Navigating the Affordance Landscape: Feedback Control as a Process Model of Behavior and Cognition

Evidence for interacting but decoupled controls of decisions and movements in nonhuman primates

Many recent studies indicate that control of decisions and actions is integrated during interactive behavior. Among these, several carried out in humans and monkeys conclude that there is a coregulation of choices and movements. Another perspective, based on human data only, proposes a decoupled control of decision duration and movement speed, allowing, for instance, trading decision duration for movement duration when time pressure increases. Crucially, it is not currently known whether this ability to flexibly dissociate decision duration from movement speed is specific to humans, whether it can vary depending on the context in which a task is performed, and whether it is stable over time. These are important questions to address, especially to rely on monkey electrophysiology to infer the neural mechanisms of decision-action coordination in humans. To do so, we trained two macaque monkeys in a perceptual decision-making task and analyzed data collected over multiple behavioral sessions. Our findings reveal a strong and complex relationship between decision duration and movement vigor. Decision duration and action duration can covary but also "compensate" each other. Such integrated but decoupled control of decisions and actions aligns with recent studies in humans, validating the monkey model in electrophysiology as a means of inferring neural mechanisms in humans. Crucially, we demonstrate for the first time that this control can evolve with experience, in an adapted manner. Together, the present findings contribute to deepening our understanding of the integrated control of decisions and actions during interactive behavior.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The mechanism by which the integrated control of decisions and actions occurs, coupled or interactive but decoupled, is debated. In the present study, we show in monkeys that decisions and actions influence each other in a decoupled way. For the first time, we also demonstrate that this control can evolve depending the subject's experience, allowing the trade of movement time for decision time and limiting the temporal discounting of reward value.

Biomechanical costs influence decisions made during ongoing actions

Accurate interaction with the environment relies on the integration of external information about the spatial layout of potential actions and knowledge of their costs and benefits. Previous studies have shown that when given a choice between voluntary reaching movements, humans tend to prefer actions with lower biomechanical costs. However, these studies primarily focused on decisions made before the onset of movement ("decide-then-act" scenarios), and it is not known to what extent their conclusions generalize to many real-life situations, in which decisions occur during ongoing actions ("decide-while-acting"). For example, one recent study found that biomechanical costs did not influence decisions to switch from a continuous manual tracking movement to a point-to-point movement, suggesting that biomechanical costs may be disregarded in decide-while-acting scenarios. To better understand this surprising result, we designed an experiment in which participants were faced with the decision between continuing to track a target moving along a straight path or changing paths to track a new target that gradually moved along a direction that deviated from the initial one. We manipulated tracking direction, angular deviation rate, and side of deviation, allowing us to compare scenarios where biomechanical costs favored either continuing or changing the path. Crucially, here the choice was always between two continuous tracking actions. Our results show that in this situation decisions clearly took biomechanical costs into account. Thus we conclude that biomechanics are not disregarded during decide-while-acting scenarios but rather that cost comparisons can only be made between similar types of actions.NEW & NOTEWORTHY In this study, we aim to shed light on how biomechanical factors influence decisions made during ongoing actions. Previous work suggested that decisions made during actions disregard biomechanical costs, in contrast to decisions made before movement. Our results challenge that proposal and suggest instead that the effect of biomechanical factors is dependent on the types of actions being compared (e.g., continuous tracking vs. point-to-point reaching). These findings contribute to our understanding of the dynamic interplay between biomechanical considerations and action choices during ongoing interactions with the environment.

Human brain dynamics dissociate early perceptual and late motor-related stages of affordance processing

Affordances, the opportunities for action offered by the environment to an agent, are vital for meaningful behaviour and exist in every interaction with the environment. There is an ongoing debate in the field about whether the perception of affordances is an automated process. Some studies suggest that affordance perception is an automated process that is independent from the visual context and bodily interaction with the environment, whereas others argue that it is modulated by the visual and motor context in which affordances are perceived. The present paper aims to resolve this debate by examining affordance automaticity from the perspective of sensorimotor time windows. To investigate the impact of different forms of bodily interactions with an environment, that is, the movement context (physical vs. joystick movement), we replicated a previous study on affordance perception in which participants actively moved through differently wide doors in an immersive 3D virtual environment. In the present study, we displayed the same environment on a 2D screen with participants moving through doors of different widths using the keys on a standard keyboard. We compared components of the event-related potential (ERP) from the continuously recorded electroencephalogram (EEG) that were previously reported to be related to affordance perception of architectural transitions (passable and impassable doors). Comparing early sensory and later motor-related ERPs, our study replicated ERPs reflecting early affordance perception but found differences in later motor-related components. These results indicate a shift from automated perception of affordances during early sensorimotor time windows to movement context dependence of affordance perception at later stages, suggesting that affordance perception is a dynamic and flexible process that changes over sensorimotor stages.

Reciprocal interactions among parietal and occipito-temporal representations support everyday object-directed actions

Everyday interactions with common manipulable objects require the integration of conceptual knowledge about objects and actions with real-time sensory information about the position, orientation and volumetric structure of the grasp target. The ability to successfully interact with everyday objects involves analysis of visual form and shape, surface texture, material properties, conceptual attributes such as identity, function and typical context, and visuomotor processing supporting hand transport, grasp form, and object manipulation. Functionally separable brain regions across the dorsal and ventral visual pathways support the processing of these different object properties and, in cohort, are necessary for functional object use. Object-directed grasps display end-state-comfort: they anticipate in form and force the shape and material properties of the grasp target, and how the object will be manipulated after it is grasped. End-state-comfort is the default for everyday interactions with manipulable objects and implies integration of information across the ventral and dorsal visual pathways. We propose a model of how visuomotor and action representations in parietal cortex interact with object representations in ventral and lateral occipito-temporal cortex. One pathway, from the supramarginal gyrus to the middle and inferior temporal gyrus, supports the integration of action-related information, including hand and limb position (supramarginal gyrus) with conceptual attributes and an appreciation of the action goal (middle temporal gyrus). A second pathway, from posterior IPS to the fusiform gyrus and collateral sulcus supports the integration of grasp parameters (IPS) with the surface texture and material properties (e.g., weight distribution) of the grasp target. Reciprocal interactions among these regions are part of a broader network of regions that support everyday functional object interactions.

