Emergence of self and other in perception and action: An event-control approach

The Relationship Between Social Class and Generalized Trust: The Mediating Role of Sense of Control

The success and well-being theory of trust holds that higher social class is associated with higher generalized trust, and this association has been well documented in empirical research. However, few studies have examined the processes that might explain this link. This study extends this assumption to explore the mediating mechanism in the association. We hypothesized that social class would positively predict generalized trust, and the relationship would be mediated by people's sense of control. Self-report data were collected from 480 adults (160 males, 320 females; ages 18-61) who participated through an online crowdsourcing platform in China. The results of multiple regression and mediation analyses supported the hypothesized model. This research provides further support for the success and well-being theory of trust, and builds on it by identifying greater sense of control as a possible explanation for the link between high social class and generalized trust. Limitations and possible future research are discussed.

Time and time again: a multi-scale hierarchical framework for time-consciousness and timing of cognition

Temporality and the feeling of ‘now’ is a fundamental property of consciousness. Different conceptualizations of time-consciousness have argued that both the content of our experiences and the representations of those experiences evolve in time, or neither have temporal extension, or only content does. Accounting for these different positions, we propose a nested hierarchical model of multiple timescales that accounts for findings on timing of cognition and phenomenology of temporal experience. This framework hierarchically combines the three major philosophical positions on time-consciousness (i.e. cinematic, extensional and retentional) and presents a common basis for temporal experience. We detail the properties of these hierarchical levels and speculate how they could coexist mechanistically. We also place several findings on timing and temporal experience at different levels in this hierarchy and show how they can be brought together. Finally, the framework is used to derive novel predictions for both timing of our experiences and time perception. The theoretical framework offers a novel dynamic space that can bring together sub-fields of cognitive science like perception, attention, action and consciousness research in understanding and describing our experiences both in and of time.

Consciousness Without Content: A Look at Evidence and Prospects

Many traditions in the East have proposed that consciousness without content is possible and could be achieved with mental training. However, it is not clear whether such a state is possible given that intentionality is a critical property of mentality and consciousness in many theories of consciousness. A prominent recent attempt to account for such states of "minimal phenomenal experience" is the ascending reticular arousal system (ARAS) model, which proposes a specific type of non-conceptual representational content to address such a state. Consciousness without content can also be understood by studying related or similar states of minimal phenomenal experience and this paper discusses such findings from such states including dreamless sleep experience and their implications. One way to argue for the need for proposing consciousness without content is to locate a property of consciousness that would necessitate postulating it. A continuous state of consciousness without content may be needed to understand continuity of conscious experience. Finally, I discuss the implications of consciousness without content for current theories of consciousness.

Environmental control and psychosis-relevant traits modulate the prospective sense of agency in non-clinical individuals

The sense of agency concerns the experience of being the source of one's own actions and their consequences. An altered sense of agency can occur due to task automation and in psychosis. We tested in a non-clinical sample the hypothesis that reducing voluntary task control diminishes intentional binding as an implicit indicator of the sense of agency, possibly interacting with psychosis-relevant personality traits. Agent-device interactions were manipulated obtaining positive-control (voluntary interaction), no-control (automation), and negative-control (device-commanded interaction) groups. The main results showed reduced prospective intentional binding (predictive coding of action consequences) in the no-control and negative-control groups, compared to the positive-control group. Psychosis-like experiences covaried positively with intentional binding in the no-control group, but negatively in the negative-control group. Moreover, positive-social traits were associated with increased intentional binding in the positive-control group. These findings demonstrate the interplay between environmental and individual differences variables in establishing the implicit sense of agency.

