Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects

New evidence for the sensorimotor mismatch theory of weight perception and the size-weight illusion

The size-weight illusion is a phenomenon where a smaller object is perceived heavier than an equally weighted larger object. The sensorimotor mismatch theory proposed that this illusion occurs because of a mismatch between efferent motor commands and afferent sensory feedback received when lifting large and small objects (i.e., the application of too little and too much lifting force, respectively). This explanation has been undermined by studies demonstrating a separation between the perceived weight of objects and the lifting forces that are applied on them. However, this research suffers from inconsistencies in the choice of lifting force measures reported. Therefore, we examined the contribution of sensorimotor mismatch in the perception of weight in the size-weight illusion and in non-size-weight illusion stimuli and evaluated the use of a lifting force aggregate measure comprising the four most common lifting force measures used in previous research. In doing so, the sensorimotor mismatch theory was mostly supported. In a size-weight illusion experiment, the lifting forces correlated with weight perception and, contrary to some earlier research, did not adapt over time. In a non-size-weight illusion experiment, switches between lifting light and heavy objects resulted in perceiving the weight of these objects differently compared to no switch trials, which mirrored differences in the manner participants applied forces on the objects. Additionally, we reveal that our force aggregate measure can allow for a more sensitive and objective examination of the effects of lifting forces on objects.

Perceptual (roots of) core knowledge

Some core knowledge may be rooted in - or even identical to - well-characterized mechanisms of mid-level visual perception and attention. In the decades since it was first proposed, this possibility has inspired (and has been supported by) several discoveries in both infant cognition and adult perception, but it also faces several challenges. To what degree does What Babies Know reflect how babies see and attend?

Not all core knowledge systems are created equal, and they are subject to revision in both children and adults

Core knowledge systems play an important role in theories of cognitive development. However, recent studies suggest that fundamental principles of the object and agent systems can be revised by adults and preschoolers, when given small amounts of counterevidence. We argue that not all core knowledge systems are created equal, and they may be subject to revision throughout development.

Tracking rivalry with neural rhythms: multivariate SSVEPs reveal perception during binocular rivalry

The contents of awareness can substantially change without any modification to the external world. Such effects are exemplified in binocular rivalry, where a different stimulus is presented to each eye causing instability in perception. This phenomenon has made binocular rivalry a quintessential method for studying consciousness and the necessary neural correlates for awareness. However, to conduct research on binocular rivalry usually requires self-reports of changes in percept, which can produce confounds and exclude states and contexts where self-reports are undesirable or unreliable. Here, we use a novel multivariate spatial filter dubbed 'Rhythmic Entrainment Source Separation' to extract steady state visual evoked potentials from electroencephalography data. We show that this method can be used to quantify the perceptual switch-rate of participants during binocular rivalry and therefore may be valuable in experimental contexts where self-reports are methodologically problematic or impossible, particularly as an adjunct. Our analyses also reveal that 'no-report' conditions may affect the deployment of attention and thereby neural correlates, another important consideration for consciousness research.

Toward a neuroscience of natural behavior

One of the most exciting new developments in systems neuroscience is the progress being made toward neurophysiological experiments that move beyond simplified laboratory settings and address the richness of natural behavior. This is enabled by technological advances such as wireless recording in freely moving animals, automated quantification of behavior, and new methods for analyzing large data sets. Beyond new empirical methods and data, however, there is also a need for new theories and concepts to interpret that data. Such theories need to address the particular challenges of natural behavior, which often differ significantly from the scenarios studied in traditional laboratory settings. Here, we discuss some strategies for developing such novel theories and concepts and some example hypotheses being proposed.

The color of fruits in photographs and still life paintings

Still life paintings comprise a wealth of data on visual perception. Prior work has shown that the color statistics of objects show a marked bias for warm colors. Here, we ask about the relative chromatic contrast of these object-associated colors compared with background colors in still life paintings. We reasoned that, owing to the memory color effect, where the color of familiar objects is perceived more saturated, warm colors will be relatively more saturated than cool colors in still life paintings as compared with photographs. We analyzed color in 108 slides of still life paintings of fruit from the teaching slide collection of the Fogg University Art Museum and 41 color-calibrated photographs of fruit from the McGill data set. The results show that the relatively higher chromatic contrast of warm colors was greater for paintings compared with photographs, consistent with the hypothesis.

Do They Know It's Christmash? Lexical Knowledge Directly Impacts Speech Perception

We recently reported strong, replicable (i.e., replicated) evidence for lexically mediated compensation for coarticulation (LCfC; Luthra et al., 2021), whereby lexical knowledge influences a prelexical process. Critically, evidence for LCfC provides robust support for interactive models of cognition that include top-down feedback and is inconsistent with autonomous models that allow only feedforward processing. McQueen, Jesse, and Mitterer (2023) offer five counter-arguments against our interpretation; we respond to each of those arguments here and conclude that top-down feedback provides the most parsimonious explanation of extant data.

Identifying Consciousness in Other Creatures: Three Initial Steps

Identifying consciousness in other creatures, be they animals or exotic creatures that have yet to be discovered, remains a great scientific challenge. We delineate the first three steps that we think are necessary for identifying consciousness in other creatures. Step 1 is to define the particular kind of consciousness in which one is interested. Step 2 is to identify, in humans, the key differences between the brain processes that are associated with consciousness and the brain processes that are not associated with consciousness. For Step 2, to identify these differences, we focus on passive frame theory. Step 3 concerns how the insights derived from consciousness research on humans (e.g., concerning these differences) can be generalized to other creatures. We discuss the significance of examining how consciousness was fashioned by the process of evolution, a process that could be happenstance and replete with incessant tinkering, yielding adaptations that can be suboptimal and counterintuitive, far different in nature from our efficiently designed robotic systems. We conclude that the more that is understood about the differences between conscious processing and unconscious processing in humans, the easier it will be to identify consciousness in other creatures.