Toward a neuroscience of natural behavior

One of the most exciting new developments in systems neuroscience is the progress being made toward neurophysiological experiments that move beyond simplified laboratory settings and address the richness of natural behavior. This is enabled by technological advances such as wireless recording in freely moving animals, automated quantification of behavior, and new methods for analyzing large data sets. Beyond new empirical methods and data, however, there is also a need for new theories and concepts to interpret that data. Such theories need to address the particular challenges of natural behavior, which often differ significantly from the scenarios studied in traditional laboratory settings. Here, we discuss some strategies for developing such novel theories and concepts and some example hypotheses being proposed.

Invariant representations in abstract concept grounding - the physical world in grounded cognition

Grounded cognition states that mental representations of concepts consist of experiential aspects. For example, the concept "cup" consists of the sensorimotor experiences from interactions with cups. Typical modalities in which concepts are grounded are: The sensorimotor system (including interoception), emotion, action, language, and social aspects. Here, we argue that this list should be expanded to include physical invariants (unchanging features of physical motion; e.g., gravity, momentum, friction). Research on physical reasoning consistently demonstrates that physical invariants are represented as fundamentally as other grounding substrates, and therefore should qualify. We assess several theories of concept representation (simulation, conceptual metaphor, conceptual spaces, predictive processing) and their positions on physical invariants. We find that the classic grounded cognition theories, simulation and conceptual metaphor theory, have not considered physical invariants, while conceptual spaces and predictive processing have. We conclude that physical invariants should be included into grounded cognition theories, and that the core mechanisms of simulation and conceptual metaphor theory are well suited to do this. Furthermore, conceptual spaces and predictive processing are very promising and should also be integrated with grounded cognition in the future.

Neural representation in active inference: Using generative models to interact with-and understand-the lived world

This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy). The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those that support action-perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and imagination; namely, from explicit models that entail variables for predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people-to action-oriented models that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and the development of advanced cognitive abilities-and the gradual transition from pragmatic to detached neural representations. The analysis on offer foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive processes and the evolution of neural representation.

An active inference perspective for the amygdala complex

The amygdala is a heterogeneous network of subcortical nuclei with central importance in cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Various experimental designs in human psychology and animal model research have mapped multiple conceptual frameworks (e.g., valence/salience and decision making) to ever more refined amygdala circuitry. However, these predominantly bottom up-driven accounts often rely on interpretations tailored to a specific phenomenon, thus preventing comprehensive and integrative theories. We argue here that an active inference model of amygdala function could unify these fractionated approaches into an overarching framework for clearer empirical predictions and mechanistic interpretations. This framework embeds top-down predictive models, informed by prior knowledge and belief updating, within a dynamical system distributed across amygdala circuits in which self-regulation is implemented by continuously tracking environmental and homeostatic demands.

Active inference as a theory of sentient behavior

This review paper offers an overview of the history and future of active inference-a unifying perspective on action and perception. Active inference is based upon the idea that sentient behavior depends upon our brains' implicit use of internal models to predict, infer, and direct action. Our focus is upon the conceptual roots and development of this theory of (basic) sentience and does not follow a rigid chronological narrative. We trace the evolution from Helmholtzian ideas on unconscious inference, through to a contemporary understanding of action and perception. In doing so, we touch upon related perspectives, the neural underpinnings of active inference, and the opportunities for future development. Key steps in this development include the formulation of predictive coding models and related theories of neuronal message passing, the use of sequential models for planning and policy optimization, and the importance of hierarchical (temporally) deep internal (i.e., generative or world) models. Active inference has been used to account for aspects of anatomy and neurophysiology, to offer theories of psychopathology in terms of aberrant precision control, and to unify extant psychological theories. We anticipate further development in all these areas and note the exciting early work applying active inference beyond neuroscience. This suggests a future not just in biology, but in robotics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence.

Generating meaning: active inference and the scope and limits of passive AI

Prominent accounts of sentient behavior depict brains as generative models of organismic interaction with the world, evincing intriguing similarities with current advances in generative artificial intelligence (AI). However, because they contend with the control of purposive, life-sustaining sensorimotor interactions, the generative models of living organisms are inextricably anchored to the body and world. Unlike the passive models learned by generative AI systems, they must capture and control the sensory consequences of action. This allows embodied agents to intervene upon their worlds in ways that constantly put their best models to the test, thus providing a solid bedrock that is - we argue - essential to the development of genuine understanding. We review the resulting implications and consider future directions for generative AI.

Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective

Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.

Minding the gut: extending embodied cognition and perception to the gut complex

Scientific and philosophical accounts of cognition and perception have traditionally focused on the brain and external sense organs. The extended view of embodied cognition suggests including other parts of the body in these processes. However, one organ has often been overlooked: the gut. Frequently conceptualized as merely a tube for digesting food, there is much more to the gut than meets the eye. Having its own enteric nervous system, sometimes referred to as the "second brain," the gut is also an immune organ and has a large surface area interacting with gut microbiota. The gut has been shown to play an important role in many physiological processes, and may arguably do so as well in perception and cognition. We argue that proposals of embodied perception and cognition should take into account the role of the "gut complex," which considers the enteric nervous, endocrine, immune, and microbiota systems as well as gut tissue and mucosal structures. The gut complex is an interface between bodily tissues and the "internalized external environment" of the gut lumen, involved in many aspects of organismic activity beyond food intake. We thus extend current embodiment theories and suggest a more inclusive account of how to "mind the gut" in studying cognitive processes.