Human Consciousness: Where Is It From and What Is It for

Consciousness is not a process in the brain but a kind of behavior that, of course, is controlled by the brain like any other behavior. Human consciousness emerges on the interface between three components of animal behavior: communication, play, and the use of tools. These three components interact on the basis of anticipatory behavioral control, which is common for all complex forms of animal life. All three do not exclusively distinguish our close relatives, i.e., primates, but are broadly presented among various species of mammals, birds, and even cephalopods; however, their particular combination in humans is unique. The interaction between communication and play yields symbolic games, most importantly language; the interaction between symbols and tools results in human praxis. Taken together, this gives rise to a mechanism that allows a creature, instead of performing controlling actions overtly, to play forward the corresponding behavioral options in a “second reality” of objectively (by means of tools) grounded symbolic systems. The theory possesses the following properties: (1) It is anti-reductionist and anti-eliminativist, and yet, human consciousness is considered as a purely natural (biological) phenomenon. (2) It avoids epiphenomenalism and indicates in which conditions human consciousness has evolutionary advantages, and in which it may even be disadvantageous. (3) It allows to easily explain the most typical features of consciousness, such as objectivity, seriality and limited resources, the relationship between consciousness and explicit memory, the feeling of conscious agency, etc.

Multi-scale control influences sense of agency: Investigating intentional binding using event-control approach

Control exercised by humans through interactions with the environment is critical for sense of agency. Here, we investigate how control at multiple levels influence implicit sense of agency measured using intentional binding. Participants are asked to hit a moving target using a joystick with noisy control followed by an intentional binding task initiated by the target hitting action. Perceptual-motor level control was manipulated through noise in the joystick controller (experiment 1) and goal-level control in terms of feedback about successful hit (experiments 2a and 2b). In the first experiment, intentional binding increased with amount of joystick control only when goal was not achieved and independent otherwise suggesting that the two levels interact hierarchically. In the second experiment, the estimated duration was dependent on when participants knew about goal completion. The results are similar to those obtained with explicit measures of sense of agency indicating that multi-scale event control influences agency.

Methodological Problems on the Way to Integrative Human Neuroscience

Neuroscience is a multidisciplinary effort to understand the structures and functions of the brain and brain-mind relations. This effort results in an increasing amount of data, generated by sophisticated technologies. However, these data enhance our descriptive knowledge, rather than improve our understanding of brain functions. This is caused by methodological gaps both within and between subdisciplines constituting neuroscience, and the atomistic approach that limits the study of macro- and mesoscopic issues. Whole-brain measurement technologies do not resolve these issues, but rather aggravate them by the complexity problem. The present article is devoted to methodological and epistemic problems that obstruct the development of human neuroscience. We neither discuss ontological questions (e.g., the nature of the mind) nor review data, except when it is necessary to demonstrate a methodological issue. As regards intradisciplinary methodological problems, we concentrate on those within neurobiology (e.g., the gap between electrical and chemical approaches to neurophysiological processes) and psychology (missing theoretical concepts). As regards interdisciplinary problems, we suggest that core disciplines of neuroscience can be integrated using systemic concepts that also entail human-environment relations. We emphasize the necessity of a meta-discussion that should entail a closer cooperation with philosophy as a discipline of systematic reflection. The atomistic reduction should be complemented by the explicit consideration of the embodiedness of the brain and the embeddedness of humans. The discussion is aimed at the development of an explicit methodology of integrative human neuroscience, which will not only link different fields and levels, but also help in understanding clinical phenomena.

Joint Perception of a Shared Object: A Minimalist Perceptual Crossing Experiment

The minimalist perceptual crossing paradigm has emphasized the essential role of interpersonal dynamics on social understanding. Within the particular case of minimalist interaction, it has been argued that interpersonal processes can constitute social cognition, at least partially, which calls for a paradigm shift in social cognition studies. In this paper, we review several perceptual crossing experiments and their theoretical implications, and propose an original experiment to go beyond strictly dyadic interactions. Whereas past experiments have used objects as distracters of dyadic interaction, our experiment aims at integrating objects themselves as the goal of interpersonal coordination. We asked 24 subjects to participate in a minimalist perceptual crossing experiment where they had to decide, based on their on-line interaction in a one-dimensional digital space, which of the objects they perceived was also perceptible by their partner. The main results suggest that the mutual awareness of a shared object (SO) arises from the quality of sensorimotor coordination between the partners. Indeed, the presence of a SO acts as a simultaneous affordance that attracts and structures individual perceptive activities, giving both partners the opportunity to co-construct a shared world where their respective actions make sense. We discuss our results by way of an enactive account of social cognition, taking the joint perception of a SO as a first step to account for joint attention.

