkers of awareness in AD. Impairments of awareness in AD are associated with neuropathology in regions that overlap with proposed neural correlates of consciousness. Recent developments in consciousness science provide theoretical frameworks and experimental approaches to help further understand the conscious experience of people with AD. Recognition of AD as a disorder of consciousness is overdue, and important to both understand the lived experience of people with AD and to improve care.

Bittersweet: The Neuroscience of Ambivalent Affect

Ambivalent affective states, such as bittersweetness, nostalgia, and longing, which are felt as having both positive and negative aspects, are an important component of human experience but have received little attention. The most influential theoretical frameworks in affective neuroscience focus largely on univalenced states. As a result, it is not known whether ambivalent affect corresponds to a simultaneously positive and negative valenced state or whether it results from a rapid vacillation between positive and negative states. Here we hypothesize that ambivalent affect involves both mechanisms, that is, rapid vacillation and simultaneity of positive and negative affect, albeit at different neurobiological levels. Rapidly vacillating univalent emotions could give rise to an ambivalent feeling, a mechanism that depends on brainstem nuclei that facilitate rapid action programs of emotional behavior while inhibiting opposing behaviors. This reciprocal inhibition prevents organisms from simultaneously implementing responses to conflicting emotions but also allows for rapid switching between emotions triggered by counterfactual thinking and rapid reappraisal of situations. We propose that as these transitions occur and respective interoceptive information reaches the insular cortex, further processing of this "emotional moment" would allow separate emotional events to be experienced as one "mixed" and integrated feeling.

Alterations in the fronto-limbic network and corpus callosum in borderline-personality disorder

Neuroimaging research provides evidence of grey matter changes in the prefrontal-limbic network in borderline personality disorder (BPD), yet research scarcely examines the white matter (WM) within this circuitry. The present study aimed to explore WM in prefrontal-limbic brain networks within BPD. Quantitative diffusion tensor imaging (DTI-MRI) measures of fractional anisotropy (FA) and mean diffusion (MD) were used to analyze the neural pathways in fifteen individuals with BPD (M = 25, SD = 6.76), in comparison to thirteen healthy individuals (M = 27.92, SD = 8.41). Quantitative DTI-MRI measures of FA and MD were evaluated for the cingulum, the fornix, the corpus callosum (CC), the inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF), the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) and the uncinate fasciculus (UF). Lower FA values for both the left and the right cingulum, the genu, body, and splenium of the CC, left ILF and right SLF were found in BPD, compared to healthy individuals. MD values were higher for the genu and splenium of the CC in BPD. The findings indicate that a large-scale emotional brain network is affected in BPD with alterations in MD and FA of WM prefrontal-limbic pathways of the heteromodal association cortex involved in emotion processing and emotion regulation.

"All is not lost"-Rethinking the nature of memory and the self in dementia

Memory and the self have long been considered intertwined, leading to the assumption that without memory, there can be no self. This line of reasoning has led to the misconception that a loss of memory in dementia necessarily results in a diminished sense of self. Here, we challenge this assumption by considering discrete facets of self-referential memory, and their relative profiles of loss and sparing, across three neurodegenerative disorders: Alzheimer's disease, semantic dementia, and frontotemporal dementia. By exploring canonical expressions of the self across past, present, and future contexts in dementia, relative to healthy ageing, we reconcile previous accounts of loss of self in dementia, and propose a new framework for understanding and managing everyday functioning and behaviour. Notably, our approach highlights the multifaceted and dynamic nature in which the temporally-extended self is likely to change in healthy and pathological ageing, with important ramifications for development of person-centred care. Collectively, we aim to promote a cohesive sense of self in dementia across past, present, and future contexts, by demonstrating how, ultimately, 'All is not lost'.

Being misunderstood in autism: The role of motor disruption in expressive communication, implications for satisfying social relations

Jaswal & Akhtar's outstanding target article identifies the necessary social nature of the human mind, even in autism. We agree with the authors and present significant contributory origins of this autistic isolation in disruption of purposeful movement made social from infancy. Timing differences in expression can be misunderstood in embodied engagement, and social intention misread. Sensitive relations can repair this.

