Twenty years of Hendra virus: laboratory submission trends and risk factors for infection in horses

Horse populations are severely underestimated in a region at risk of Hendra virus spillover

OBJECTIVE

To identify the size and distribution of the horse population in the Northern Rivers Region of NSW, including changes from 2007 to 2021, to better understand populations at risk of Hendra virus transmission.

METHODS

Census data from the 2007 Equine Influenza (EI) outbreak were compared with data collected annually by New South Wales Local Land Services (LLS) (2011-2021), and with field observations via road line transects (2021).

RESULTS

The horse populations reported to LLS in 2011 (3000 horses; 0.77 horses/km2) was 145% larger than that reported during the EI outbreak in 2007 (1225 horses; 0.32 horses/km2). This was inconsistent with the 6% increase in horses recorded from 2011 to 2020 within the longitudinal LLS dataset. Linear modelling suggested the true horse population of this region in 2007 was at least double that reported at the time. Distance sampling in 2021 estimated the region's population at 10,185 horses (3.89 per km2; 95% CI = 4854-21,372). Field sampling and modelling identified higher horse densities in rural cropland, with the percentage of conservation land, modified grazing, and rural residential land identified as the best predictors of horse densities.

CONCLUSIONS

Data from the 2007 EI outbreak no longer correlates to the current horse population in size or distribution and was likely not a true representation at the time. Current LLS data also likely underestimates horse populations. Ongoing efforts to further quantify and map horse populations in Australia are important for estimating and managing the risk of equine zoonoses.

Time of year, age class and body condition predict Hendra virus infection in Australian black flying foxes (Pteropus alecto)

Hendra virus (HeV) continues to cause fatal infection in horses and threaten infection in close-contact humans in eastern Australia. Species of Pteropus bats (flying-foxes) are the natural reservoir of the virus. We caught and sampled flying-foxes from a multispecies roost in southeast Queensland, Australia on eight occasions between June 2013 and June 2014. The effects of sample date, species, sex, age class, body condition score (BCS), pregnancy and lactation on HeV antibody prevalence, log-transformed median fluorescent intensity (lnMFI) values and HeV RNA status were assessed using unbalanced generalised linear models. A total of 1968 flying-foxes were sampled, comprising 1012 Pteropus alecto, 742 P. poliocephalus and 214 P. scapulatus. Sample date, species and age class were each statistically associated with HeV RNA status, antibody status and lnMFI values; BCS was statistically associated with HeV RNA status and antibody status. The findings support immunologically naïve sub-adult P. alecto playing an important role in maintaining HeV infection at a population level. The biological significance of the association between BCS and HeV RNA status, and BCS and HeV antibody status, is less clear and warrants further investigation. Contrary to previous studies, we found no direct association between HeV infection and pregnancy or lactation. The findings in P. poliocephalus suggest that HeV exposure in this species may not result in systemic infection and virus excretion, or alternatively, may reflect assay cross-reactivity with another (unidentified) henipavirus.

Synchronous shedding of multiple bat paramyxoviruses coincides with peak periods of Hendra virus spillover

Within host-parasite communities, viral co-circulation and co-infections of hosts are the norm, yet studies of significant emerging zoonoses tend to focus on a single parasite species within the host. Using a multiplexed paramyxovirus bead-based PCR on urine samples from Australian flying foxes, we show that multi-viral shedding from flying fox populations is common. We detected up to nine bat paramyxoviruses shed synchronously. Multi-viral shedding infrequently coalesced into an extreme, brief and spatially restricted shedding pulse, coinciding with peak spillover of Hendra virus, an emerging fatal zoonotic pathogen of high interest. Such extreme pulses of multi-viral shedding could easily be missed during routine surveillance yet have potentially serious consequences for spillover of novel pathogens to humans and domestic animal hosts. We also detected co-occurrence patterns suggestive of the presence of interactions among viruses, such as facilitation and cross-immunity. We propose that multiple viruses may be interacting, influencing the shedding and spillover of zoonotic pathogens. Understanding these interactions in the context of broader scale drivers, such as habitat loss, may help predict shedding pulses of Hendra virus and other fatal zoonoses.

