The metaphor that viruses are living is alive and well, but it is no more than a metaphor

Process epistemology in the COVID-19 era: rethinking the research process to avoid dangerous forms of reification

Whether we live in a world of autonomous things, or a world of interconnected processes in constant flux, is an ancient philosophical debate. Modern biology provides decisive reasons for embracing the latter view. How does one understand the practices and outputs of science in such a dynamic, ever-changing world - and particularly in an emergency situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic, where scientific knowledge has been regarded as bedrock for decisive social interventions? We argue that key to answering this question is to consider the role of the activity of reification within the research process. Reification consists in the identification of more or less stable features of the flux, and treating these as constituting stable things. As we illustrate with reference to biological and biomedical research on COVID-19, reification is a necessary component of any process of inquiry and comes in at least two forms: (1) means reification (phenomena-to-object), when researchers create objects meant to capture features of the world, or phenomena, in order to be able to study them; and (2) target reification (object-to-phenomena), when researchers infer an understanding of phenomena from an investigation of the epistemic objects created to study them. We note that both objects and phenomena are dynamic processes and argue that have no reason to assume that changes in objects and phenomena track one another. We conclude that failure to acknowledge these forms of reification and their epistemic role in scientific inquiry can have dire consequences for how the resulting knowledge is interpreted and used.

An organisational systems-biology view of viruses explains why they are not alive

Whether or not viruses are alive remains unsettled. Discoveries of giant viruses with translational genes and large genomes have kept the debate active. Here, a fresh approach is introduced, based on the organisational definition of life from within systems biology. It views living as a circular process of self-organisation and self-construction which is 'closed to efficient causation'. How information combines with force to fabricate and organise environmentally obtained materials, given an energy source, is here explained as a physical embodiment of informational constraint. Comparing a general virus replication cycle with Rosen's (M,R)-system shows it to be linear, rather than closed. Some viruses contribute considerable organisational information, but so far none is known to supply all required, nor the material nor energy necessary to complete their replication cycle. As a result, no known virus replication cycle is closed to efficient causation: unlike cellular obligate parasites, viruses do not match the causal structure of an (M,R)-system. Analysis based in identifying a Markov blanket in causal structure proved inconclusive, but using Integrated Information Theory on a Boolean representation, it was possible to show that the causal structure of a virocell is not different from that of the host cell.

Investigating the Concept and Origin of Viruses

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has piqued public interest in the properties, evolution, and emergence of viruses. Here, we discuss how these basic questions have surprisingly remained disputed despite being increasingly within the reach of scientific analysis. We review recent data-driven efforts that shed light into the origin and evolution of viruses and explain factors that resist the widespread acceptance of new views and insights. We propose a new definition of viruses that is not restricted to the presence or absence of any genetic or physical feature, detail a scenario for how viruses likely originated from ancient cells, and explain technical and conceptual biases that limit our understanding of virus evolution. We note that the philosophical aspects of virus evolution also impact the way we might prepare for future outbreaks.

The Hidden Charm of Life

Synthetic biology is an engineering view on biotechnology, which has revolutionized genetic engineering. The field has seen a constant development of metaphors that tend to highlight the similarities of cells with machines. I argue here that living organisms, particularly bacterial cells, are not machine-like, engineerable entities, but, instead, factory-like complex systems shaped by evolution. A change of the comparative paradigm in synthetic biology from machines to factories, from hardware to software, and from informatics to economy is discussed.

Development of a Preventive HIV Vaccine Requires Solving Inverse Problems Which Is Unattainable by Rational Vaccine Design

Hypotheses and theories are essential constituents of the scientific method. Many vaccinologists are unaware that the problems they try to solve are mostly inverse problems that consist in imagining what could bring about a desired outcome. An inverse problem starts with the result and tries to guess what are the multiple causes that could have produced it. Compared to the usual direct scientific problems that start with the causes and derive or calculate the results using deductive reasoning and known mechanisms, solving an inverse problem uses a less reliable inductive approach and requires the development of a theoretical model that may have different solutions or none at all. Unsuccessful attempts to solve inverse problems in HIV vaccinology by reductionist methods, systems biology and structure-based reverse vaccinology are described. The popular strategy known as rational vaccine design is unable to solve the multiple inverse problems faced by HIV vaccine developers. The term “rational” is derived from “rational drug design” which uses the 3D structure of a biological target for designing molecules that will selectively bind to it and inhibit its biological activity. In vaccine design, however, the word “rational” simply means that the investigator is concentrating on parts of the system for which molecular information is available. The economist and Nobel laureate Herbert Simon introduced the concept of “bounded rationality” to explain why the complexity of the world economic system makes it impossible, for instance, to predict an event like the financial crash of 2007–2008. Humans always operate under unavoidable constraints such as insufficient information, a limited capacity to process huge amounts of data and a limited amount of time available to reach a decision. Such limitations always prevent us from achieving the complete understanding and optimization of a complex system that would be needed to achieve a truly rational design process. This is why the complexity of the human immune system prevents us from rationally designing an HIV vaccine by solving inverse problems.

The Species Problem in Virology

Virus classification deals with conceptual species classes that have viruses as their members. A virus species cannot be described but can only be defined by listing certain species-defining properties of its member. However, it is not possible to define a virus species by using a single species-defining property. The new 2013 official definition of virus species is not appropriate because it applies equally to virus genera. A nucleotide motif is a chemical part of a viral genome and is not a species-defining property that could be used for establishing new virus species. A virus classification based solely on nucleotide sequences is a classification of viral genomes and not of viruses. The variable distribution of species-defining properties of a polythetic species class is not itself a single common property of all the members of the class, since this would lead to the paradox that every polythetic class is also a monothetic one.

