Functioning of the International Health Regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic

A closer look at the international health regulations capacities in Lebanon: a mixed method study

BACKGROUND

Lebanon ratified the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) in 2007, and since then, it has been facing complex political deadlocks, financial deterioration, and infectious disease emergencies. We aimed to understand the IHR capacities' scores of Lebanon in comparison to other countries, the IHR milestones and activities in Lebanon, the challenges of maintaining the IHR capacities, the refugee crisis's impact on the development of these capacities; and the possible recommendations to support the IHR performance in Lebanon.

METHODS

We used a mixed-method design. The study combined the use of secondary data analysis of the 2020 State Party Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) submissions and qualitative design using semi-structured interviews with key informants. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine key informants. The analysis of the data generated was based on inductive thematic analysis.

RESULTS

According to SPAR, Lebanon had levels of 4 out of 5 (≤ 80%) in 2020 in the prevention, detection, response, enabling functions, and operational readiness capacities, pertaining that the country was functionally capable of dealing with various events at the national and subnational levels. Lebanon scored more than its neighboring countries, Syria, and Jordan, which have similar contexts of economic crises, emergencies, and refugee waves. Despite this high level of commitment to meeting IHR capacities, the qualitative findings demonstrated several gaps in IHR performance as resource shortage, governance, and political challenges. The study also showed contradictory results regarding the impact of refugees on IHR capacities. Some key informants agreed that the Syrian crisis had a positive impact, while others suggested the opposite. Whether refugees interfere with IHR development is still an area that needs further investigation.

CONCLUSION

The study shows that urgent interventions are needed to strengthen the implementation of the IHR capacities in Lebanon. The study recommends 1) reconsidering the weight given to IHR capacities; 2) promoting governance to strengthen IHR compliance; 3) strengthening the multisectoral coordination mechanisms; 4) reinforcing risk communication strategies constantly; 5) mobilizing and advancing human resources at the central and sub-national levels; 6) ensuring sustainable financing; 7) integrating refugees and displaced persons in IHR framework and its assessment tools; 8) acknowledging risk mapping as a pre-requisite to a successful response; and 9) strengthening research on IHR capacities in Lebanon.

HIV/AIDS, SARS, and COVID-19: the trajectory of China's pandemic responses and its changing politics in a contested world

The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the contested politics of global health governance, though we still don't know enough about the dynamics of domestic pandemic responses, or about the relationship between the politics of those responses and the politics of global health governance, both of which have changed significantly in recent decades. Focusing on three cases (HIV/AIDS, SARS, and COVID-19) of cross-border infectious diseases, this article explores the trajectory of China's pandemic responses in the context of globalization. Attending to changing politics at domestic, international, and global levels, I argue that those responses have been a complex combination of China's domestic politics (e.g., priorities, institutions, leadership, and timing), its international relations (especially with the US), and its engagements with global health governance. It is concluded that the increasing divergence of pandemic responses in a time of ubiquitous global health crisis demands urgent attention to the connections (including contestations) between domestic pandemic responses and the evolvement of global health governance from a broader perspective that considers changes in geopolitics.

Assessment of the Implementation of the International Health Regulations during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Portugal as a Case Study

INTRODUCTION

The International Health Regulations (IHR) were developed to prepare countries to deal with public health emergencies. The spread of SARS-CoV-2 underlined the need for international coordination, although few attempts were made to evaluate the integrated implementation of the IHR's core capacities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of this study was to evaluate whether IHR shortcomings stem from non-compliance or regulatory issues, using Portugal as a European case study due to its size, organization, and previous discrepancies between self-reporting and peer assessment of the IHR's core capacities.

METHODS

Fifteen public health medical residents involved in contact tracing in mainland Portugal interpreted the effectiveness of the IHR's core capabilities by reviewing the publicly available evidence and reflecting on their own field experience, then grading each core capability according to the IHR Monitoring Framework. The assessment of IHR enforcement considered efforts made before and after the onset of the pandemic, covering the period up to July 2021.

RESULTS

Four out of nine core IHR capacities (surveillance; response; risk communication; and human resource capacity) were classified as level 1, the lowest. Only two were graded level 3 (preparedness; and laboratory), the highest. The remaining three) (national legislation, policy & financing; coordination and national focal point communication; and points of entry) were classified as level 2.