Does culture moderate the encoding and recognition of negative cues? Evidence from an eye-tracking study

Cross-cultural research has elucidated many important differences between people from Western European and East Asian cultural backgrounds regarding how each group encodes and consolidates the contents of complex visual stimuli. While Western European groups typically demonstrate a perceptual bias towards centralised information, East Asian groups favour a perceptual bias towards background information. However, this research has largely focused on the perception of neutral cues and thus questions remain regarding cultural group differences in both the perception and recognition of negative, emotionally significant cues. The present study therefore compared Western European (n = 42) and East Asian (n = 40) participants on a free-viewing task and a subsequent memory task utilising negative and neutral social cues. Attentional deployment to the centralised versus background components of negative and neutral social cues was indexed via eye-tracking, and memory was assessed with a cued-recognition task two days later. While both groups demonstrated an attentional bias towards the centralised components of the neutral cues, only the Western European group demonstrated this bias in the case of the negative cues. There were no significant differences observed between Western European and East Asian groups in terms of memory accuracy, although the Western European group was unexpectedly less sensitive to the centralised components of the negative cues. These findings suggest that culture modulates low-level attentional deployment to negative information, however not higher-level recognition after a temporal interval. This paper is, to our knowledge, the first to concurrently consider the effect of culture on both attentional outcomes and memory for both negative and neutral cues.

Threat Expectation Does Not Improve Perceptual Discrimination despite Causing Heightened Priority Processing in the Frontoparietal Network

Threat cues have been widely shown to elicit increased sensory and attentional neural processing. However, whether this enhanced recruitment leads to measurable behavioral improvements in perception is still in question. Here, we adjudicate between two opposing theories: that threat cues do or do not enhance perceptual sensitivity. We created threat stimuli by pairing one direction of motion in a random dot kinematogram with an aversive sound. While in the MRI scanner, 46 subjects (both men and women) completed a cued (threat/safe/neutral) perceptual decision-making task where they indicated the perceived motion direction of each moving dot stimulus. We found strong evidence that threat cues did not increase perceptual sensitivity compared with safe and neutral cues. This lack of improvement in perceptual decision-making ability occurred despite the threat cue resulting in widespread increases in frontoparietal BOLD activity, as well as increased connectivity between the right insula and the frontoparietal network. These results call into question the intuitive claim that expectation automatically enhances our perception of threat and highlight the role of the frontoparietal network in prioritizing the processing of threat-related environmental cues.

Art perception is affected by negative knowledge about famous and unknown artists

The biographies of some celebrated artists are marked by accounts that paint a far from beautiful portrait. Does this negative-social knowledge influence the aesthetic experience of an artwork? Does an artist's fame protect their paintings from such an influence? We present two preregistered experiments examining the effect of social-emotional biographical knowledge about famous and unknown artists on the reception and perception of their paintings, using aesthetic ratings and neurocognitive measures. In Experiment 1, paintings attributed to artists characterised by negative biographical information were liked less, evoked greater feelings of arousal and were judged lower in terms of quality, than paintings by artists associated with neutral information. No modulation of artist renown was found. Experiment 2 fully replicated these behavioural results and revealed that paintings by artists associated with negative social-emotional knowledge also elicited enhanced early brain activity related to visual perception (P1) and early emotional arousal (early posterior negativity; EPN). Together, the findings suggest that negative knowledge about famous artists can shape not only explicit aesthetic evaluations, but may also penetrate the perception of the artwork itself.

Incompatibility Influences Cursor Placement When Pointing to Images of Cups

OBJECTIVE

As images are used within graphical user interfaces to signify menu selection, it is important to understand how image properties can influence cursor placement online.

BACKGROUND

Objects have multiple dimensions that create potential ambiguity and Stroop-like confusions for the operator if a previously habitual response conflicts with the required response.

METHODS

To examine the impact of compatibility and other contextual factors, 41 participants used a computer Mouse or touch screen to place the cursor upon images of full or empty cups that varied in size, and direction of handle.

RESULTS

Cursor placements took longer using the Mouse than touch screen. Although participants were placing the cursor on images, the size of the cup, whether it was empty or full, and the handle orientation interacted in their effects upon response duration and cursor placement. The effects of cup size reversed for empty cups or those with incompatible handles.

CONCLUSION

Context can influence cursor placement. Perceived spillability influenced precision requirements, and the cup handle can serve as target or a flanking distractor.

APPLICATION

Image content can influence screen hotspots. As performance can change with cup spillability, this bodes well for attempts to detect intent from cursor trajectories.

Heart is deceitful above all things: Threat expectancy induces the illusory perception of increased heartrate

It has been suggested that our perception of the internal milieu, or the body's internal state, is shaped by our beliefs and previous knowledge about the body's expected state, rather than being solely based on actual interoceptive experiences. This study investigated whether heartbeat perception could be illusorily distorted towards prior subjective beliefs, such that threat expectations suffice to induce a misperception of heartbeat frequency. Participants were instructed to focus on their cardiac activity and report their heartbeat, either tapping along to it (Experiment 1) or silently counting (Experiment 2) while ECG was recorded. While completing this task, different cues provided valid predictive information about the intensity of an upcoming cutaneous stimulation (high- vs. low- pain). Results showed that participants expected a heart rate increase over the anticipation of high- vs. low-pain stimuli and that this belief was perceptually instantiated, as suggested by their interoceptive reports. Importantly, the perceived increase was not mirrored by the real heart rate. Perceptual modulations were absent when participants executed the same task but with an exteroceptive stimulus (Experiment 3). The findings reveal, for the first time, an interoceptive illusion of increased heartbeats elicited by threat expectancy and shed new light on interoceptive processes through the lenses of Bayesian predictive processes, providing tantalizing insights into how such illusory phenomena may intersect with the recognition and regulation of people's internal states.

