What the brain's intrinsic activity can tell us about consciousness? A tri-dimensional view

Beyond task response-Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness

The current discussion on the neural correlates of the contents of consciousness (NCCc) focuses mainly on the post-stimulus period of task-related activity. This neglects the substantial impact of the spontaneous or ongoing activity of the brain as manifest in pre-stimulus activity. Does the interaction of pre- and post-stimulus activity shape the contents of consciousness? Addressing this gap in our knowledge, we review and converge two recent lines of findings, that is, pre-stimulus alpha power and pre- and post-stimulus alpha trial-to-trial variability (TTV). The data show that pre-stimulus alpha power modulates post-stimulus activity including specifically the subjective features of conscious contents like confidence and vividness. At the same time, alpha pre-stimulus variability shapes post-stimulus TTV reduction including the associated contents of consciousness. We propose that non-additive rather than merely additive interaction of the internal pre-stimulus activity with the external stimulus in the alpha band is key for contents to become conscious. This is mediated by mechanisms on different levels including neurophysiological, neurocomputational, neurodynamic, neuropsychological and neurophenomenal levels. Overall, considering the interplay of pre-stimulus intrinsic and post-stimulus extrinsic activity across wider timescales, not just evoked responses in the post-stimulus period, is critical for identifying neural correlates of consciousness. This is well in line with both processing and especially the Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC).

What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review

A recent development in the psychological and neuroscientific study of consciousness has been the tendency to conceptualize consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon. This narrative review elucidates the notion of dimensionality of consciousness and outlines the key concepts and disagreements on this topic through the viewpoints of several theoretical proposals. The reviewed literature is critically evaluated, and the main issues to be resolved by future theoretical and empirical work are identified: the problems of dimension selection and dimension aggregation, as well as some ethical considerations. This narrative review is seemingly the first to comprehensively overview this specific aspect of consciousness science.

The Thermodynamics of Mind

To not only survive, but also thrive, the brain must efficiently orchestrate distributed computation across space and time. This requires hierarchical organisation facilitating fast information transfer and processing at the lowest possible metabolic cost. Quantifying brain hierarchy is difficult but can be estimated from the asymmetry of information flow. Thermodynamics has successfully characterised hierarchy in many other complex systems. Here, we propose the 'Thermodynamics of Mind' framework as a natural way to quantify hierarchical brain orchestration and its underlying mechanisms. This has already provided novel insights into the orchestration of hierarchy in brain states including movie watching, where the hierarchy of the brain is flatter than during rest. Overall, this framework holds great promise for revealing the orchestration of cognition.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

A Mechanistic Model of Perceptual Binding Predicts That Binding Mechanism Is Robust against Noise

The concept of the brain's own time and space is central to many models and theories that aim to explain how the brain generates consciousness. For example, the temporo-spatial theory of consciousness postulates that the brain implements its own inner time and space for conscious processing of the outside world. Furthermore, our perception and cognition of time and space can be different from actual time and space. This study presents a mechanistic model of mutually connected processes that encode phenomenal representations of space and time. The model is used to elaborate the binding mechanism between two sets of processes representing internal space and time, respectively. Further, a stochastic version of the model is developed to investigate the interplay between binding strength and noise. Spectral entropy is used to characterize noise effects on the systems of interacting processes when the binding strength between them is varied. The stochastic modeling results reveal that the spectral entropy values for strongly bound systems are similar to those for weakly bound or even decoupled systems. Thus, the analysis performed in this study allows us to conclude that the binding mechanism is noise-resilient.

Theories of consciousness and psychiatric disorders - A comparative analysis

Disorders of consciousness represent an efficient way to test theories of consciousness' (ToCs) predictions. So far, ToCs have mostly focused on disorders of quantitative awareness such as coma, vegetative state, spatial neglect and hemianopia. Psychiatric disorders, by contrast, have received little attention, leaving their contribution to consciousness research almost unexplored. Therefore, this paper aims to assess the relation between ToCs and psychiatric disorders - that is, the extent to which current ToCs can account for psychiatric symptomatology. First, I review direct and indirect evidence linking each ToC to psychiatry disorders. Next, I differentiate ToCs based on their theoretical and methodological ground, highlighting how they distinctively address neural, cognitive, and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience and, in turn, psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I refer to one specific symptom to directly compare ToCs' explanatory power. Overall, Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) appears to provide a more comprehensive account of psychiatric disorders, suggesting that a novel dimension of consciousness (i.e., form of consciousness) may be needed to address more qualitative alterations in conscious experience.

Complex of global functional network as the core of consciousness

Finding the neural basis of consciousness is challenging, and the distribution location of the core of consciousness remains inconclusive. Integrated information theory (IIT) argues that the posterior part of the brain is the hot zone of consciousness, especially phenological consciousness. The IIT has proposed a "main complex", a set of elements determined such that the information loss in a hierarchical partition approach is the largest among those of any other supersets and subsets, as the core of consciousness in a dynamic system. This approach may be applicable not only to phenomenal but also to access-consciousness. This study estimated the main complex of brain dynamics using functional magnetic resonance imaging in Human Connectome Project (HCP) and sleep datasets. The complex analyses revealed the common networks across various tasks and rest-state in HCP, composed of executive control, salience, and dorsal/ventral attention networks. The set of networks of the main complex was maintained during sleep. However, compared with the wakefulness stage, the amount of information of these networks and the default mode network, was reduced for the hypnagogic stage. The global interconnected structure composed of major functional networks can comprise the core of consciousness.