CONCLUSION

Portugal exemplifies the extent to which implementation of the IHR was not fully achieved, which has resulted in the underperformance of several core capacities. There is a need to improve preparedness and international cooperation in order to harmonize and strengthen the global response to public health emergencies, with better political, institutional, and financial support.

Progress and experiences of implementing an integrated disease surveillance and response system in Somalia; 2016-2023

Introduction

In 2021, a regional strategy for integrated disease surveillance was adopted by member states of the World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Region. But before then, member states including Somalia had made progress in integration of their disease surveillance systems. We report on the progress and experiences of implementing an integrated disease surveillance and response system in Somalia between 2016 and 2023.

Methods

We reviewed 20 operational documents and identified key integrated disease surveillance and response system (IDSRS) actions/processes implemented between 2016 and 2023. We verified these through an anonymized online survey. The survey respondents also assessed Somalia's IDSRS implementation progress using a standard IDS monitoring framework Finally, we interviewed 8 key informants to explore factors to which the current IDSRS implementation progress is attributed.

Results

Between 2016 and 2023, 7 key IDSRS actions/processes were implemented including: establishment of high-level commitment; development of a 3-year operational plan; development of a coordination mechanism; configuring the District Health Information Software to support implementation among others. IDSRS implementation progress ranged from 15% for financing to 78% for tools. Reasons for the progress were summarized under 6 thematic areas; understanding frustrations with the current surveillance system; the opportunity occasioned by COVID-19; mainstreaming IDSRS in strategic documents; establishment of an oversight mechanism; staggering implementation of key activities over a reasonable length of time and being flexible about pre-determined timelines.

Discussion

From 2016 to 2023, Somalia registered significant progress towards implementation of IDSRS. The 15 years of EWARN implementation in Somalia (since 2008) provided a strong foundation for IDSRS implementation. If implemented comprehensively, IDSRS will accelerate country progress toward establishment of IHR core capacities. Sustainable funding is the major challenge towards IDSRS implementation in Somalia. Government and its partners need to exploit feasible options for sustainable investment in integrated disease surveillance and response.

Infectious disease control: from health security strengthening to health systems improvement at global level

Since the twenty first century, the outbreaks of global infectious diseases have caused several public health emergencies of international concern, imposing an enormous impact on population health, the economy, and social development. The COVID-19 pandemic has once again exposed deficiencies in existing global health systems, emergency management, and disease surveillance, and highlighted the importance of developing effective evaluation tools. This article outlines current challenges emerging from infectious disease control from the perspective of global health, elucidated through influenza, malaria, tuberculosis, and neglected tropical diseases. The discordance among government actors and absent data sharing platforms or tools has led to unfulfilled targets in health system resilience and a capacity gap in infectious disease response. The current situation calls for urgent action to tackle these threats of global infectious diseases with joined forces through more in-depth international cooperation and breaking governance barriers from the purview of global health. Overall, a systematic redesign should be considered to enhance the resilience of health systems, which warrants a great need to sustain capacity-building efforts in emergency preparedness and response and raises an emerging concern of data integration in the concept of One Health that aims to address shared health threats at the human-animal-environment interface.

[Qualitative analysis of health preparedness policies in ChileUma análise qualitativa das políticas de preparação na área de saúde no Chile]

Objective

Analyze health preparedness policies in Chile and identify their strengths and weaknesses. No other studies to date provide an analysis of the country's preparedness policies.

Methods

A desk review and semi-structured interviews with experts in emergency preparedness and response were conducted to identify the regulatory framework, key actors, and the strengths and weaknesses of health preparedness policies.

Results

The researchers identified 103 standards and interviewed seven preparedness experts. The reviewed standards and interviews show that Chile is in a transitional phase between the old National Civil Protection System and the new National Disaster Prevention and Response System. Only three standards were directly related to health, but the preparedness regulations provide for a multidisciplinary set of actors to address any threat. The experts gave a positive assessment of the Chilean system, although they agreed that certain weaknesses must be corrected. The country's main strength is its disaster response experience, along with its coordination mechanisms. The main shortcomings include risk communication, mitigation, preparedness and assessment, and human resources.