Modal and amodal cognition: an overarching principle in various domains of psychology

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

Perception of interpersonal distance and social distancing before and during COVID-19 pandemic

Since COVID-19 is easily transmitted among people in close physical proximity, the focus of epidemiological policy during the COVID-19 crisis included major restrictions on interpersonal distance. However, the way in which distance restrictions affected spatial perception is unclear. In the current study, we examined interpersonal distance preferences and perceptions at three time points: pre-pandemic, early post-pandemic, and late post-pandemic. The results indicate that following the pandemic outbreak, people perceived others as farther away than they actually were, suggesting that the distance restrictions were associated with an enlargement of perceived interpersonal distance. Interestingly, however, people maintained the same distance from one another as before the outbreak, indicating no change in actual distance behavior due to the risk of infection. These findings suggest that COVID-19 was associated with a change in the way distance is perceived, while in practice, people maintain the same distance as before. In contrast, COVID-related anxiety predicted both a preference for maintaining a greater distance and a bias toward underestimating perceived distance from others. Thus, individuals who were highly fearful of COVID-19 perceived other people to be closer than they actually were and preferred to maintain a larger distance from them. The results suggest that subjective risk can lead to an increased perception of danger and a subsequent change in behavior. Taken together, even when behaviors should logically change, the decision-making process can be based on distorted perceptions. This insight may be used to predict public compliance.

Using deep neural networks to disentangle visual and semantic information in human perception and memory

Mental representations of familiar categories are composed of visual and semantic information. Disentangling the contributions of visual and semantic information in humans is challenging because they are intermixed in mental representations. Deep neural networks that are trained either on images or on text or by pairing images and text enable us now to disentangle human mental representations into their visual, visual-semantic and semantic components. Here we used these deep neural networks to uncover the content of human mental representations of familiar faces and objects when they are viewed or recalled from memory. The results show a larger visual than semantic contribution when images are viewed and a reversed pattern when they are recalled. We further reveal a previously unknown unique contribution of an integrated visual-semantic representation in both perception and memory. We propose a new framework in which visual and semantic information contribute independently and interactively to mental representations in perception and memory.

Synthetic surprise as the foundation of the psychedelic experience

Psychedelic agents, such as LSD and psilocybin, induce marked alterations in consciousness via activation of the 5-HT2A receptor (5-HT2ARs). We hypothesize that psychedelics enforce a state of synthetic surprise through the biased activation of the 5-HTRs system. This idea is informed by recent insights into the role of 5-HT in signaling surprise. The effects on consciousness, explained by the cognitive penetrability of perception, can be described within the predictive coding framework where surprise corresponds to prediction error, the mismatch between predictions and actual sensory input. Crucially, the precision afforded to the prediction error determines its effect on priors, enabling a dynamic interaction between top-down expectations and incoming sensory data. By integrating recent findings on predictive coding circuitry and 5-HT2ARs transcriptomic data, we propose a biological implementation with emphasis on the role of inhibitory interneurons. Implications arise for the clinical use of psychedelics, which may rely primarily on their inherent capacity to induce surprise in order to disrupt maladaptive patterns.

Holistic processing is modulated by the probability that parts contain task-congruent information

Holistic processing of face and non-face stimuli has been framed as a perceptual strategy, with classic hallmarks of holistic processing, such as the composite effect, reflecting a failure of selective attention, which is a consequence of this strategy. Further, evidence that holistic processing is impacted by training different patterns of attentional prioritization suggest that it may be a result of learned attention to the whole, which renders it difficult to attend to only part of a stimulus. If so, holistic processing should be modulated by the same factors that shape attentional selection, such as the probability that distracting or task-relevant information will be present. In contrast, other accounts suggest that it is the match to an internal face template that triggers specialized holistic processing mechanisms. Here we probed these accounts by manipulating the probability, across different testing sessions, that the task-irrelevant face part in the composite face task will contain task-congruent or -incongruent information. Attentional accounts of holistic processing predict that when the probability that the task-irrelevant part contains congruent information is low (25%), holistic processing should be attenuated compared to when this probability is high (75%). In contrast, template-based accounts of holistic face processing predict that it will be unaffected by manipulation given the integrity of the faces remains intact. Experiment 1 found evidence consistent with attentional accounts of holistic face processing and Experiment 2 extends these findings to holistic processing of non-face stimuli. These findings are broadly consistent with learned attention accounts of holistic processing.

The Relative Contribution of Facial and Body Information to the Perception of Cuteness

Faces and bodies both provide cues to age and cuteness, but little work has explored their interaction in cuteness perception. This study examines the interplay of facial and bodily cues in the perception of cuteness, particularly when these cues convey conflicting age information. Participants rated the cuteness of face-body composites that combined either a child or adult face with an age-congruent or incongruent body alongside manipulations of the head-to-body height ratio (HBR). The findings from two experiments indicated that child-like facial features enhanced the perceived cuteness of adult bodies, while child-like bodily features generally had negative impacts. Furthermore, the results showed that an increased head size significantly boosted the perceived cuteness for child faces more than for adult faces. Lastly, the influence of the HBR was more pronounced when the outline of a body's silhouette was the only available information compared to when detailed facial and bodily features were presented. This study suggests that body proportion information, derived from the body's outline, and facial and bodily features, derived from the interior surface, are integrated to form a unitary representation of a whole person in cuteness perception. Our findings highlight the dominance of facial features over bodily information in cuteness perception, with facial attributes serving as key references for evaluating face-body relationships and body proportions. This research offers significant insights into social cognition and character design, particularly in how people perceive entities with mixed features of different social categories, underlining the importance of congruency in perceptual elements.

Serial Dependence in Perception

Much evidence has shown that perception is biased towards previously presented similar stimuli, an effect recently termed serial dependence. Serial dependence affects nearly every aspect of perception, often causing gross perceptual distortions, especially for weak and ambiguous stimuli. Despite unwanted side-effects, empirical evidence and Bayesian modeling show that serial dependence acts to improve efficiency and is generally beneficial to the system. Consistent with models of predictive coding, the Bayesian priors of serial dependence are generated at high levels of cortical analysis, incorporating much perceptual experience, but feed back to lower sensory areas. These feedback loops may drive oscillations in the alpha range, linked strongly with serial dependence. The discovery of top-down predictive perceptual processes is not new, but the new, more quantitative approach characterizing serial dependence promises to lead to a deeper understanding of predictive perceptual processes and their underlying neural mechanisms.