Topographic-dynamic reorganisation model of dreams (TRoD) - A spatiotemporal approach

Dreams are one of the most bizarre and least understood states of consciousness. Bridging the gap between brain and phenomenology of (un)conscious experience, we propose the Topographic-dynamic Re-organization model of Dreams (TRoD). Topographically, dreams are characterized by a shift towards increased activity and connectivity in the default-mode network (DMN) while they are reduced in the central executive network, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (except in lucid dreaming). This topographic re-organization is accompanied by dynamic changes; a shift towards slower frequencies and longer timescales. This puts dreams dynamically in an intermediate position between awake state and NREM 2/SWS sleep. TRoD proposes that the shift towards DMN and slower frequencies leads to an abnormal spatiotemporal framing of input processing including both internally- and externally-generated inputs (from body and environment). In dreams, a shift away from temporal segregation to temporal integration of inputs results in the often bizarre and highly self-centric mental contents as well as hallucinatory-like states. We conclude that topography and temporal dynamics are core features of the TroD, which may provide the connection of neural and mental activity, e.g., brain and experience during dreams as their "common currency".

The why of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness: Its main functions and the mechanisms underpinning it

What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent’s own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define “the self” (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, and is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems; it maps the agent’s body and cognitive capacities, and its interactions with the environment. The detection of the state of S by attention modulates the energy level of the organ of attention (OA), i.e., the neural substrate that underpins attention. This modulation generates the PAC. The PAC can be qualified according to five dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal and spatial. Each dimension can be traced back to a specific feature of the modulation of the energy level of the OA.

Unifying turbulent dynamics framework distinguishes different brain states

Significant advances have been made by identifying the levels of synchrony of the underlying dynamics of a given brain state. This research has demonstrated that non-conscious dynamics tend to be more synchronous than in conscious states, which are more asynchronous. Here we go beyond this dichotomy to demonstrate that different brain states are underpinned by dissociable spatiotemporal dynamics. We investigated human neuroimaging data from different brain states (resting state, meditation, deep sleep and disorders of consciousness after coma). The model-free approach was based on Kuramoto's turbulence framework using coupled oscillators. This was extended by a measure of the information cascade across spatial scales. Complementarily, the model-based approach used exhaustive in silico perturbations of whole-brain models fitted to these measures. This allowed studying of the information encoding capabilities in given brain states. Overall, this framework demonstrates that elements from turbulence theory provide excellent tools for describing and differentiating between brain states.

The INSIDEOUT framework provides precise signatures of the balance of intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics in brain states

Finding precise signatures of different brain states is a central, unsolved question in neuroscience. We reformulated the problem to quantify the 'inside out' balance of intrinsic and extrinsic brain dynamics in brain states. The difference in brain state can be described as differences in the detailed causal interactions found in the underlying intrinsic brain dynamics. We used a thermodynamics framework to quantify the breaking of the detailed balance captured by the level of asymmetry in temporal processing, i.e. the arrow of time. Specifically, the temporal asymmetry was computed by the time-shifted correlation matrices for the forward and reversed time series, reflecting the level of non-reversibility/non-equilibrium. We found precise, distinguishing signatures in terms of the reversibility and hierarchy of large-scale dynamics in three radically different brain states (awake, deep sleep and anaesthesia) in electrocorticography data from non-human primates. Significantly lower levels of reversibility were found in deep sleep and anaesthesia compared to wakefulness. Non-wakeful states also showed a flatter hierarchy, reflecting the diversity of the reversibility across the brain. Overall, this provides signatures of the breaking of detailed balance in different brain states, perhaps reflecting levels of conscious awareness.

A Dynamic Mechanistic Model of Perceptual Binding

The brain’s ability to create a unified conscious representation of an object by integrating information from multiple perception pathways is called perceptual binding. Binding is crucial for normal cognitive function. Some perceptual binding errors and disorders have been linked to certain neurological conditions, brain lesions, and conditions that give rise to illusory conjunctions. However, the mechanism of perceptual binding remains elusive. Here, I present a computational model of binding using two sets of coupled oscillatory processes that are assumed to occur in response to two different percepts. I use the model to study the dynamic behavior of coupled processes to characterize how these processes can modulate each other and reach a temporal synchrony. I identify different oscillatory dynamic regimes that depend on coupling mechanisms and parameter values. The model can also discriminate different combinations of initial inputs that are set by initial states of coupled processes. Decoding brain signals that are formed through perceptual binding is a challenging task, but my modeling results demonstrate how crosstalk between two systems of processes can possibly modulate their outputs. Therefore, my mechanistic model can help one gain a better understanding of how crosstalk between perception pathways can affect the dynamic behavior of the systems that involve perceptual binding.

AI ethics in computational psychiatry: From the neuroscience of consciousness to the ethics of consciousness

Methods used in artificial intelligence (AI) overlap with methods used in computational psychiatry (CP). Hence, considerations from AI ethics are also relevant to ethical discussions of CP. Ethical issues include, among others, fairness and data ownership and protection. Apart from this, morally relevant issues also include potential transformative effects of applications of AI-for instance, with respect to how we conceive of autonomy and privacy. Similarly, successful applications of CP may have transformative effects on how we categorise and classify mental disorders and mental health. Since many mental disorders go along with disturbed conscious experiences, it is desirable that successful applications of CP improve our understanding of disorders involving disruptions in conscious experience. Here, we discuss prospects and pitfalls of transformative effects that CP may have on our understanding of mental disorders. In particular, we examine the concern that even successful applications of CP may fail to take all aspects of disordered conscious experiences into account.

