Internally generated preactivation of single neurons in human medial frontal cortex predicts volition

Slow ramping emerges from spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural networks

1. We reveal a mechanism for slow-ramping signals before spontaneous voluntary movements. 2. Slow synapses stabilize spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural network. 3. We validate model predictions in human frontal cortical single-neuron recordings. 4. The model recreates the readiness potential in an EEG proxy signal. 5. Neurons that ramp together had correlated activity before ramping onset. The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping activity in medial frontal cortex that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural-network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets ∼2 seconds before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses.

A randomised controlled trial investigating the causal role of the medial prefrontal cortex in mediating self-agency during speech monitoring and reality monitoring

Self-agency is the awareness of being the agent of one's own thoughts and actions. Self-agency is essential for interacting with the outside world (reality-monitoring). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is thought to be one neural correlate of self-agency. We investigated whether mPFC activity can causally modulate self-agency on two different tasks of speech-monitoring and reality-monitoring. The experience of self-agency is thought to result from making reliable predictions about the expected outcomes of one's own actions. This self-prediction ability is necessary for the encoding and memory retrieval of one's own thoughts during reality-monitoring to enable accurate judgments of self-agency. This self-prediction ability is also necessary for speech-monitoring where speakers consistently compare auditory feedback (what we hear ourselves say) with what we expect to hear while speaking. In this study, 30 healthy participants are assigned to either 10 Hz repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to enhance mPFC excitability (N = 15) or 10 Hz rTMS targeting a distal temporoparietal site (N = 15). High-frequency rTMS to mPFC enhanced self-predictions during speech-monitoring that predicted improved self-agency judgments during reality-monitoring. This is the first study to provide robust evidence for mPFC underlying a causal role in self-agency, that results from the fundamental ability of improving self-predictions across two different tasks.

The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner

Debates about the concept of Free Will date back to ancient times. About 40 years ago, Benjamin Libet designed an experiment showing that the conscious intention to move is preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation. His finding suggested that unconscious processes determine our decisions. Libet-style experiments have continued to dominate the debate about Free Will, pushing some authors to argue that the existence of Free Will is a mere illusion. We believe that this dispute is because we often measure Free Will using arbitrary human decisions rather than deliberate actions. After reviewing the definition of Free Will and the related literature, we conclude that the scientific evidence does not disprove the existence of Free Will. However, our will encounters several constraints and limitations that should be considered when evaluating our deeds' personal responsibility.

Causal role of medial superior frontal cortex on enhancing neural information flow and self-agency judgments in the self-agency network

Self-agency is being aware of oneself as the agent of one's thoughts and actions. Self-agency is necessary for successful interactions with the outside world (reality-monitoring). Prior research has shown that the medial superior prefrontal gyri (mPFC/SFG) may represent one neural correlate underlying self-agency judgments. However, the causal relationship remains unknown. Here, we applied high-frequency 10Hz repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to modulate the excitability of the mPFC/SFG site that we have previously shown to mediate self-agency. For the first time, we delineate causal neural mechanisms, revealing precisely how rTMS modulates SFG excitability and impacts directional neural information flow in the self-agency network by implementing innovative magnetoencephalography (MEG) phase-transfer entropy (PTE) metrics, measured from pre-to-post rTMS. We found that, compared to control rTMS, enhancing SFG excitability by rTMS induced significant increases in information flow between SFG and specific cingulate and paracentral regions in the self-agency network in delta-theta, alpha, and gamma bands, which predicted improved self-agency judgments. This is the first multimodal imaging study in which we implement MEG PTE metrics of 5D imaging of space, frequency and time, to provide cutting-edge analyses of the causal neural mechanisms of how rTMS enhances SFG excitability and improves neural information flow between distinct regions in the self-agency network to potentiate improved self-agency judgments. Our findings provide a novel perspective for investigating causal neural mechanisms underlying self-agency and create a path towards developing novel neuromodulation interventions to improve self-agency that will be particularly useful for patients with psychosis who exhibit severe impairments in self-agency.

A theory of the skill-performance relationship

The skill-performance relationship is a cornerstone of a meritocratic society. People are selected for schools, colleges and jobs based on the premise that more skillful individuals perform better. Scientific understanding of the skill-performance relationship demands that the effect of skill on performance is objectively assessed without subjective, social, and political considerations. One of the best areas for this analysis is sports. In many sports settings, the skill-performance relationship can objectively be examined at the technical, behavioral, psychological, and neurological levels. This examination reveals that skill and performance are inextricably intertwined. While skill affects performance, performance in turn defines and affects skill. To disentangle the previously confusing and interchangeable use of these key constructs, the paper presents a theoretical model specifying that ability and effort have their own direct effects on performance, as well as indirect effects on performance through skill possession and skill execution in cognitive and physical domains of human performance. Thus, ability and skill are not the same. Although skill is a key determinant of performance, recent theory and research suggests that successful performers are successful not just because of their skills per se, but because they take advantage of their skills by creating more occurrences of momentum, making them last longer, and using them to bounce back faster from streaks of unsuccessful performance. Thus, momentum is an important mediator of the effects of skill on performance.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Brain-wide neural activity underlying memory-guided movement

Behavior relies on activity in structured neural circuits that are distributed across the brain, but most experiments probe neurons in a single area at a time. Using multiple Neuropixels probes, we recorded from multi-regional loops connected to the anterior lateral motor cortex (ALM), a circuit node mediating memory-guided directional licking. Neurons encoding sensory stimuli, choices, and actions were distributed across the brain. However, choice coding was concentrated in the ALM and subcortical areas receiving input from the ALM in an ALM-dependent manner. Diverse orofacial movements were encoded in the hindbrain; midbrain; and, to a lesser extent, forebrain. Choice signals were first detected in the ALM and the midbrain, followed by the thalamus and other brain areas. At movement initiation, choice-selective activity collapsed across the brain, followed by new activity patterns driving specific actions. Our experiments provide the foundation for neural circuit models of decision-making and movement initiation.