The role of memory color in visual attention

The expected color of an object influences how it is perceived. For example, a banana in a greyscale photo may appear slightly yellow because bananas are expected to be yellow. This phenomenon is known as the memory color effect (MCE), and the objects with a memory color are called "color-diagnostic." The MCE is theorized to be a top-down influence of color knowledge on visual perception. However, its validity has been questioned because most evidence for the MCE is based on subjective reports. Here a change detection task is used as an objective measure of the effect and the results show that change detection differs for color-diagnostic objects. Specifically, it was predicted and found that unnaturally colored color-diagnostic objects (e.g., a blue banana) would attract attention and thus be discovered more quickly and accurately. In the experiment, two arrays alternated with the target present in one array and absent in the other while all other objects remained unchanged. Participants had to find the target as quickly and accurately as possible. In the experimental condition, the targets were color-diagnostic objects (e.g., a banana) presented in either their natural (yellow) or an unnatural (blue) color. In the control condition, non-color-diagnostic objects (e.g., a mug) were presented with the same colors as the color-diagnostic objects. Unnaturally colored color-diagnostic objects were found more quickly, which suggests that the MCE is a top-down, preattentive process that can influence a nonsubjective visual perceptual task such as change detection.

Contingent capture by color is sensitive to categorical color perception

Contingent capture (CC) theory postulates that attention can only be captured by top-down matching stimuli. Although the contingent capture of attention is a well-known and thoroughly studied phenomenon, there is still no consensus on the characteristics of the top-down template which guides the search for colors. We tried to replicate the classical contingent capture effect on color (Experiment 1) and then added linguistic processing to this perceptual effect (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, attention was indeed captured by the cues of the same color as the target, while the cues of different colors were successfully ignored. In Experiment 2, the cue color was never identical to the target color but would either belong to the same linguistic category or not (i.e., linguistic matching and linguistic nonmatching cues). In both cases, cues were made to be equally perceptually distant from the target. Although, attention was captured by both cue types, the degree of capture was significantly higher for linguistic matching cues. Our research replicated the classic contingent capture effect but on color, and also demonstrated the effect of color categories in the search task. In short, we demonstrated the effect of color categories in the search task. Results show that the template for color search contains physical characteristics of color, as well as information about color category names.

Contra assertions, feedback improves word recognition: How feedback and lateral inhibition sharpen signals over noise

Whether top-down feedback modulates perception has deep implications for cognitive theories. Debate has been vigorous in the domain of spoken word recognition, where competing computational models and agreement on at least one diagnostic experimental paradigm suggest that the debate may eventually be resolvable. Norris and Cutler (2021) revisit arguments against lexical feedback in spoken word recognition models. They also incorrectly claim that recent computational demonstrations that feedback promotes accuracy and speed under noise (Magnuson et al., 2018) were due to the use of the Luce choice rule rather than adding noise to inputs (noise was in fact added directly to inputs). They also claim that feedback cannot improve word recognition because feedback cannot distinguish signal from noise. We have two goals in this paper. First, we correct the record about the simulations of Magnuson et al. (2018). Second, we explain how interactive activation models selectively sharpen signals via joint effects of feedback and lateral inhibition that boost lexically-coherent sublexical patterns over noise. We also review a growing body of behavioral and neural results consistent with feedback and inconsistent with autonomous (non-feedback) architectures, and conclude that parsimony supports feedback. We close by discussing the potential for synergy between autonomous and interactive approaches.

Social norms shape visual appearance: Taking a closer look at the link between social norm learning and perceptual decision-making

One of the most fundamental questions in social psychology is whether norms can change individuals' minds by shaping the visual appearance of stimuli. This question was first raised by Muzafer Sherif (1935). Drawing on the extended social reinforcement account (Germar and Mojzisch, 2019), we aimed to provide a rigorous test of the hypothesis that norm learning leads to a persistent perceptual bias and, hence, to a change in the visual appearance of stimuli. From a methodological perspective, we used both a diffusion model approach and the method of adjustment, a well-established technique from psychophysics and vision research. The results of Experiments 1-3 show that norm effects on perceptual decision-making are robustly replicable, and are due to genuine social influence, that is, they cannot be explained by non-social priming, contingency learning effects (Experiments 1 and 2) or anchoring effects (Experiment 3). Most importantly, by using a psychophysical approach, Experiment 4 shows, for the first time, that social norm learning alters individuals' point of subjective equality and, hence, the visual appearance of stimuli.

Seeing far: Abstract construal and visual distance judgments

construal underlies mental travel. As a result, the human mind associates abstraction and psychological distance, whereby prompting abstract construal begets the inference of psychological distance - in time, social distance, hypotheticality, and physical space. That final distance is the only dimension that can be appraised visually, so would abstract construal impact judgments related to perceived visual distance? Two experiments provide evidence that abstract construal causes targets in the visual field to be judged as physically farther away. Further, the exacerbated sense of distance gives rise to related inferences about those visual targets (size and weight). These results deepen and broaden Construal Level Theory with practical implications for how people reason about the physical properties of objects - including but not limited to their physical distance.

Relational visual representations underlie human social interaction recognition

Humans effortlessly recognize social interactions from visual input. Attempts to model this ability have typically relied on generative inverse planning models, which make predictions by inverting a generative model of agents' interactions based on their inferred goals, suggesting humans use a similar process of mental inference to recognize interactions. However, growing behavioral and neuroscience evidence suggests that recognizing social interactions is a visual process, separate from complex mental state inference. Yet despite their success in other domains, visual neural network models have been unable to reproduce human-like interaction recognition. We hypothesize that humans rely on relational visual information in particular, and develop a relational, graph neural network model, SocialGNN. Unlike prior models, SocialGNN accurately predicts human interaction judgments across both animated and natural videos. These results suggest that humans can make complex social interaction judgments without an explicit model of the social and physical world, and that structured, relational visual representations are key to this behavior.

