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Ng DW, Lee JC, Lovibond PF. Unidirectional rating scales overestimate the illusory causation phenomenon. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2024; 77:551-562. [PMID: 37114953 PMCID: PMC10880420 DOI: 10.1177/17470218231175003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2022] [Revised: 02/28/2023] [Accepted: 04/21/2023] [Indexed: 04/29/2023]
Abstract
Illusory causation is a phenomenon in which people mistakenly perceive a causal relationship between a cue and outcome even though the contingency between them is actually zero. Illusory causation studies typically use a unidirectional causal rating scale, where one endpoint refers to no relationship and the other to a strongly positive causal relationship. This procedure may bias mean causal ratings in a positive direction, either by censoring negative ratings or by discouraging participants from giving the normative rating of zero which is at the bottom extreme of the scale. To test this possibility, we ran two experiments that directly compared the magnitude of causal illusions when assessed with a unidirectional (zero-positive) versus a bidirectional (negative-zero-positive) rating scale. Experiment 1 used high cue and outcome densities (both 75%), whereas Experiment 2 used neutral cue and outcome densities (both 50%). Across both experiments, we observed a larger illusory causation effect in the unidirectional group compared with the bidirectional group, despite both groups experiencing the same training trials. The causal illusions in Experiment 2 were observed despite participants accurately learning the conditional probabilities of the outcome occurring in both the presence and absence of the cue, suggesting that the illusion is driven by the inability to accurately integrate conditional probabilities to infer causal relationships. Our results indicate that although illusory causation is a genuine phenomenon that is observable with either a undirectional or a bidirectional rating scale, its magnitude may be overestimated when unidirectional rating scales are used.
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2
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Vinas A, Blanco F, Matute H. Scarcity affects cognitive biases: The case of the illusion of causality. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2023; 239:104007. [PMID: 37573740 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2023.104007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/15/2022] [Revised: 06/20/2023] [Accepted: 08/07/2023] [Indexed: 08/15/2023] Open
Abstract
Previous research indicates that economic scarcity affects people's judgments, decisions, and cognition in a variety of contexts, and with various consequences. We hypothesized that scarcity could sometimes reduce cognitive biases. Specifically, it could reduce the causal illusion, a cognitive bias that is at the heart of superstitions and irrational thoughts, and consists of believing that two events are causally connected when they are not. In three experiments, participants played the role of doctors deciding whether to administer a drug to a series of patients. The drug was ineffective, because the percentage of patients recovering was identical regardless of whether they took the drug. We manipulated the budget available to buy the drugs, tough all participants had enough for all their patients. Even so, participants in the scarce group reduced the use of the drug and showed a lower causal illusion than participants in the wealthy group. Experiments 2 and 3 added a phase in which the budget changed. Participants who transitioned from scarcity to wealth exhibited a reduced use of resources and a lower causal illusion, whereas participants transitioning from wealth to scarcity were unaffected by their previous history.
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3
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Dewey JA. Cognitive load decreases the sense of agency during continuous action. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2023; 233:103824. [PMID: 36623472 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2022.103824] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2022] [Revised: 12/13/2022] [Accepted: 12/22/2022] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
The sense of agency that normally accompanies voluntary actions depends on a combination of sensory predictions and other inferences. For example, when people manipulate moving objects and rate their degree of control, control ratings are influenced by proximal correlations between motor commands and visual feedback as well as the overall success or failure of the action. The relative importance of sensory predictions vs. post hoc feedback may depend on the availability and perceived reliability of those cues, which is context dependent. The present study investigated how increasing cognitive load during a visuomotor tracking task influences the sense of agency, and whether cognitive load influences the extent to which control ratings depend on sensory predictions vs. post hoc feedback. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants performed a dual task that involved tracking a moving target using a joystick while rehearsing 3, 5, or 7 digits. Control ratings decreased as memory set size increased, even though set size had no significant effect on objective tracking error. Experiment 3 replicated this finding while also manipulating the favorability of feedback presented after each trial. Control ratings were correlated with post hoc feedback, but there was no significant interaction between feedback and cognitive load. These results suggest that sensorimotor predictions, performance feedback, and availability of working memory resources can all influence sense of agency. The hypothesis that people rely more on post hoc feedback to rate control when they are distracted was not supported.
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Affiliation(s)
- John A Dewey
- University of North Georgia, Dahlonega, United States of America.