Downstream network transformations dissociate neural activity from causal functional contributions

Neuroscientists rely on distributed spatio-temporal patterns of neural activity to understand how neural units contribute to cognitive functions and behavior. However, the extent to which neural activity reliably indicates a unit's causal contribution to the behavior is not well understood. To address this issue, we provide a systematic multi-site perturbation framework that captures time-varying causal contributions of elements to a collectively produced outcome. Applying our framework to intuitive toy examples and artificial neural networks revealed that recorded activity patterns of neural elements may not be generally informative of their causal contribution due to activity transformations within a network. Overall, our findings emphasize the limitations of inferring causal mechanisms from neural activities and offer a rigorous lesioning framework for elucidating causal neural contributions.

Neurophysiological evidence of motor preparation in inner speech and the effect of content predictability

Self-generated overt actions are preceded by a slow negativity as measured by electroencephalogram, which has been associated with motor preparation. Recent studies have shown that this neural activity is modulated by the predictability of action outcomes. It is unclear whether inner speech is also preceded by a motor-related negativity and influenced by the same factor. In three experiments, we compared the contingent negative variation elicited in a cue paradigm in an active vs. passive condition. In Experiment 1, participants produced an inner phoneme, at which an audible phoneme whose identity was unpredictable was concurrently presented. We found that while passive listening elicited a late contingent negative variation, inner speech production generated a more negative late contingent negative variation. In Experiment 2, the same pattern of results was found when participants were instead asked to overtly vocalize the phoneme. In Experiment 3, the identity of the audible phoneme was made predictable by establishing probabilistic expectations. We observed a smaller late contingent negative variation in the inner speech condition when the identity of the audible phoneme was predictable, but not in the passive condition. These findings suggest that inner speech is associated with motor preparatory activity that may also represent the predicted action-effects of covert actions.

Pre-movement event-related potentials and multivariate pattern of EEG encode action outcome prediction

Self-initiated movements are accompanied by an efference copy, a motor command sent from motor regions to the sensory cortices, containing a prediction of the movement's sensory outcome. Previous studies have proposed pre-motor event-related potentials (ERPs), including the readiness potential (RP) and its lateralized sub-component (LRP), as potential neural markers of action feedback prediction. However, it is not known how specific these neural markers are for voluntary (active) movements as compared to involuntary (passive) movements, which produce much of the same sensory feedback (tactile, proprioceptive) but are not accompanied by an efference copy. The goal of the current study was to investigate how active and passive movements are distinguishable from premotor electroencephalography (EEG), and to examine if this change of neural activity differs when participants engage in tasks that differ in their expectation of sensory outcomes. Participants made active (self-initiated) or passive (finger moved by device) finger movements that led to either visual or auditory stimuli (100 ms delay), or to no immediate contingency effects (control). We investigated the time window before the movement onset by measuring pre-movement ERPs time-locked to the button press. For RP, we observed an interaction between task and movement. This was driven by movement differences in the visual and auditory but not the control conditions. LRP conversely only showed a main effect of movement. We then used multivariate pattern analysis to decode movements (active vs. passive). The results revealed ramping decoding for all tasks from around -800 ms onwards up to an accuracy of approximately 85% at the movement. Importantly, similar to RP, we observed lower decoding accuracies for the control condition than the visual and auditory conditions, but only shortly (from -200 ms) before the button press. We also decoded visual vs. auditory conditions. Here, task is decodable for both active and passive conditions, but the active condition showed increased decoding shortly before the button press. Taken together, our results provide robust evidence that pre-movement EEG activity may represent action-feedback prediction in which information about the subsequent sensory outcome is encoded.

Clarifying the nature of stochastic fluctuations and accumulation processes in spontaneous movements

Experiments on choice-predictive brain signals have played an important role in the debate on free will. In a seminal study, Benjamin Libet and colleagues found that a negative-going EEG signal, the readiness potential (RP), can be observed over motor-related brain regions even hundreds of ms before the time of the conscious decision to move. If the early onset of the readiness potential is taken as an indicator of the "brain's decision to move" this could mean that this decision is made early, by unconscious brain activity, rather than later, at the time when the subject believes to have decided. However, an alternative kind of interpretation, involving ongoing stochastic fluctuations, has recently been brought to light. This stochastic decision model (SDM) takes its inspiration from leaky accumulator models of perceptual decision making. It suggests that the RP originates from an accumulation of ongoing stochastic fluctuations. In this view, the decision happens only at a much later stage when an accumulated noisy signal (plus imperative) reaches a threshold. Here, we clarify a number of confusions regarding both the evidence for the stochastic decision model as well as the interpretation that it offers. We will explore several points that we feel are in need of clarification: (a) the empirical evidence for the role of stochastic fluctuations is so far only indirect; (b) the interpretation of animal studies is unclear; (c) a model that is deterministic during the accumulation stage can explain the data in a similar way; (d) the primary focus in the literature has been on the role of random fluctuations whereas the deterministic aspects of the model have been largely ignored; (e) contrary to the original interpretation, the deterministic component of the model is quantitatively the dominant input into the accumulator; and finally (f) there is confusion regarding the role of "imperative" in the SDM and its link to "evidence" in perceptual decision making. Our aim is not to rehabilitate the role of the RP in the free will debate. Rather we aim to address some confusions regarding the evidence for accumulators playing a role in these preparatory brain processes.

Modulation of Motor Awareness: A Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Study in the Healthy Brain

Previous studies on the mechanisms underlying willed actions reported that the premotor cortex may be involved in the construction of motor awareness. However, its exact role is still under investigation. Here, we investigated the role of the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) in motor awareness by modulating its activity applying inhibitory rTMS to PMd, before a specific motor awareness task (under three conditions: without stimulation, after rTMS and after Sham stimulation). During the task, subjects had to trace straight lines to a given target, receiving visual feedback of the line trajectories on a computer screen. Crucially, in most trials, the trajectories on the screen were deviated, and to produce straight lines, subjects had to correct their movements towards the opposite direction. After each trial, participants were asked to judge whether the line seen on the computer screen corresponded to the line actually drawn. Results show that participants in the No Stimulation condition did not recognize the perturbation until 14 degrees of deviation. Importantly, active, but not Sham, rTMS significantly modulated motor awareness, decreasing the amplitude of the angle at which participants became aware of the trajectory correction. These results suggest that PMd plays a crucial role in action self-monitoring.