Mass distribution and shape influence the perceived weight of objects

Research suggests that the rotational dynamics of an object underpins our perception of its weight. We examine the generalisability of that account using a more ecologically valid way of manipulating an object's mass distribution (mass concentrated either at the top, bottom, centre, near the edges or evenly distributed throughout the object), shape (cube or sphere), and lifting approach (lifting directly by the hand or indirectly using a handle or string). The results were in line with our predictions. An interaction effect was found where the mass distribution and lifting approach both associated with the lowest rotational dynamics made the stimulus appear lighter compared to other combinations. These findings demonstrate rotational dynamic effects in a more run-of-the-mill experience of weight perception than what has been demonstrated before using cumbersome stimuli.

Visual event boundaries restrict anchoring effects in decision-making

Research on higher-level thought has revealed many principles of reasoning and decision-making but has rarely made contact with how we perceive the world in the first place. Here we show how a lower-level property of perception-the spontaneous and task-irrelevant segmentation of continuous visual stimulation into discrete events-can restrict one of the most notorious biases in decision-making: numerical anchoring. Subjects walked down a long room in an immersive three dimensional (3D) animation and then made a numerical judgment (e.g., of how much a suitcase is worth, or of how many hours of community service a minor crime deserved). Critically, some subjects passed through a doorway (a visual event boundary) during their virtual walk, while others did not-equating time, distance traveled, and visual complexity. The anchoring manipulation was especially innocuous, not appearing to be part of the experiment at all. Before the online trial began, subjects reported the two-digit numerical value from a visually distorted "CAPTCHA" ("to verify that you are human")-where this task-irrelevant anchor was either low (e.g., 29) or high (e.g., 92). With no doorway, we observed reliable anchoring effects: Higher CAPTCHA values produced higher estimates. With the doorway, however, such effects were attenuated or even eliminated. This generalized across tasks involving item valuations, factual questions, and legal judgments and in tests of both incidental and explicit anchoring. This demonstrates how spontaneous visual event segmentation can have profound consequences for higher-level thought.

Predictive extrapolation effects can have a greater impact on visual decisions, while visual adaptation has a greater impact on conscious visual experience

Human vision is shaped by historic and by predictive processes. The lingering impact of visual adaptation, for instance, can act to exaggerate differences between past and present inputs, whereas predictive processes can promote extrapolation effects that allow us to anticipate the near future. It is unclear to what extent either of these effects manifest in changes to conscious visual experience. It is also unclear how these influences combine, when acting in concert or opposition. We had people make decisions about the sizes of inputs, and report on levels of decisional confidence. Tests were either selectively subject to size adaptation, to an extrapolation effect, or to both of these effects. When these two effects were placed in opposition, extrapolation had a greater impact on decision making. However, our data suggest the influence of extrapolation is primarily decisional, whereas size adaptation more fully manifests in changes to conscious visual awareness.

Dissociable Neural Mechanisms Underlie the Effects of Attention on Visual Appearance and Response Bias

A prominent theoretical framework spanning philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience holds that selective attention penetrates early stages of perceptual processing to alter the subjective visual experience of behaviorally relevant stimuli. For example, searching for a red apple at the grocery store might make the relevant color appear brighter and more saturated compared with seeing the exact same red apple while searching for a yellow banana. In contrast, recent proposals argue that data supporting attention-related changes in appearance reflect decision- and motor-level response biases without concurrent changes in perceptual experience. Here, we tested these accounts by evaluating attentional modulations of EEG responses recorded from male and female human subjects while they compared the perceived contrast of attended and unattended visual stimuli rendered at different levels of physical contrast. We found that attention enhanced the amplitude of the P1 component, an early evoked potential measured over visual cortex. A linking model based on signal detection theory suggests that response gain modulations of the P1 component track attention-induced changes in perceived contrast as measured with behavior. In contrast, attentional cues induced changes in the baseline amplitude of posterior alpha band oscillations (∼9-12 Hz), an effect that best accounts for cue-induced response biases, particularly when no stimuli are presented or when competing stimuli are similar and decisional uncertainty is high. The observation of dissociable neural markers that are linked to changes in subjective appearance and response bias supports a more unified theoretical account and demonstrates an approach to isolate subjective aspects of selective information processing.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Does attention alter visual appearance, or does it simply induce response bias? In the present study, we examined these competing accounts using EEG and linking models based on signal detection theory. We found that response gain modulations of the visually evoked P1 component best accounted for attention-induced changes in visual appearance. In contrast, cue-induced baseline shifts in alpha band activity better explained response biases. Together, these results suggest that attention concurrently impacts visual appearance and response bias, and that these processes can be experimentally isolated.

Multisensory perception constrains the formation of object categories: a review of evidence from sensory-driven and predictive processes on categorical decisions

Although object categorization is a fundamental cognitive ability, it is also a complex process going beyond the perception and organization of sensory stimulation. Here we review existing evidence about how the human brain acquires and organizes multisensory inputs into object representations that may lead to conceptual knowledge in memory. We first focus on evidence for two processes on object perception, multisensory integration of redundant information (e.g. seeing and feeling a shape) and crossmodal, statistical learning of complementary information (e.g. the 'moo' sound of a cow and its visual shape). For both processes, the importance attributed to each sensory input in constructing a multisensory representation of an object depends on the working range of the specific sensory modality, the relative reliability or distinctiveness of the encoded information and top-down predictions. Moreover, apart from sensory-driven influences on perception, the acquisition of featural information across modalities can affect semantic memory and, in turn, influence category decisions. In sum, we argue that both multisensory processes independently constrain the formation of object categories across the lifespan, possibly through early and late integration mechanisms, respectively, to allow us to efficiently achieve the everyday, but remarkable, ability of recognizing objects. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Big number, big body: Jersey numbers alter body size perception

Vision has been shown to be an active process that can be shaped by top-down influences. Here, we add to this area of research by showing a surprising example of how visual perception can be affected by cognition (i.e., cognitive penetration). Observers were presented, on each trial, with a picture of a computer-generated football player and asked to rate the slenderness of the player on an analog scale. The results of two experiments showed that observers perceived athletes wearing small jersey numbers as more slender than those with high numbers. This finding suggests that the cognition of numbers quantitatively alters body size perception. We conjecture that this effect is the result of previously learned associations (i.e., prior expectations) affecting perceptual inference. Such associations are likely the result of implicit learning of the statistical regularities of number and size attributes co-occurrences by the nervous system. We discuss how these results are consistent with previous research on statistical learning and how they fit into the Bayesian framework of perception. The current finding supports the notion of top-down influences of cognition on perception.