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4
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Tao J, Zhao J, Li H. Impact of luck perception on consumer's construal level: the mediating role of psychological security and the moderating role of power. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-022-03978-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/10/2022]
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5
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Segovia G, Sanz-Barbero B. “It Works for Me”: Pseudotherapy Use is Associated With Trust in Their Efficacy Rather Than Belief in Their Scientific Validity. Int J Public Health 2022; 67:1604594. [PMID: 36188754 PMCID: PMC9522909 DOI: 10.3389/ijph.2022.1604594] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/08/2021] [Accepted: 08/31/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Objectives: To identify how perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs towards pseudotherapies, health, medicine, and the public health system influence the pseudotherapy use in Spain.Methods: We carried out a cross-sectional study using the Survey of Social Perception of Science and Technology-2018 (5,200 interviews). Dependent variable: ever use of pseudotherapies. Covariables: attitude towards medicine, health and public health system; perceived health; assessment of the scientific character of homeopathy/acupuncture. The association was estimated using prevalence ratios obtained by Poisson regression models. The model was adjusted for age and socioeconomic variables.Results: Pseudotherapy use was higher in women (24.9%) than in men (14.2%) (p < 0.001). The probability of use in men (p < 0.001) and women (p < 0.001) increases with the belief in pseudotherapies’ usefulness. Among men, a proactive attitude (reference: passive) towards medicine and health (RP:1.3), and a negative (reference: positive) assessment of the quality of the public health system increased use-probability (RP:1.2). For women, poor health perceived (referencie: good) increased likelihood of use (RP:1.2).Conclusion: Pseudotherapy use in Spain was associated with confidence in its usefulness irrespective of users’ assessment of its scientific validity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gregorio Segovia
- Department of Physiology, Faculty of Medicine, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
- Joint Research Institute National Distance Education University and Health Institute Carlos III (IMIENS), Madrid, Spain
- *Correspondence: Gregorio Segovia,
| | - Belén Sanz-Barbero
- Joint Research Institute National Distance Education University and Health Institute Carlos III (IMIENS), Madrid, Spain
- Epidemiology and Statistics Department, National School of Public Health, Carlos III Institute of Health, Madrid, Spain
- CIBER Epidemilogy and Public Health (CIBERESP), Madrid, Spain
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6
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Walach H, Ofner M, Ruof V, Herbig M, Klement RJ. Why do people consent to receiving SARS-CoV-2 vaccinations? A representative survey in Germany. BMJ Open 2022; 12:e060555. [PMID: 35981767 PMCID: PMC9393854 DOI: 10.1136/bmjopen-2021-060555] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
OBJECTIVE To answer the question: Why do people consent to being vaccinated with novel vaccines against SARS-CoV-2? DESIGN Representative survey. SETTING Online panel. PARTICIPANTS 1032 respondents of the general German population. METHOD A representative survey among German citizens in November/December 2021 that resulted in 1032 complete responses on vaccination status, sociodemographic parameters and opinions about the COVID-19 situation. RESULTS Almost 83% of the respondents were vaccinated. The major motivation was fear of medical consequences of an infection and the wish to lead a normal life again. The major motivation to be not vaccinated was the fear of side effects and scepticism about long-term effectiveness and safety. Sixteen per cent of vaccinated respondents reported some serious side effect, while more than 30% reported health improvements, mostly due to the relief of psychological stress and social reintegration. We also validated a 'Corona Orthodoxy Score-COS' consisting of seven items reflecting opinions on COVID-19. The scale is reliable (alpha=0.76) and unidimensional. The COS was a highly significant predictor of vaccination status and readiness to be vaccinated in a multivariable logistic regression model. Those who were vaccinated were more likely to live in smaller households (OR=0.82, p=0.024), had a higher income (OR=1.27, p<0.001), a higher COS score (OR 1.4, p<0.0001) and used less alternative media (OR=0.44, p=0.0024) and scientific publications (OR=0.42, p=0.011) as information sources. CONCLUSIONS The major motives for being vaccinated are fear of medical symptoms and the wish to lead a normal life. Those not wanting to be vaccinated cite a lack of knowledge regarding long-term safety and side effects as reasons. This can likely only be overcome by careful and active long-term efficacy and safety monitoring.
