'Catching the waves' - slow cortical potentials as moderator of voluntary action

Using a Veto paradigm to investigate the decision models in explaining Libet-style experiments

The question of whether free will exists or not has intrigued philosophers for centuries. About 40 years ago, cognitive neuroscientists such as Benjamin Libet have joined the discussion by demonstrating that an ERP component, the readiness potential (RP), precedes the reported time of decision to act by a few hundred milliseconds. Libet et al. (1983) argued that our brains unconsciously prepare the movement before we experience any conscious intention, which led some free will skeptics (e.g., Ebert & Wegner, 2011) to argue that free will does not exist. While Libet's interpretation of his findings initiated an intense philosophical debate, alternative interpretations have been put forward more recently (Bode et al., 2014; Brass et al., 2019; Schurger et al., 2012; 2021). Integration to bound models (ITB) of Libet-style experiments suggest that we accumulate information until an intention threshold is reached, which triggers our experience of intention and execution of voluntary behaviors. The RP, from this perspective reflects the decision process itself rather than the consequence of an unconscious decision. To determine if the ITB model better predicts behavioral patterns in Libet-style experiments, we added a whether-component to the classical Libet task (the Veto Libet task) and compared the behavioral measures in the Veto Libet task with the Classical Libet task. We hypothesized that the signal accumulation in the Veto Libet task would be less steep than in the Classical Libet task, resulting in longer wait times and earlier self-reported intentions to act (i.e., the W). The result in general supported our hypotheses. In addition, these behavioral differences between the Classical Libet task and the Veto Libet task established valuable behavioral correlates for future investigations into the vetoing phenomenon. Finally, this study was also the first application of the Libet task in an online setting, and the behavioral parameters were highly comparable to the previous offline studies, further supporting the possibility of using the online platform to study arbitrary decision-making.

Slow ramping emerges from spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural networks

The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping activity in medial frontal cortex that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural-network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets ~2 s before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses.

Effects of divided attention on movement-related cortical potential in community-dwelling elderly adults: A preliminary study

Dual-tasking is defined as performing two or more tasks concurrently. This study aimed to investigate the effect of divided attention on movement-related cortical potential (MRCP) during dual-task performance in 11 community-dwelling elderly individuals while the load of the secondary task was altered. MRCP was recorded during a single task (ST), simple dual task (S-DT), and complex dual task (C-DT) as no-, low-, and high-load divided attention tasks, respectively. The ST involved self-paced tapping with an extended right index finger. In the S-DT and C-DT, the subjects simultaneously performed the ST and a visual number counting task with different levels of load. The coefficient of variation of movement frequency was significantly more variable in the C-DT than in the ST. The MRCP amplitude from electroencephalography electrode C3, contralateral to the moving hand, was significantly higher in the C-DT than in the ST. Higher attention diversion led to a significant reduction in MRCP amplitude in the participants. These results suggest that attention division in dual-task situations plays an important role in movement preparation and execution. We propose that MRCP can serve as a marker for screening the ability of older individuals to perform dual-tasks.

Slow ramping emerges from spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural networks

1. We reveal a mechanism for slow-ramping signals before spontaneous voluntary movements. 2. Slow synapses stabilize spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural network. 3. We validate model predictions in human frontal cortical single-neuron recordings. 4. The model recreates the readiness potential in an EEG proxy signal. 5. Neurons that ramp together had correlated activity before ramping onset. The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping activity in medial frontal cortex that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural-network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets ∼2 seconds before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

What is the intention to move and when does it occur?

In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious intention" and attempts to measure its timing. Scalp electroencephalographic activity prior to movement, the Bereitschaftspotential, clearly begins prior to the reported onset of conscious intent. However, the interpretation of this finding remains controversial. Numerous studies show that the Libet method for determining intent, W time, is not accurate and may be misleading. We conclude that intention has many different aspects, and although we now understand much more about how the brain makes movements, identifying the time of conscious intention is still elusive.