From Shorter to Longer Timescales: Converging Integrated Information Theory (IIT) with the Temporo-Spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC)

Time is a key element of consciousness as it includes multiple timescales from shorter to longer ones. This is reflected in our experience of various short-term phenomenal contents at discrete points in time as part of an ongoing, more continuous, and long-term ‘stream of consciousness.’ Can Integrated Information Theory (IIT) account for this multitude of timescales of consciousness? According to the theory, the relevant spatiotemporal scale for consciousness is the one in which the system reaches the maximum cause-effect power; IIT currently predicts that experience occurs on the order of short timescales, namely, between 100 and 300 ms (theta and alpha frequency range). This can well account for the integration of single inputs into a particular phenomenal content. However, such short timescales leave open the temporal relation of specific phenomenal contents to others during the course of the ongoing time, that is, the stream of consciousness. For that purpose, we converge the IIT with the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC), which, assuming a multitude of different timescales, can take into view the temporal integration of specific phenomenal contents with other phenomenal contents over time. On the neuronal side, this is detailed by considering those neuronal mechanisms driving the non-additive interaction of pre-stimulus activity with the input resulting in stimulus-related activity. Due to their non-additive interaction, the single input is not only integrated with others in the short-term timescales of 100–300 ms (alpha and theta frequencies) (as predicted by IIT) but, at the same time, also virtually expanded in its temporal (and spatial) features; this is related to the longer timescales (delta and slower frequencies) that are carried over from pre-stimulus to stimulus-related activity. Such a non-additive pre-stimulus-input interaction amounts to temporo-spatial expansion as a key mechanism of TTC for the constitution of phenomenal contents including their embedding or nesting within the ongoing temporal dynamic, i.e., the stream of consciousness. In conclusion, we propose converging the short-term integration of inputs postulated in IIT (100–300 ms as in the alpha and theta frequency range) with the longer timescales (in delta and slower frequencies) of temporo-spatial expansion in TTC.

Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) - Bridging the gap of neuronal activity and phenomenal states

Consciousness and its neural mechanisms remain a mystery. Current neuroscientific theories focus predominantly on the external input/stimulus and the associated stimulus-related activity during conscious contents. Despite all progress, we encounter two gaps: (i) a gap between spontaneous and stimulus-related activity; (ii) a gap between neuronal and phenomenal features. A novel, different, and unique approach, Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC) aims to bridge both gaps. The TTC focuses on the brain's spontaneous activity and how its spatial topography and temporal dynamic shape stimulus-related activity and resurface in the corresponding spatial and temporal features of consciousness, i.e., 'common currency'. The TTC introduces four temporo-spatial mechanisms: expansion, globalization, alignment, and nestedness. These are associated with distinct dimensions of consciousness including phenomenal content, access, form/structure, and level/state, respectively. Following up on the first introduction of the TTC in 2017, we review updates, further develop these temporo-spatial mechanisms, and postulate specific neurophenomenal hypotheses. We conclude that the TTC offers a viable approach for (i) linking spontaneous and stimulus-related activity in conscious states; (ii) determining specific neuronal and neurophenomenal mechanisms for the distinct dimensions of consciousness; (iii) an integrative and unifying framework of different neuroscientific theories of consciousness; and (iv) offers novel empirically grounded conceptual assumptions about the biological and ontological nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain.

Rare long-range cortical connections enhance human information processing

What are the key topological features of connectivity critically relevant for generating the dynamics underlying efficient cortical function? A candidate feature that has recently emerged is that the connectivity of the mammalian cortex follows an exponential distance rule, which includes a small proportion of long-range high-weight anatomical exceptions to this rule. Whole-brain modeling of large-scale human neuroimaging data in 1,003 participants offers the unique opportunity to create two models, with and without long-range exceptions, and explicitly study their functional consequences. We found that rare long-range exceptions are crucial for significantly improving information processing. Furthermore, modeling in a simplified ring architecture shows that this improvement is greatly enhanced by the turbulent regime found in empirical neuroimaging data. Overall, the results provide strong empirical evidence for the immense functional benefits of long-range exceptions combined with turbulence for information processing.

Comparing stimulus-evoked and spontaneous response of the face-selective multi-units in the human posterior fusiform gyrus

The stimulus-evoked neural response is a widely explored phenomenon. Conscious awareness is associated in many cases with the corresponding selective stimulus-evoked response. For example, conscious awareness of a face stimulus is associated with or accompanied by stimulus-evoked activity in the fusiform face area (FFA). In addition to the stimulus-evoked response, spontaneous (i.e. task-unrelated) activity in the brain is also abundant. Notably, spontaneous activity is considered unconscious. For example, spontaneous activity in the FFA is not associated with conscious awareness of a face. The question is: what is the difference at the neural level between stimulus-evoked activity in a case that this activity is associated with conscious awareness of some content (e.g. activity in the FFA in response to fully visible face stimuli) and spontaneous activity in that same region of the brain? To answer this question, in the present study, we had a rare opportunity to record two face-selective multi-units in the vicinity of the FFA in a human patient. We compared multi-unit face-selective task-evoked activity with spontaneous prestimulus and a resting-state activity. We found that when activity was examined over relatively long temporal windows (e.g. 100–200 ms), face-selective stimulus-evoked firing in the recorded multi-units was much higher than the spontaneous activity. In contrast, when activity was examined over relatively short windows, we found many cases of high firing rates within the spontaneous activity that were comparable to stimulus-evoked activity. Our results thus indicate that the sustained activity is what might differentiate between stimulus-evoked activity that is associated with conscious awareness and spontaneous activity.

Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification

Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their 'explanatory profiles'. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.

Neural Circuits, Microtubule Processing, Brain's Electromagnetic Field-Components of Self-Awareness

The known theories discussing the essence of consciousness have been recently updated. This prompts an attempt to integrate these explanations concerning several distinct components of the consciousness phenomenon such as the ego, and qualia perceptions. Therefore, it is useful to consider the latest publications on the 'Orch OR' and 'cemi' theories, which assume that quantum processing occurs in microtubules and that the brain's endogenous electromagnetic field is important. The authors combine these explanations with their own theory describing the neural circuits realizing imagery. They try to present such an interdisciplinary, integrated theoretical model in a manner intuitively understandable to people with a typical medical education. In order to do this, they even refer to intuitively understandable metaphors. The authors maintain that an effective comprehension of consciousness is important for health care professionals because its disorders are frequent medical symptoms in emergencies, during general anesthesia and in the course of cognitive disorders in elderly people. The authors emphasize the current possibilities to verify these theses regarding the essence of consciousness thanks to the development of functional brain imaging methods-magnetoencephalography, transcranial magnetic stimulation-as well as clinical studies on the modification of perceptions and feelings by such techniques as mindfulness and the use of certain psychoactive substances, especially among people with self-awareness and identity disorders.