Decentering and Related Constructs: A Critical Review and Metacognitive Processes Model

The capacity to shift experiential perspective-from within one's subjective experience onto that experience-is fundamental to being human. Scholars have long theorized that this metacognitive capacity-which we refer to as decentering-may play an important role in mental health. To help illuminate this mental phenomenon and its links to mental health, we critically examine decentering-related constructs and their respective literatures (e.g., self-distanced perspective, cognitive distancing, cognitive defusion). First, we introduce a novel metacognitive processes model of decentering. Specifically, we propose that, to varying degrees, decentering-related constructs reflect a common mental phenomenon subserved by three interrelated metacognitive processes: meta-awareness, disidentification from internal experience, and reduced reactivity to thought content. Second, we examine extant research linking decentering-related constructs and their underlying metacognitive processes to mental health. We conclude by proposing future directions for research that transcends decentering-related constructs in an effort to advance the field's understanding of this facet of human experience and its role in (mal)adaptation.

Interacting hands: the role of attention for the joint Simon effect

Recent research in monkeys and humans has shown that the presence of the hands near an object enhances spatial processing for objects presented near the hand. This study aimed to test the effect of hand position on the joint Simon effect. In Experiment 1, two human co-actors shared a Simon task while placing their response hands either near the objects appearing on the monitor or away from the monitor. Experiment 2 varied each co-actor’s hand position independently. Experiment 3 tested whether enhanced spatial processing for objects presented near the hand is obtained when replacing one of the two co-actors by a non-human event-producing rubber hand. Experiment 1 provided evidence for a Simon effect. Hand position significantly modulated the size of the Simon effect in the joint Simon task showing an increased Simon effect when the hands of both actors were located near the objects on the monitor, than when they were located away from the monitor. Experiment 2 replicated this finding showing an increased Simon effect when the actor’s hand was located near the objects on the monitor, but only when the co-actor also produced action events in spatial reference. A similar hand position effect was observed in Experiment 3 when a non-human rubber hand replaced the human co-actor. These findings suggest that external action events that are produced in spatial reference bias the distribution of attention to the area near the hand. This strengthens the weight of the spatial response codes (referential coding) and hence increases the joint Simon effect.

Naturalizing sense of agency with a hierarchical event-control approach

Unraveling the mechanisms underlying self and agency has been a difficult scientific problem. We argue for an event-control approach for naturalizing the sense of agency by focusing on the role of perception-action regularities present at different hierarchical levels and contributing to the sense of self as an agent. The amount of control at different levels of the control hierarchy determines the sense of agency. The current study investigates this approach in a set of two experiments using a scenario containing multiple agents sharing a common goal where one of the agents is partially controlled by the participant. The participant competed with other agents for achieving the goal and subsequently answered questions on identification (which agent was controlled by the participant), the degree to which they are confident about their identification (sense of identification) and the degree to which the participant believed he/she had control over his/her actions (sense of authorship). Results indicate a hierarchical relationship between goal-level control (higher level) and perceptual-motor control (lower level) for sense of agency. Sense of identification ratings increased with perceptual-motor control when the goal was not completed but did not vary with perceptual-motor control when the goal was completed. Sense of authorship showed a similar interaction effect only in experiment 2 that had only one competing agent unlike the larger number of competing agents in experiment 1. The effect of hierarchical control can also be seen in the misidentification pattern and misidentification was greater with the agent affording greater control. Results from the two studies support the event-control approach in understanding sense of agency as grounded in control. The study also offers a novel paradigm for empirically studying sense of agency and self.

