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Anderson RA, Nichols S, Pizarro DA. Praise Is for Actions That Are Neither Expected nor Required. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024:1461672241289833. [PMID: 39417535 DOI: 10.1177/01461672241289833] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2024]
Abstract
In six studies, we examined two foundational questions about moral praise. First, what makes an action praiseworthy? In Study 1, participants reported that actions that exceed duties (compared with dutiful actions) deserve greater praise and are perceived as less likely to happen. Second, what do observers infer from praise? Praise may communicate information about local norms. In Study 2, we found that-in general-participants expect praise to increase the likelihood of a behavior. However, in Studies 3-6, participants inferred that moral behavior that receives praise is less common and is less required and expected of people. These inferences led individuals to judge that someone would be less likely to perform a behavior that was praised. These studies provide insight into the lay beliefs and communicative function of moral praise.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rajen A Anderson
- Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
| | - Shaun Nichols
- Department of Philosophy, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
| | - David A Pizarro
- Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
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2
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Furr RM, Prentice M, Hawkins Parham A, Hartley AG, Fleeson W. Is Doing Good Good Enough? A Motivation, Action, Sacrifice, and Temptation (MAST) View of Moral Praiseworthiness. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024:1461672241273243. [PMID: 39275980 DOI: 10.1177/01461672241273243] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/16/2024]
Abstract
We present the Motivation, Action, Sacrifice, and Temptation (MAST) view of moral praiseworthiness and evaluate four components shaping judgments of an actor's morality: (a) How did the person act? (b) Why did the person act? (c) Did the person sacrifice something when acting? and (d) Was the person tempted to avoid the sacrifice? Across multiple moral domains, we evaluate moral impressions of hypothetical actors who acted ostensibly morally under different motivational, sacrificial, and temptational conditions. Across four studies (total N > 1,200) and 150 morally relevant scenarios, all components shaped moral impressions, with motivational purity having the strongest impact. Exploring motivation more deeply via Self-Determination Theory, we found effects of internalized (vs. externalized) motivations. Broadly speaking, judges prefer actors to act automatically and in an idealized manner rather than with deliberation and effort. This work address questions that have fascinated philosophers, psychologists, and laypeople, advancing understanding of moral impression formation.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Anselma G Hartley
- Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
- Meta, Menlo Park, CA, USA
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3
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Anderson RA, Ruisch BC, Pizarro DA. On the Highway to Hell: Slippery Slope Perceptions in Judgments of Moral Character. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024; 50:679-693. [PMID: 36602035 DOI: 10.1177/01461672221143022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/06/2023]
Abstract
Across four studies, we test the hypothesis that people exhibit "slippery slope" thinking in their judgments of moral character-that is, do observers judge that a person who behaves immorally will become increasingly immoral over time? In Study 1, we find that a person who commits an immoral act is judged as more likely to behave immorally and as having a worse character in the future than in the past. In Study 2, we find that it is the commission of an immoral act specifically-rather than merely attempting an immoral act-that drives this slippery slope effect. In Study 3, we demonstrate that observers judge the moral agent as more likely to commit acts of greater severity further in time after the initial immoral act. In Study 4, we find that this effect is driven by an anticipated corrupting of moral character, related to perceptions of the agent's guilt.
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4
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Landy JF, Perry AD. Forming Evaluations of Moral Character: How Are Multiple Pieces of Information Prioritized and Integrated? Cogn Sci 2024; 48:e13443. [PMID: 38659093 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13443] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/12/2022] [Revised: 03/01/2024] [Accepted: 03/29/2024] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
Evaluating other people's moral character is a crucial social cognitive task. However, the cognitive processes by which people seek out, prioritize, and integrate multiple pieces of character-relevant information have not been studied empirically. The first aim of this research was to examine which character traits are considered most important when forming an impression of a person's overall moral character. The second aim was to understand how differing levels of trait expression affect overall character judgments. Four preregistered studies and one supplemental study (total N = 720), using five different measures of importance and sampling undergraduates, online workers, and community members, found that our participants placed the most importance on the traits honest, helpful, compassionate, loyal, and responsible. Also, when integrating the information that they have learned, our participants seemed to engage in a simple averaging process in which all available, relevant information is combined in a linear fashion to form an overall evaluation of moral character. This research provides new insights into the cognitive processes by which evaluations of moral character are formed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Justin F Landy
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Nova Southeastern University
| | - Alexander D Perry
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Nova Southeastern University
- Department of Psychology, Iowa State University
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5
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Willemsen P, Baumgartner L, Cepollaro B, Reuter K. Evaluative Deflation, Social Expectations, and the Zone of Moral Indifference. Cogn Sci 2024; 48:e13406. [PMID: 38279901 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13406] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2023] [Revised: 11/06/2023] [Accepted: 01/09/2024] [Indexed: 01/29/2024]
Abstract
Acts that are considered undesirable standardly violate our expectations. In contrast, acts that count as morally desirable can either meet our expectations or exceed them. The zone in which an act can be morally desirable yet not exceed our expectations is what we call the zone of moral indifference, and it has so far been neglected. In this paper, we show that people can use positive terms in a deflated manner to refer to actions in the zone of moral indifference, whereas negative terms cannot be so interpreted.