Brain States and Transitions: Insights from Computational Neuroscience

Within the field of computational neuroscience there are great expectations of finding new ways to rebalance the complex dynamic system of the human brain through controlled pharmacological or electromagnetic perturbation. Yet many obstacles remain between the ability to accurately predict how and where best to perturb to force a transition from one brain state to another. The foremost challenge is a commonly agreed definition of a given brain state. Recent progress in computational neuroscience has made it possible to robustly define brain states and force transitions between them. Here, we review the state of the art and propose a framework for determining the functional hierarchical organization describing any given brain state. We describe the latest advances in creating sophisticated whole-brain computational models with interacting neuronal and neurotransmitter systems that can be studied fully in silico to predict and design novel pharmacological and electromagnetic interventions to rebalance them in disease.

Implications of Noise on Neural Correlates of Consciousness: A Computational Analysis of Stochastic Systems of Mutually Connected Processes

Random fluctuations in neuronal processes may contribute to variability in perception and increase the information capacity of neuronal networks. Various sources of random processes have been characterized in the nervous system on different levels. However, in the context of neural correlates of consciousness, the robustness of mechanisms of conscious perception against inherent noise in neural dynamical systems is poorly understood. In this paper, a stochastic model is developed to study the implications of noise on dynamical systems that mimic neural correlates of consciousness. We computed power spectral densities and spectral entropy values for dynamical systems that contain a number of mutually connected processes. Interestingly, we found that spectral entropy decreases linearly as the number of processes within the system doubles. Further, power spectral density frequencies shift to higher values as system size increases, revealing an increasing impact of negative feedback loops and regulations on the dynamics of larger systems. Overall, our stochastic modeling and analysis results reveal that large dynamical systems of mutually connected and negatively regulated processes are more robust against inherent noise than small systems.

Bridging the gap between single receptor type activity and whole-brain dynamics

What is the effect of activating a single modulatory neuronal receptor type on entire brain network dynamics? Can such effect be isolated at all? These are important questions because characterizing elementary neuronal processes that influence network activity across the given anatomical backbone is fundamental to guide theories of brain function. Here, we introduce the concept of the cortical 'receptome' taking into account the distribution and densities of expression of different modulatory receptor types across the brain's anatomical connectivity matrix. By modelling whole-brain dynamics in silico, we suggest a bidirectional coupling between modulatory neurotransmission and neuronal connectivity hardware exemplified by the impact of single serotonergic (5-HT) receptor types on cortical dynamics. As experimental support of this concept, we show how optogenetic tools enable specific activation of a single 5-HT receptor type across the cortex as well as in vivo measurement of its distinct effects on cortical processing. Altogether, we demonstrate how the structural neuronal connectivity backbone and its modulation by a single neurotransmitter system allow access to a rich repertoire of different brain states that are fundamental for flexible behaviour. We further propose that irregular receptor expression patterns-genetically predisposed or acquired during a lifetime-may predispose for neuropsychiatric disorders like addiction, depression and anxiety along with distinct changes in brain state. Our long-term vision is that such diseases could be treated through rationally targeted therapeutic interventions of high specificity to eventually recover natural transitions of brain states.

Revisiting the global workspace orchestrating the hierarchical organization of the human brain

A central challenge in neuroscience is how the brain organizes the information necessary to orchestrate behaviour. Arguably, this whole-brain orchestration is carried out by a core subset of integrative brain regions, a 'global workspace', but its constitutive regions remain unclear. We quantified the global workspace as the common regions across seven tasks as well as rest, in a common 'functional rich club'. To identify this functional rich club, we determined the information flow between brain regions by means of a normalized directed transfer entropy framework applied to multimodal neuroimaging data from 1,003 healthy participants and validated in participants with retest data. This revealed a set of regions orchestrating information from perceptual, long-term memory, evaluative and attentional systems. We confirmed the causal significance and robustness of our results by systematically lesioning a generative whole-brain model. Overall, this framework describes a complex choreography of the functional hierarchical organization of the human brain.

Higher-order sensorimotor circuit of the brain's global network supports human consciousness

Consciousness is a mental characteristic of the human mind, whose exact neural features remain unclear. We aimed to identify the critical nodes within the brain's global functional network that support consciousness. To that end, we collected a large fMRI resting state dataset with subjects in at least one of the following three consciousness states: preserved (including the healthy awake state, and patients with a brain injury history (BI) that is fully conscious), reduced (including the N1-sleep state, and minimally conscious state), and lost (including the N3-sleep state, anesthesia, and unresponsive wakefulness state). We also included a unique dataset of subjects in rapid eye movement sleep state (REM-sleep) to test for the presence of consciousness with minimum movements and sensory input. To identify critical nodes, i.e., hubs, within the brain's global functional network, we used a graph-theoretical measure of degree centrality conjoined with ROI-based functional connectivity. Using these methods, we identified various higher-order sensory and motor regions including the supplementary motor area, bilateral supramarginal gyrus (part of inferior parietal lobule), supragenual/dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and left middle temporal gyrus, that could be important hubs whose degree centrality was significantly reduced when consciousness was reduced or absent. Additionally, we identified a sensorimotor circuit, in which the functional connectivity among these regions was significantly correlated with levels of consciousness across the different groups, and remained present in the REM-sleep group. Taken together, we demonstrated that regions forming a higher-order sensorimotor integration circuit are involved in supporting consciousness within the brain's global functional network. That offers novel and more mechanism-guided treatment targets for disorders of consciousness.