Multiscale Entrainment: A Primer in Prospective Cognition for Educational Researchers

The purpose of this article is to compare traditional, cognitive approaches to studying human interaction to an alternative approach (i.e., multiscale entrainment) that is inspired by recent discoveries in cognitive neuroscience. Specifically, these findings indicate that mimicry, imitation, and behavioral synchrony share a common neurocircuitry that is (a) directly activated during interaction, (b) inherently social, (c) inherently prospective (i.e., anticipatory), and (d) inherently multiscale; it functions at the levels of action, perception, and cognition, simultaneously. In addition to providing a means of conceptually integrating research on mimicry, imitation, and synchrony, the notion of multiscale entrainment is consistent with research practices in the field of conversation analysis as well as recently developed techniques for measuring the multiscale contingencies that emerge between body movements, gestures, and speech acts during real-time interaction. In conclusion, the article examines attempts to measure multiscale entrainment within educational episodes.

The wild ways of conscious will: what we do, how we do it, and why it has meaning

It is becoming increasingly mainstream to claim that conscious will is an illusion. This assertion is based on a host of findings that indicate conscious will does not share an efficient-cause relationship with actions. As an alternative, the present paper will propose that conscious will is not about causing actions, but rather, about constraining action systems toward producing outcomes. In addition, it will be proposed that we generate and sustain multiple outcomes simultaneously because the multi-scale dynamics by which we do so are, themselves, self-sustaining. Finally, it will be proposed that self-sustaining dynamics entail meaning (i.e., conscious content) because they naturally and necessarily constitute embodiments of context.

The many faces of precision (Replies to commentaries on "Whatever next? Neural prediction, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science")

An appreciation of the many roles of “precision-weighting” (upping the gain on select populations of prediction error units) opens the door to better accounts of planning and “offline simulation,” makes suggestive contact with large bodies of work on embodied and situated cognition, and offers new perspectives on the “active brain”. Combined with the complex affordances of language and culture, and operating against the essential backdrop of a variety of more biologically basic ploys and stratagems, the result is a maximally context-sensitive, restless, constantly self-reconfiguring architecture.

Thinking as the control of imagination: a conceptual framework for goal-directed systems

This paper offers a conceptual framework which (re)integrates goal-directed control, motivational processes, and executive functions, and suggests a developmental pathway from situated action to higher level cognition. We first illustrate a basic computational (control-theoretic) model of goal-directed action that makes use of internal modeling. We then show that by adding the problem of selection among multiple action alternatives motivation enters the scene, and that the basic mechanisms of executive functions such as inhibition, the monitoring of progresses, and working memory, are required for this system to work. Further, we elaborate on the idea that the off-line re-enactment of anticipatory mechanisms used for action control gives rise to (embodied) mental simulations, and propose that thinking consists essentially in controlling mental simulations rather than directly controlling behavior and perceptions. We conclude by sketching an evolutionary perspective of this process, proposing that anticipation leveraged cognition, and by highlighting specific predictions of our model.

Wild agency: nested intentionalities in cognitive neuroscience and archaeology

The present paper addresses the tensions between internalist and radical-interactionist approaches to cognitive neuroscience, and the conflicting conclusions these positions lead to as regards the issue of whether archaeological artefacts constitute 'results' or 'components' of cognition. Wild systems theory (WST) and the notion of wild agency are presented as a potential resolution. Specifically, WST conceptualizes organisms (i.e. wild agents) as open, multi-scale self-sustaining systems. It is thus able to address the causal properties of wild systems in a manner that is consistent with radical-interactionist concerns regarding multi-scale contingent interactions. Furthermore, by conceptualizing wild agents as self-sustaining embodiments of the persistent, multi-scale contexts that afforded their emergence and in which they sustain themselves, WST is able to address the semantic properties of wild agents in a way that acknowledges the internalist concerns regarding meaningful (i.e. semantic) internal states (i.e. causal content). In conclusion, WST agrees with radical interactionism and asserts that archaeological artefacts constitute components of cognition. In addition, given its ability to resolve tensions between the internalist and the radical interactionist approaches to cognition, WST is presented as potentially integrative for cognitive science in general.