Risky decisions are influenced by individual attributes as a function of risk preference

It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attributes or dimensions - such as probabilities and amounts of money to be earned during risky choices - are resolved by first combining the attributes of each option to form an overall expected value and then comparing the expected values of the alternative options, using a unique evidence accumulation process. A plausible alternative would be performing independent comparisons between the individual attributes and then integrating the results of the comparisons afterwards. Here, we devise a novel method to disambiguate between these types of models, by orthogonally manipulating the expected value of choice options and the relative salience of their attributes. Our results, based on behavioral measures and drift-diffusion models, provide evidence in favor of the framework where information about individual attributes independently impacts deliberation. This suggests that risky decisions are resolved by running in parallel multiple comparisons between the separate attributes - possibly alongside an additional comparison of expected value. This result stands in contrast with the assumption of standard economic theory that choices require a unique comparison of expected values and suggests that at the cognitive level, decision processes might be more distributed than commonly assumed. Beyond our planned analyses, we also discovered that attribute salience affects people of different risk preference type in different ways: risk-averse participants seem to focus more on probability, except when monetary amount is particularly high; risk-neutral/seeking participants, in contrast, seem to focus more on monetary amount, except when probability is particularly low.

The feasibility of artificial consciousness through the lens of neuroscience

Interactions with large language models (LLMs) have led to the suggestion that these models may soon be conscious. From the perspective of neuroscience, this position is difficult to defend. For one, the inputs to LLMs lack the embodied, embedded information content characteristic of our sensory contact with the world around us. Secondly, the architectures of present-day artificial intelligence algorithms are missing key features of the thalamocortical system that have been linked to conscious awareness in mammals. Finally, the evolutionary and developmental trajectories that led to the emergence of living conscious organisms arguably have no parallels in artificial systems as envisioned today. The existence of living organisms depends on their actions and their survival is intricately linked to multi-level cellular, inter-cellular, and organismal processes culminating in agency and consciousness.

Pretrial predictors of conflict response efficacy in the human prefrontal cortex

The ability to perform motor actions depends, in part, on the brain's initial state. We hypothesized that initial state dependence is a more general principle and applies to cognitive control. To test this idea, we examined human single units recorded from the dorsolateral prefrontal (dlPFC) cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) during a task that interleaves motor and perceptual conflict trials, the multisource interference task (MSIT). In both brain regions, variability in pre-trial firing rates predicted subsequent reaction time (RT) on conflict trials. In dlPFC, ensemble firing rate patterns suggested the existence of domain-specific initial states, while in dACC, firing patterns were more consistent with a domain-general initial state. The deployment of shared and independent factors that we observe for conflict resolution may allow for flexible and fast responses mediated by cognitive initial states. These results also support hypotheses that place dACC hierarchically earlier than dlPFC in proactive control.

Perceptual control or action-selection? Comment on: a perceptual control theory of emotional action

The Perceptual Control Theory of Emotional Action provides a compelling view of the synergy between action and perception in the context of emotion. In this invited response, we outline three suggestions to further clarify and concretesise the theory in the hope that it can provide a solid basis for the theoretical, empirical, and clinical fields of emotion and emotion regulation. First, we emphasise the importance of concretesising these ideas in a way that is biologically plausible and testable in terms of its neuronal implementation, which has not been addressed in the main manuscript. Secondly, we highlight the challenges for this account to effectively describe core symptoms in emotional disorders, an essential step if the theory aims to foster the development of better-tuned neurocognitively grounded interventions. Finally, we take a leap on what action-oriented accounts of emotion can mean for the field of emotion regulation.

Persistence of extensively trained avoidance is not elevated in anxiety disorders in an outcome devaluation paradigm

BACKGROUND

A habitual avoidance component may enforce the persistence of maladaptive avoidance behavior in anxiety disorders. Whether habitual avoidance is acquired more strongly in anxiety disorders is unclear.

METHODS

Individuals with current social anxiety disorder, panic disorder and/or agoraphobia (n = 62) and healthy individuals (n = 62) completed a devaluation paradigm with extensive avoidance training, followed by the devaluation of the aversive outcome. In the subsequent test phase, habitual response tendencies were inferred from compatibility effects. Neutral control trials were added to assess general approach learning in the absence of previous extensive avoidance training.

RESULTS

The compatibility effects indicating habitual control did not differ between patients with anxiety disorders and healthy controls. Patients showed lower overall approach accuracy, but this effect was unrelated to the compatibility effects.

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, anxiety disorders were characterized by reduced approach but not stronger habitual avoidance. These results do not indicate a direct association between anxiety disorders and the acquisition of pervasive habitual avoidance in this devaluation paradigm.

Emotion regulation from an action-control perspective

Despite increasing interest in emotional processes in cognitive science, theories on emotion regulation have remained rather isolated, predominantly focused on cognitive regulation strategies such as reappraisal. However, recent neurocognitive evidence suggests that early emotion regulation may involve sensorimotor control in addition to other emotion-regulation processes. We propose an action-oriented view of emotion regulation, in which feedforward predictions develop from action-selection mechanisms. Those can account for acute emotional-action control as well as more abstract instances of emotion regulation such as cognitive reappraisal. We argue the latter occurs in absence of overt motor output, yet in the presence of full-blown autonomic, visceral, and subjective changes. This provides an integrated framework with testable neuro-computational predictions and concrete starting points for intervention to improve emotion control in affective disorders.

Mind your heart to bear the weight: Cardiac interoception predicts action-related visual perception when wearing a heavy backpack

Visual perception can be modulated by the physiological potential for action. For instance, it was famously shown that a geographical slant appears steeper when wearing a heavy backpack than not wearing any. However, those results are not always replicated. In the present exploratory study, we test the hypothesis that the backpack weight's effect on perception relies on the ability of the cognitive system to integrate the physiological constraint's change rather than the change itself. Young adults (n = 54) wore an electrocardiogram monitor and completed a computerised task in which photographs of real geographical slants were displayed on a screen while wearing a heavy versus light backpack. The activity of the vagus nerve, as an index of physiological adaptability, was recorded as a proxy of the physiological state during the task. The participants also completed an interoception task assessing one's ability to detect his or her own heartbeat as the index of integration ability of the cognitive system. While Bayesian analyses revealed no difference in angle estimation between carrying a heavy versus light backpack, the results indicated that interoception predicted less accurate angle estimation only when wearing a heavy backpack. In contrast, there was anecdotal evidence that vagal activity changes predicted visual perception. Interoception might thus play a crucial role in the interplay between the physiological potential for action and action-related visual perception.