Conclusions

Chile has a solid regulatory framework with an all-hazards approach and a set of multisectoral institutions. The new National Disaster Prevention and Response System must build on its strengths to correct the weaknesses that limit its emergency preparedness and response capacity.

Public health emergency operations center operations and coordination among Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Malaysia during the COVID-19 pandemic

Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) are the critical units to lead communications, information sharing, and resource mobilisation during national and international health emergencies, and are key components for maintaining global health security. This assessment sought to examine the coordination mechanisms between national and sub-national PHEOCs in Thailand, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Malaysia (TCLM countries) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Information was collected on PHEOC structures, functions, and cross-border communications in three stages: a literature review of national PHEOC and emergency preparedness capacities; questionnaire responses from stakeholders to describe PHEOC activity at the national level; and meetings with emergency response staff in five border provinces of Thailand to assess communications between sub-national PHEOCs across country borders. The findings showed that each of the countries has demonstrated a commitment to strengthening their national PHEOCs and improving cross-border communication in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Strong existing relationships between TCLM countries assisted in activating a coordinated pandemic response, but gaps remain in efficient data sharing, workforce capacity, and the utilisation of consistent communication platforms among countries. Lessons learned from the pandemic can be used to further strengthen countries' preparedness for future health emergencies, in line with International Health Regulations (2005) and regional plans to build health security in the Southeast Asia region. This assessment provides TCLM countries with the opportunity to address weaknesses in national and international PHEOC capacities. It may be used alongside existing guidelines to prepare the region for a stronger response to future global and regional health emergencies.

Construction of public health core competence and the improvement of its legal guarantee in China

Public health core capacity, first established by the 58th United Nations General Assembly in 2003 and recognized by the World Health Organization when "the International Health Regulations" were revised, refers to the basic and necessary capacity to allocate human, financial, and material resources for the prevention and control of public health events that a country or region should have. It includes national and regional levels, and its constituent elements and their basic requirements differ, but public health core capacity building at both national and regional levels requires certain legal safeguards. At present, there are still some problems, including the imperfect legal system, conflicting legal norms, the non-sufficient supply of local legislation, and the weak operability of legislation in the legal guarantee of public health core capacity building in China. China should make improvements in terms of comprehensive cleaning of existing public health laws, strengthening their post-legislative evaluation, adopting parcel legislation, strengthening legislation in key areas of public health, and promoting the supply of local legislation. The goal is to provide a perfect and comprehensive legal system to guarantee the construction of China's core capacity in public health.

The effect of COVID-19 on public confidence in the World Health Organization: a natural experiment among 40 countries

Background

At a time when a highly contagious pandemic and global political and economic turmoil are intertwined, worldwide cooperation under the leadership of an international organization has become increasingly important. This study aimed to estimate the effect of COVID-19 on public confidence in the World Health Organization (WHO), which will serve as a reference for other international organizations regarding the maintenance of their credibility in crisis management and ability to play a greater role in global health governance.

Methods

We obtained individual data from the World Values Survey (WVS). A total of 44,775 participants aged 16 and older from 40 countries in six WHO regions were included in this study. The COVID-19 pandemic was used as a natural experiment. We obtained difference-in-differences (DID) estimates of the pandemic’s effects by exploiting temporal variation in the timing of COVID-19 exposure across participants interviewed from 2017 to 2020 together with the geographical variation in COVID-19 severity at the country level. Public confidence in the WHO was self-reported by the respondents.

Results

Among the participants, 28,087 (62.73%) reported having confidence in the WHO. The DID estimates showed that the COVID-19 pandemic could significantly decrease the likelihood of people reporting confidence in the WHO after controlling for multiple covariates (adjusted OR 0.54, 95% CI: 0.49–0.61), especially during the global outbreak (0.35, 0.24–0.50). The effect was found in both younger individuals (0.58, 0.51–0.66) and older adults (0.49, 0.38–0.63) and in both males (0.47, 0.40–0.55) and females (0.62, 0.53–0.72), with a vulnerability in males (adjusted P for interaction = 0.008).

Conclusion

Our findings are relevant regarding the impact of COVID-19 on people’s beliefs about social institutions of global standing, highlighting the need for the WHO and other international organizations to shoulder the responsibility of global development for the establishment and maintenance of public credibility in the face of emergencies, as well as the prevention of confidence crises.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12992-022-00872-y.