Motor imagery vividness and symptom severity in Parkinson's disease

Motor imagery (MI), the mental simulation of movement in the absence of overt motor output, has demonstrated potential as a technique to support rehabilitation of movement in neurological conditions such as Parkinson's disease (PD). Existing evidence suggests that MI is largely preserved in PD, but previous studies have typically examined global measures of MI and have not considered the potential impact of individual differences in symptom presentation on MI. The present study investigated the influence of severity of overall motor symptoms, bradykinesia and tremor on MI vividness scores in 44 individuals with mild to moderate idiopathic PD. Linear mixed effects modelling revealed that imagery modality and the severity of left side bradykinesia significantly influenced MI vividness ratings. Consistent with previous findings, participants rated visual motor imagery (VMI) to be more vivid than kinesthetic motor imagery (KMI). Greater severity of left side bradykinesia (but not right side bradykinesia) predicted increased vividness of KMI, while tremor severity and overall motor symptom severity did not predict vividness of MI. The specificity of the effect of bradykinesia to the left side may reflect greater premorbid vividness for the dominant (right) side or increased attention to more effortful movements on the left side of the body resulting in more vivid motor imagery.

Time-estimation process could cause the disappearence of readiness potential

Generally, the readiness potential (RP) is considered to be the scalp electroencephalography (EEG) activity preceding movement. In our previous study, we found early RP was absent among approximately half of the subjects during instructed action, but we did not identify the mechanism causing the disappearance of the RP. In this study, we investigated whether the time-estimation process could cause the disappearance of the RP. First, we designed experiments consisting of motor execution (ME), motor execution after time estimation (MEATE), and time estimation (TE) tasks, and we collected and preprocessed the EEG data of 16 subjects. Second, we compared the event related potential (ERP) waveform and scalp topography between ME and MEATE tasks. Then, to explore the influence of time-estimation, we analyzed the difference in ERP between MEATE and TE tasks. Finally, we used source imaging to probe the activation of brain regions during the three tasks, and we calculated the average activation amplitude of eight motor related brain regions. We found that the RP occurred in the ME task but not in the MEATE task. We also found that the waveform of the difference in ERP between the MEATE and TE tasks was similar to that of the ME task. The results of source imaging indicated that, compared to the ME task, the activation amplitude of the supplementary motor area (SMA) decreased significantly for the MEATE task. Our results suggested that the time estimation process could cause the disappearance of the RP. This phenomenon might be caused by the counteraction of neural electrical activity related to time estimation and motor preparation in the SMA.

A framework for application of consumer neuroscience in pro-environmental behavior change interventions

Most consumers are aware that climate change is a growing problem and admit that action is needed. However, research shows that consumers' behavior often does not conform to their value and orientations. This value-behavior gap is due to contextual factors such as price, product design, and social norms as well as individual factors such as personal and hedonic values, environmental beliefs, and the workload capacity an individual can handle. Because of this conflict of interest, consumers have a hard time identifying the true drivers of their behavior, as they are either unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge the processes at play. Therefore, consumer neuroscience methods might provide a valuable tool to uncover the implicit measurements of pro-environmental behavior (PEB). Several studies have already defined neurophysiological differences between green and non-green individuals; however, a behavior change intervention must be developed to motivate PEB among consumers. Motivating behavior with reward or punishment will most likely get users engaged in climate change action via brain structures related to the reward system, such as the amygdala, nucleus accumbens, and (pre)frontal cortex, where the reward information and subsequent affective responses are encoded. The intensity of the reward experience can be increased when the consumer is consciously considering the action to achieve it. This makes goal-directed behavior the potential aim of behavior change interventions. This article provides an extensive review of the neuroscientific evidence for consumer attitude, behavior, and decision-making processes in the light of sustainability incentives for behavior change interventions. Based on this review, we aim to unite the current theories and provide future research directions to exploit the power of affective conditioning and neuroscience methods for promoting PEB engagement.

Free will strikes back: Steady-state movement-related cortical potentials are modulated by cognitive control

In psychology and neuroscience, opposition to free will has asserted that any degree of perceived self-control or choice is a mere epiphenomenon which provides no meaningful influence on action. The present research tested the validity of this conclusion by designing a paradigm in which the potential effect of self-monitoring on motor output could be investigated. Using a repetitive finger tapping task that evokes automatic patterns in participants tapping responses, we have obtained evidence that (1) participants may voluntarily reduce the predictability of their tapping patterns (2) by exercising cognitive control that (3) modulates response-locked steady-state movement-related potentials over primary and supplementary motor areas. These findings challenge the most radical accounts of the nonexistence of free will and instead provide support for a more balanced model of human behaviour in which cognitive control may constrain automatic response tendencies in response preparation and action execution.