Revisiting the effects of configuration, predictability, and relevance on visual detection during interocular suppression

Statistical regularities and predictions can influence the earliest stages of visual processing. Studies examining their effects on detection, however, have yielded inconsistent results. In continuous flash suppression (CFS), where a static image projected to one eye is suppressed by a dynamic image presented to the other, the predictability of the suppressed signal may facilitate or delay detection. To identify the factors that differentiate these outcomes and dissociate the effects of expectation from those of behavioral relevance, we conducted three CFS experiments that addressed confounds related to the use of reaction time measures and complex images. In experiment 1, orientation recognition performance and visibility rates increased when a suppressed line segment completed a partial shape surrounding the CFS patch, demonstrating that valid configuration cues facilitate detection. In Experiment 2, however, predictive cues marginally affected visibility and did not modulate localization performance, challenging existing findings. In experiment 3, a relevance manipulation was introduced; participants pressed a key upon detecting lines of a particular orientation, ignoring the other possible orientation. Visibility and localization were enhanced for relevant orientations. Predictive cues modulated visibility, orientation recognition sensitivity, and response latencies, but not localization-an objective measure sensitive to partial breakthrough. Thus, while a consistent surround can strongly enhance detection during passive observation, predictive cueing primarily affects post-detection factors such as response readiness and recognition confidence. Relevance and predictability did not interact, suggesting that the contributions of these two processes to detection are mostly orthogonal.

Knowing your boundaries: no effect of tool-use on body representation following a gather-and-sort task

Internal representations of the body have received considerable attention in recent years, particularly in the context of tool-use. Results have supported the notion that these representations are plastic and tool-use engenders an extension of the internal representation of the arm. However, the limitations of the literature underlying this tool embodiment process have not been adequately considered or tested. For example, there is some evidence that tool-use effects do not extend beyond simplistic tool-use tasks. To further clarify this issue, 66 participants engaged in a period of tool-augmented reaches in a speeded gather-and-sort task. If task characteristics inherent to simplistic tasks are relevant to putative embodiment effects, it was predicted that there would be no effect of tool-use on tactile distance judgments or forearm bisections. A Bayesian analysis found considerable support for the null hypothesis in both outcome measures, suggesting that some of the evidence for tool embodiment may be based in task characteristics inherent in the narrow range of tool-use tasks used to study them, rather than a tool incorporation process. Potential sources of influence stemming from these characteristics are discussed.

Cursor movements to targets labelled "stop": a kinematic analysis

The label 'Stop' potentially generates conflict-signifying important corrective action, or a warning not to touch. To examine potential conflict between an incongruent label (i.e. STOP) and an imperative command (i.e. MOVE!), 18 participants used a computer mouse to move a crosshair cursor to targets with superimposed labels. Trials systematically varied Imperative (blank or MOVE!), Label (+GO + or STOP) and movement Distance. Kinematic analyses examined response latency, movement duration and accuracy. Incongruent labels had little impact upon response latencies, but they affected cursor deceleration and the variability of cursor placement. Although reading is assumed to be obligatory, the impact of written labels is not immediate, instead affecting cursor deceleration. Indeed, responses to controls labelled STOP were less accurate than those labelled + GO+. As labelled interfaces can create error versus command confusions, enhancing the discriminability of controls to afford more obvious visible cues as to method of use is recommended. Practitioner summary: Emergency stop and shutdown controls can cause response conflict as their labels signify both urgent corrective actions and 'don't touch'. Response conflict caused by confusing superimposed labels is resolved as cursors near the target control and may result in reduced movement accuracy. Prior warnings may influence resolution of response conflict. Abbreviations: Hz: Hertz; M: Mean; ms: millisecond; mm: millimetre; S: second; SD: Standard Deviation; SE: Standard Error; USB: Universal Serial Bus.

The psychophysics of bouncing: Perceptual constraints, physical constraints, animacy, and phenomenal causality

In the present study we broadly explored the perception of physical and animated motion in bouncing-like scenarios through four experiments. In the first experiment, participants were asked to categorize bouncing-like displays as physical bounce, animated motion, or other. Several parameters of the animations were manipulated, that is, the simulated coefficient of restitution, the value of simulated gravitational acceleration, the motion pattern (uniform acceleration/deceleration or constant speed) and the number of bouncing cycles. In the second experiment, a variable delay at the moment of the collision between the bouncing object and the bouncing surface was introduced. Main results show that, although observers appear to have realistic representations of physical constraints like energy conservation and gravitational acceleration/deceleration, the amount of visual information available in the scene has a strong modulation effect on the extent to which they rely on these representations. A coefficient of restitution >1 was a crucial cue to animacy in displays showing three bouncing cycles, but not in displays showing one bouncing cycle. Additionally, bouncing impressions appear to be driven by perceptual constraints that are unrelated to the physical realism of the scene, like preference for simulated gravitational attraction smaller than g and perceived temporal contiguity between the different phases of bouncing. In the third experiment, the visible opaque bouncing surface was removed from the scene, and the results showed that this did not have any substantial effect on the resulting impressions of physical bounce or animated motion, suggesting that the visual system can fill-in the scene with the missing element. The fourth experiment explored visual impressions of causality in bouncing scenarios. At odds with claims of current causal perception theories, results indicate that a passive object can be perceived as the direct cause of the motion behavior of an active object.