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6
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Xiang Y, Landy J, Cushman FA, Vélez N, Gershman SJ. Actual and counterfactual effort contribute to responsibility attributions in collaborative tasks. Cognition 2023; 241:105609. [PMID: 37708602 PMCID: PMC10592005 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105609] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/08/2023] [Revised: 07/14/2023] [Accepted: 08/28/2023] [Indexed: 09/16/2023]
Abstract
How do people judge responsibility in collaborative tasks? Past work has proposed a number of metrics that people may use to attribute blame and credit to others, such as effort, competence, and force. Some theories consider only the actual effort or force (individuals are more responsible if they put forth more effort or force), whereas others consider counterfactuals (individuals are more responsible if some alternative behavior on their or their collaborator's part could have altered the outcome). Across four experiments (N=717), we found that participants' judgments are best described by a model that considers both actual and counterfactual effort. This finding generalized to an independent validation data set (N=99). Our results thus support a dual-factor theory of responsibility attribution in collaborative tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yang Xiang
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States of America.
| | - Jenna Landy
- College of Human Ecology, Cornell University, United States of America
| | - Fiery A Cushman
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States of America
| | - Natalia Vélez
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States of America
| | - Samuel J Gershman
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States of America; Center for Brain Science, Harvard University, United States of America; Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, MIT, United States of America
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7
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Wong A, Cordes S, Harris PL, Chernyak N. Being nice by choice: The effect of counterfactual reasoning on children's social evaluations. Dev Sci 2023; 26:e13394. [PMID: 37073547 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13394] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/12/2022] [Revised: 03/10/2023] [Accepted: 03/11/2023] [Indexed: 04/20/2023]
Abstract
The ability to engage in counterfactual thinking (reason about what else could have happened) is critical to learning, agency, and social evaluation. However, not much is known about how individual differences in counterfactual reasoning may play a role in children's social evaluations. In the current study, we investigate how prompting children to engage in counterfactual thinking about positive moral actions impacts children's social evaluations. Eighty-seven 4-8-year-olds were introduced to a character who engaged in a positive moral action (shared a sticker with a friend) and asked about what else the character could have done with the sticker (counterfactual simulation). Children were asked to generate either a high number of counterfactuals (five alternative actions) or a low number of counterfactuals (one alternative action). Children were then asked a series of social evaluation questions contrasting that character with one who did not have a choice and had no alternatives (was told to give away the sticker to his friend). Results show that children who generated selfish counterfactuals were more likely to positively evaluate the character with choice than children who did not generate selfish counterfactuals, suggesting that generating counterfactuals most distant from the chosen action (prosociality) leads children to view prosocial actions more positively. We also found age-related changes: as children got older, regardless of the type of counterfactuals generated, they were more likely to evaluate the character with choice more positively. These results highlight the importance of counterfactual reasoning in the development of moral evaluations. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Older children were more likely to endorse agents who choose to share over those who do not have a choice. Children who were prompted to generate more counterfactuals were more likely to allocate resources to characters with choice. Children who generated selfish counterfactuals more positively evaluated agents with choice. Comparable to theories suggesting children punish willful transgressors more than accidental transgressors, we propose children also consider free will when making positive moral evaluations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alyson Wong
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Sara Cordes
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Paul L Harris
- Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Nadia Chernyak
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California Irvine, Irvine, California, USA
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8
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Longin L, Bahrami B, Deroy O. Intelligence brings responsibility - Even smart AI assistants are held responsible. iScience 2023; 26:107494. [PMID: 37609629 PMCID: PMC10440553 DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2023.107494] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2022] [Revised: 06/07/2023] [Accepted: 07/22/2023] [Indexed: 08/24/2023] Open
Abstract
People will not hold cars responsible for traffic accidents, yet they do when artificial intelligence (AI) is involved. AI systems are held responsible when they act or merely advise a human agent. Does this mean that as soon as AI is involved responsibility follows? To find out, we examined whether purely instrumental AI systems stay clear of responsibility. We compared AI-powered with non-AI-powered car warning systems and measured their responsibility rating alongside their human users. Our findings show that responsibility is shared when the warning system is powered by AI but not by a purely mechanical system, even though people consider both systems as mere tools. Surprisingly, whether the warning prevents the accident introduces an outcome bias: the AI takes higher credit than blame depending on what the human manages or fails to do.