Electrophysiological evidence of discontinuities in the propagation of lexical decision processes across the motor hierarchy

This research assessed the propagation of decisional effects across multiple electrophysiological indexes related to motor-response implementation within a lexical decision task, a paradigmatic case of a 2-alternative choice task on linguistic stimuli. By co-registering electroencephalographic and electromyographic data, we focused on the lexicality effect (i.e., the difference between responses to words and nonwords), and we tracked its influence across indexes of motor-response planning (indexed by effector-selective lateralization of beta-frequency desynchronizations), programming (indexed by the lateralized readiness potential) and execution (indexed by the chronometric durations of muscular responses). In addition, we explored corticomuscular coherence as the potential physiological underpinning of a continuous mapping of information between stimulus evaluation and response channels. The results revealed lexicality effects only on indexes of motor planning and execution, with no reliable involvement of the other measures. This pattern is discussed with reference to the hypothesis of multiple decisional components exerting different influences across the motor-hierarchy.

Beyond simple laboratory studies: Developing sophisticated models to study rich behavior

Psychology and neuroscience are concerned with the study of behavior, of internal cognitive processes, and their neural foundations. However, most laboratory studies use constrained experimental settings that greatly limit the range of behaviors that can be expressed. While focusing on restricted settings ensures methodological control, it risks impoverishing the object of study: by restricting behavior, we might miss key aspects of cognitive and neural functions. In this article, we argue that psychology and neuroscience should increasingly adopt innovative experimental designs, measurement methods, analysis techniques and sophisticated computational models to probe rich, ecologically valid forms of behavior, including social behavior. We discuss the challenges of studying rich forms of behavior as well as the novel opportunities offered by state-of-the-art methodologies and new sensing technologies, and we highlight the importance of developing sophisticated formal models. We exemplify our arguments by reviewing some recent streams of research in psychology, neuroscience and other fields (e.g., sports analytics, ethology and robotics) that have addressed rich forms of behavior in a model-based manner. We hope that these "success cases" will encourage psychologists and neuroscientists to extend their toolbox of techniques with sophisticated behavioral models - and to use them to study rich forms of behavior as well as the cognitive and neural processes that they engage.

Adversarial inference: predictive minds in the attention economy

What is it about our current digital technologies that seemingly makes it difficult for users to attend to what matters to them? According to the dominant narrative in the literature on the "attention economy," a user's lack of attention is due to the large amounts of information available in their everyday environments. I will argue that information-abundance fails to account for some of the central manifestations of distraction, such as sudden urges to check a particular information-source in the absence of perceptual information. I will use active inference, and in particular models of action selection based on the minimization of expected free energy, to develop an alternative answer to the question about what makes it difficult to attend. Besides obvious adversarial forms of inference, in which algorithms build up models of users in order to keep them scrolling, I will show that active inference provides the tools to identify a number of problematic structural features of current digital technologies: they contain limitless sources of novelty, they can be navigated by very simple and effortless motor movements, and they offer their action possibilities everywhere and anytime independent of place or context. Moreover, recent models of motivated control show an intricate interplay between motivation and control that can explain sudden transitions in motivational state and the consequent alteration of the salience of actions. I conclude, therefore, that the challenges users encounter when engaging with digital technologies are less about information overload or inviting content, but more about the continuous availability of easily available possibilities for action.

Anxious individuals shift emotion control from lateral frontal pole to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex

Anxious individuals consistently fail in controlling emotional behavior, leading to excessive avoidance, a trait that prevents learning through exposure. Although the origin of this failure is unclear, one candidate system involves control of emotional actions, coordinated through lateral frontopolar cortex (FPl) via amygdala and sensorimotor connections. Using structural, functional, and neurochemical evidence, we show how FPl-based emotional action control fails in highly-anxious individuals. Their FPl is overexcitable, as indexed by GABA/glutamate ratio at rest, and receives stronger amygdalofugal projections than non-anxious male participants. Yet, high-anxious individuals fail to recruit FPl during emotional action control, relying instead on dorsolateral and medial prefrontal areas. This functional anatomical shift is proportional to FPl excitability and amygdalofugal projections strength. The findings characterize circuit-level vulnerabilities in anxious individuals, showing that even mild emotional challenges can saturate FPl neural range, leading to a neural bottleneck in the control of emotional action tendencies.

Implicit Sensorimotor Adaptation Proceeds in Absence of Movement Execution

In implicit sensorimotor adaptation, a mismatch between the predicted and actual sensory feedback results in a sensory prediction error (SPE). Sensory predictions have long been thought to be linked to descending motor commands, implying a necessary contribution of movement execution to adaptation. However, recent work has shown that mere motor imagery (MI) also engages predictive mechanisms, opening up the possibility that MI might be sufficient to drive implicit adaptation. In a within-subject design in humans (n = 30), implicit adaptation was assessed in a center-out reaching task, following a single exposure to a visuomotor rotation. It was hypothesized that performing MI of a reaching movement while being provided with an animation of rotated visual feedback (MI condition) would lead to postrotation biases (PRBs) similar to those observed when the movement is executed (Execution condition). Results revealed that both the MI and Execution conditions led to significant directional biases following rotated trials. Yet the magnitude of these biases was significantly larger in the Execution condition. To further probe the contribution of MI to adaptation, a Control condition was conducted in which participants were presented with the same rotated visual animation as in the MI condition, but in which they were prevented from performing MI. Surprisingly, significant biases were also observed in the Control condition, suggesting that MI per se may not have accounted for adaptation. Overall, these results suggest that implicit adaptation can be partially supported by processes other than those that strictly pertain to generating motor commands, although movement execution does potentiate it.