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Affiliation(s)
- Harald Walach
- Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Next Society Institute, Vilnius, Lithuania
- CHS Institute, Berlin, Germany
| | - Michael Ofner
- Department Immunology and Pathophysiology, Medical University of Graz, Graz, Austria
- Medyco International, Dubai, UAE
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7
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Zhang Y, Zhou H, Qin J. Research on the effect of uncertain rewards on impulsive purchase intention of blind box products. Front Behav Neurosci 2022; 16:946337. [PMID: 36046369 PMCID: PMC9421032 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2022.946337] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/17/2022] [Accepted: 07/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/28/2022] Open
Abstract
Since 2019, China has gradually seen a “blind box” boom, and young people have quickly become the main buying force of blind boxes, promoting the continuous development of the blind box industry. Previous studies have shown that uncertainty in events with positive prospects can play a more positive role than certainty. However, how does uncertainty in the blind box affect consumers’ emotions and cognition and trigger subsequent consumption decisions? To clarify the internal mechanism of this process, this paper takes the blind box as the research object and constructs the mechanism model of perceived uncertainty on consumers’ impulsive purchase intention, based on Stimulus-Organism-Response (SOR) theory. In addition, the curiosity variable and perceived luck variable are introduced according to the information gap theory and optimism theory. On this basis, we conduct an empirical analysis by means of a questionnaire survey. The results show that perceived uncertainty has a positive impact on consumers’ impulsive purchase intentions, in which curiosity plays a mediating role. Besides, perceived luck positively moderates the impact of perceived uncertainty on impulsive purchase intention. This study clarifies the internal impact of perceived uncertainty on impulsive purchase intention of the blind box and enriches the basic theory of uncertainty reward and purchase intention. At the same time, we also offer related recommendations for future enterprises to learn from the marketing model of uncertain rewards.
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8
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Panitz C, Endres D, Buchholz M, Khosrowtaj Z, Sperl MFJ, Mueller EM, Schubö A, Schütz AC, Teige-Mocigemba S, Pinquart M. A Revised Framework for the Investigation of Expectation Update Versus Maintenance in the Context of Expectation Violations: The ViolEx 2.0 Model. Front Psychol 2021; 12:726432. [PMID: 34858264 PMCID: PMC8632008 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.726432] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2021] [Accepted: 10/20/2021] [Indexed: 12/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Expectations are probabilistic beliefs about the future that shape and influence our perception, affect, cognition, and behavior in many contexts. This makes expectations a highly relevant concept across basic and applied psychological disciplines. When expectations are confirmed or violated, individuals can respond by either updating or maintaining their prior expectations in light of the new evidence. Moreover, proactive and reactive behavior can change the probability with which individuals encounter expectation confirmations or violations. The investigation of predictors and mechanisms underlying expectation update and maintenance has been approached from many research perspectives. However, in many instances there has been little exchange between different research fields. To further advance research on expectations and expectation violations, collaborative efforts across different disciplines in psychology, cognitive (neuro)science, and other life sciences are warranted. For fostering and facilitating such efforts, we introduce the ViolEx 2.0 model, a revised framework for interdisciplinary research on cognitive and behavioral mechanisms of expectation update and maintenance in the context of expectation violations. To support different goals and stages in interdisciplinary exchange, the ViolEx 2.0 model features three model levels with varying degrees of specificity in order to address questions about the research synopsis, central concepts, or functional processes and relationships, respectively. The framework can be applied to different research fields and has high potential for guiding collaborative research efforts in expectation research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christian Panitz
- Department of Psychology, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany.,Department of Psychology, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany.,Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, United States
| | - Dominik Endres
- Department of Psychology, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany
| | - Merle Buchholz
- Department of Psychology, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany
| | - Zahra Khosrowtaj
- Department of Psychology, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany
| | - Matthias F J Sperl
- Department of Psychology, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany.,Department of Psychology, University of Giessen, Giessen, Germany
| | - Erik M Mueller
- Department of Psychology, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany
| | - Anna Schubö
- Department of Psychology, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany
| | | | | | - Martin Pinquart