Hendra Virus Spillover is a Bimodal System Driven by Climatic Factors

Understanding environmental factors driving spatiotemporal patterns of disease can improve risk mitigation strategies. Hendra virus (HeV), discovered in Australia in 1994, spills over from bats (Pteropus sp.) to horses and thence to humans. Below latitude - 22°, almost all spillover events to horses occur during winter, and above this latitude spillover is aseasonal. We generated a statistical model of environmental drivers of HeV spillover per month. The model reproduced the spatiotemporal pattern of spillover risk between 1994 and 2015. The model was generated with an ensemble of methods for presence-absence data (boosted regression trees, random forests and logistic regression). Presences were the locations of horse cases, and absences per spatial unit (2.7 × 2.7 km pixels without spillover) were sampled with the horse census of Queensland and New South Wales. The most influential factors indicate that spillover is associated with both cold-dry and wet conditions. Bimodal responses to several variables suggest spillover involves two systems: one above and one below a latitudinal area close to - 22°. Northern spillovers are associated with cold-dry and wet conditions, and southern with cold-dry conditions. Biologically, these patterns could be driven by immune or behavioural changes in response to food shortage in bats and horse husbandry. Future research should look for differences in these traits between seasons in the two latitudinal regions. Based on the predicted risk patterns by latitude, we recommend enhanced preventive management for horses from March to November below latitude 22° south.

Animal infection studies of two recently discovered African bat paramyxoviruses, Achimota 1 and Achimota 2

Bats are implicated as the natural reservoirs for several highly pathogenic viruses that can infect other animal species, including man. Here, we investigate the potential for two recently discovered bat rubulaviruses, Achimota virus 1 (AchPV1) and Achimota virus 2 (AchPV2), isolated from urine collected under urban bat (Eidolon helvum) roosts in Ghana, West Africa, to infect small laboratory animals. AchPV1 and AchPV2 are classified in the family Paramyxoviridae and cluster with other bat derived zoonotic rubulaviruses (i.e. Sosuga, Menangle and Tioman viruses). To assess the susceptibility of AchPV1 and AchPV2 in animals, infection studies were conducted in ferrets, guinea pigs and mice. Seroconversion, immunohistological evidence of infection, and viral shedding were identified in ferrets and guinea pigs, but not in mice. Infection was associated with respiratory disease in ferrets. Viral genome was detected in a range of tissues from ferrets and guinea pigs, however virus isolation was only achieved from ferret tissues. The results from this study indicate Achimota viruses (AchPVs) are able to cross the species barrier. Consequently, vigilance for infection with and disease caused by these viruses in people and domesticated animals is warranted in sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabian Peninsula where the reservoir hosts are present.

Application of a quantitative entry assessment model to compare the relative risk of incursion of zoonotic bat-borne viruses into European Union Member States

This paper presents a quantitative assessment model for the risk of entry of zoonotic bat-borne viruses into the European Union (EU). The model considers four routes of introduction: human travel, legal trade of products, live animal imports and illegal import of bushmeat and was applied to five virus outbreak scenarios. Two scenarios were considered for Zaire ebolavirus (wEBOV, cEBOV) and other scenarios for Hendra virus, Marburg virus (MARV) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV). The use of the same framework and generic data sources for all EU Member States (MS) allows for a relative comparison of the probability of virus introduction and of the importance of the routes of introduction among MSs. According to the model wEBOV posed the highest risk of an introduction event within the EU, followed by MARV and MERS-CoV. However, the main route of introduction differed, with wEBOV and MERS-CoV most likely through human travel and MARV through legal trade of foodstuffs. The relative risks to EU MSs as entry points also varied between outbreak scenarios, highlighting the heterogeneity in global trade and travel to the EU MSs. The model has the capability to allow for a continual updating of the risk estimate using new data as, and when, it becomes available. The model provides an horizon scanning tool for use when available data are limited and, therefore, the absolute risk estimates often have high uncertainty. Sensitivity analysis suggested virus prevalence in bats has a large influence on the results; a 90% reduction in prevalence reduced the risk of introduction considerably and resulted in the relative ranking of MARV falling below that for MERS-CoV, due to this parameter disproportionately affecting the risk of introduction from the trade route over human travel.