Tool mastering today - an interdisciplinary perspective

Tools have coined human life, living conditions, and culture. Recognizing the cognitive architecture underlying tool use would allow us to comprehend its evolution, development, and physiological basis. However, the cognitive underpinnings of tool mastering remain little understood in spite of long-time research in neuroscientific, psychological, behavioral and technological fields. Moreover, the recent transition of tool use to the digital domain poses new challenges for explaining the underlying processes. In this interdisciplinary review, we propose three building blocks of tool mastering: (A) perceptual and motor abilities integrate to tool manipulation knowledge, (B) perceptual and cognitive abilities to functional tool knowledge, and (C) motor and cognitive abilities to means-end knowledge about tool use. This framework allows for integrating and structuring research findings and theoretical assumptions regarding the functional architecture of tool mastering via behavior in humans and non-human primates, brain networks, as well as computational and robotic models. An interdisciplinary perspective also helps to identify open questions and to inspire innovative research approaches. The framework can be applied to studies on the transition from classical to modern, non-mechanical tools and from analogue to digital user-tool interactions in virtual reality, which come with increased functional opacity and sensorimotor decoupling between tool user, tool, and target. By working towards an integrative theory on the cognitive architecture of the use of tools and technological assistants, this review aims at stimulating future interdisciplinary research avenues.

Neuromodulatory control of complex adaptive dynamics in the brain

How is the massive dimensionality and complexity of the microscopic constituents of the nervous system brought under sufficiently tight control so as to coordinate adaptive behaviour? A powerful means for striking this balance is to poise neurons close to the critical point of a phase transition, at which a small change in neuronal excitability can manifest a nonlinear augmentation in neuronal activity. How the brain could mediate this critical transition is a key open question in neuroscience. Here, I propose that the different arms of the ascending arousal system provide the brain with a diverse set of heterogeneous control parameters that can be used to modulate the excitability and receptivity of target neurons-in other words, to act as control parameters for mediating critical neuronal order. Through a series of worked examples, I demonstrate how the neuromodulatory arousal system can interact with the inherent topological complexity of neuronal subsystems in the brain to mediate complex adaptive behaviour.

Explaining human interactions on the road by large-scale integration of computational psychological theory

When humans share space in road traffic, as drivers or as vulnerable road users, they draw on their full range of communicative and interactive capabilities. Much remains unknown about these behaviors, but they need to be captured in models if automated vehicles are to coexist successfully with human road users. Empirical studies of human road user behavior implicate a large number of underlying cognitive mechanisms, which taken together are well beyond the scope of existing computational models. Here, we note that for all of these putative mechanisms, computational theories exist in different subdisciplines of psychology, for more constrained tasks. We demonstrate how these separate theories can be generalized from abstract laboratory paradigms and integrated into a computational framework for modeling human road user interaction, combining Bayesian perception, a theory of mind regarding others' intentions, behavioral game theory, long-term valuation of action alternatives, and evidence accumulation decision-making. We show that a model with these assumptions-but not simpler versions of the same model-can account for a number of previously unexplained phenomena in naturalistic driver-pedestrian road-crossing interactions, and successfully predicts interaction outcomes in an unseen data set. Our modeling results contribute to demonstrating the real-world value of the theories from which we draw, and address calls in psychology for cumulative theory-building, presenting human road use as a suitable setting for work of this nature. Our findings also underscore the formidable complexity of human interaction in road traffic, with strong implications for the requirements to set on development and testing of vehicle automation.

Visual search for reach targets in actionable space is influenced by movement costs imposed by obstacles

Real world search tasks often involve action on a target object once it has been located. However, few studies have examined whether movement-related costs associated with acting on located objects influence visual search. Here, using a task in which participants reached to a target object after locating it, we examined whether people take into account obstacles that increase movement-related costs for some regions of the reachable search space but not others. In each trial, a set of 36 objects (4 targets and 32 distractors) were displayed on a vertical screen and participants moved a cursor to a target after locating it. Participants had to fixate on an object to determine whether it was a target or distractor. A rectangular obstacle, of varying length, location, and orientation, was briefly displayed at the start of the trial. Participants controlled the cursor by moving the handle of a robotic manipulandum in a horizontal plane. The handle applied forces to simulate contact between the cursor and the unseen obstacle. We found that search, measured using eye movements, was biased to regions of the search space that could be reached without moving around the obstacle. This result suggests that when deciding where to search, people can incorporate the physical structure of the environment so as to reduce the movement-related cost of subsequently acting on the located target.

Solving the binding problem: Assemblies form when neurons enhance their firing rate-they don't need to oscillate or synchronize

When we look at an image, its features are represented in our visual system in a highly distributed manner, calling for a mechanism that binds them into coherent object representations. There have been different proposals for the neuronal mechanisms that can mediate binding. One hypothesis is that binding is achieved by oscillations that synchronize neurons representing features of the same perceptual object. This view allows separate communication channels between different brain areas. Another hypothesis is that binding of features that are represented in different brain regions occurs when the neurons in these areas that respond to the same object simultaneously enhance their firing rate, which would correspond to directing object-based attention to these features. This review summarizes evidence in favor of and against these two hypotheses, examining the neuronal correlates of binding and assessing the time course of perceptual grouping. I conclude that enhanced neuronal firing rates bind features into coherent object representations, whereas oscillations and synchrony are unrelated to binding.

Evidence for entropy maximisation in human free choice behaviour

The freedom to choose between options is strongly linked to notions of free will. Accordingly, several studies have shown that individuals demonstrate a preference for choice, or the availability of multiple options, over and above utilitarian value. Yet we lack a decision-making framework that integrates preference for choice with traditional utility maximisation in free choice behaviour. Here we test the predictions of an inference-based model of decision-making in which an agent actively seeks states yielding entropy (availability of options) in addition to utility (economic reward). We designed a study in which participants freely navigated a virtual environment consisting of two consecutive choices leading to reward locations in separate rooms. Critically, the choice of one room always led to two final doors while, in the second room, only one door was permissible to choose. This design allowed us to separately determine the influence of utility and entropy on participants' choice behaviour and their self-evaluation of free will. We found that choice behaviour was better predicted by an inference-based model than by expected utility alone, and that both the availability of options and the value of the context positively influenced participants' perceived freedom of choice. Moreover, this consideration of options was apparent in the ongoing motion dynamics as individuals navigated the environment. In a second study, in which participants selected between rooms that gave access to three or four doors, we observed a similar pattern of results, with participants preferring the room that gave access to more options and feeling freer in it. These results suggest that free choice behaviour is well explained by an inference-based framework in which both utility and entropy are optimised and supports the idea that the feeling of having free will is tightly related to options availability.