Moving from cognition to behavior: What the research says

In 1994, R. G. Lord and P. E. Levy proposed a variant of control theory that incorporated human information processing principles. The current article evaluates the empirical evidence for their propositions and updates the theory by considering contemporary research on information processing. Considerable support drawing from diverse literatures was found for propositions concerning the activation of goal-relevant information, the inhibition of goal-irrelevant information, and the consequences of goal completion. These effects were verified by meta-analytic analyses, which also supported the meaningfulness of such effects on the basis of their unstandardized magnitudes. The authors conclude by proposing new directions for this version of control theory by invoking recent theorizing on goal emergence and the importance of velocity and acceleration information for goal striving and by reviewing research in cognitive neuroscience.

Event-related potentials, cognition, and behavior: A biological approach

The prevailing cognitive-psychological accounts of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) assume that ERP components manifest information processing operations leading from stimulus to response. Since this view encounters numerous difficulties already analyzed in previous studies, an alternative view is presented here that regards cortical control of behavior as a repetitive sensorimotor cycle consisting of two phases: (i) feedforward anticipation and (ii) feedback cortical performance. This view allows us to interpret in an integrative manner numerous data obtained from very different domains of ERP studies: from biophysics of ERP waves to their relationship to the processing of language, in which verbal behavior is viewed as likewise controlled by the same two basic control processes: feedforward (hypothesis building) and feedback (hypothesis checking). The proposed approach is intentionally simplified, explaining numerous effects on the basis of few assumptions and relating several levels of analysis: neurophysiology, macroelectrical processes (i.e. ERPs), cognition and behavior. It can, therefore, be regarded as a first approximation to a general theory of ERPs.

Being a self: considerations from functional imaging

Having a self is associated with important advantages for an organism. These advantages have been suggested to include mechanisms supporting elaborate capacities for planning, decision-making, and behavioral control. Acknowledging such functionality offers possibilities for obtaining traction on investigation of neural correlates of self-hood. A method that has potential for investigating some of the brain-based properties of self arising in behavioral contexts varying in requirements for such behavioral guidance and control is functional brain imaging. Data obtained with this method are beginning to converge on a set of brain areas that appear to play a significant role in permitting conscious access to representational content having reference to self as an embodied and independent experiencer and agent. These areas have been identified in a variety of imaging contexts ranging from passive state conditions in which they appear to manifest ongoing activity associated with spontaneous and typically 'self-related' cognition, to tasks targeting explicitly experienced properties of self, to demanding task conditions where activity within them is attenuated in apparent redirection of cognitive resources in the service of task guidance and control. In this paper, these data will be reviewed and a hypothesis presented regarding a significant role for these areas in enabling degrees of self-awareness and participating in the management of such behavioral control.

Differential role of the orbital frontal lobe in emotional versus cognitive perspective-taking

Lesions of the orbital frontal lobe, particularly its medial sectors, are known to cause deficits in empathic ability, whereas the role of this region in theory of mind processing is the subject of some controversy. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging study with healthy participants, emotional perspective-taking was contrasted with cognitive perspective-taking in order to examine the role of the orbital frontal lobe in subcomponents of theory of mind processing. Subjects responded to a series of scenarios presented visually in three conditions: emotional perspective-taking, cognitive perspective-taking and a control condition that required inferential reasoning, but not perspective-taking. Group results demonstrated that the medial orbitofrontal lobe, defined as Brodmann's areas 11 and 25, was preferentially involved in emotional as compared to cognitive perspective-taking. This finding is both consistent with the lesion literature, and resolves the inconsistency of orbital frontal findings in the theory of mind literature.