How far neuroscience is from understanding brains

The cellular biology of brains is relatively well-understood, but neuroscientists have not yet generated a theory explaining how brains work. Explanations of how neurons collectively operate to produce what brains can do are tentative and incomplete. Without prior assumptions about the brain mechanisms, I attempt here to identify major obstacles to progress in neuroscientific understanding of brains and central nervous systems. Most of the obstacles to our understanding are conceptual. Neuroscience lacks concepts and models rooted in experimental results explaining how neurons interact at all scales. The cerebral cortex is thought to control awake activities, which contrasts with recent experimental results. There is ambiguity distinguishing task-related brain activities from spontaneous activities and organized intrinsic activities. Brains are regarded as driven by external and internal stimuli in contrast to their considerable autonomy. Experimental results are explained by sensory inputs, behavior, and psychological concepts. Time and space are regarded as mutually independent variables for spiking, post-synaptic events, and other measured variables, in contrast to experimental results. Dynamical systems theory and models describing evolution of variables with time as the independent variable are insufficient to account for central nervous system activities. Spatial dynamics may be a practical solution. The general hypothesis that measurements of changes in fundamental brain variables, action potentials, transmitter releases, post-synaptic transmembrane currents, etc., propagating in central nervous systems reveal how they work, carries no additional assumptions. Combinations of current techniques could reveal many aspects of spatial dynamics of spiking, post-synaptic processing, and plasticity in insects and rodents to start with. But problems defining baseline and reference conditions hinder interpretations of the results. Furthermore, the facts that pooling and averaging of data destroy their underlying dynamics imply that single-trial designs and statistics are necessary.

Manipulating free will beliefs using online video games

Research in social psychology and experimental philosophy has investigated lay people's free will beliefs (FWB). Using different approaches (i.e. experimental manipulations and vignette studies), they investigated how FWB relate to other concepts, and whether changing FWB has an impact on downstream processes such as social behavior. However, both approaches have shortcomings. While experimental manipulations used in social psychology suffer from demand effects, vignettes used in experimental philosophy are often highly abstract. Across two pre-registered studies, we developed a new approach by merging them in an online video game setting. Using this novel, experience-based FWB manipulation, we found that decreasing FWB impacted variables such as perceived control and responsibility in both studies. While the experience-based manipulation influenced participants' beliefs in free will within the context of the experience ("Within the context of the scenario, would the agent believe in free will?") in the first study, this manipulation effect did not transfer to participants' general FWB ("Do you believe in free will?") in the second study. Overall, our findings suggest a way forward in studying laypeople's beliefs in free will.

Consciousness: a neurosurgical perspective

Neurosurgeons are in a unique position to shed light on the neural basis for consciousness, not only by their clinical care of patients with compromised states of consciousness, but also by employing neurostimulation and neuronal recordings through intracranial electrodes in awake surgical patients, as well as during stages of sleep and anethesia. In this review, we discuss several aspects of consciousness, i.e., perception, memory, and willed actions, studied by electrical stimulation and single neuron recordings in the human brain. We demonstrate how specific neuronal activity underlie the emergence of concepts, memories, and intentions in human consciousness. We discuss the representation of specific conscious content by temporal lobe neurons and present the discovery of "concept cells" and the encoding and retrieval of memories by neurons in the medial temporal lobe. We review prefrontal and parietal neuronal activation that precedes conscious intentions to act. Taken together with other studies in the field, these findings suggest that specific conscious experience may arise from stochastic fluctuations of neuronal activity, reaching a dynamic threshold. Advances in brain recording and stimulation technology coupled with the rapid rise in artificial intelligence are likely to increase the amount and analysis capabilities of data obtained from the human brain, thereby improving the decoding of conscious and preconscious states and open new horizons for modulation of human cognitive functions such as memory and volition.

Neural signals-based respiratory motion tracking: a proof-of-concept study

Objective.Respiratory motion tracking techniques can provide optimal treatment accuracy for thoracoabdominal radiotherapy and robotic surgery. However, conventional imaging-based respiratory motion tracking techniques are time-lagged owing to the system latency of medical linear accelerators and surgical robots. This study aims to investigate the precursor time of respiratory-related neural signals and analyze the potential of neural signals-based respiratory motion tracking.Approach.The neural signals and respiratory motion from eighteen healthy volunteers were acquired simultaneously using a 256-channel scalp electroencephalography (EEG) system. The neural signals were preprocessed using the MNE python package to extract respiratory-related EEG neural signals. Cross-correlation analysis was performed to assess the precursor time and cross-correlation coefficient between respiratory-related EEG neural signals and respiratory motion.Main results.Respiratory-related neural signals that precede the emergence of respiratory motion are detectable via non-invasive EEG. On average, the precursor time of respiratory-related EEG neural signals was 0.68 s. The representative cross-correlation coefficients between EEG neural signals and respiratory motion of the eighteen healthy subjects varied from 0.22 to 0.87.Significance.Our findings suggest that neural signals have the potential to compensate for the system latency of medical linear accelerators and surgical robots. This indicates that neural signals-based respiratory motion tracking is a potential promising solution to respiratory motion and could be useful in thoracoabdominal radiotherapy and robotic surgery.

A randomised controlled trial investigating the causal role of the medial prefrontal cortex in mediating self-agency during speech monitoring and reality monitoring

Self-agency is being aware of oneself as the agent of one's thoughts and actions. Self agency is necessary for successful interactions with the external world (reality-monitoring). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is considered to represent one neural correlate underlying self-agency. We investigated whether mPFC activity can causally modulate self-agency on two different tasks involving speech-monitoring and reality-monitoring. The experience of self-agency is thought to result from being able to reliably predict the sensory outcomes of one's own actions. This self-prediction ability is necessary for successfully encoding and recalling one's own thoughts to enable accurate self-agency judgments during reality-monitoring tasks. This self-prediction ability is also necessary during speech-monitoring tasks where speakers compare what we hear ourselves say in auditory feedback with what we predict we will hear while speaking. In this randomised-controlled study, heathy controls (HC) are assigned to either high-frequency transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to enhance mPFC excitability or TMS targeting a control site. After TMS to mPFC, HC improved self-predictions during speech-monitoring tasks that predicted improved self-agency judgments during different reality-monitoring tasks. These first-in-kind findings demonstrate the mechanisms of how mPFC plays a causal role in self-agency that results from the fundamental ability of improving self-predictions across two different tasks.

Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.

What is the intention to move and when does it occur?

In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious intention" and attempts to measure its timing. Scalp electroencephalographic activity prior to movement, the Bereitschaftspotential, clearly begins prior to the reported onset of conscious intent. However, the interpretation of this finding remains controversial. Numerous studies show that the Libet method for determining intent, W time, is not accurate and may be misleading. We conclude that intention has many different aspects, and although we now understand much more about how the brain makes movements, identifying the time of conscious intention is still elusive.

Human primary motor cortex indexes the onset of subjective intention in brain-machine-interface mediated actions

Self-initiated behavior is accompanied by the experience of willing our actions. Here, we leverage the unique opportunity to examine the full intentional chain - from will (W) to action (A) to environmental effects (E) - in a tetraplegic person fitted with a primary motor cortex (M1) brain machine interface (BMI) generating hand movements via neuromuscular electrical stimulation (NMES). This combined BMI-NMES approach allowed us to selectively manipulate each element of the intentional chain (W, A, and E) while performing extra-cellular recordings and probing subjective experience. Our results reveal single-cell, multi-unit, and population-level dynamics in human M1 that encode W and may predict its subjective onset. Further, we show that the proficiency of a neural decoder in M1 reflects the degree of W-A binding, tracking the participant's subjective experience of intention in (near) real time. These results point to M1 as a critical node in forming the subjective experience of intention and demonstrate the relevance of intention-related signals for translational neuroprosthetics.

Scratching the structure of moral agency: insights from philosophy applied to neuroscience

This paper explores the intersection between neuroscience and philosophy, particularly in the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of mind. While traditional philosophical questions, such as those relating to free will and moral motivation, have been subject to much debate, the rise of neuroscience has led to a reinterpretation of these questions considering empirical evidence. This has led to tensions between those who believe neuroscience can provide definitive answers to very complex philosophical questions and those who are skeptical about the scope of these studies. However, the paper argues that neuroscientists and philosophers can work together to generate major scientific and social advances. To contribute to bridge the gap, in this paper we expose the complexity of moral experience from a philosophical point of view and point to two great challenges and gaps to cover from neurosciences.

When Neural Activity Fails to Reveal Causal Contributions

Neuroscientists rely on distributed spatio-temporal patterns of neural activity to understand how neural units contribute to cognitive functions and behavior. However, the extent to which neural activity reliably indicates a unit's causal contribution to the behavior is not well understood. To address this issue, we provide a systematic multi-site perturbation framework that captures time-varying causal contributions of elements to a collectively produced outcome. Applying our framework to intuitive toy examples and artificial neuronal networks revealed that recorded activity patterns of neural elements may not be generally informative of their causal contribution due to activity transformations within a network. Overall, our findings emphasize the limitations of inferring causal mechanisms from neural activities and offer a rigorous lesioning framework for elucidating causal neural contributions.

A systematic approach to brain dynamics: cognitive evolution theory of consciousness

The brain integrates volition, cognition, and consciousness seamlessly over three hierarchical (scale-dependent) levels of neural activity for their emergence: a causal or 'hard' level, a computational (unconscious) or 'soft' level, and a phenomenal (conscious) or 'psyche' level respectively. The cognitive evolution theory (CET) is based on three general prerequisites: physicalism, dynamism, and emergentism, which entail five consequences about the nature of consciousness: discreteness, passivity, uniqueness, integrity, and graduation. CET starts from the assumption that brains should have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, not as prediction machines. This emphasizes the dynamical nature of consciousness in terms of critical dynamics to account for metastability, avalanches, and self-organized criticality of brain processes, then coupling it with volition and cognition in a framework unified over the levels. Consciousness emerges near critical points, and unfolds as a discrete stream of momentary states, each volitionally driven from oldest subcortical arousal systems. The stream is the brain's way of making a difference via predictive (Bayesian) processing. Its objective observables could be complexity measures reflecting levels of consciousness and its dynamical coherency to reveal how much knowledge (information gain) the brain acquires over the stream. CET also proposes a quantitative classification of both disorders of consciousness and mental disorders within that unified framework.

Neurons in human pre-supplementary motor area encode key computations for value-based choice

Adaptive behaviour in real-world environments requires that choices integrate several variables, including the novelty of the options under consideration, their expected value and uncertainty in value estimation. Here, to probe how integration over decision variables occurs during decision-making, we recorded neurons from the human pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA), ventromedial prefrontal cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate. Unlike the other areas, preSMA neurons not only represented separate pre-decision variables for each choice option but also encoded an integrated utility signal for each choice option and, subsequently, the decision itself. Post-decision encoding of variables for the chosen option was more widely distributed and especially prominent in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our findings position the human preSMA as central to the implementation of value-based decisions.

Wide-field calcium imaging of cortical activation and functional connectivity in externally- and internally-driven locomotion

The neural dynamics underlying self-initiated versus sensory driven movements is central to understanding volitional action. Upstream motor cortices are associated with the generation of internally-driven movements over externally-driven. Here we directly compare cortical dynamics during internally- versus externally-driven locomotion using wide-field Ca2+ imaging. We find that secondary motor cortex (M2) plays a larger role in internally-driven spontaneous locomotion transitions, with increased M2 functional connectivity during starting and stopping than in the externally-driven, motorized treadmill locomotion. This is not the case in steady-state walk. In addition, motorized treadmill and spontaneous locomotion are characterized by markedly different patterns of cortical activation and functional connectivity at the different behavior periods. Furthermore, the patterns of fluorescence activation and connectivity are uncorrelated. These experiments reveal widespread and striking differences in the cortical control of internally- and externally-driven locomotion, with M2 playing a major role in the preparation and execution of the self-initiated state.