- Department of Psychology, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany
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9
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Benz D, Reinhard MA. Sadder and Less Gullible?—Investigating Depressive Realism Effects in Judgments of Veracity. JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1521/jscp.2021.40.5.421] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Introduction: Depressive realism literature suggests that depressed individuals’ negative self-view is correlated with less self-serving positivity bias. Also, research suggests some social cognitive advantages for individuals with subclinical levels of depression (dysphoria), especially in identifying negative emotions. This study tested the hypothesis that individuals with dysphoric symptoms show less of a truth bias and are more accurate at detecting deception. Moreover, this effect was expected to be stronger in positive statements (I like) than in negative (I dislike) statements. Finally, a lower judgment confidence and a more accurate assessment of their lie detection ability were expected to be found in individuals with dysphoric symptoms. Methods: Two hundred-sixty-nine participants judged the veracity of 24 video statements. Analyses tested the hypotheses with three different measures of depression: the IPIP-240 Depression Subscale, the PHQ-9, and the DESC-I. Results: In contrast to the assumptions, results found no evidence that individuals with dysphoric symptoms were better at identifying false and true messages in general. While higher scores of the DESC-I were negatively correlated with accuracy in lie detection, the IPIP-240 and the PHQ-9 were found to be not significantly correlated with lie detection accuracy. While for like statements individuals with dysphoric symptoms and individuals without (measured with the DESC-I) were not different in accuracy, individuals with dysphoric symptoms had lower accuracy scores in dislike statements than individuals without. Moreover, the PHQ-9 found lower measures of judgment confidence in individuals with dysphoric symptoms compared to individuals without, while the other depression measurements showed no significant differences. Furthermore, no evidence for a more accurate assessment of lie detection ability in individuals with dysphoric symptoms was found. Discussion: Results and directions for future research are discussed.
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10
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Statistical process control charts for better analysis of sequential data in psychology: The case of illusion of control experiments. Behav Res Methods 2021; 54:475-492. [PMID: 34244984 DOI: 10.3758/s13428-021-01619-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/10/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Illusion of control (IOC) is a bias in the judgment of personal success with implications to learning theories and health policies; some important questions in the investigation of IOC may be related to traditional measures in the field, namely self-assessment using Likert scales about the sense of control. Statistical process control (SPC) and Shewhart charts are methods developed to monitor and control industrial processes, never applied in psychological studies before. The present two studies investigated the use of the technique of Shewhart charts in the analysis of IOC. The purpose was to explore the use of SPC and Shewhart charts in the analysis of data sequences from psychological experiments; the objective was to analyze the results of reaction time (RT) data sequences plotted in SPC charts, in comparison with self-assessment judgments from an IOC task. Participants were 63 undergraduate students (Study 1) and 103 mine workers (Study 2) instructed to try to control a traffic light on a computer by pressing or not the keyboard. Higher probabilities of the successful outcome generated judgments of illusion and shifts (due to cognitive activity) in the charts of RT; lower probabilities resulted in null illusion and RT presented a random and stable profile. Patterns for different groups emerged in Shewhart charts. SPC can contribute to the analysis of the behavior of sequences of data in psychological studies, so that the charts indicate changes and patterns not detected by traditional ANOVA and other linear models.
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11
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The Effect of Skeuomorphic Digital Interfaces on the Illusion of Control over Gambling Outcomes. J Gambl Stud 2021; 37:623-642. [PMID: 32666374 DOI: 10.1007/s10899-020-09961-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
The current research focuses on how the use of "skeuomorphs" in digital design interacts with an illusion of control to influence gambling behavior. Skeuomorphism is a design concept in which an aspect of a modern item is made to represent its outdated counterpart, even if this representation serves no functional purpose, such as hands "dealing" cards or horses "racing" on the screen of a digital machine. It is proposed that the inclusion of these non-essential links to physical objects in digital gambling games interacts with a player's illusion of control over the outcome to influence behavior. Shown across a pretest and three experiments, the inclusion of skeuomorphic elements in the design of gambling games, compared to a minimalistic "flat" design, increases amount gambled. Additionally, skeuomorphism and manipulated illusion of control interact to further increase the amount gambled. The manuscript concludes with a discussion on the practical, theoretical, and policy implications of this research.