Functional Neural Correlates of Anosognosia in Mild Cognitive Impairment and Alzheimer's Disease: a Systematic Review

Functional neuroimaging techniques (i.e. single photon emission computed tomography, positron emission tomography, and functional magnetic resonance imaging) have been used to assess the neural correlates of anosognosia in mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD). A systematic review of this literature was performed, following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta Analyses statement, on PubMed, EMBASE, and PsycINFO databases. Twenty-five articles met all inclusion criteria. Specifically, four brain connectivity and 21 brain perfusion, metabolism, and activation articles. Anosognosia is associated in MCI with frontal lobe and cortical midline regional dysfunction (reduced perfusion and activation), and with reduced parietotemporal metabolism. Reduced within and between network connectivity is observed in the default mode network regions of AD patients with anosognosia compared to AD patients without anosognosia and controls. During initial stages of cognitive decline in anosognosia, reduced indirect neural activity (i.e. perfusion, metabolism, and activation) is associated with the cortical midline regions, followed by the parietotemporal structures in later stages and culminating in frontotemporal dysfunction. Although the current evidence suggests differences in activation between AD or MCI patients with anosognosia and healthy controls, more evidence is needed exploring the differences between MCI and AD patients with and without anosognosia using resting state and task related paradigms.

Prospective organization of neonatal arm movements: A motor foundation of embodied agency, disrupted in premature birth

Prospective motor control moves the body into the future, from where one is to where one wants to be. It is a hallmark of intentionality. But its origin in development is uncertain. In this study, we tested whether or not the arm movements of newborn infants were prospectively controlled. We measured the spatiotemporal organization of 480 full-term neonatal arm movements and 384 arm movements of prematurely born infants at-risk for neurodevelopmental disorder. We found 75% of healthy term-birth neonatal movements and 68% of prematurely born infant movements conformed to the τG -coupling model of prospective sensorimotor control. Prospective coupling values were significantly reduced in the latter (p = .010, r = .087). In both cases prospectively controlled movements were tightly organized by fixed-duration units with a base duration of 218 ms and additional temporal units of 145 ms. Yet distances remained constant. Thus, we demonstrate for the first time a precise prospective spatiotemporal organization of neonatal arm movements and demonstrate that at-risk infants exhibit reduced sensorimotor control. Prospective motor control is a hallmark of primary sensorimotor intentionality and gives a strong embodied foundation to conscious motor agency.

Brainstem enlargement in preschool children with autism: Results from an intermethod agreement study of segmentation algorithms

The intermethod agreement between automated algorithms for brainstem segmentation is investigated, focusing on the potential involvement of this structure in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Inconsistencies highlighted in previous studies on brainstem in the population with ASD may in part be a result of poor agreement in the extraction of structural features between different methods. A sample of 76 children with ASD and 76 age-, gender-, and intelligence-matched controls was considered. Volumetric analyses were performed using common tools for brain structures segmentation, namely FSL-FIRST, FreeSurfer (FS), and Advanced Normalization Tools (ANTs). For shape analysis SPHARM-MAT was employed. Intermethod agreement was quantified in terms of Pearson correlations between pairs of volumes obtained by the different methods. The degree of overlap between segmented masks was quantified in terms of the Dice index. Both Pearson correlations and Dice indices, showed poor agreement between FSL-FIRST and the other methods (ANTs and FS), which by contrast, yielded Pearson correlations greater than 0.93 and average Dice indices greater than 0.76 when compared with each other. As with volume, shape analyses exhibited discrepancies between segmentation methods, with particular differences noted between FSL-FIRST and the others (ANT and FS), with under- and over-segmentation in specific brainstem regions. These data suggest that research on brain structure alterations should cross-validate findings across multiple methods. We consistently detected an enlargement of brainstem volume in the whole sample and in the male cohort across multiple segmentation methods, a feature particularly driven by the subgroup of children with idiopathic intellectual disability associated with ASD.