Assessing residual motor function in patients with disorders of consciousness by brain network properties of task-state EEG

Recent achievements in evaluating the residual consciousness of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs) have demonstrated that spontaneous or evoked electroencephalography (EEG) could be used to improve consciousness state diagnostic classification. Recent studies showed that the EEG signal of the task-state could better characterize the conscious state and cognitive ability of the brain, but it has rarely been used in consciousness assessment. A cue-guide motor task experiment was designed, and task-state EEG were collected from 18 patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS), 29 patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS), and 19 healthy controls. To obtain the markers of residual motor function in patients with DOC, the event-related potential (ERP), scalp topography, and time-frequency maps were analyzed. Then the coherence (COH) and debiased weighted phase lag index (dwPLI) networks in the delta, theta, alpha, beta, and gamma bands were constructed, and the correlations of network properties and JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) motor function scores were calculated. The results showed that there was an obvious readiness potential (RP) at the Cz position during the motor preparation process in the MCS group, but no RP was observed in the UWS group. Moreover, the node degree properties of the COH network in the theta and alpha bands and the global efficiency properties of the dwPLI network in the theta band were significantly greater in the MCS group compared to the UWS group. The above network properties and CRS-R motor function scores showed a strong linear correlation. These findings demonstrated that the brain network properties of task-state EEG could be markers of residual motor function of DOC patients.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11571-021-09741-7.

Unconscious Influences on "Free Will" Movement Initiation: Slow-wave Brain Stimulation and the Readiness Potential

A central objective in the study of volition has been to identify how changes in neural activity relate to voluntary-"free will"-movement. The readiness potential (RP) is observed in the EEG as a slow-building signal that precedes action onset. Many consider the RP as a marker of an underlying preparatory process for initiating voluntary movement. However, the RP may emerge from ongoing slow-wave brain oscillations that influence the timing of movement initiation in a phase-dependent manner. Transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) enables brain oscillations to be entrained at the frequency of stimulation. We delivered tACS at a slow-wave frequency over frontocentral motor areas while participants (n = 30) performed a simple, self-paced button press task. During the active tACS condition, participants showed a tendency to initiate actions in the phase of the tACS cycle that corresponded to increased negative potentials across the frontocentral motor region. Comparisons of premovement EEG activity observed over frontocentral and central scalp electrodes showed earlier onset and increased amplitude of RPs from active stimulation compared with sham stimulation. This suggests that movement-related activity in the brain can be modulated by the delivery of weak, nonconsciously perceptible alternating currents over frontocentral motor regions. We present novel findings that support existing theories, which suggest the timing of voluntary movement is influenced by the phase of slow-changing oscillating brain states.

Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness

Cerebral energy supply is insufficient to support continuous neuronal processing of the plethora of time-constant objects that we are aware of. As a result, the brain is forced to limit processing resources to (the most relevant) cases of change. The neuronally generated world is thus temporally discontinuous. This parallels the fact that, in all relevant microscopic fundamental equations of nature, temporal change plays a dominant role. When a scientist calculates a "solution" to such an equation, integration over time is an essential step. The present Hypothesis expresses that the step from neuronal activity to phenomenal content of consciousness is reflective of a (phenomenal) "solution:" the main source of the incomprehensibility of consciousness is proposed to result from the introduction of phenomenal time-constant entities. These are "filled-in" via integration, even though neuronal data only exists for changes to these entities. In this way, a temporally continuous picture of the world phenomenally appears. Qualia are "initial conditions," which are required for integration and cannot be deduced from present data. Phenomenal "identity" (vs. "high similarity") is related to qualia. Inattentive visual perception, which is only rarely investigated, offers insights into these relationships. Introspectively, unattended vision appears rich because percepts are cumulated over long time spans, whereas attentive perception relies purely on present neuronal signals. The present Hypothesis is that a brief neuronal activity can signify long-lasting and constant phenomenal content of consciousness. Experimental support is presented that comes from discrepancies between neuronal activity and perception: transient neuronal responses to sustained stimuli, "filling-in," change blindness, identity vs. close resemblance.