The impact of human population pressure on flying fox niches and the potential consequences for Hendra virus spillover

Hendra virus (HeV) is an emerging pathogen of concern in Australia given its ability to spillover from its reservoir host, pteropid bats, to horses and further on to humans, and the severe clinical presentation typical in these latter incidental hosts. Specific human pressures over recent decades, such as expanding human populations, urbanization, and forest fragmentation, may have altered the ecological niche of Pteropus species acting as natural HeV reservoirs and may modulate spillover risk. This study explored the influence of inter-decadal net human local migration between 1970 and 2000 on changes in the habitat suitability to P. alecto and P. conspicillatus from 1980 to 2015 in eastern Australia. These ecological niches were modeled using boosted regression trees and subsequently fitted, along with additional landscape factors, to HeV spillovers to explore the spatial dependency of this zoonosis. The spatial model showed that the ecological niche of these two flying fox species, the human footprint, and proximity to woody savanna were each strongly associated with HeV spillover and together explained most of the spatial dependency exhibited by this zoonosis. These findings reinforce the potential for anthropogenic pressures to shape the landscape epidemiology of HeV spillover.

"Why won't they just vaccinate?" Horse owner risk perception and uptake of the Hendra virus vaccine

BACKGROUND

Hendra virus is a paramyxovirus that causes periodic serious disease and fatalities in horses and humans in Australia first identified in 1994. Pteropid bats (commonly known as flying-foxes) are the natural host of the virus, and the putative route of infection in horses is by ingestion or inhalation of material contaminated by flying-fox urine or other bodily fluids. Humans become infected after close contact with infected horses. Horse owners in Australia are encouraged to vaccinate their horses against Hendra virus to reduce the risk of Hendra virus infection, and to prevent potential transmission to humans. After the vaccine was released in 2012, uptake by horse owners was slow, with some estimated 11-17% of horses in Australia vaccinated. This study was commissioned to examine barriers to vaccine uptake and potential drivers to future adoption of vaccination by horse owners.

METHODS

This study examined qualitative comments from respondents to an on-line survey, reporting reasons for not vaccinating their horses. The study also investigated scenarios in which respondents felt they might consider vaccinating their horses.

RESULTS

Self-reported barriers to uptake of the Hendra virus vaccine by horse owners (N = 150) included concerns about vaccine safety, cost, and effectiveness. Reduction in vaccination costs and perception of immediacy of Hendra virus risk were reported as being likely to change future behaviour. However, the data also indicated that horse owners generally would not reconsider vaccinating their horses if advised by their veterinarian.

CONCLUSION

While changes to vaccine costs and the availability data supporting vaccine safety and efficacy may encourage more horse owners to vaccinate, this study highlights the importance of protecting the relationship between veterinarians and horse owners within the risk management strategies around Hendra virus. Interactions and trust between veterinarians and animal owners has important implications for management of and communication around Hendra virus and other zoonotic disease outbreaks.

One Health research and training in Australia and New Zealand

Purpose of the review

This review was performed to create a repository of information on One Health research and training in Australia and New Zealand (ANZ). The review sought to determine 1) how many training activities there are in ANZ, 2) how much research on zoonotic diseases is undertaken by multidisciplinary teams, and 3) how collaborative and integrated they are.

Recent findings

There are few opportunities for training in One Health in ANZ. The majority require enrolment in a postgraduate degree programme, and there is only one postgraduate level course that is also available for continuing professional development (CPD). Of the broad range of One Health research performed in ANZ, the majority is performed by teams with limited disciplinary diversity, although diversity is improving.

Summary

Progress has been made in building collaboration between human, animal, and environmental health professions. However, the lack of clearly defined competencies and agreed purpose for One Health may be impeding collaboration.