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Affiliation(s)
- Louis Longin
- Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion, LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 Munich, Germany
| | - Bahador Bahrami
- Crowd Cognition Group, Department of General Psychology and Education, LMU-Munich, Gabelsbergerstraße 62, 80333 Munich, Germany
| | - Ophelia Deroy
- Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion, LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 Munich, Germany
- Munich Centre for Neurosciences-Brain & Mind, Großhaderner Str. 2, 82152 Munich, Germany
- Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU, UK
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9
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Schwartz SA, Inbar Y. Is it good to feel bad about littering? Conflict between moral beliefs and behaviors for everyday transgressions. Cognition 2023; 236:105437. [PMID: 36989917 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105437] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2022] [Revised: 03/04/2023] [Accepted: 03/06/2023] [Indexed: 03/29/2023]
Abstract
People sometimes do things that they think are morally wrong. We investigate how actors' perceptions of the morality of their own behaviors affects observer evaluations. In Study 1 (n = 302), we presented participants with six different descriptions of actors who routinely engaged in a morally questionable behavior and varied whether the actors thought the behavior was morally wrong. Actors who believed their behavior was wrong were seen as having better moral character, but their behavior was rated as more wrong. In Study 2 (n = 391) we investigated whether perceptions of actor metadesires were responsible for the effects of actor beliefs on character judgments. We used the same stimuli and measures as in Study 1 but added a measure of the actor's perceived desires to engage in the behaviors. As predicted, the effect of actors' moral beliefs on judgments of their moral character was mediated by perceived metadesires. In Study 3 (n = 1092) we replicated these findings in a between-participants design and further found that the effect of actor beliefs on act and character judgments was moderated by participant beliefs about the general acceptability of the behavior.
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Khan U, Jaffer-Diaz M, Najafizadeh A, Starmans C. Going above and beyond? Early reasoning about which moral acts are best. Cognition 2023; 236:105444. [PMID: 36947976 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105444] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/25/2022] [Revised: 03/10/2023] [Accepted: 03/13/2023] [Indexed: 03/24/2023]
Abstract
Philosophers and theologians have long distinguished between acts a good person is obliged to do, and those that are supererogatory-going above and beyond what is required. Across three studies (N = 796), we discovered a striking developmental difference in intuitions about such acts: while adults view supererogatory actions as morally better than obligatory actions, children view fulfilling obligations as morally better. This difference did not stem from differing views of what is obligatory-children agreed that supererogatory acts were not required. And this difference remained even when the very same actions were framed as either supererogatory or obligatory. These findings suggest that the intuition that supererogatory acts are especially morally good might be late-emerging and culturally specific.
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Affiliation(s)
- Umang Khan
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Canada
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11
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Ericson SR, Denison S, Turri J, Friedman O. Probability and intentional action. Cogn Psychol 2023; 141:101551. [PMID: 36764242 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101551] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2022] [Revised: 01/30/2023] [Accepted: 01/30/2023] [Indexed: 02/11/2023]
Abstract
How does probability affect attributions of intentionality? In five experiments (total N = 1410), we provide evidence for a probability raising account holding that people are more likely to see the outcome of an agent's action as intentional if the agent does something to increase the odds of that outcome. Experiment 1 found that high probability without probability raising does not suffice for strong attributions of intentionality. Participants were more likely to conclude a girl intentionally obtained a desired gumball from a single gumball machine when it offered favorable odds for getting that kind of gumball compared with when it offered poor odds, but their attributions of intentionality were lukewarm. Experiments 2 and 3 then found stronger attributions of intentionality when the girl raised her probability of success by choosing to use machines offering favorable odds over machines offering poor odds. Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 examined whether these effects of probability raising might reduce to consideration of agents' beliefs and expectations. We found that although these mental states do matter, probability raising matters too-people attribute intentional actions to agents who increase their odds of success, rather than to agents who merely become convinced that success is likely. We discuss the implications of these findings for claims that control and skill contribute to attributions of intentional action.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - John Turri
- Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, Canada
| | - Ori Friedman
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Canada.