Predicting motor behavior: an efficient EEG signal processing pipeline to detect brain states with potential therapeutic relevance for VR-based neurorehabilitation

Virtual reality (VR)-based motor therapy is an emerging approach in neurorehabilitation. The combination of VR with electroencephalography (EEG) presents further opportunities to improve therapeutic efficacy by personalizing the paradigm. Specifically, the idea is to synchronize the choice and timing of stimuli in the perceived virtual world with fluctuating brain states relevant to motor behavior. Here, we present an open source EEG single-trial based classification pipeline that is designed to identify ongoing brain states predictive of the planning and execution of movements. 9 healthy volunteers each performed 1080 trials of a repetitive reaching task with an implicit two-alternative forced choice, i.e., use of the right or left hand, in response to the appearance of a visual target. The performance of the EEG decoding pipeline was assessed with respect to classification accuracy of right vs. left arm use, based on the EEG signal at the time of the stimulus. Different features, feature extraction methods, and classifiers were compared at different time windows; the number and location of informative EEG channels and the number of calibration trials needed were also quantified, as well as any benefits from individual-level optimization of pipeline parameters. This resulted in a set of recommended parameters that achieved an average 83.3% correct prediction on never-before-seen testing data, and a state-of-the-art 77.1% in a real-time simulation. Neurophysiological plausibility of the resulting classifiers was assessed by time-frequency and event-related potential analyses, as well as by Independent Component Analysis topographies and cortical source localization. We expect that this pipeline will facilitate the identification of relevant brain states as prospective therapeutic targets in closed-loop EEG-VR motor neurorehabilitation.

Conscious intention and human action: Review of the rise and fall of the readiness potential and Libet's clock

Is consciousness-the subjective awareness of the sensations, perceptions, beliefs, desires, and intentions of mental life-a genuine cause of human action or a mere impotent epiphenomenon accompanying the brain's physical activity but utterly incapable of making anything actually happen? This article will review the history and current status of experiments and commentary related to Libet's influential paper (Brain 106:623-664, 1983) whose conclusion "that cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous voluntary act …can and usually does begin unconsciously" has had a huge effect on debate about the efficacy of conscious intentions. Early (up to 2008) and more recent (2008 on) experiments replicating and criticizing Libet's conclusions and especially his methods will be discussed, focusing especially on recent observations that the readiness potential (RP) may only be an "artifact of averaging" and that, when intention is measured using "tone probes," the onset of intention is found much earlier and often before the onset of the RP. Based on these findings, Libet's methodology was flawed and his results are no longer valid reasons for rejecting Fodor's "good old commonsense belief/desire psychology" that "my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching.".

A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments

In the seminal Libet experiment (Libet et al., 1983), unconscious brain activity preceded the self-reported, conscious intention to move. This was repeatedly interpreted as challenging the view that (conscious) mental states cause behavior and, prominently, as challenging the existence of free will. Extensive discussions in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and jurisprudence followed, but further empirical findings were heterogeneous. However, a quantitative review of the literature summarizing the evidence of Libet-style experiments is lacking. The present meta-analysis fills this gap. The results revealed a temporal pattern that is largely consistent with the one found by Libet and colleagues. Remarkably, there were only k = 6 studies for the time difference between unconscious brain activity and the conscious intention to move - the most crucial time difference regarding implications about conscious causation and free will. Additionally, there was a high degree of uncertainty associated with this meta-analytic effect. We conclude that some of Libet et al.'s findings appear more fragile than anticipated in light of the substantial scientific work that built on them.

What Is the Readiness Potential?

The readiness potential (RP), a slow buildup of electrical potential recorded at the scalp using electroencephalography, has been associated with neural activity involved in movement preparation. It became famous thanks to Benjamin Libet (Brain 1983;106:623-642), who used the time difference between the RP and self-reported time of conscious intention to move to argue that we lack free will. The RP's informativeness about self-generated action and derivatively about free will has prompted continued research on this neural phenomenon. Here, we argue that recent advances in our understanding of the RP, including computational modeling of the phenomenon, call for a reassessment of its relevance for understanding volition and the philosophical problem of free will.

Special Issue: Consciousness science and its theories Time consciousness: the missing link in theories of consciousness

There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete "functional moments" of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the "experienced moment"). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.

Suppress Me if You Can: Neurofeedback of the Readiness Potential

Voluntary movements are usually preceded by a slow, negative-going brain signal over motor areas, the so-called readiness potential (RP). To date, the exact nature and causal role of the RP in movement preparation have remained heavily debated. Although the RP is influenced by several motorical and cognitive factors, it has remained unclear whether people can learn to exert mental control over their RP, for example, by deliberately suppressing it. If people were able to initiate spontaneous movements without eliciting an RP, this would challenge the idea that the RP is a necessary stage of the causal chain leading up to a voluntary movement. We tested the ability of participants to control the magnitude of their RP in a neurofeedback experiment. Participants performed self-initiated movements, and after every movement, they were provided with immediate feedback about the magnitude of their RP. They were asked to find a strategy to perform voluntary movements such that the RPs were as small as possible. We found no evidence that participants were able to to willfully modulate or suppress their RPs while still eliciting voluntary movements. This suggests that the RP might be an involuntary component of voluntary action over which people cannot exert conscious control.