Beyond Avoiding Hemiplegia after Glioma Surgery: The Need to Map Complex Movement in Awake Patient to Preserve Conation

Improving the onco-functional balance has always been a challenge in glioma surgery, especially regarding motor function. Given the importance of conation (i.e., the willingness which leads to action) in patient's quality of life, we propose here to review the evolution of its intraoperative assessment through a reminder of the increasing knowledge of its neural foundations-based upon a meta-networking organization at three levels. Historical preservation of the primary motor cortex and pyramidal pathway (first level), which was mostly dedicated to avoid hemiplegia, has nonetheless shown its limits to prevent the occurrence of long-term deficits regarding complex movement. Then, preservation of the movement control network (second level) has permitted to prevent such more subtle (but possibly disabling) deficits thanks to intraoperative mapping with direct electrostimulations in awake conditions. Finally, integrating movement control in a multitasking evaluation during awake surgery (third level) enabled to preserve movement volition in its highest and finest level according to patients' specific demands (e.g., to play instrument or to perform sports). Understanding these three levels of conation and its underlying cortico-subcortical neural basis is therefore critical to propose an individualized surgical strategy centered on patient's choice: this implies an increasingly use of awake mapping and cognitive monitoring regardless of the involved hemisphere. Moreover, this also pleads for a finer and systematic assessment of conation before, during and after glioma surgery as well as for a stronger integration of fundamental neurosciences into clinical practice.

Flexible intentions: An Active Inference theory

We present a normative computational theory of how the brain may support visually-guided goal-directed actions in dynamically changing environments. It extends the Active Inference theory of cortical processing according to which the brain maintains beliefs over the environmental state, and motor control signals try to fulfill the corresponding sensory predictions. We propose that the neural circuitry in the Posterior Parietal Cortex (PPC) compute flexible intentions-or motor plans from a belief over targets-to dynamically generate goal-directed actions, and we develop a computational formalization of this process. A proof-of-concept agent embodying visual and proprioceptive sensors and an actuated upper limb was tested on target-reaching tasks. The agent behaved correctly under various conditions, including static and dynamic targets, different sensory feedbacks, sensory precisions, intention gains, and movement policies; limit conditions were individuated, too. Active Inference driven by dynamic and flexible intentions can thus support goal-directed behavior in constantly changing environments, and the PPC might putatively host its core intention mechanism. More broadly, the study provides a normative computational basis for research on goal-directed behavior in end-to-end settings and further advances mechanistic theories of active biological systems.

Active inference, morphogenesis, and computational psychiatry

Active inference is a leading theory in neuroscience that provides a simple and neuro-biologically plausible account of how action and perception are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behavior; and has been recently used to explain a variety of psychopathological conditions. In parallel, morphogenesis has been described as the behavior of a (non-neural) cellular collective intelligence solving problems in anatomical morphospace. In this article, we establish a link between the domains of cell biology and neuroscience, by analyzing disorders of morphogenesis as disorders of (active) inference. The aim of this article is three-fold. We want to: (i) reveal a connection between disorders of morphogenesis and disorders of active inference as apparent in psychopathological conditions; (ii) show how disorders of morphogenesis can be simulated using active inference; (iii) suggest that active inference can shed light on developmental defects or aberrant morphogenetic processes, seen as disorders of information processing, and perhaps suggesting novel intervention and repair strategies. We present four simulations illustrating application of these ideas to cellular behavior during morphogenesis. Three of the simulations show that the same forms of aberrant active inference (e.g., deficits of sensory attenuation and low sensory precision) that have been used to explain psychopathological conditions (e.g., schizophrenia and autism) also produce familiar disorders of development and morphogenesis when implemented at the level of the collective behavior of a group of cells. The fourth simulation involves two cells with too high precision, in which we show that the reduction of concentration signaling and sensitivity to the signals of other cells treats the development defect. Finally, we present the results of an experimental test of one of the model's predictions in early Xenopus laevis embryos: thioridazine (a dopamine antagonist that may reduce sensory precision in biological systems) induced developmental (anatomical) defects as predicted. The use of conceptual and empirical tools from neuroscience to understand the morphogenetic behavior of pre-neural agents offers the possibility of new approaches in regenerative medicine and evolutionary developmental biology.

Inductive biases for deep learning of higher-level cognition

A fascinating hypothesis is that human and animal intelligence could be explained by a few principles (rather than an encyclopaedic list of heuristics). If that hypothesis was correct, we could more easily both understand our own intelligence and build intelligent machines. Just like in physics, the principles themselves would not be sufficient to predict the behaviour of complex systems like brains, and substantial computation might be needed to simulate human-like intelligence. This hypothesis would suggest that studying the kind of inductive biases that humans and animals exploit could help both clarify these principles and provide inspiration for AI research and neuroscience theories. Deep learning already exploits several key inductive biases, and this work considers a larger list, focusing on those which concern mostly higher-level and sequential conscious processing. The objective of clarifying these particular principles is that they could potentially help us build AI systems benefiting from humans’ abilities in terms of flexible out-of-distribution and systematic generalization, which is currently an area where a large gap exists between state-of-the-art machine learning and human intelligence.

A New Look at Young Children's Referential Informativeness

In this article, I review experimental evidence for the dependence of 2- to 5-year-olds' linguistic referential informativeness on cues to common ground (CG) and propose a process model. Cues to CG provide evidence for CG, that is, for the shared knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes of interlocutors. The presence of cues to CG (e.g., unimpeded listener line of regard or prior mention) is shown to be associated with less informative reference (e.g., pronouns). In contrast, the absence of cues to CG (e.g., impeded listener line of regard or new mention) is shown to be associated with more informative reference (e.g., nouns). Informativeness is sensitive to linguistic before nonlinguistic cues to CG (i.e., 2.0 vs. 2.5 years old, respectively). Reference is cast as a process of active inference, a formulation of Bayesian belief-guided control in biological systems. Child speakers are hierarchical generative models that, characteristically, expect sensory evidence for the evolved, prior Bayesian belief that interlocutor mental states are aligned (i.e., that CG exists). Referential control emerges as an embodied tool to gather evidence for this prior belief. Bottom-up cues to CG elicited by action drive updates to beliefs about CG. In turn, beliefs about CG guide efficient referential control.