Could Self-Consciousness Be Enhanced in Alzheimer’s Disease? An Approach from Emotional Sensorial Stimulation

Alzheimer’s disease (AD) provides a valuable field of research into impairment of self-consciousness (SC), because AD patients have a reduced capacity to understand their mental world, to experience and relive previous personal events, as well as to interpret thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about themselves. Several studies observed that AD patients had an altered SC, but not a complete abolition of it. Emotions are an integral part of the construction of personal identity, therefore of Self. In general, most studies on emotion in AD patients have observed that emotion is not completely abolished and it lets them better remember autobiographical events with greater emotional charge. The positive effect of autobiographical memories rich in emotional content, evoked directly/automatically by sensorial stimuli such as familiar odors or music, could be used to reestablish/reinforce the permanence and coherence of the Self in AD. We studied the research of empirical evidence supporting the power of the sensorial cues associated with emotion, which could be capable of enhancing the SC in AD. We presented the studies about “Emotional stimulations” using odor, music, or taste cues in AD. All studies have shown to have a positive impact on SC in AD patients such as odor-evoked autobiographical memories, taste/odor-evoked autobiographical memories, emotional sensorial stimulation using musical cues, and multi-sensorial stimulations using healing gardens. We found research supporting the notion that emotional sensorial stimulations can even temporarily exalt memory, affective state, and personal identity, that is, the SC in AD. The emotional sensory stimulations could be used as a tool to activate the SC in AD and hence improve the quality of life of patients and caregivers.

Neural signs and mechanisms of consciousness: Is there a potential convergence of theories of consciousness in sight?

Various theories for the neural basis of consciousness have been proposed, suggesting a diversity of neural signs and mechanisms. We ask to what extent this diversity is real, or whether many theories share the same basic ideas with a potential for convergence towards a more unified theory of the neural basis of consciousness. For that purpose, we review and compare the various neural signs, measures, and mechanisms proposed in the different theories. We demonstrate that different theories focus on neural signs and measures of distinct aspects of neural activity including stimulus-related, prestimulus, and resting state activity as well as on distinct features of consciousness. Therefore, the various mechanisms proposed in the different theories may, in part, complement each other. Together, we provide insight into the shared basis and convergences (and, in part, discrepancies) of the different theories of consciousness. We conclude that the different theories concern distinct aspects of both neural activity and consciousness which, as we suppose, may be integrated and nested within the brain's overall temporo-spatial dynamics.

The temporal evolution of pre-stimulus slow cortical potentials is associated with an upcoming stimulus' access to visual consciousness

Slow cortical potentials (SCPs) have been proposed to be essential for the formation of conscious experience. To examine their temporal characteristics, we recorded electroencephalography during a visual backward-masking task, which required participants to localize the missing part of a target stimulus. A subsequent confidence rating was used as a proxy for the target's access to consciousness. Event-related potentials (ERPs) of all correct trials were determined relative to a brief period immediately before the target and then compared among consciousness levels. In an interval ranging from 2 s prior to target presentation up to this period, a negative relationship between slowly fluctuating ERP values and the level of consciousness became evident. After target presentation, high conscious awareness was characterized by an enhanced visual awareness negativity, an increased P3 component, and associated positive SCPs. Together, these findings add new evidence to the proposed role of SCPs in the emergence of visual consciousness.

Dissociation as a disorder of integration - On the footsteps of Pierre Janet

At the end of the 19th century Pierre Janet described dissociation as an altered state of consciousness manifested in disrupted integration of psychological functions. Clinically, such disruption comprises compartmentalization symptoms like amnesia, detachment symptoms like depersonalization/derealization, and structural dissociation of personality with changes in the sense of self. The exact neuronal mechanisms leading to these different symptoms remain unclear. We here suggest to put Janet's original account of dissociation as disrupted integration of psychological functions into a novel context, that is, a neuronal context as related to current brain imaging. This requires a combined theoretical and empirical approach on data supporting such neuronal reframing of Janet. For that, we here review (i) past and (ii) recent psychological and neuronal views on dissociation together with neuroscientific theories of integration, which (iii) are supported and complemented by preliminary fMRI data. We propose three neuronal mechanisms of dynamic integration operating at different levels of the brain's spontaneous activity - temporo-spatial binding on the regional level, temporo-spatial synchronization on the network level, and temporo-spatial globalization on the global level. These neuronal mechanisms, in turn, may be related to different symptomatic manifestation of dissociation operating at different levels, e.g., compartmentalization, detachment, and structural, which, as we suggest, can all be traced to disrupted integration of neuronal and psychological functions as originally envisioned by Janet.

Mathematics and the Brain: A Category Theoretical Approach to Go Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness

Consciousness is a central issue in neuroscience, however, we still lack a formal framework that can address the nature of the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrates. In this review, we provide a novel mathematical framework of category theory (CT), in which we can define and study the sameness between different domains of phenomena such as consciousness and its neural substrates. CT was designed and developed to deal with the relationships between various domains of phenomena. We introduce three concepts of CT which include (i) category; (ii) inclusion functor and expansion functor; and, most importantly, (iii) natural transformation between the functors. Each of these mathematical concepts is related to specific features in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). In this novel framework, we will examine two of the major theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness and temporospatial theory of consciousness (TTC). We conclude that CT, especially the application of the notion of natural transformation, highlights that we need to go beyond NCC and unravels questions that need to be addressed by any future neuroscientific theory of consciousness.