ERP markers of action planning and outcome monitoring in human - robot interaction

The present study aimed to examine event-related potentials (ERPs) of action planning and outcome monitoring in human-robot interaction. To this end, participants were instructed to perform costly actions (i.e. losing points) to stop a balloon from inflating and to prevent its explosion. They performed the task alone (individual condition) or with a robot (joint condition). Similar to findings from human-human interactions, results showed that action planning was affected by the presence of another agent, robot in this case. Specifically, the early readiness potential (eRP) amplitude was larger in the joint, than in the individual, condition. The presence of the robot affected also outcome perception and monitoring. Our results showed that the P1/N1 complex was suppressed in the joint, compared to the individual condition when the worst outcome was expected, suggesting that the presence of the robot affects attention allocation to negative outcomes of one's own actions. Similarly, results also showed that larger losses elicited smaller feedback-related negativity (FRN) in the joint than in the individual condition. Taken together, our results indicate that the social presence of a robot may influence the way we plan our actions and also the way we monitor their consequences. Implications of the study for the human-robot interaction field are discussed.

Differences in Intersubject Early Readiness Potentials Between Voluntary and Instructed Actions

Readiness potential (RP) is a slow negative electroencephalogram (EEG) potential prior to voluntary action and was first described by Kornhuber and Deecke (1965). Recent studies have demonstrated that a few subjects do not exhibit standard RP before voluntary action. In our previous study, we also found that some subjects did not show an early RP preceding instructed action. Although this phenomenon may be meaningful, no studies have yet investigated its origins. In the present study, we designed and implemented an experimental paradigm involving voluntary and instructed actions in the form of hand movements from 29 subjects with concurrent acquisition of EEGs. According to whether the subjects showed a standard RP waveform during instructed action, they were divided into the SHOW and NOSHOW group. Then, the RPs and voltage topographies were plotted for each group. Finally, the slope of each epoch at the early RP phase was estimated. We showed that early RPs were absent in 14 of 29 subjects during instructed actions. Besides, based on the slow cortical potential (SCP) sampling hypothesis, we also showed a decreased proportion in the negative potential for the NOSHOW group. Our results suggested that early RP is absent among approximately half of subjects during instructed action and that the decreased proportion of negative potential shifts may account for the absence of early RP in the NOSHOW group.

Cerebral preparation of spontaneous movements: An EEG study

OBJECTIVE

The current study sought to determine whether there is a Bereitschaftspotential (BP) before uninstructed, spontaneous movements.

METHODS

14 participants were seated on a comfortable armchair for one hour without any instruction except not to fall asleep and to keep their eyes open. Electroencephalography (EEG) and electromyography (EMG) activity were recorded during the whole session. EEG activity was analyzed before spontaneous movements and compared with EEG activity before repetitive, instructed movements in a separate session.

RESULTS

BPs were identified in most participants with the spontaneous movements. The BPs with spontaneous movements were mostly localized in the medial frontocentral regions. The BPs with the instructed movements were localized primarily in the central regions and had larger amplitude.

CONCLUSION

Presence of a BP before movement does not depend on instruction and may be independent of conscious volition. The amplitude of the BP may depend on the amount of attention.

SIGNIFICANCE

This study shows that the presence of a BP before movement is not an "artifact" of the experimental instructions.

Content-Free Awareness: EEG-fcMRI Correlates of Consciousness as Such in an Expert Meditator

The minimal neural correlate of the conscious state, regardless of the neural activity correlated with the ever-changing contents of experience, has still not been identified. Different attempts have been made, mainly by comparing the normal waking state to seemingly unconscious states, such as deep sleep or general anesthesia. A more direct approach would be the neuroscientific investigation of conscious states that are experienced as free of any specific phenomenal content. Here we present serendipitous data on content-free awareness (CFA) during an EEG-fMRI assessment reported by an extraordinarily qualified meditator with over 50,000 h of practice. We focused on two specific cortical networks related to external and internal awareness, i.e., the dorsal attention network (DAN) and the default mode network (DMN), to explore the neural correlates of this experience. The combination of high-resolution EEG and ultrafast fMRI enabled us to analyze the dynamic aspects of fMRI connectivity informed by EEG power analysis. The neural correlates of CFA were characterized by a sharp decrease in alpha power and an increase in theta power as well as increases in functional connectivity in the DAN and decreases in the posterior DMN. We interpret these findings as correlates of a top-down-initiated attentional state excluding external sensory stimuli and internal mentation from conscious experience. We conclude that the investigation of states of CFA could provide valuable input for new methodological and conceptual approaches in the search for the minimal neural correlate of consciousness.