Pupillary evidence reveals the influence of conceptual association on brightness perception

Our visual experience often varies based on momentary thoughts and feelings. For example, when positive concepts are invoked, visual objects may appear brighter (e.g., a "brighter" smile). However, it remains unclear whether this phenomenological experience is driven by a genuine top-down modulation of brightness perception or by a mere response bias. To investigate this issue, we use pupillometry as a more objective measure of perceived brightness. We asked participants to judge the brightness level of an iso-luminant gray color patch after evaluating the valence of a positive or negative word. We found that the gray color patch elicited greater pupillary light reflex and more frequent "brighter" responses after observers had evaluated the valence of a positive word. As pupillary light reflex is unlikely driven by voluntary control, these results suggest that the conceptual association between affect and luminance can modulate brightness perception.

Visual Perception Is Highly Flexible and Context Dependent in Young Infants: A Case of Top-Down-Modulated Motion Perception

Top-down modulation is an essential cognitive component in human perception. Despite mounting evidence of top-down perceptual modulation in adults, it is largely unknown whether infants can engage in this cognitive function. Here, we examined top-down modulation of motion perception in 6- to 8-month-old infants (recruited in North America) via their smooth-pursuit eye movements. In four experiments, we demonstrated that infants' perception of motion direction can be flexibly shaped by briefly learned predictive cues when no coherent motion is available. The current findings present a novel insight into infant perception and its development: Infant perceptual systems respond to predictive signals engendered from higher-level learning systems, leading to a flexible and context-dependent modulation of perception. This work also suggests that the infant brain is sophisticated, interconnected, and active when placed in a context in which it can learn and predict.

The role of line-orientation processing in the production of the Poggendorff illusion: A dual-task study

Using a dual-task paradigm, the present investigation examined whether processes related to line orientation play a critical role in the production of the Poggendorff illusion. In Experiment 1, we assessed the magnitude of the Poggendorff illusion under three different task conditions. In the single-task condition, participants were asked to report how they perceive the alignment of transversal lines in the Poggendorff figure. In two different dual-task conditions, the participants were asked to read aloud the time displayed on a digital or analogue clock while also performing the Poggendorff perception task. The method of constant stimuli was used to calculate the point of subjective equality (PSE) and bistability width values, which represent illusion strength and perceptual uncertainty, respectively. PSEs indicated that the magnitude of the illusion did not vary between single, dual-analogue, and dual-digital task conditions, which suggests that the additional demands placed by the dual tasks had no effect on the illusion strength. Perceptual uncertainty and clock-reading errors were greater in the dual-analogue task condition. Experiment 2 revealed that the analogue clockface was more difficult to read than the digital clockface. Based on these results, we conclude that having participants perform a secondary task does not influence the magnitude of the Poggendorff illusion.

Self-Prioritization Reconsidered: Scrutinizing Three Claims

Such is the power of self-relevance, it has been argued that even arbitrary stimuli (e.g., shapes, lines, colors) with no prior personal connection are privileged during information processing following their association with the self (i.e., self-prioritization). This prioritization effect, moreover, is deemed to be stimulus driven (i.e., automatic), grounded in perception, and supported by specialized processing operations. Here, however, we scrutinize these claims and challenge this viewpoint. Although self-relevance unquestionably influences information processing, we contend that, at least at present, there is limited evidence to suggest that the prioritization of arbitrary self-related stimuli is compulsory, penetrates perception, and is underpinned by activity in a dedicated neural network. Rather, self-prioritization appears to be a task-dependent product of ordinary cognitive processes.

Carving joints into nature: reengineering scientific concepts in light of concept-laden evidence

A new wave of proposals suggests that scientists must reassess scientific concepts in light of accumulated evidence. However, reengineering scientific concepts in light of data is challenging because scientific concepts affect the evidence itself in multiple ways. Among other possible influences, concepts (i) prime scientists to overemphasize within-concept similarities and between-concept differences; (ii) lead scientists to measure conceptually relevant dimensions more accurately; (iii) serve as units of scientific experimentation, communication, and theory-building; and (iv) affect the phenomena themselves. When looking for improved ways to carve nature at its joints, scholars must take the concept-laden nature of evidence into account to avoid entering a vicious circle of concept-evidence mutual substantiation.

Instant Effects of Semantic Information on Visual Perception

Does our perception of an object change once we discover what function it serves? We showed human participants (n = 48, 31 females and 17 males) pictures of unfamiliar objects either together with keywords matching their function, leading to semantically informed perception, or together with nonmatching keywords, resulting in uninformed perception. We measured event-related potentials to investigate at which stages in the visual processing hierarchy these two types of object perception differed from one another. We found that semantically informed compared with uninformed perception was associated with larger amplitudes in the N170 component (150-200 ms), reduced amplitudes in the N400 component (400-700 ms), and a late decrease in alpha/beta band power. When the same objects were presented once more without any information, the N400 and event-related power effects persisted, and we also observed enlarged amplitudes in the P1 component (100-150 ms) in response to objects for which semantically informed perception had taken place. Consistent with previous work, this suggests that obtaining semantic information about previously unfamiliar objects alters aspects of their lower-level visual perception (P1 component), higher-level visual perception (N170 component), and semantic processing (N400 component, event-related power). Our study is the first to show that such effects occur instantly after semantic information has been provided for the first time, without requiring extensive learning.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT There has been a long-standing debate about whether or not higher-level cognitive capacities, such as semantic knowledge, can influence lower-level perceptual processing in a top-down fashion. Here we could show, for the first time, that information about the function of previously unfamiliar objects immediately influences cortical processing within less than 200 ms. Of note, this influence does not require training or experience with the objects and related semantic information. Therefore, our study is the first to show effects of cognition on perception while ruling out the possibility that prior knowledge merely acts by preactivating or altering stored visual representations. Instead, this knowledge seems to alter perception online, thus providing a compelling case against the impenetrability of perception by cognition.