Is learning scale-free? Chemistry learning increases EEG fractal power and changes the power law exponent

Learning in chemistry and other areas of science involves developing one's mental models of invisible processes and manipulating temporal and spatial domains during visual information processing. While some aspects learning have been well studied by EEG (e.g., theta and gamma oscillations), the role of spontaneous and scale-free brain activity remains unclear. We used a continuous chemistry learning EEG paradigm to explore how scale-free brain activity is related learning. We found a learning effect in participants (N = 22) with an increase in test accuracy (learning gain) and decrease in test question response times in a counterbalanced pre/post-test experiment. In the brain we found increased overall (mixed) broadband power (1-50 Hz) during learning compared to rest. We then used the IRASA method to separate oscillatory and fractal (i.e. scale-free) spectral components and observed an increase in low-frequency oscillatory band powers during learning. More importantly, we found that fractal power increased during the learning sessions relative to oscillatory power. Finally, the structure of the fractal power spectra (PLE) correlated to the individual participants' learning gains. These findings support the importance of scale-free activity for learning from a complex visual paradigm. We tentatively hypothesize that this fractal component is involved in integrating the different time scales of the learning material with those of the spontaneous activity during learning and mental model shaping.

Lessons From Astronomy and Biology for the Mind-Copernican Revolution in Neuroscience

Neuroscience made major progress in unravelling the neural basis of mental features like self, consciousness, affect, etc. However, we nevertheless lack what recently has been described as "missing ingredient" or "common currency" in the relationship between neuronal and mental activity. Rather than putting forward yet another theory of the neural basis of mental features, I here suggest a change in our methodological strategy how to approach the brain, that is, our view or vantage point of the brain. Learning from astronomy (Copernicus) and biology (Darwin), I suggest that we may want to change our currently pre-Copernican vantage point from within brain to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain. Such post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain allows us taking into view that what happens beyond the brain itself, e.g., the world, and how that shapes the brain and its neural activity, e.g., world-brain relation. We then lend empirical support to the world-brain relation by converging it with Karl Friston's free energy principle that, as we see it, provides a neuro-ecological and therefore post-Copernican view of the brain. That, in turn, allows us taking into view that mental features are shaped by both world and brain and are therefore truly neuro-ecological rather than merely neuronal. This raises the question for the link, e.g., the "missing ingredient" or "common currency" of world brain relation and mental features. Recent empirical evidence suggests that temporo-spatial dynamics may provide such link as it characterizes both the world-brain relation's free energy and mental features, e.g., their spatiotemporality as described in philosophy. Taken together, I here advocate a change in our methodological strategy on how to approach the brain, that is, a shift from a pre-Copernican vantage point from within brain to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain. The latter allows us taking into view that what happens beyond the brain in the world and how that shapes the brain in such a way that it can yield mental features. This amounts to nothing less than a Copernican turn or revolution in neuroscience akin to the ones in astronomy (Copernicus) and biology (Darwin).

"Average is good, extremes are bad" - Non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship between neural mechanisms and functionality of mental features

Traditionally, studies emphasize differences in neural measures between pathological and healthy groups, assuming a binary distinction between the groups, and a linear relationship between neural measures and symptoms. Here, we present four examples that show a continuous relation across the divide of normal and pathological states between neural measures and mental functions. This relation can be characterized by a non-linear inverted-U shaped curve. Along this curve, mid-range or average expression of a neural measure is associated with optimal function of a mental feature (in healthy states), whereas extreme expression, either high or low, is associated with sub-optimal function, and occurs in different neural disorders. Neural expression between the optimal or intermediate and pathological or extreme values is associated with sub-optimal function and at-risk mental states. Thus, this model of neuro-mental relationship can be summarized as "average is good, extremes are bad". By focussing on neuro-mental relationships, this model can facilitate the transition of psychiatry from a categorical to a dimensional and individualized approach needed in the era of precision medicine.

Brain songs framework used for discovering the relevant timescale of the human brain

A key unresolved problem in neuroscience is to determine the relevant timescale for understanding spatiotemporal dynamics across the whole brain. While resting state fMRI reveals networks at an ultraslow timescale (below 0.1 Hz), other neuroimaging modalities such as MEG and EEG suggest that much faster timescales may be equally or more relevant for discovering spatiotemporal structure. Here, we introduce a novel way to generate whole-brain neural dynamical activity at the millisecond scale from fMRI signals. This method allows us to study the different timescales through binning the output of the model. These timescales can then be investigated using a method (poetically named brain songs) to extract the spacetime motifs at a given timescale. Using independent measures of entropy and hierarchy to characterize the richness of the dynamical repertoire, we show that both methods find a similar optimum at a timescale of around 200 ms in resting state and in task data.

Alterations in Intra- and Interregional Intrinsic Brain Connectivity Are Differentially Associated with Memory Performance in Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment

BACKGROUND

Previous research has separated spatial patterns of intra- and interregional intrinsic brain connectivity, as evaluated by regional homogeneity (ReHo) and functional connectivity (FC), respectively, in prodromal Alzheimer's disease (AD). Moreover, the intra- and interregional intrinsic brain connectivities have been demonstrated to have a significant relationship with each other.

OBJECTIVE

To explore FCs from brain regions which display a difference in ReHo between an amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) group and healthy controls (HC) and to examine the relationship of intra- and interregional intrinsic brain connectivity to cognitive function in both groups.

METHODS

Thirty-four subjects with aMCI and 38 HC underwent 3T MRI scanning and a battery of neuropsychological tests.

RESULTS

The aMCI group exhibited significantly higher ReHo in the left putamen and lower ReHo in the left inferior temporal gyrus than the HC. Furthermore, both groups showed a distinctive functional connectivity pattern seeded from 2 regions of interest which exhibited significant ReHo differences between the groups. In the HC group, only ReHo exhibited significant associations with memory performance, but in the aMCI group, only FC seeded from the left inferior temporal gyrus showed significant correlations with memory performance.

CONCLUSIONS

By approaching both intra- and interregional intrinsic brain activities in the early stages of AD, the findings of this research provide insights into the early pathogenesis of AD as related to memory performance.