Neural precursors of decisions that matter-an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice

The readiness potential (RP)—a key ERP correlate of upcoming action—is known to precede subjects' reports of their decision to move. Some view this as evidence against a causal role for consciousness in human decision-making and thus against free-will. But previous work focused on arbitrary decisions—purposeless, unreasoned, and without consequences. It remains unknown to what degree the RP generalizes to deliberate, more ecological decisions. We directly compared deliberate and arbitrary decision-making during a $1000-donation task to non-profit organizations. While we found the expected RPs for arbitrary decisions, they were strikingly absent for deliberate ones. Our results and drift-diffusion model are congruent with the RP representing accumulation of noisy, random fluctuations that drive arbitrary—but not deliberate—decisions. They further point to different neural mechanisms underlying deliberate and arbitrary decisions, challenging the generalizability of studies that argue for no causal role for consciousness in decision-making to real-life decisions.

Editorial note: This article has been through an editorial process in which the authors decide how to respond to the issues raised during peer review. The Reviewing Editor's assessment is that all the issues have been addressed (see decision letter).

Phase synchrony in slow cortical potentials is decreased in both expert and trained novice meditators

Neuronal interactions coupled by phase synchronization have been studied in a wide range of frequency bands, but fluctuations below the delta frequency have often been neglected. In the present study, phase synchrony in slow cortical potentials (SCPs, 0.01-0.1 Hz) was examined during two different mental states; a resting state and a breath-focused mindfulness meditation. SCP phase synchrony in 9 long-term expert meditators (on average 22 years of experience) were compared with the data obtained from 11 novices. Additionally, after the novices attended an 8-week mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) program, SCP phase synchrony was measured again. While expert meditators and novices exhibited the same amount of SCP phase synchrony in the resting state, decreased synchronization was found during meditation among expert meditators as well as novices who had participated in the MBSR program (but not prior to the program). These findings suggest that phase synchrony in slow cortical activity is context-dependent and could provide crucial information in the study of the human mind.

Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis

Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences. Mindfulness meditation centrally involves awareness of intentions and is associated with improved metacognitive access to intentions. Therefore, mindfulness meditators and highly hypnotizable people may lie at opposite ends of a spectrum with regard to metacognitive access to intention‐related information. Here we review the theoretical background and evidence for differences in the metacognition of intentions in these groups, as revealed by chronometric measures of the awareness of voluntary action: the timing of an intention to move (Libet's “W” judgments) and the compressed perception of time between an intentional action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). We review these measures and critically evaluate their proposed connection to the experience of volition and sense of agency.

Decreased alpha-band oscillatory brain activity prior to movement initiated by perception of fatigue sensation

Fatigue is a health problem prevalent in modern societies. Fatigue sensation plays an important role as a biological alarm urging rest to maintain homeostasis, and clarifying the neural mechanisms related to fatigue sensations by which we decide to engage in rest is therefore essential. This study enrolled healthy male volunteers and showed that the decrease in alpha-band power as assessed by magnetoencephalography of the left Brodmann's area (BA) 6 before perception of fatigue when a button-press based on the level of fatigue was required was smaller than that before perception of the intention to move when a voluntary button-press was required. In addition, the decrease of alpha-band power in the left BA 6 before the perception of fatigue was not altered compared with that in the right BA 6 when a button-press based on the level of fatigue was required. These results suggest that the button-press based on the perception of fatigue is not prepared before the perception of fatigue. These findings will advance the understanding of the neural mechanisms related to subjective feelings such as fatigue sensation.