Implementing Goal-Directed Foraging Decisions of a Simpler Nervous System in Simulation

Economic decisions arise from evaluation of alternative actions in contexts of motivation and memory. In the predatory sea-slug Pleurobranchaea the economic decisions of foraging are found to occur by the workings of a simple, affectively controlled homeostat with learning abilities. Here, the neuronal circuit relations for approach-avoidance choice of Pleurobranchaea are expressed and tested in the foraging simulation Cyberslug. Choice is organized around appetitive state as a moment-to-moment integration of sensation, motivation (satiation/hunger), and memory. Appetitive state controls a switch for approach vs. avoidance turn responses to sensation. Sensory stimuli are separately integrated for incentive value into appetitive state, and for prey location (stimulus place) into mapping motor response. Learning interacts with satiation to regulate prey choice affectively. The virtual predator realistically reproduces the decisions of the real one in varying circumstances and satisfies optimal foraging criteria. The basic relations are open to experimental embellishment toward enhanced neural and behavioral complexity in simulation, as was the ancestral bilaterian nervous system in evolution.

Neural networks in bottom up 'experiential emotion regulation'

Emotion regulation influences how and when we experience emotion, impacting our sense of self and well being. While previous brain research on emotion regulation has focused on gray matter correlates of emotion regulation, this study represents a first exploratory study on white matter integrity of brain networks of 'emotional approach' as a bottom up experiential emotion regulation-strategy. Responding to the gap between cognitive and affective approaches of emotion regulation, pertaining to some of the daily emotional stressors, the present study investigates brain pathways of individual differences in 'emotional approach', or the tendency to affectively acknowledge, understand and express emotional experience (cf. [1]). Diffusion tensor magnetic resonance imaging (DTI-MRI) measures of fractional anisotropy (FA) and mean diffusion (MD) evaluated dispositional emotion regulation in a group of 21 women with a 'high emotional approach' (HEA) (N = 11) and a 'low emotional approach' (LEA) (N = 10). HEA exhibited more FA of the cingulum, supporting emotion processing and emotion regulation, whereas LEA correlated to a higher FA in the right corticospinal tracts, supporting automatic action tendencies and a higher FA in the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF), supporting cognitive control and monitoring of emotion. LEA also correlated with an increase in MD in the body (p. = 0.05) and in the splenium of the corpus callosum (CC). A higher FA in the inferior longitudinal fasciculus (IFL) may indicate higher visual- affective integration within emotion processing, whereas more MD in the body and splenium of the CC decreases interhemispheric integration of emotional information within emotion processing and emotion regulation.

The Affective Core of the Self: A Neuro-Archetypical Perspective on the Foundations of Human (and Animal) Subjectivity

Psychologists usually considered the "Self" as an object of experience appearing when the individual perceives its existence within the conscious field. In accordance with such a view, the self-representing capacity of the human mind has been related to corticolimbic learning processes taking place within individual development. On the other hand, Carl Gustav Jung considered the Self as the core of our personality, in its conscious and unconscious aspects, as well as in its actual and potential forms. According to Jung, the Self originates from an inborn dynamic structure integrating the essential drives of our "brain-mind," and leading both to instinctual behavioral actions and to archetypal psychological experiences. Interestingly, recent neuroethological studies indicate that our subjective identity rests on ancient neuropsychic processes that humans share with other animals as part of their inborn constitutional repertoire. Indeed, brain activity within subcortical midline structures (SCMSs) is intrinsically related to the emergence of prototypical affective states, that not only influence our behavior in a flexible way, but alter our conscious field, giving rise to specific feelings or moods, which constitute the first form of self-orientation in the world. Moreover, such affective dynamics play a central role in the organization of individual personality and in the evolution of all other (more sophisticated) psychological functions. Therefore, on the base of the convergence between contemporary cutting-edge scientific research and some psychological intuitions of Jung, we intend here to explore the first neuroevolutional layer of human mind, that we call the affective core of the Self.