The Agent Preference in Visual Event Apprehension

A central aspect of human experience and communication is understanding events in terms of agent ("doer") and patient ("undergoer" of action) roles. These event roles are rooted in general cognition and prominently encoded in language, with agents appearing as more salient and preferred over patients. An unresolved question is whether this preference for agents already operates during apprehension, that is, the earliest stage of event processing, and if so, whether the effect persists across different animacy configurations and task demands. Here we contrast event apprehension in two tasks and two languages that encode agents differently; Basque, a language that explicitly case-marks agents ('ergative'), and Spanish, which does not mark agents. In two brief exposure experiments, native Basque and Spanish speakers saw pictures for only 300 ms, and subsequently described them or answered probe questions about them. We compared eye fixations and behavioral correlates of event role extraction with Bayesian regression. Agents received more attention and were recognized better across languages and tasks. At the same time, language and task demands affected the attention to agents. Our findings show that a general preference for agents exists in event apprehension, but it can be modulated by task and language demands.

The impact of affective states and traits on perceptual stability during binocular rivalry

Affective states and traits have been associated with different measures of perceptual stability during binocular rivalry. Diverging approaches to measuring perceptual stability as well as to examination of the role of affective variables have contributed to an inconclusive pattern of findings. Here, we studied the influence of affective traits, such as depressiveness and trait anxiety, and states, which were manipulated with a musical mood induction paradigm, on different measures of perceptual stability (dominance ratios and phase durations) during binocular rivalry. Fifty healthy participants reported alternations in two conditions: a biased perception condition with an unequal probability of perceiving stimuli, using an upright versus a tilted face with a neutral expression, and a control condition with equal chances of perceiving stimuli, using Gabors of different orientations. Baseline positive state affect significantly predicted longer phase durations whereas affective traits did not yield any such effect. Furthermore, in an exploratory analysis, induced negative affect attenuated stimulus related bias in predominance ratios. Overall, we found a strong correlation between both measures of perceptual stability (phase durations and dominance ratios). Our findings thus question the distinction between different measures of perceptual stability during binocular rivalry and highlight the role of affective states in its formation.

The habituation of higher-order conscious processes: Evidence from mental arithmetic

A recurring idea in psychology is that one is conscious only of the "outputs" of mental operations, but not of the operations themselves. Often, such "entry into consciousness" occurs involuntarily. To investigate involuntary entry, some experimentalists have used the reflexive imagery task (RIT). The RIT has revealed that, under certain conditions, external stimuli (e.g., line drawings) can elicit involuntary entry of high-level cognitions. In the basic version of the task, participants are presented with visual objects and instructed not to subvocalize (i.e., say in one's head) the names of these objects. Participants cannot suppress these subvocalizations on a majority of the trials. It has been proposed that, if RIT effects resemble a reflex, then perhaps they will habituate as reflexes do. In the "habituation" variant of the RIT, the same stimulus object (e.g., CAT) is presented on ten consecutive trials (ten "instantiations"), in order to induce habituation (i.e., a weakened RIT effect). It remains unknown whether such habituation effects arise for stimulus-elicited processes that depend, not on subvocalization, but on more complex processes, such as mental arithmetic. To illuminate this issue, we conducted a conceptual replication of the "habituation" RIT that involves, on each trial, the participant trying not to add two numbers (e.g., 14 and 2). We assessed whether the habituation effects were stimulus-specific or set-specific. Understanding the boundary conditions of the RIT effect and its habituation illuminates the limits of unconscious processes and the role of conscious processing.

Hypnotic suggestions cognitively penetrate tactile perception through top-down modulation of semantic contents

Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abundant studies have shown modulation of perception by attention, motivation, content and context, there is an unresolved controversy whether these examples provide true evidence that perception is penetrable by cognition. Here we show that tactile perception assessed as spatial discrimination can be instantaneously and systematically altered merely by the semantic content during hypnotic suggestions. To study neurophysiological correlates, we recorded EEG and SEPs. We found that the suggestion "your index finger becomes bigger" led to improved tactile discrimination, while the suggestion "your index finger becomes smaller" led to impaired discrimination. A hypnosis without semantic suggestions had no effect but caused a reduction of phase-locking synchronization of the beta frequency band between medial frontal cortex and the finger representation in somatosensory cortex. Late SEP components (P80-N140 complex) implicated in attentional processes were altered by the semantic contents, but processing of afferent inputs in SI remained unaltered. These data provide evidence that the psychophysically observed modifiability of tactile perception by semantic contents is not simply due to altered perception-based judgments, but instead is a consequence of modified perceptual processes which change the perceptual experience.

Breaking boundaries: The Bayesian Brain Hypothesis for perception and prediction

This special issue aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of the Bayesian Brain Hypothesis and its standing across neuroscience, cognitive science and the philosophy of cognitive science. By gathering cutting-edge research from leading experts, this issue seeks to showcase the latest advancements in our understanding of the Bayesian brain, as well as its potential implications for future research in perception, cognition, and motor control. A special focus to achieve this aim is adopted in this special issue, as it seeks to explore the relation between two seemingly incompatible frameworks for the understanding of cognitive structure and function: the Bayesian Brain Hypothesis and the Modularity Theory of the Mind. In assessing the compatibility between these theories, the contributors to this special issue open up new pathways of thinking and advance our understanding of cognitive processes.

Cognitive Science Progresses Toward Interactive Frameworks

Despite its many twists and turns, the arc of cognitive science generally bends toward progress, thanks to its interdisciplinary nature. By glancing at the last few decades of experimental and computational advances, it can be argued that-far from failing to converge on a shared set of conceptual assumptions-the field is indeed making steady consensual progress toward what can broadly be referred to as interactive frameworks. This inclination is apparent in the subfields of psycholinguistics, visual perception, embodied cognition, extended cognition, neural networks, dynamical systems theory, and more. This pictorial essay briefly documents this steady progress both from a bird's eye view and from the trenches. The conclusion is one of optimism that cognitive science is getting there, albeit slowly and arduously, like any good science should.