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12
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Interpersonal relationships modulate subjective ratings and electrophysiological responses of moral evaluations. COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2023; 23:125-141. [PMID: 36253608 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-022-01041-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/02/2022] [Indexed: 02/15/2023]
Abstract
This study explored how interpersonal relationships modulate moral evaluations in moral dilemmas. Participants rated moral acceptability in response to altruistic (prescriptive) and selfish (proscriptive) behavior conducted by allocators (i.e., a friend or stranger), toward the participants themselves or another stranger in a modified Dictator Game (Experiments 1 and 2). Event-related potential (ERP) data were recorded as participants observed the allocators' behavior (Experiment 2). Moral acceptability ratings showed that when the allocator was a friend, participants evaluated the friend's altruistic and selfish behavior toward another stranger as being less morally acceptable than when their friend showed the respective behavior toward the participants themselves. The ERP results showed that participants exhibited more negative medial frontal negativity (MFN) amplitude whether observing a friend's altruistic or selfish behavior toward a stranger (vs. participant oneself), indicating that friends' altruistic and selfish behaviors toward strangers (vs. participants) were processed as being less acceptable at the earlier and semi-automatic processing stage in brains. However, this effect did not emerge when the allocator was a stranger in subjective ratings and MFN results. In the later-occurring P3 component, no interpersonal relationship modulation occurred in moral evaluations. These findings suggest that interpersonal relationships affect moral evaluations from the second-party perspective.
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Tuen YJ, Bulley A, Palombo DJ, O'Connor BB. Social value at a distance: Higher identification with all of humanity is associated with reduced social discounting. Cognition 2023; 230:105283. [PMID: 36209687 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105283] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2021] [Revised: 09/01/2022] [Accepted: 09/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
How much we value the welfare of others has critical implications for the collective good. Yet, it is unclear what leads people to make more or less equal decisions about the welfare of those from whom they are socially distant. The current research sought to explore the psychological mechanisms that might underlie welfare judgements across social distance. Here, a social discounting paradigm was used to measure the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the social distance of its recipient increased. Across two cohorts (one discovery, one replication), we found that a more expansive identity with all of humanity was associated with reduced social discounting. Additionally, we investigated the specificity of this association by examining whether this relationship extended to delay discounting, the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the temporal distance to its receipt increases. Our findings suggest that the observed association with identity was unique to social discounting, thus underscoring a distinction in value-based decision-making processes across distances in time and across social networks. As data were collected during the COVID-19 pandemic, we also considered how stress associated with this global threat might influence welfare judgements across social distances. We found that, even after controlling for COVID-19 related stress, correlations between identity and social discounting held. Together, these findings elucidate the psychological processes that are associated with a more equal distribution of generosity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Young Ji Tuen
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
| | - Adam Bulley
- The University of Sydney, School of Psychology and Brain and Mind Centre, 94 Mallett Street Camperdown, NSW 2050, Australia; Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States of America
| | - Daniela J Palombo
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada.
| | - Brendan Bo O'Connor
- Department of Psychology, University of Albany (SUNY), Social Science 399, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12222, United States of America.