Connectivity Changes in Parkinson's Disease

Parkinson's disease (PD) is a chronic and progressive movement disorder of the central nervous system characterized by widespread alterations in several non-motor aspects such as mood, sleep, olfactory, and cognition in addition to motor dysfunctions. Advanced neuroimaging using functional connectivity reconstruction of the human brain has provided a vast knowledge on the pathophysiological mechanisms underlying this disorder, but this, however, does not cover the overall inter-/intra-individual variability of PD phenotypes. The present review is aimed at discussing to what extent the evidence provided by group-based neuroimaging analysis in this field of study (using seed-based, network-based, or graph theory approaches) may be generalized. In particular, we summarized the literature on the application of resting-state functional connectivity studies to explore different neural correlates of motor and non-motor symptoms of PD and the neural mechanisms involved in treatment effects: effects of levodopa or deep brain stimulation. The lesson learnt from one decade of studies provides consistent evidence on the role of the altered communication between the striato-frontal pathways as a marker of PD-related motor degeneration, whereas in the non-motor domain, several missing pieces of a complex puzzle are provided. However, the main target is to present a new era of intelligent neuroimaging applications, where automated multivariate analysis of functional connectivity data may be used for moving from group-level statistical results to personalized predictions in a clinical setting. Although in its relative infancy, the evidence gathered so far suggests a new era of clinical neuroimaging is starting.

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.

The ontogenesis of narrative: from moving to meaning

Narrative, the creation of imaginative projects and experiences displayed in expressions of movement and voice, is how human cooperative understanding grows. Human understanding places the character and qualities of objects and events of interest within stories that portray intentions, feelings, and ambitions, and how one cares about them. Understanding the development of narrative is therefore essential for understanding the development of human intelligence, but its early origins are obscure. We identify the origins of narrative in the innate sensorimotor intelligence of a hypermobile human body and trace the ontogenesis of narrative form from its earliest expression in movement. Intelligent planning, with self-awareness, is evident in the gestures and motor expressions of the mid-gestation fetus. After birth, single intentions become serially organized into projects with increasingly ambitious distal goals and social meaning. The infant imitates others’ actions in shared tasks, learns conventional cultural practices, and adapts his own inventions, then names topics of interest. Through every stage, in simple intentions of fetal movement, in social imitations of the neonate, in early proto-conversations and collaborative play of infants and talk of children and adults, the narrative form of creative agency with it four-part structure of ‘introduction,’ ‘development,’ ‘climax,’ and ‘resolution’ is present. We conclude that shared rituals of culture and practical techniques develop from a fundamental psycho-motor structure with its basic, vital impulses for action and generative process of thought-in-action that express an integrated, imaginative, and sociable Self. This basic structure is evident before birth and invariant in form throughout life. Serial organization of single, non-verbal actions into complex projects of expressive and explorative sense-making become conventional meanings and explanations with propositional narrative power. Understanding the root of narrative in embodied meaning-making in this way is important for practical work in therapy and education, and for advancing philosophy and neuroscience.

The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory

Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, homeostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can be considered as the autonomic flow of primary-process phenomenal experiences that reflects a fundamental form of first-person “self-experience,” a vastly underestimated primary form of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that this anoetic form of evolutionarily refined consciousness constitutes a critical antecedent that is foundational for all forms of knowledge acquisition via learning and memory, giving rise to a knowledge-based, or noetic, consciousness as well as higher forms of “awareness” or “knowing consciousness” that permits “time-travel” in the brain-mind. We summarize the conceptual advantages of such a multi-tiered neuroevolutionary approach to psychological issues, namely from genetically controlled primary (affective) and secondary (learning and memory), to higher tertiary (developmentally emergent) brain-mind processes, along with suggestions about how affective experiences become more cognitive and object-oriented, allowing the developmental creation of more subtle higher mental processes such as episodic memory which allows the possibility of autonoetic consciousness, namely looking forward and backward at one’s life and its possibilities within the “mind’s eye.”