Possibility and Challenges of Conversion of Current Virus Species Names to Linnaean Binomials

Botanical, mycological, zoological, and prokaryotic species names follow the Linnaean format, consisting of an italicized Latinized binomen with a capitalized genus name and a lower case species epithet (e.g., Homo sapiens). Virus species names, however, do not follow a uniform format, and, even when binomial, are not Linnaean in style. In this thought exercise, we attempted to convert all currently official names of species included in the virus family Arenaviridae and the virus order Mononegavirales to Linnaean binomials, and to identify and address associated challenges and concerns. Surprisingly, this endeavor was not as complicated or time-consuming as even the authors of this article expected when conceiving the experiment. [Arenaviridae; binomials; ICTV; International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses; Mononegavirales; virus nomenclature; virus taxonomy.].

What roles for viruses in origin of life scenarios?

Important roles in origin of life (OL) scenarios have been and still are attributed to viruses. Yet the strict dependence of viruses on cells for their multiplication has been widely acknowledged since the first decades of the 20th century. How could viruses play critical roles in the OL if life relies on cellular organization and if viruses are defined as parasites of cells? In other words, how could viruses play a role in the emergence of cellular life if the existence of cells is a prerequisite for the existence of viruses? This paper investigates this issue and describes past and current OL scenarios conferring viruses with important roles, thereby completing the work of historian of science and physician Scott Podolsky who identified three major roles of viruses in past OL scenarios. Some objections raised by present OL scenarios conferring viruses with an important role are discussed. I argue that disagreements concerning the roles of viruses in OL scenarios stem from the different concepts of life and of virus scientists defend. Investigating the roles of viruses in OL scenarios not only helps identifying different ways to define life in the context of OL theorizing. It also offers the opportunity to better understand how viruses could be conceptualized. The relevance of the replication-first versus metabolism-first dichotomy in OL theorizing is briefly discussed.

Writing the history of virology in the twentieth century: Discovery, disciplines, and conceptual change

Concerned with the study of viruses and the diseases they cause, virology is now a well-established scientific discipline. Whereas aspects of its history from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century have often been recounted through a number of detailed case studies, few general discussions of the historiography of virology have been offered. Looking at the ways in which the history of virology has been told, this article examines a number of debates among scientists and historians of biology and show how they are based on a different understanding of notions such as "discipline", of processes such as "scientific discovery" as well as on distinct views about what the history of science is and how it should be written (the opposition between "longue durée" and "micro-history" or between history of "concepts" versus "experimental methods"). The analysis provided here also suggests that a richer historiography of virology will require looking at the variations over time of the relations between conceptual, technological, and institutional factors that fostered its development at the intersection of several other scientific fields in the life sciences.

To be or not to be alive: How recent discoveries challenge the traditional definitions of viruses and life

Three major discoveries have recently profoundly modified our perception of the viral world: molecular ecologists have shown that viral particles are more abundant than cells in natural environments; structural biologists have shown that some viruses from the three domains of life, Bacteria, Eukarya and Archaea, are evolutionarily related, and microbiologists have discovered giant viruses that rival with cells in terms of size and gene content. I discuss here the scientific and philosophical impact of these discoveries on the debates over the definition, nature (living or not), and origin of viruses. I suggest that viruses have often been considered non-living, because they are traditionally assimilated to their virions. However, the term virus describes a biological process and should integrate all aspects of the viral reproduction cycle. It is especially important to focus on the intracellular part of this cycle, the virocell, when viral information is actively expressed and reproduced, allowing the emergence of new viral genes. The virocell concept theoretically removes roadblocks that prevent defining viruses as living organisms. However, defining a "living organism" remains challenging, as indicated by the case of organelles that evolved from intracellular bacteria. To bypass this problem, I suggest considering that all biological entities that actively participate in the process of life are living.

Understanding viruses: Philosophical investigations

Viruses have been virtually absent from philosophy of biology. In this editorial introduction, we explain why we think viruses are philosophically important. We focus on six issues (the definition of viruses, the individuality and diachronic identity of a virus, the possibility to classify viruses into species, the question of whether viruses are living, the question of whether viruses are organisms, and finally the biological roles of viruses in ecology and evolution), and we show how they relate to classic questions of philosophy of biology and even general philosophy.

Structure-Based Reverse Vaccinology Failed in the Case of HIV Because it Disregarded Accepted Immunological Theory

Two types of reverse vaccinology (RV) should be distinguished: genome-based RV for bacterial vaccines and structure-based RV for viral vaccines. Structure-based RV consists in trying to generate a vaccine by first determining the crystallographic structure of a complex between a viral epitope and a neutralizing monoclonal antibody (nMab) and then reconstructing the epitope by reverse molecular engineering outside the context of the native viral protein. It is based on the unwarranted assumption that the epitope designed to fit the nMab will have acquired the immunogenic capacity to elicit a polyclonal antibody response with the same protective capacity as the nMab. After more than a decade of intensive research using this type of RV, this approach has failed to deliver an effective, preventive HIV-1 vaccine. The structure and dynamics of different types of HIV-1 epitopes and of paratopes are described. The rational design of an anti-HIV-1 vaccine is shown to be a misnomer since investigators who claim that they design a vaccine are actually only improving the antigenic binding capacity of one epitope with respect to only one paratope and not the immunogenic capacity of an epitope to elicit neutralizing antibodies. Because of the degeneracy of the immune system and the polyspecificity of antibodies, each epitope studied by the structure-based RV procedure is only one of the many epitopes that the particular nMab is able to recognize and there is no reason to assume that this nMab must have been elicited by this one epitope of known structure. Recent evidence is presented that the trimeric Env spikes of the virus possess such an enormous plasticity and intrinsic structural flexibility that it is it extremely difficult to determine which Env regions are the best candidate vaccine immunogens most likely to elicit protective antibodies.