Neural Oscillations and the Initiation of Voluntary Movement

The brain processes involved in the planning and initiation of voluntary action are of great interest for understanding the relationship between conscious awareness of decisions and the neural control of movement. Voluntary motor behavior has generally been considered to occur when conscious decisions trigger movements. However, several studies now provide compelling evidence that brain states indicative of forthcoming movements take place before a person becomes aware of a conscious decision to act. While such studies have created much debate over the nature of ‘free will,’ at the very least they suggest that unconscious brain processes are predictive of forthcoming movements. Recent studies suggest that slow changes in neuroelectric potentials may play a role in the timing of movement onset by pushing brain activity above a threshold to trigger the initiation of action. Indeed, recent studies have shown relationships between the phase of low frequency oscillatory activity of the brain and the onset of voluntary action. Such studies, however, cannot determine whether this underlying neural activity plays a causal role in the initiation of movement or is only associated with the intentional behavior. Non-invasive transcranial alternating current brain stimulation can entrain neural activity at particular frequencies in order to assess whether underlying brain processes are causally related to associated behaviors. In this review, we examine the evidence for neural coding of action as well as the brain states prior to action initiation and discuss whether low frequency alternating current brain stimulation could influence the timing of a persons’ decision to act.

Delusions of control in schizophrenia: Resistant to the mind's best trick?

The existence of a free will is fiercely debated in neuroscience and philosophy. The debate has great impact on society and our self-understanding as human beings. Behavioral and electrophysiological data have challenged the intuitive assumption that human behavior is the result of conscious intentions. This notion has important implications for delusions of control in schizophrenia, where patients experience bodily movements as not being controlled by themselves. Current theories explain control delusions as a deficit to perceive certain aspects of motor control, but many findings are inconsistent with this idea. Here, an alternative view is proposed: Control delusions might be triggered by an even more veridical perception of the temporal order of intentions and actions. This hypothesis is supported by evidence that (a) conscious intentions in healthy subjects are often based on retrospective inferences, (b) temporal recalibrations of conscious percepts occur in healthy subjects and are disturbed in schizophrenia and (c) basic perceptual functions of schizophrenic patients are less influenced by expectations and therefore they can sometimes be closer to physical reality than those of healthy subjects.

Exploring the maximum duration of the contingent negative variation

While the contingent negative variation (CNV) has been the subject of extensive research over the last fifty years, the maximum duration during which such cortical negativity can be maintained has, to the best of our knowledge, never been systematically explored. Participants were presented with the classic S1-S2 paradigm task, where a warning stimulus (S1) acts as a cue for the appearance of an imperative stimulus (S2). A fast motor response was required upon S2 arrival. Inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) of 2.5, 5, 7.5 and 10 s duration were presented in blocked fashion. Data was analysed using both EEG referenced to linked mastoids and the current source density (CSD) technique, which maximizes the cortical origin of the measured voltage. Mean late CNV (lCNV) amplitude was found to be significantly higher for fast reaction time (RT) trials when CSD data was split according to the median into 'fast' and 'slow' RT halves. Post-hoc comparisons showed that this RT effect was particularly strong for the 10 s condition. This may be explained by the lack of an lCNV component and thus of cortical negativity prior to S2 in the 10 s condition. Our results suggest that intervals of a duration between 7.5 and 10 s represent the upper boundary during which the lCNV component can be elicited.

Specific Relationship between the Shape of the Readiness Potential, Subjective Decision Time, and Waiting Time Predicted by an Accumulator Model with Temporally Autocorrelated Input Noise

Self-initiated movements are reliably preceded by a gradual buildup of neuronal activity known as the readiness potential (RP). Recent evidence suggests that the RP may reflect subthreshold stochastic fluctuations in neural activity that can be modeled as a process of accumulation to bound. One element of accumulator models that has been largely overlooked in the literature is the stochastic term, which is traditionally modeled as Gaussian white noise. While there may be practical reasons for this choice, we have long known that noise in neural systems is not white - it is long-term correlated with spectral density of the form 1/f^β(with roughly 1 < β < 3) across a broad range of spatial scales. I explored the behavior of a leaky stochastic accumulator when the noise over which it accumulates is temporally autocorrelated. I also allowed for the possibility that the RP, as measured at the scalp, might reflect the input to the accumulator (i.e., its stochastic noise component) rather than its output. These two premises led to two novel predictions that I empirically confirmed on behavioral and electroencephalography data from human subjects performing a self-initiated movement task. In addition to generating these two predictions, the model also suggested biologically plausible levels of autocorrelation, consistent with the degree of autocorrelation in our empirical data and in prior reports. These results expose new perspectives for accumulator models by suggesting that the spectral properties of the stochastic input should be allowed to vary, consistent with the nature of biological neural noise.