Implicit and explicit social mentalizing: dual processes driven by a shared neural network

Recent social neuroscientific evidence indicates that implicit and explicit inferences on the mind of another person (i.e., intentions, attributions or traits), are subserved by a shared mentalizing network. Under both implicit and explicit instructions, ERP studies reveal that early inferences occur at about the same time, and fMRI studies demonstrate an overlap in core mentalizing areas, including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). These results suggest a rapid shared implicit intuition followed by a slower explicit verification processes (as revealed by additional brain activation during explicit vs. implicit inferences). These data provide support for a default-adjustment dual-process framework of social mentalizing.

Autism as a developmental disorder in intentional movement and affective engagement

We review evidence that autistic spectrum disorders have their origin in early prenatal failure of development in systems that program timing, serial coordination and prospective control of movements, and that regulate affective evaluations of experiences. There are effects in early infancy, before medical diagnosis, especially in motor sequencing, selective or exploratory attention, affective expression and intersubjective engagement with parents. These are followed by retardation of cognitive development and language learning in the second or third year, which lead to a diagnosis of ASD. The early signs relate to abnormalities that have been found in brain stem systems and cerebellum in the embryo or early fetal stage, before the cerebral neocortex is functional, and they have clear consequences in infancy when neocortical systems are intensively elaborated. We propose, with evidence of the disturbances of posture, locomotion and prospective motor control in children with autism, as well as of their facial expression of interest and affect, and attention to other persons' expressions, that examination of the psychobiology of motor affective disorders, rather than later developing cognitive or linguistic ones, may facilitate early diagnosis. Research in this area may also explain how intense interaction, imitation or "expressive art" therapies, which respond intimately with motor activities, are effective at later stages. Exceptional talents of some autistic people may be acquired compensations for basic problems with expectant self-regulations of movement, attention and emotion.

Mapping the connectivity underlying multimodal (verbal and non-verbal) semantic processing: a brain electrostimulation study

Accessing the meaning of words, objects, people and facts is a human ability, made possible thanks to semantic processing. Although studies concerning its cortical organization are proficient, the subcortical connectivity underlying this semantic network received less attention. We used intraoperative direct electrostimulation, which mimics a transient virtual lesion during brain surgery for glioma in eight awaken patients, to map the anatomical white matter substrate subserving the semantic system. Patients performed a picture naming task and a non-verbal semantic association test during the electrical mapping. Direct electrostimulation of the inferior fronto-occipital fascicle, a poorly known ventral association pathway which runs throughout the brain, induced in all cases semantic disturbances. These transient disorders were highly reproducible, and concerned verbal as well as non-verbal output. Our results highlight for the first time the essential role of the left inferior fronto-occipital fascicle in multimodal (and not only in verbal) semantic processing. On the basis of these original findings, and in the lights of phylogenetic considerations regarding this fascicle, we suggest its possible implication in the monitoring of the human level of consciousness related to semantic memory, namely noetic consciousness.

Memory and self-neuroscientific landscapes

Relations between memory and the self are framed from a number of perspectives-developmental aspects, forms of memory, interrelations between memory and the brain, and interactions between the environment and memory. The self is seen as dividable into more rudimentary and more advanced aspects. Special emphasis is laid on memory systems and within them on episodic autobiographical memory which is seen as a pure human form of memory that is dependent on a proper ontogenetic development and shaped by the social environment, including culture. Self and episodic autobiographical memory are seen as interlocked in their development and later manifestation. Aside from content-based aspects of memory, time-based aspects are seen along two lines-the division between short-term and long-term memory and anterograde-future-oriented-and retrograde-past-oriented memory. The state dependency of episodic autobiographical is stressed and implications of it-for example, with respect to the occurrence of false memories and forensic aspects-are outlined. For the brain level, structural networks for encoding, consolidation, storage, and retrieval are discussed both by referring to patient data and to data obtained in normal participants with functional brain imaging methods. It is elaborated why descriptions from patients with functional or dissociative amnesia are particularly apt to demonstrate the facets in which memory, self, and personal temporality are interwoven.