The "Instinct" of Imagination. A Neuro-Ethological Approach to the Evolution of the Reflective Mind and Its Application to Psychotherapy

Recent neuro-psychoanalytic literature has emphasized the view that our subjective identity rests on ancient subcortical neuro-psychic processes expressing unthinking forms of experience, which are “affectively intense without being known” (Solms and Panksepp, 2012). Devoid of internal representations, the emotional states of our “core-Self” (Panksepp, 1998b) are entirely “projected” towards the external world and tend to be discharged through instinctual action-patterns. However, due to the close connections between the subcortical and the cortical midline brain, the emotional drives may also find a way to be reflected within an intrinsic self-referential processing, evident when the organism is not actively engaged with the external world. Thanks to such endogenous functioning, the core-Self emotional dispositions are not overtly executed, but they are organized within coherent dynamic mental structures, called “feeling-toned complexes” by C. G. Jung and “unconscious phantasies” by Melanie Klein. The intrinsic self-referential dynamism of the “brainmind” originated from REM sleep arousal and then evolved in the resting-state activity of a complex of cortico-limbic midline brain structures (CMS), also called Default Mode Network (DMN). From our neuro-ethological perspective, it is sustained by an “introverted” SEEKING activity leading to the subjective exploration of internally constructed virtual scenarios. This “mind wandering” function, implicated in dreaming, fantasy processing, remembering and thinking, is the essence of the imaginative function and constitutes the first form of reflection, where intentions and drives gain a primordial form of conscious (but not self-conscious) representation. During postnatal development, this original (“archetypal”) imaginative function is slowly attuned in a relational “transitional” space and may be expressed first in non-verbal and eventually in abstract-verbal social communicative patterns. Our view has noticeable implications for psychotherapy. Instead of trying to directly modify interpersonal, extrinsic relationships (a top-down approach), dysfunctional emotional-relational patterns may be modified by a process in which the patient is helped to let-go of the perceived feeling-objects in favor of an immersion, via the actual feeling, from the superficial level of perception towards a void feeling-state, empty of images. Only starting from this “anoetic” feeling-state, the deep imaginal creative and re-structuring self-referential activity may be reactivated by a process of spontaneous imagination.

Spontaneous Brain Activity Predicts Task-Evoked Activity During Animate Versus Inanimate Touch

The spontaneous activity of the brain is characterized by an elaborate temporal structure with scale-free properties as indexed by the power law exponent (PLE). We test the hypothesis that spontaneous brain activity modulates task-evoked activity during interactions with animate versus inanimate stimuli. For this purpose, we developed a paradigm requiring participants to actively touch either animate (real hand) or inanimate (mannequin hand) stimuli. Behaviorally, participants perceived the animate target as closer in space, temporally more synchronous with their own self, and more personally relevant, compared with the inanimate. Neuronally, we observed a modulation of task-evoked activity by animate versus inanimate interactions in posterior insula, in medial prefrontal cortex, comprising anterior cingulate cortex, and in medial superior frontal gyrus. Among these regions, an increased functional connectivity was shown between posterior insula and perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC) during animate compared with inanimate interactions and during resting state. Importantly, PLE during spontaneous brain activity in PACC correlated positively with PACC task-evoked activity during animate versus inanimate stimuli. In conclusion, we demonstrate that brain spontaneous activity in PACC can be related to the distinction between animate and inanimate stimuli and thus might be specifically tuned to align our brain with its animate environment.

Large-Scale Brain Simulation and Disorders of Consciousness. Mapping Technical and Conceptual Issues

Modeling and simulations have gained a leading position in contemporary attempts to describe, explain, and quantitatively predict the human brain's operations. Computer models are highly sophisticated tools developed to achieve an integrated knowledge of the brain with the aim of overcoming the actual fragmentation resulting from different neuroscientific approaches. In this paper we investigate the plausibility of simulation technologies for emulation of consciousness and the potential clinical impact of large-scale brain simulation on the assessment and care of disorders of consciousness (DOCs), e.g., Coma, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State. Notwithstanding their technical limitations, we suggest that simulation technologies may offer new solutions to old practical problems, particularly in clinical contexts. We take DOCs as an illustrative case, arguing that the simulation of neural correlates of consciousness is potentially useful for improving treatments of patients with DOCs.

Consciousness: a unique way of processing information

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the "single voice" of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention.

How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC)

Time and space are the basic building blocks of nature. As a unique existent in nature, our brain exists in time and takes up space. The brain's activity itself also constitutes and spreads in its own (intrinsic) time and space that is crucial for consciousness. Consciousness is a complex phenomenon including different dimensions: level/state, content/form, phenomenal aspects, and cognitive features. We propose a Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) focusing primarily on the temporal and spatial features of the brain activity. We postulate four different neuronal mechanisms accounting for the different dimensions of consciousness: (i) "temporo-spatial nestedness" of the spontaneous activity accounts for the level/state of consciousness as neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC); (ii) "temporo-spatial alignment" of the pre-stimulus activity accounts for the content/form of consciousness as neural prerequisite of consciousness (preNCC); (iii) "temporo-spatial expansion" of early stimulus-induced activity accounts for phenomenal consciousness as neural correlates of consciousness (NCC); (iv) "temporo-spatial globalization" of late stimulus-induced activity accounts for the cognitive features of consciousness as neural consequence of consciousness (NCCcon).

Bottom-Up and Top-Down Mechanisms of General Anesthetics Modulate Different Dimensions of Consciousness

There has been controversy regarding the precise mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness, with two salient approaches that have emerged within systems neuroscience. One prominent approach is the “bottom up” paradigm, which argues that anesthetics suppress consciousness by modulating sleep-wake nuclei and neural circuits in the brainstem and diencephalon that have evolved to control arousal states. Another approach is the “top-down” paradigm, which argues that anesthetics suppress consciousness by modulating the cortical and thalamocortical circuits involved in the integration of neural information. In this article, we synthesize these approaches by mapping bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of general anesthetics to two distinct but inter-related dimensions of consciousness: level and content. We show how this explains certain empirical observations regarding the diversity of anesthetic drug effects. We conclude with a more nuanced discussion of how levels and contents of consciousness interact to generate subjective experience and what this implies for the mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.