When the "satisficing" is the new "fittest": how a proscriptive definition of adaptation can change our view of cognition and culture

Since Darwin's theory of evolution, adaptationism is frequently invoked to explain cognition and cultural processes. Adaptationism can be described as a prescriptive view, as phenotypes that do not optimize fitness should not be selected by natural selection. From an epistemological perspective, the principle of a prescriptive definition of adaptation seems incompatible with recent advances in epigenetics, evolutionary developmental biology, ethology, and genomics. From these challenges, a proscriptive view of adaptation has emerged, postulating that phenotypes that are not deleterious will be evolutionary maintained. In this epistemological investigation, we examine how the shift from adaptationism to a proscriptive view changes our view of cognition and culture. We argue that, while adaptationism leads to cognitivism and a view of culture as strategies to optimize overall fitness, the proscriptive definition favors embodied theories of cognition and a view of culture as the cumulative diffusion of behaviors allowed by the constraints of reproduction.

Machines That Feel and Think: The Role of Affective Feelings and Mental Action in (Artificial) General Intelligence

What role do affective feelings (feelings/emotions/moods) play in adaptive behaviour? What are the implications of this for understanding and developing artificial general intelligence? Leading theoretical models of brain function are beginning to shed light on these questions. While artificial agents have excelled within narrowly circumscribed and specialised domains, domain-general intelligence has remained an elusive goal in artificial intelligence research. By contrast, humans and nonhuman animals are characterised by a capacity for flexible behaviour and general intelligence. In this article I argue that computational models of mental phenomena in predictive processing theories of the brain are starting to reveal the mechanisms underpinning domain-general intelligence in biological agents, and can inform the understanding and development of artificial general intelligence. I focus particularly on approaches to computational phenomenology in the active inference framework. Specifically, I argue that computational mechanisms of affective feelings in active inference-affective self-modelling-are revealing of how biological agents are able to achieve flexible behavioural repertoires and general intelligence. I argue that (i) affective self-modelling functions to "tune" organisms to the most tractable goals in the environmental context; and (ii) affective and agentic self-modelling is central to the capacity to perform mental actions in goal-directed imagination and creative cognition. I use this account as a basis to argue that general intelligence of the level and kind found in biological agents will likely require machines to be implemented with analogues of affective self-modelling.

The biased hand. Mouse-tracking metrics to examine the conflict processing in a race-implicit association test

In this study, we adapted a race-Implicit Association Test (race-IAT) to mouse-tracking (MT) technique to identify the more representative target observed MT-metrics and explore the temporal unfolding of the cognitive conflict emerging during the categorisation task. Participants of Western European descent performed a standard keyboard-response race-IAT (RT-race-IAT) and an MT-race-IAT with the same structure. From a behavioural point of view, our sample showed a typical Congruency Effect, thus a pro-White implicit bias, in the RT-race-IAT. In addition, in the MT-race-IAT, the MT-metrics showed a similar Congruency Effect mirroring the higher attraction of the averaged-trajectories towards the incorrect response button in incongruent than congruent trials. Moreover, these MT-metrics were positively associated with RT-race-IAT scores, strengthening the MT approach’s validity in characterising the implicit bias. Furthermore, the distributional analyses showed that mouse trajectories displayed a smooth profile both in congruent and incongruent trials to indicate that the unfolding of the decision process and the raised conflict is guided by dynamical cognitive processing. This latter continuous competition process was studied using a novel phase-based approach which allowed to temporally dissect an Early, a Mid and a Late phase, each of which may differently reflect the decision conflict between automatic and controlled responses in the evolution of the mouse movement towards the target response. Our results show that the MT approach provides an accurate and finer-grained characterisation of the implicit racial attitude than classical RT-IAT. Finally, our novel phase-based approach can be an effective tool to shed light on the implicit conflict processing emerging in a categorisation task with a promising transferable value in different cognitive and neuropsychological fields.

Quantitatively assessing aging effects in rapid motor behaviours: a cross-sectional study

BACKGROUND

An individual's rapid motor skills allow them to perform many daily activities and are a hallmark of physical health. Although age and sex are both known to affect motor performance, standardized methods for assessing their impact on upper limb function are limited.

METHODS

Here we perform a cross-sectional study of 643 healthy human participants in two interactive motor tasks developed to quantify sensorimotor abilities, Object-Hit (OH) and Object-Hit-and-Avoid (OHA). The tasks required participants to hit virtual objects with and without the presence of distractor objects. Velocities and positions of hands and objects were recorded by a robotic exoskeleton, allowing a variety of parameters to be calculated for each trial. We verified that these tasks are viable for measuring performance in healthy humans and we examined whether any of our recorded parameters were related to age or sex.

RESULTS

Our analysis shows that both OH and OHA can assess rapid motor behaviours in healthy human participants. It also shows that while some parameters in these tasks decline with age, those most associated with the motor system do not. Three parameters show significant sex-related effects in OH, but these effects disappear in OHA.

CONCLUSIONS

This study suggests that the underlying effect of aging on rapid motor behaviours is not on the capabilities of the motor system, but on the brain's capacity for processing inputs into motor actions. Additionally, this study provides a baseline description of healthy human performance in OH and OHA when using these tasks to investigate age-related declines in sensorimotor ability.