Moving without sensory feedback: online TMS over the dorsal premotor cortex impairs motor performance during ischemic nerve block

The study investigates the role of dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) in generating predicted sensory consequences of movements, i.e. corollary discharges. In 2 different sessions, we disrupted PMd and parietal hand's multisensory integration site (control area) with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) during a finger-sequence-tapping motor task. In this TMS sham-controlled design, the task was performed with normal sensory feedback and during upper-limb ischemic nerve block (INB), in a time-window where participants moved without somatosensation. Errors and movement timing (objective measures) and ratings about movement perception (subjective measures) were collected. We found that INB overall worsens objective and subjective measures, but crucially in the PMd session, the absence of somatosensation together with TMS disruption induced more errors, less synchronized movements, and increased subjective difficulty ratings as compared with the parietal control session (despite a carryover effect between real and sham stimulation to be addressed in future studies). Contrarily, after parietal area interference session, when sensory information is already missing due to INB, motor performance was not aggravated. Altogether these findings suggest that the loss of actual (through INB) and predicted (through PMd disruption) somatosensory feedback degraded motor performance and perception, highlighting the crucial role of PMd in generating corollary discharge.

Engaging distributed cortical and cerebellar networks through motor execution, observation, and imagery

When we interact with the environment around us, we are sometimes active participants, making directed physical motor movements and other times only mentally engaging with our environment, taking in sensory information and internally planning our next move without directed physical movement. Traditionally, cortical motor regions and key subcortical structures such as the cerebellum have been tightly linked to motor initiation, coordination, and directed motor behavior. However, recent neuroimaging studies have noted the activation of the cerebellum and wider cortical networks specifically during various forms of motor processing, including the observations of actions and mental rehearsal of movements through motor imagery. This phenomenon of cognitive engagement of traditional motor networks raises the question of how these brain regions are involved in the initiation of movement without physical motor output. Here, we will review evidence for distributed brain network activation during motor execution, observation, and imagery in human neuroimaging studies as well as the potential for cerebellar involvement specifically in motor-related cognition. Converging evidence suggests that a common global brain network is involved in both movement execution and motor observation or imagery, with specific task-dependent shifts in these global activation patterns. We will further discuss underlying cross-species anatomical support for these cognitive motor-related functions as well as the role of cerebrocerebellar communication during action observation and motor imagery.

Neuronal structures controlling locomotor behavior during active and inactive motor states

Animal behaviors can be divided into two states according to their motor activity: the active motor state, which involves significant body movements, and the inactive motor state, which refers to when the animal is stationary. The timing and duration of these states are determined by the activity of the neuronal circuits involved in motor control. Among these motor circuits, those that generate locomotion are some of the most studied neuronal networks and are widely distributed from the spinal cord to the cerebral cortex. In this review, we discuss recent discoveries, mainly in rodents using state-of-the-art experimental approaches, of the neuronal mechanisms underlying the initiation and termination of locomotion in the brainstem, basal ganglia, and prefrontal cortex. These findings is discussed with reference to studies on the neuronal mechanism of motor control during sleep and the modulation of cortical states in these structures. Accumulating evidence has unraveled the complex yet highly structured network that controls the transition between motor states.

Stimulus-dependent deliberation process in left- and right-handers obtained via current source density analysis

The aim of the present study was to compare the activity patterns of young, healthy right- (RH, n = 25) and left-handed (LH, n = 20) subjects in high-density electroencephalograpic (EEG) recordings during a deliberation task. The deliberation task consisted of pressing one of two keys depending on a color-word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) presented on a computer screen. Depending on the color shown and the meaning of the color word, participants responded with the index finger of the dominant or non-dominant hand. This leads to different activities in the hemispheres depending on the acting hand and on subject's handedness. Presenting the word "black" in black color, subjects were not to press any key (no-go-trial). Prior to this, subjects were tested for simple motor tasks, during which they were informed about the motor action to be performed. The temporal activity patterns obtained from RH and LH were very similar in shape and constituent components. The comparison of the three types of trials lead to the assumption that the deliberation process is based on a two-step decision: The first decision was characterized by the choice between move (match-trials, mismatch-trials) or not to move (no-go-trials). The second decision resulted in the final judgment of which index finger has to be used. The latter decision, in particular, can be tracked via the local spread of activity over the scalp. Our hypothesis is based on a comparison of activities and locations of RH and LH and yields some insights about processing a two-step decision in a deliberation task.

From the origins to the stream of consciousness and its neural correlates

There are now dozens of very different theories of consciousness, each somehow contributing to our understanding of its nature. The science of consciousness needs therefore not new theories but a general framework integrating insights from those, yet not making it a still-born "Frankenstein" theory. First, the framework must operate explicitly on the stream of consciousness, not on its static description. Second, this dynamical account must also be put on the evolutionary timeline to explain the origins of consciousness. The Cognitive Evolution Theory (CET), outlined here, proposes such a framework. This starts with the assumption that brains have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, inherited from primitive (fast and random) reflexes of simplest neural networks, only then resembling error-minimizing prediction machines. CET adopts the tools of critical dynamics to account for metastability, scale-free avalanches, and self-organization which are all intrinsic to brain dynamics. This formalizes the stream of consciousness as a discrete (transitive, irreflexive) chain of momentary states derived from critical brain dynamics at points of phase transitions and mapped then onto a state space as neural correlates of a particular conscious state. The continuous/discrete dichotomy appears naturally between the brain dynamics at the causal level and conscious states at the phenomenal level, each volitionally triggered from arousal centers of the brainstem and cognitively modulated by thalamocortical systems. Their objective observables can be entropy-based complexity measures, reflecting the transient level or quantity of consciousness at that moment.

Diverging lay intuitions about concepts related to free will in arbitrary and deliberate decisions

Philosophical accounts of free will frequently appeal to deliberate, consequential, and purposeful decisions. However, some recent studies have found that laypeople attribute more freedom to arbitrary than to deliberate decisions. We hypothesized that these differences stem from diverging intuitions about concepts surrounding free will-especially freedom, being in control, and the ability to decide otherwise. In two studies, we found that laypeople attributed high levels of free will, freedom, and control to both arbitrary and deliberate decisions. However, subjects surprisingly attributed reduced ability to decide otherwise when faced with an "easy" decision with one clearly superior option. Furthermore, laypeople attributed greater free will, freedom, and control to "easy" than "hard" decisions with no clearly superior option. Our results suggest that laypeople have diverging intuitions about these different, free-will-related concepts. Therefore, a scientific account of free will may require integrating results from studies on different types of decision-making.