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Zhao X, Kushnir T. When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness. Dev Sci 2023; 26:e13257. [PMID: 35301779 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13257] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2021] [Revised: 02/28/2022] [Accepted: 03/02/2022] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xin Zhao
- Department of Educational Psychology, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China
| | - Tamar Kushnir
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
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15
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Baumgartner L, Willemsen P, Reuter K. The polarity effect of evaluative language. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2123311] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/14/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Kevin Reuter
- Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
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16
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Kawamura Y, Sasaki S, Kusumi T. Cultural similarities and differences in lay theories of altruism: Replication of Carlson and Zaki (2018) in a Japanese sample. ASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1111/ajsp.12502] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Yuta Kawamura
- Department of Sustainable System Sciences Osaka Prefecture University Osaka Japan
| | - Shusaku Sasaki
- Faculty of Economics Tohoku Gakuin University Sendai Japan
| | - Takashi Kusumi
- Graduate School of Education Kyoto University Kyoto Japan
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17
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Frackowiak M, Hilpert P, Russell PS. Partner's perception of phubbing is more relevant than the behavior itself: A daily diary study. COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.chb.2022.107323] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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18
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How morality signals, benefits, binds, and teaches. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104313] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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19
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Response time modelling reveals evidence for multiple, distinct sources of moral decision caution. Cognition 2022; 223:105026. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/10/2021] [Revised: 01/12/2022] [Accepted: 01/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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20
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Redhead D, Power EA. Social hierarchies and social networks in humans. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2022; 377:20200440. [PMID: 35000451 PMCID: PMC8743884 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0440] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/04/2021] [Accepted: 08/04/2021] [Indexed: 01/06/2023] Open
Abstract
Across species, social hierarchies are often governed by dominance relations. In humans, where there are multiple culturally valued axes of distinction, social hierarchies can take a variety of forms and need not rest on dominance relations. Consequently, humans navigate multiple domains of status, i.e. relative standing. Importantly, while these hierarchies may be constructed from dyadic interactions, they are often more fundamentally guided by subjective peer evaluations and group perceptions. Researchers have typically focused on the distinct elements that shape individuals' relative standing, with some emphasizing individual-level attributes and others outlining emergent macro-level structural outcomes. Here, we synthesize work across the social sciences to suggest that the dynamic interplay between individual-level and meso-level properties of the social networks in which individuals are embedded are crucial for understanding the diverse processes of status differentiation across groups. More specifically, we observe that humans not only navigate multiple social hierarchies at any given time but also simultaneously operate within multiple, overlapping social networks. There are important dynamic feedbacks between social hierarchies and the characteristics of social networks, as the types of social relationships, their structural properties, and the relative position of individuals within them both influence and are influenced by status differentiation. This article is part of the theme issue 'The centennial of the pecking order: current state and future prospects for the study of dominance hierarchies'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel Redhead
- Department of Human Behaviour, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
| | - Eleanor A. Power
- Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK
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21
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Basu S. Framing an altruistic action in periodic (versus aggregate) terms reduces people's moral evaluation of the act and the actor. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104205] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
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Robbins P, Alvear F, Litton P. Good deeds and hard knocks: The effect of past suffering on praise for moral behavior. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104216] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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Earp BD, McLoughlin KL, Monrad JT, Clark MS, Crockett MJ. How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments. Nat Commun 2021; 12:5776. [PMID: 34599174 PMCID: PMC8486868 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-021-26067-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/10/2020] [Accepted: 09/10/2021] [Indexed: 02/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and the nature of their relationship. But how, when, and why social relationships shape moral judgments is not well understood. We provide evidence to address these questions, measuring cooperative expectations and moral wrongness judgments in the context of common social relationships such as romantic partners, housemates, and siblings. In a pre-registered study of 423 U.S. participants nationally representative for age, race, and gender, we show that people normatively expect different relationships to serve cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, reciprocity, and mating to varying degrees. In a second pre-registered study of 1,320 U.S. participants, these relationship-specific cooperative expectations (i.e., relational norms) enable highly precise out-of-sample predictions about the perceived moral wrongness of actions in the context of particular relationships. In this work, we show that this 'relational norms' model better predicts patterns of moral wrongness judgments across relationships than alternative models based on genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence, demonstrating how the perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on the relational context in which those actions occur.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brian D Earp
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
| | | | - Joshua T Monrad
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