Altered resting-state functional organization within the central executive network in obsessive-compulsive disorder

AIM

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is associated with deficits in response inhibition and planning, which are governed by the central executive network. The objective of this study was to investigate both intra- and inter-regional resting-state connectivity within the central executive network in OCD.

METHODS

Thirty OCD patients and 30 matched healthy controls were scanned using resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging. The independent component analysis was used on a separate sample of healthy controls to generate the central executive network mask for the subsequent OCD analyses. Regional homogeneity (ReHo) and seed-based functional connectivity analyses were used to explore the differences between intra- and inter-regional synchronized activity within the central executive network in OCD patients at rest.

RESULTS

Increased ReHo and functional connectivity in the key regions of the central executive network, such as the orbitofrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the angular gyrus, were found in OCD patients. Furthermore, changes in both the ReHo within the orbitofrontal cortex and the functional connectivity between the orbitofrontal cortex and angular gyrus were negatively correlated with OCD duration.

CONCLUSION

The increased resting-state functional organization within the central executive network may be related to OCD patients' deficits in cognitive control and symptom progression.

Self, cortical midline structures and the resting state: Implications for Alzheimer's disease

Different aspects of the self have been reported to be affected in many neurological or psychiatric diseases such as Alzheimer's disease (AD), including mainly higher-level cognitive self-unawareness. This higher sense of self-awareness is most likely related to and dependent on episodic memory, due to the proper integration of ourselves in time, with a permanent conservation of ourselves (i.e., sense of continuity across time). Reviewing studies in this field, our objective is thus to raise possible explanations, especially with the help of neuroimaging studies, for where such self-awareness deficits originate in AD patients. We describe not only episodic (and autobiographical memory) impairment in patients, but also the important role of cortical midline structures, the Default Mode Network, and the resting state (intrinsic brain activity) for the processing of self-related information.

Integrative Processing of Touch and Affect in Social Perception: An fMRI Study

Social perception commonly employs multiple sources of information. The present study aimed at investigating the integrative processing of affective social signals. Task-related and task-free functional magnetic resonance imaging was performed in 26 healthy adult participants during a social perception task concerning dynamic visual stimuli simultaneously depicting facial expressions of emotion and tactile sensations that could be either congruent or incongruent. Confounding effects due to affective valence, inhibitory top-down influences, cross-modal integration, and conflict processing were minimized. The results showed that the perception of congruent, compared to incongruent stimuli, elicited enhanced neural activity in a set of brain regions including left amygdala, bilateral posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and left superior parietal cortex. These congruency effects did not differ as a function of emotion or sensation. A complementary task-related functional interaction analysis preliminarily suggested that amygdala activity depended on previous processing stages in fusiform gyrus and PCC. The findings provide support for the integrative processing of social information about others' feelings from manifold bodily sources (sensory-affective information) in amygdala and PCC. Given that the congruent stimuli were also judged as being more self-related and more familiar in terms of personal experience in an independent sample of participants, we speculate that such integrative processing might be mediated by the linking of external stimuli with self-experience. Finally, the prediction of task-related responses in amygdala by intrinsic functional connectivity between amygdala and PCC during a task-free state implies a neuro-functional basis for an individual predisposition for the integrative processing of social stimulus content.

Spatiotemporal Psychopathology II: How does a psychopathology of the brain's resting state look like? Spatiotemporal approach and the history of psychopathology

Psychopathology as the investigation and classification of experience, behavior and symptoms in psychiatric patients is an old discipline that ranges back to the end of the 19th century. Since then different approaches to psychopathology have been suggested. Recent investigations showing abnormalities in the brain on different levels raise the question how the gap between brain and psyche, between neural abnormalities and alteration in experience and behavior can be bridged. Historical approaches like descriptive (Jaspers) and structural (Minkoswki) psychopathology as well as the more current phenomenological psychopathology (Paarnas, Fuchs, Sass, Stanghellini) remain on the side of the psyche giving detailed description of the phenomenal level of experience while leaving open the link to the brain. In contrast, the recently introduced Research Domain Classification (RDoC) aims at explicitly linking brain and psyche by starting from so-called 'neuro-behavioral constructs'. How does Spatiotemporal Psychopathology, as demonstrated in the first paper on depression, stand in relation to these approaches? In a nutshell, Spatiotemporal Psychopathology aims to bridge the gap between brain and psyche. Specifically, as demonstrated in depression in the first paper, the focus is on the spatiotemporal features of the brain's intrinsic activity and how they are transformed into corresponding spatiotemporal features in experience on the phenomenal level and behavioral changes, which can well account for the symptoms in these patients. This second paper focuses on some of the theoretical background assumptions in Spatiotemporal Psychopathology by directly comparing it to descriptive, structural, and phenomenological psychopathology as well as to RDoC.

A unified 3D default space consciousness model combining neurological and physiological processes that underlie conscious experience

The Global Workspace Theory and Information Integration Theory are two of the most currently accepted consciousness models; however, these models do not address many aspects of conscious experience. We compare these models to our previously proposed consciousness model in which the thalamus fills-in processed sensory information from corticothalamic feedback loops within a proposed 3D default space, resulting in the recreation of the internal and external worlds within the mind. This 3D default space is composed of all cells of the body, which communicate via gap junctions and electrical potentials to create this unified space. We use 3D illustrations to explain how both visual and non-visual sensory information may be filled-in within this dynamic space, creating a unified seamless conscious experience. This neural sensory memory space is likely generated by baseline neural oscillatory activity from the default mode network, other salient networks, brainstem, and reticular activating system.