Understanding the effects of serotonin in the brain through its role in the gastrointestinal tract

The neuromodulatory arousal system imbues the nervous system with the flexibility and robustness required to facilitate adaptive behaviour. While there are well-understood mechanisms linking dopamine, noradrenaline and acetylcholine to distinct behavioural states, similar conclusions have not been as readily available for serotonin. Fascinatingly, despite clear links between serotonergic function and cognitive capacities as diverse as reward processing, exploration, and the psychedelic experience, over 95% of the serotonin in the body is released in the gastrointestinal tract, where it controls digestive muscle contractions (peristalsis). Here, we argue that framing neural serotonin as a rostral extension of the gastrointestinal serotonergic system dissolves much of the mystery associated with the central serotonergic system. Specifically, we outline that central serotonin activity mimics the effects of a digestion/satiety circuit mediated by hypothalamic control over descending serotonergic nuclei in the brainstem. We review commonalities and differences between these two circuits, with a focus on the heterogeneous expression of different classes of serotonin receptors in the brain. Much in the way that serotonin-induced peristalsis facilitates the work of digestion, serotonergic influences over cognition can be reframed as performing the work of cognition. Extending this analogy, we argue that the central serotonergic system allows the brain to arbitrate between different cognitive modes as a function of serotonergic tone: low activity facilitates cognitive automaticity, whereas higher activity helps to identify flexible solutions to problems, particularly if and when the initial responses fail. This perspective sheds light on otherwise disparate capacities mediated by serotonin, and also helps to understand why there are such pervasive links between serotonergic pathology and the symptoms of psychiatric disorders.

Neuroscience and architecture: Modulating behavior through sensorimotor responses to the built environment

As we move through the world, natural and built environments implicitly guide behavior by appealing to certain sensory and motor dynamics. This process can be motivated by automatic attention to environmental features that resonate with specific sensorimotor responses. This review aims at providing a psychobiological framework describing how environmental features can lead to automated sensorimotor responses through defined neurophysiological mechanisms underlying attention. Through the use of automated processes in subsets of cortical structures, the goal of this framework is to describe on a neuronal level the functional link between the designed environment and sensorimotor responses. By distinguishing between environmental features and sensorimotor responses we elaborate on how automatic behavior employs the environment for sensorimotor adaptation. This is realized through a thalamo-cortical network integrating environmental features with motor aspects of behavior. We highlight the underlying transthalamic transmission from an Enactive and predictive perspective and review recent studies that effectively modulated behavior by systematically manipulating environmental features. We end by suggesting a promising combination of neuroimaging and computational analysis for future studies.

Loving Objects: Can Autism Explain Objectophilia?

Objectophilia (also known as objectum-sexuality) involves romantic and sexual attraction to specific objects. Objectophiles often develop deep and enduring emotional, romantic, and sexual relations with specific inanimate (concrete or abstract) objects such as trains, bridges, cars, or words. The determinants of objectophilia are poorly understood. The aim of this paper is to examine the determining factors of objectophilia. We examine four hypotheses about the determinants of objectophilia (pertaining to fetishism, synesthesia, cross-modal mental imagery, and autism) and argue that the most likely determining factors of objectophilia are the social and non-social features of autism. Future studies on the determinants of objectophilia could enhance our understanding and potentially lessen the marginalization experienced by objectophiles.

Hasty sensorimotor decisions rely on an overlap of broad and selective changes in motor activity

Humans and other animals are able to adjust their speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT) at will depending on the urge to act, favoring either cautious or hasty decision policies in different contexts. An emerging view is that SAT regulation relies on influences exerting broad changes on the motor system, tuning its activity up globally when hastiness is at premium. The present study aimed to test this hypothesis. A total of 50 participants performed a task involving choices between left and right index fingers, in which incorrect choices led either to a high or to a low penalty in 2 contexts, inciting them to emphasize either cautious or hasty policies. We applied transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) on multiple motor representations, eliciting motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in 9 finger and leg muscles. MEP amplitudes allowed us to probe activity changes in the corresponding finger and leg representations, while participants were deliberating about which index to choose. Our data indicate that hastiness entails a broad amplification of motor activity, although this amplification was limited to the chosen side. On top of this effect, we identified a local suppression of motor activity, surrounding the chosen index representation. Hence, a decision policy favoring speed over accuracy appears to rely on overlapping processes producing a broad (but not global) amplification and a surround suppression of motor activity. The latter effect may help to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the chosen representation, as supported by single-trial correlation analyses indicating a stronger differentiation of activity changes in finger representations in the hasty context.

Many have argued that the regulation of the speed-accuracy tradeoff relies on an urgency signal, which implements "collapsing decision thresholds" by tuning neural activity in a global manner in decision-related structures. This study indicates that the reality is more subtle, with several aspects of "urgency" being specifically targeted to particular corticospinal populations within the motor system.

Brain Dynamics of Action Monitoring in Higher-Order Motor Control Disorders: The Case of Apraxia

Limb apraxia (LA) refers to a high-order motor disorder characterized by the inability to reproduce transitive actions on commands or after observation. Studies demonstrate that action observation and action execution activate the same networks in the human brain, and provides an onlooker’s motor system with appropriate cognitive, motor and sensory-motor cues to flexibly implementing action-sequences and gestures. Tellingly, the temporal dynamics of action monitoring has never been explored in people suffering from LA. To fill this gap, we studied the electro-cortical signatures of error observation in human participants suffering from acquired left-brain lesions with (LA+) and without (LA–) LA, and in a group of healthy controls (H). EEG was acquired while participants observed from a first-person perspective (1PP) an avatar performing correct or incorrect reach-to-grasp a glass action in an immersive-virtual environment. Alterations of typical EEG signatures of error observation in time (early error positivity; Pe) and time-frequency domain (theta band-power) were found reduced in LA+ compared with H. Connectivity analyses showed that LA+ exhibited a decreased theta phase synchronization of both the frontoparietal and frontofrontal network, compared with H and LA–. Moreover, linear regression analysis revealed that the severity of LA [test of upper LA (TULIA) scores] was predicted by mid-frontal error-related theta activity, suggesting a link between error monitoring capacity and apraxic phenotypes. These results provide novel neurophysiological evidence of altered neurophysiological dynamics of action monitoring in individuals with LA and shed light on the performance monitoring changes occurring in this disorder.