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Raihani NJ, Power EA. No good deed goes unpunished: the social costs of prosocial behaviour. EVOLUTIONARY HUMAN SCIENCES 2021; 3:e40. [PMID: 37588551 PMCID: PMC10427331 DOI: 10.1017/ehs.2021.35] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Performing costly helpful behaviours can allow individuals to improve their reputation. Those who gain a good reputation are often preferred as interaction partners and are consequently better able to access support through cooperative relationships with others. However, investing in prosocial displays can sometimes yield social costs: excessively generous individuals risk losing their good reputation, and even being vilified, ostracised or antisocially punished. As a consequence, people frequently try to downplay their prosocial actions or hide them from others. In this review, we explore when and why investments in prosocial behaviour are likely to yield social costs. We propose two key features of interactions that make it more likely that generous individuals will incur social costs when: (a) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; and (b) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them. We describe how the cognition required to consider ulterior motives emerges over development and how these tendencies vary across cultures - and discuss how the potential for helpful actions to result in social costs might place boundaries on prosocial behaviour as well as limiting the contexts in which it might occur. We end by outlining the key avenues and priorities for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nichola J Raihani
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
| | - Eleanor A Power
- Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
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Moralizing mental states: The role of trait self-control and control perceptions. Cognition 2021; 214:104662. [PMID: 34098305 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104662] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2020] [Revised: 03/08/2021] [Accepted: 03/08/2021] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Which attributes of a person contribute to their tendency to moralize others' thoughts? Adopting an individual-difference approach to moral cognition, eight studies (N = 2,033) investigated how people's ability for self-control shapes their moral reactions to others' mental states. Specifically, Studies 1a-2b found positive predictive effects of trait self-control (TSC) on the moralization (e.g., blaming) of another person's fantasies about different immoral behaviors. While ruling out alternative explanations, they furthermore supported the mediating role of ascribing targets control over their mental states. Studies 3a-3b provided correlational evidence of the perceived ability to control one's own mental states as a mechanism in the relationship between TSC and ascriptions of control to others. Studies 4a-4b followed a causal-chain experimental approach: A manipulation of participants' self-perceived ability to control their emotions impacted their control ascriptions to others over their immoral mental states (Study 4a), and targets perceived as high (vs. low) in control over their immoral mental states elicited stronger moralizing reactions. Taken together, the present studies elucidate why people moralize others' purely mental states, even in the absence of overt behavior. More broadly, they advance our knowledge about the role of individual differences, particularly in self-control, in moral cognition.
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Ziv T, Whiteman JD, Sommerville JA. Toddlers' interventions toward fair and unfair individuals. Cognition 2021; 214:104781. [PMID: 34051419 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104781] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/04/2020] [Revised: 05/11/2021] [Accepted: 05/12/2021] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
Cooperative societies rely on reward and punishment for norm enforcement. We examined the developmental origin of these interventions in the context of distributive fairness: past research has shown that infants expect resources to be distributed fairly, prefer to interact with fair distributors, and evaluate others based on their fair and unfair resource allocations. In order to determine whether infants would intervene in third-party resource distributions by use of reward and punishment we developed a novel task. Sixteen-month-old infants were taught that one side of a touch screen produces reward (vocal statements expressing praise; giving a cookie), whereas the other side produces punishment when touched (vocal statements expressing admonishment; taking away a cookie). After watching videos in which one actor distributed resources fairly and another actor distributed resources unfairly, participants' screen touches on the reward and punishment panels while the fair and unfair distributors appeared on screen were recorded. Infants touched the reward side significantly more than the punishment side when presented with the fair distributor but touched the screen sides equally when the unfair distributor was shown. Control experiments revealed no evidence of reward or punishment when infants saw food items they liked and disliked, or individuals uninvolved in the resource distribution events. These results provide the earliest evidence that infants are able to spontaneously intervene in socio-moral situations by rewarding positive actions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Talee Ziv
- Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, United States of America; Martin-Springer Center for Conflict Studies, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva 84015, Israel.
| | - Jesse D Whiteman
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3, Canada.
| | - Jessica A Sommerville
- Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, United States of America; Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3, Canada.
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Erlandsson A, Wingren M, Andersson PA. Type and amount of help as predictors for impression of helpers. PLoS One 2020; 15:e0243808. [PMID: 33306708 PMCID: PMC7732071 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0243808] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2020] [Accepted: 11/26/2020] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Impression of helpers can vary as a function of the magnitude of helping (amount of help) and of situational and motivational aspects (type of help). Over three studies conducted in Sweden and the US, we manipulated both the amount and the type of help in ten diverse vignettes and measured participants' impressions of the described helpers. Impressions were almost unaffected when increasing the amount of help by 500%, but clearly affected by several type of help-manipulations. Particularly, helpers were less positively evaluated if they had mixed motives for helping, did not experience intense emotions or empathy, or if helping involved no personal sacrifice. In line with the person-centered theory of moral judgment, people seem to form impressions of helpers primarily based on the presumed underlying processes and motives of prosociality rather than its consequences.
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Affiliation(s)
- Arvid Erlandsson
- Department of Behavioral Sciences and Learning, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
| | - Mattias Wingren
- Department of Behavioral Sciences and Learning, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
| | - Per A. Andersson
- Department of Behavioral Sciences and Learning, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
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