Time-estimation process could cause the disappearence of readiness potential

Generally, the readiness potential (RP) is considered to be the scalp electroencephalography (EEG) activity preceding movement. In our previous study, we found early RP was absent among approximately half of the subjects during instructed action, but we did not identify the mechanism causing the disappearance of the RP. In this study, we investigated whether the time-estimation process could cause the disappearance of the RP. First, we designed experiments consisting of motor execution (ME), motor execution after time estimation (MEATE), and time estimation (TE) tasks, and we collected and preprocessed the EEG data of 16 subjects. Second, we compared the event related potential (ERP) waveform and scalp topography between ME and MEATE tasks. Then, to explore the influence of time-estimation, we analyzed the difference in ERP between MEATE and TE tasks. Finally, we used source imaging to probe the activation of brain regions during the three tasks, and we calculated the average activation amplitude of eight motor related brain regions. We found that the RP occurred in the ME task but not in the MEATE task. We also found that the waveform of the difference in ERP between the MEATE and TE tasks was similar to that of the ME task. The results of source imaging indicated that, compared to the ME task, the activation amplitude of the supplementary motor area (SMA) decreased significantly for the MEATE task. Our results suggested that the time estimation process could cause the disappearance of the RP. This phenomenon might be caused by the counteraction of neural electrical activity related to time estimation and motor preparation in the SMA.

Free will strikes back: Steady-state movement-related cortical potentials are modulated by cognitive control

In psychology and neuroscience, opposition to free will has asserted that any degree of perceived self-control or choice is a mere epiphenomenon which provides no meaningful influence on action. The present research tested the validity of this conclusion by designing a paradigm in which the potential effect of self-monitoring on motor output could be investigated. Using a repetitive finger tapping task that evokes automatic patterns in participants tapping responses, we have obtained evidence that (1) participants may voluntarily reduce the predictability of their tapping patterns (2) by exercising cognitive control that (3) modulates response-locked steady-state movement-related potentials over primary and supplementary motor areas. These findings challenge the most radical accounts of the nonexistence of free will and instead provide support for a more balanced model of human behaviour in which cognitive control may constrain automatic response tendencies in response preparation and action execution.

Interactive Somatosensory Games in Rehabilitation Training for Older Adults With Mild Cognitive Impairment: Usability Study

BACKGROUND

In aging societies, dementia risk increases with advancing age, increasing the incidence of dementia-related degenerative diseases and other complications, especially fall risk. Dementia also escalates the care burden, impacting patients, their families, social welfare institutions, and the social structure and medical system.

OBJECTIVE

In elderly dementia, traditional card recognition rehabilitation (TCRR) does not effectively increase one's autonomy. Therefore, from the usability perspective, we used the Tetris game as a reference to develop an interactive somatosensory game rehabilitation (ISGR) with nostalgic style for elders with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). Through intuitive gesture-controlled interactive games, we evaluated subjective feelings concerning somatosensory game integration into rehabilitation to explore whether the ISGR could improve the willingness to use and motivation for rehabilitation among elders with MCI.

METHODS

A total of 15 elders with MCI (7 males and 8 females with an average age of 78.4 years) underwent 2 experiments for 15 minutes. During experiment 1, TCRR was performed, followed by completing the questionnaire of the System Usability Scale (SUS). After 3-5 minutes, the second experiment (the ISGR) was conducted, followed by completing another SUS. We used SUS to explore differences in impacts of TCRR and ISGR on willingness to use among elders with MCI. In addition, we further investigated whether the factor of gender or prior rehabilitation experience would affect the rehabilitation willingness or not.

RESULTS

The novel ISGR made the elderly feel interested and improved their willingness for continuous rehabilitation. According to the overall SUS score, the ISGR had better overall usability performance (73.7) than the TCRR (58.0) (t₂₈=-4.62, P<.001). Furthermore, the ISGR individual item scores of "Willingness to Use" (t₂₈=-8.27, P<.001), "Easy to Use" (t₂₈=-3.17, P<.001), "System Integration" (t₂₈=-5.07, P<.001), and "Easy to Learn" (t₂₈=-2.81, P<.001) were better than TCRR. The somatosensory game was easier to learn and master for females than for males (t₁₃=2.71, P=.02). Besides, the ISGR was easier to use (t₁₂=-2.50, P=.02) and learn (t₁₄=-3.33, P<.001) for those without prior rehabilitation experience. The result indicates that for elders with no rehabilitation experience ISGR was easier to use and simpler to learn than TCRR.

CONCLUSIONS

Regardless of prior rehabilitation experience, the ISGR developed in this study was easy to learn and effective in continuously improving willingness to use. Furthermore, the adoption of a nostalgic game design style served the function of cognitive training and escalated interest in rehabilitation. The ISGR also improved user stickiness by introducing different game scenarios and difficulties, increasing long-term interest and motivation for rehabilitation. For future research on the adoption of interactive somatosensory games in rehabilitation, additional rehabilitation movements can be developed to benefit the elderly with MCI.

Where Actions Meet Outcomes: Medial Prefrontal Cortex, Central Thalamus, and the Basal Ganglia

Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) interacts with distributed networks that give rise to goal-directed behavior through afferent and efferent connections with multiple thalamic nuclei and recurrent basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits. Recent studies have revealed individual roles for different thalamic nuclei: mediodorsal (MD) regulation of signaling properties in mPFC neurons, intralaminar control of cortico-basal ganglia networks, ventral medial facilitation of integrative motor function, and hippocampal functions supported by ventral midline and anterior nuclei. Large scale mapping studies have identified functionally distinct cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical subnetworks that provide a structural basis for understanding information processing and functional heterogeneity within the basal ganglia. Behavioral analyses comparing functional deficits produced by lesions or inactivation of specific thalamic nuclei or subregions of mPFC or the basal ganglia have elucidated the interdependent roles of these areas in adaptive goal-directed behavior. Electrophysiological recordings of mPFC neurons in rats performing delayed non-matching-to position (DNMTP) and other complex decision making tasks have revealed populations of neurons with activity related to actions and outcomes that underlie these behaviors. These include responses related to motor preparation, instrumental actions, movement, anticipation and delivery of action outcomes, memory delay, and spatial context. Comparison of results for mPFC, MD, and ventral pallidum (VP) suggest critical roles for mPFC in prospective processes that precede actions, MD for reinforcing task-relevant responses in mPFC, and VP for providing feedback about action outcomes. Synthesis of electrophysiological and behavioral results indicates that different networks connecting mPFC with thalamus and the basal ganglia are organized to support distinct functions that allow organisms to act efficiently to obtain intended outcomes.