COVID-19 data reporting systems in Africa reveal insights for future pandemics

Globally, countries have used diverse methods to report data during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using international guidelines and principles of emergency management, we compare national data reporting systems in African countries in order to determine lessons for future pandemics. We analyse COVID-19 reporting practices across 54 African countries through 2020. Reporting systems were diverse and included summaries, press releases, situation reports and online dashboards. These systems were communicated via social media accounts and websites belonging to ministries of health and public health. Data variables from the reports included event detection (cases/deaths/recoveries), risk assessment (demographics/co-morbidities) and response (total tests/hospitalisations). Of countries with reporting systems, 36/53 (67.9%) had recurrent situation reports and/or online dashboards which provided more extensive data. All of these systems reported cases, deaths and recoveries. However, few systems contained risk assessment and response data, with only 5/36 (13.9%) reporting patient co-morbidities and 9/36 (25%) including total hospitalisations. Further evaluation of reporting practices in Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Senegal and South Africa as examples from different sub-regions revealed differences in reporting healthcare capacity and preparedness data. Improving the standardisation and accessibility of national data reporting systems could augment research and decision-making, as well as increase public awareness and transparency for national governments.

Complementarity of International Instruments in the Field of Biosecurity

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the devastating impact of infectious disease outbreaks and the threat of emerging and re-emerging dangerous pathogens, independent of their origin. Natural, accidental, and deliberate disease outbreaks all need systems in place for an effective public health response. The best known international instrument in the field of public health is the WHO International Health Regulations (2005). Although the International Health Regulations are mainly focused on natural disease outbreaks, the actions to take to comply with them also contribute to biosecurity and non-proliferation. This paper examines in case of full implementation of the International Health Regulations, what other actions states should take to comply with international biosecurity instruments, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, to effectively prevent and defend against intentional biological threats. An overview of international instruments from different disciplines regarding biosecurity is presented. Furthermore, this paper clarifies the similarities between the international biosecurity instruments and addresses the additional requirements that instruments stipulate. From a detailed comparison between the instruments it can be concluded that, to adhere to all legally-binding international biosecurity instruments, specific non-proliferation and export control measures are necessary in addition to full implementation of the International Health Regulations. Additionally, an overview of non-legally binding instruments in the field of biosecurity is presented and practical implementation examples are highlighted. Compliance with legally binding instruments can be improved by precise guidance provided by non-legally binding instruments that are clear and attuned to the situation on the ground. To improve understanding of the existing international instruments, this paper aims to provide an overview of the international legal biosecurity framework to biosecurity experts, policymakers, civil servants, and practitioners. It offers possible practical applications for the politico-legal context and accommodates the enhancement of full employment of biosecurity resources for an improved multidisciplinary capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.

Governance for global health: the role of Nordic countries

Purpose

Global health challenges and threats could be confronted by collaborative efforts of international community. Governance for global health is a set of formal and informal processes, operating beyond state boundaries, and refers to institutions and mechanisms established at the national, regional and international levels. Nordic countries demonstrated a long-standing commitment to development assistance for health (DAH), and more recently to governance for global health. Governance for global health tools could be used effectively to achieve collective solutions for the maintenance and promotion of health as a common good, could ensure accountability and transparency, and reconcile the interests of different actors on the international and national levels. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of tools and approaches in support of eight sub-functions of governance for global health applied by the Nordic countries. This will help international audience to compare those mechanisms with similar mechanisms that are available or planned in their countries and regions, and may benefit policy scholars and practitioners.

Design/methodology/approach

This study uses qualitative review of research literature, policy documents and information available from institutional websites related to the governance of global health in four Nordic countries. In total, 50 selected publications were analyzed using framework synthesis, mapping all findings to 8 dimensions (sub-functions) of governance for global health and related tools.

Findings

Review reveals which tools are available, how they have been applied by the Nordic countries and influenced all domains (sub-functions) of governance for global health at different levels: national governments, agencies and networks; bilateral and multilateral partnerships; inter-governmental institutions and international health-related organizations. Common trends and approaches in governance for global health have been formulated.

Originality/value

This study is unique in relation to the prior literature as it looks at the role of Nordic countries in the governance for global health system through the lens of tools applied in support to its sub-functions.