Implicit mechanisms of intention

High-level cortical regions encode motor decisions before or even absent awareness, suggesting that neural processes predetermine behavior before conscious choice. Such early neural encoding challenges popular conceptions of human agency. It also raises fundamental questions for brain-machine interfaces (BMIs) that traditionally assume that neural activity reflects the user's conscious intentions. Here, we study the timing of human posterior parietal cortex single-neuron activity recorded from implanted microelectrode arrays relative to the explicit urge to initiate movement. Participants were free to choose when to move, whether to move, and what to move, and they retrospectively reported the time they felt the urge to move. We replicate prior studies by showing that posterior parietal cortex (PPC) neural activity sharply rises hundreds of milliseconds before the reported urge. However, we find that this "preconscious" activity is part of a dynamic neural population response that initiates much earlier, when the participant first chooses to perform the task. Together with details of neural timing, our results suggest that PPC encodes an internal model of the motor planning network that transforms high-level task objectives into appropriate motor behavior. These new data challenge traditional interpretations of early neural activity and offer a more holistic perspective on the interplay between choice, behavior, and their neural underpinnings. Our results have important implications for translating BMIs into more complex real-world environments. We find that early neural dynamics are sufficient to drive BMI movements before the participant intends to initiate movement. Appropriate algorithms ensure that BMI movements align with the subject's awareness of choice.

Unconscious Influences on "Free Will" Movement Initiation: Slow-wave Brain Stimulation and the Readiness Potential

A central objective in the study of volition has been to identify how changes in neural activity relate to voluntary-"free will"-movement. The readiness potential (RP) is observed in the EEG as a slow-building signal that precedes action onset. Many consider the RP as a marker of an underlying preparatory process for initiating voluntary movement. However, the RP may emerge from ongoing slow-wave brain oscillations that influence the timing of movement initiation in a phase-dependent manner. Transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) enables brain oscillations to be entrained at the frequency of stimulation. We delivered tACS at a slow-wave frequency over frontocentral motor areas while participants (n = 30) performed a simple, self-paced button press task. During the active tACS condition, participants showed a tendency to initiate actions in the phase of the tACS cycle that corresponded to increased negative potentials across the frontocentral motor region. Comparisons of premovement EEG activity observed over frontocentral and central scalp electrodes showed earlier onset and increased amplitude of RPs from active stimulation compared with sham stimulation. This suggests that movement-related activity in the brain can be modulated by the delivery of weak, nonconsciously perceptible alternating currents over frontocentral motor regions. We present novel findings that support existing theories, which suggest the timing of voluntary movement is influenced by the phase of slow-changing oscillating brain states.

Neurons as will and representation

Memory recollections and voluntary actions are often perceived as spontaneously generated irrespective of external stimuli. Although products of our neurons, they are only rarely accessible in humans at the neuronal level. Here I review insights gleaned from unique neurosurgical opportunities to record and stimulate single-neuron activity in people who can declare their thoughts, memories and wishes. I discuss evidence that the subjective experience of human recollection and that of voluntary action arise from the activity of two internal neuronal generators, the former from medial temporal lobe reactivation and the latter from frontoparietal preactivation. I characterize properties of these generators and their interaction, enabling flexible recruitment of memory-based choices for action as well as recruitment of action-based plans for the representation of conceptual knowledge in memories. Both internal generators operate on surprisingly explicit but different neuronal codes, which appear to arise with distinct single-neuron activity, often observed before participants' reports of conscious awareness. I discuss prediction of behaviour based on these codes, and the potential for their modulation. The prospects of editing human memories and volitions by enhancement, inception or deletion of specific, selected content raise therapeutic possibilities and ethical concerns.

The Interprocessual-Self Theory in Support of Human Neuroscience Studies

Rather than occurring abstractly (autonomously), ethical growth occurs in interpersonal relationships (IRs). It requires optimally functioning cognitive processes [attention, working memory (WM), episodic/autobiographical memory (AM), inhibition, flexibility, among others], emotional processes (physical contact, motivation, and empathy), processes surrounding ethical, intimacy, and identity issues, and other psychological processes (self-knowledge, integration, and the capacity for agency). Without intending to be reductionist, we believe that these aspects are essential for optimally engaging in IRs and for the personal constitution. While they are all integrated into our daily life, in research and academic work, it is hard to see how they are integrated. Thus, we need better theoretical frameworks for studying them. That study and integration thereof are undertaken differently depending on different views of what it means to live as a human being. We rely on neuroscientific data to support the chosen theory to offer knowledge to understand human beings and interpersonal relational growth. We should of course note that to describe what makes up the uniqueness of being, acting, and growing as a human person involves something much more profound which requires too, a methodology that opens the way for a theory of the person that responds to the concerns of philosophy and philosophical anthropology from many disciplines and methods (Orón Semper, 2015; Polo, 2015), but this is outside the scope of this study. With these in mind, this article aims to introduce a new explanatory framework, called the Interprocessual-self (IPS), for the neuroscientific findings that allow for a holistic consideration of the previously mentioned processes. Contributing to the knowledge of personal growth and avoiding a reductionist view, we first offer a general description of the research that supports the interrelation between personal virtue in IRs and relevant cognitive, emotional, and ethic-moral processes. This reveals how relationships allow people to relate ethically and grow as persons. We include conceptualizations and descriptions of their neural bases. Secondly, with the IPS model, we explore neuroscientific findings regarding self-knowledge, integration, and agency, all psychological processes that stimulate inner exploration of the self concerning the other. We find that these fundamental conditions can be understood from IPS theory. Finally, we explore situations that involve the integration of two levels, namely the interpersonal one and the social contexts of relationships.

Sense of agency for intracortical brain-machine interfaces

Intracortical brain-machine interfaces decode motor commands from neural signals and translate them into actions, enabling movement for paralysed individuals. The subjective sense of agency associated with actions generated via intracortical brain-machine interfaces, the neural mechanisms involved and its clinical relevance are currently unknown. By experimentally manipulating the coherence between decoded motor commands and sensory feedback in a tetraplegic individual using a brain-machine interface, we provide evidence that primary motor cortex processes sensory feedback, sensorimotor conflicts and subjective states of actions generated via the brain-machine interface. Neural signals processing the sense of agency affected the proficiency of the brain-machine interface, underlining the clinical potential of the present approach. These findings show that primary motor cortex encodes information related to action and sensing, but also sensorimotor and subjective agency signals, which in turn are relevant for clinical applications of brain-machine interfaces.

Exploring Cognition with Brain-Machine Interfaces

Traditional brain-machine interfaces decode cortical motor commands to control external devices. These commands are the product of higher-level cognitive processes, occurring across a network of brain areas, that integrate sensory information, plan upcoming motor actions, and monitor ongoing movements. We review cognitive signals recently discovered in the human posterior parietal cortex during neuroprosthetic clinical trials. These signals are consistent with small regions of cortex having a diverse role in cognitive aspects of movement control and body monitoring, including sensorimotor integration, planning, trajectory representation, somatosensation, action semantics, learning, and decision making. These variables are encoded within the same population of cells using structured representations that bind related sensory and motor variables, an architecture termed partially mixed selectivity. Diverse cognitive signals provide complementary information to traditional motor commands to enable more natural and intuitive control of external devices.

Optogenetics stimulates nerve reorganization in the contralesional anterolateral primary motor cortex in a mouse model of ischemic stroke

The anterolateral motor cortex of rodents is an important motor auxiliary area, and its function is similar to that of the premotor area in humans. Activation and inhibition of the contralesional anterolateral motor cortex (cALM) have been shown to have direct effects on motor behavior. However, the significance of cALM activation and inhibition in the treatment of stroke remains unclear. This study investigated the role of optogenetic cALM stimulation in a mouse model of cerebral stroke. The results showed that 21-day optogenetic cALM inhibition, but not activation, improved neurological function. In addition, optogenetic cALM stimulation substantially altered dendritic structural reorganization and dendritic spine plasticity, as optogenetic cALM inhibition resulted in increased dendritic length, number of dendritic spines, and number of perforated synapses, whereas optogenetic activation led to an increase in the number of multiple synapse boutons and the number of dendritic intersections. Furthermore, RNA-seq analysis showed that multiple biological processes regulated by the cALM were upregulated immediately after optogenetic cALM inhibition, and that several immediate-early genes (including cFOS, Erg1, and Sema3f) were expressed at higher levels after optogenetic inhibition than after optogenetic activation. These results were confirmed by quantitative reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction. Finally, immunofluorescence analysis showed that the c-FOS signal in layer V of the primary motor cortex in the ischemic hemisphere was higher after optogenetic cALM activation than it was after optogenetic cALM inhibition. Taken together, these findings suggest that optogenetic cALM stimulation promotes neural reorganization in the primary motor cortex of the ischemic hemisphere, and that optogenetic cALM inhibition and activation have different effects on neural plasticity. The study was approved by the Experimental Animal Ethics Committee of Fudan University (approval No. 201802173S) on March 3, 2018.

Overt speech critically changes lateralization index and did not allow determination of hemispheric dominance for language: an fMRI study

Background

Pre-surgical mapping of language using functional MRI aimed principally to determine the dominant hemisphere. This mapping is currently performed using covert linguistic task in way to avoid motion artefacts potentially biasing the results. However, overt task is closer to natural speaking, allows a control on the performance of the task, and may be easier to perform for stressed patients and children. However, overt task, by activating phonological areas on both hemispheres and areas involved in pitch prosody control in the non-dominant hemisphere, is expected to modify the determination of the dominant hemisphere by the calculation of the lateralization index (LI).

Objective

Here, we analyzed the modifications in the LI and the interactions between cognitive networks during covert and overt speech task.

Methods

Thirty-three volunteers participated in this study, all but four were right-handed. They performed three functional sessions consisting of (1) covert and (2) overt generation of a short sentence semantically linked with an audibly presented word, from which we estimated the “Covert” and “Overt” contrasts, and a (3) resting-state session. The resting-state session was submitted to spatial independent component analysis to identify language network at rest (LANG), cingulo-opercular network (CO), and ventral attention network (VAN). The LI was calculated using the bootstrapping method.

Results

The LI of the LANG was the most left-lateralized (0.66 ± 0.38). The LI shifted from a moderate leftward lateralization for the Covert contrast (0.32 ± 0.38) to a right lateralization for the Overt contrast (− 0.13 ± 0.30). The LI significantly differed from each other. This rightward shift was due to the recruitment of right hemispheric temporal areas together with the nodes of the CO.

Conclusion

Analyzing the overt speech by fMRI allowed improvement in the physiological knowledge regarding the coordinated activity of the intrinsic connectivity networks. However, the rightward shift of the LI in this condition did not provide the basic information on the hemispheric language dominance. Overt linguistic task cannot be recommended for clinical purpose when determining hemispheric dominance for language.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12868-021-00671-y.

Central nervous system physiology

This is the second chapter of the series on the use of clinical neurophysiology for the study of movement disorders. It focusses on methods that can be used to probe neural circuits in brain and spinal cord. These include use of spinal and supraspinal reflexes to probe the integrity of transmission in specific pathways; transcranial methods of brain stimulation such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct current stimulation, which activate or modulate (respectively) the activity of populations of central neurones; EEG methods, both in conjunction with brain stimulation or with behavioural measures that record the activity of populations of central neurones; and pure behavioural measures that allow us to build conceptual models of motor control. The methods are discussed mainly in relation to work on healthy individuals. Later chapters will focus specifically on changes caused by pathology.