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12
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Moreno-Fernández MM, Blanco F, Matute H. The tendency to stop collecting information is linked to illusions of causality. Sci Rep 2021; 11:3942. [PMID: 33594129 PMCID: PMC7887230 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-82075-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2020] [Accepted: 01/12/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Previous research proposed that cognitive biases contribute to produce and maintain the symptoms exhibited by deluded patients. Specifically, the tendency to jump to conclusions (i.e., to stop collecting evidence soon before making a decision) has been claimed to contribute to delusion formation. Additionally, deluded patients show an abnormal understanding of cause-effect relationships, often leading to causal illusions (i.e., the belief that two events are causally connected, when they are not). Both types of bias appear in psychotic disorders, but also in healthy individuals. In two studies, we test the hypothesis that the two biases (jumping to conclusions and causal illusions) appear in the general population and correlate with each other. The rationale is based on current theories of associative learning that explain causal illusions as the result of a learning bias that tends to wear off as additional information is incorporated. We propose that participants with higher tendency to jump to conclusions will stop collecting information sooner in a causal learning study than those participants with lower tendency to jump to conclusions, which means that the former will not reach the learning asymptote, leading to biased judgments. The studies provide evidence in favour that the two biases are correlated but suggest that the proposed mechanism is not responsible for this association.
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Affiliation(s)
- María Manuela Moreno-Fernández
- Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Granada, Granada, Spain. .,Department of Methods and Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain.
| | - Fernando Blanco
- Department of Methods and Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain.,Department of Social Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- Department of Methods and Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
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13
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Yon D, Bunce C, Press C. Illusions of control without delusions of grandeur. Cognition 2020; 205:104429. [PMID: 32949908 PMCID: PMC7684464 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104429] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/26/2020] [Revised: 08/05/2020] [Accepted: 08/07/2020] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
We frequently experience feelings of agency over events we do not objectively influence - so-called 'illusions of control'. These illusions have prompted widespread claims that we can be insensitive to objective relationships between actions and outcomes, and instead rely on grandiose beliefs about our abilities. However, these illusory biases could instead arise if we are highly sensitive to action-outcome correlations, but attribute agency when such correlations emerge simply by chance. We motion-tracked participants while they made agency judgements about a cursor that could be yoked to their actions or follow an independent trajectory. A combination of signal detection analysis, reverse correlation methods and computational modelling indeed demonstrated that 'illusions' of control could emerge solely from sensitivity to spurious action-outcome correlations. Counterintuitively, this suggests that illusions of control could arise because agents have excellent insight into the relationships between actions and outcomes in a world where causal relationships are not perfectly deterministic.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel Yon
- Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, UK; Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, UK.
| | - Carl Bunce
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, UK
| | - Clare Press
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, UK
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14
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The more, the merrier: Treatment frequency influences effectiveness perception and further treatment choice. Psychon Bull Rev 2020; 28:665-675. [PMID: 33123843 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-020-01832-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/15/2020] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Causal illusions have been postulated as cognitive mediators of pseudoscientific beliefs, which, in turn, might lead to the use of pseudomedicines. However, while the laboratory tasks aimed to explore causal illusions typically present participants with information regarding the consequences of administering a fictitious treatment versus not administering any treatment, real-life decisions frequently involve choosing between several alternative treatments. In order to mimic these realistic conditions, participants in two experiments received information regarding the rate of recovery when each of two different fictitious remedies were administered. The fictitious remedy that was more frequently administered was given higher effectiveness ratings than the low-frequency one, independent of the absence or presence of information about the spontaneous recovery rate. Crucially, we also introduced a novel dependent variable that involved imagining new occasions in which the ailment was present and asking participants to decide which treatment they would opt for. The inclusion of information about the base rate of recovery significantly influenced participants' choices. These results imply that the mere prevalence of popular treatments might make them seem particularly effective. It also suggests that effectiveness ratings should be interpreted with caution as they might not accurately reflect real treatment choices. Materials and datasets are available at the Open Science Framework [https://osf.io/fctjs/].
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15
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Studer B, Geniole SN, Becker ML, Eisenegger C, Knecht S. Inducing illusory control ensures persistence when rewards fade and when others outperform us. Psychon Bull Rev 2020; 27:809-818. [PMID: 32424621 PMCID: PMC7399668 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-020-01745-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/19/2022]
Abstract
Persisting even when the rewards of continued effort are fading is essential for achieving long-term goals, skills, and good health, alike. Yet, we often quit when things get hard. Here, we tested whether augmenting the feeling of control through external measures increases persistence under such discouraging circumstances. In two laboratory experiments, we first induced illusory control by manipulating the base-rate of positive outcomes and then tested the effect of this elevation of participants' perceived control upon their persistence under diminishing returns and in a competition against a stronger opponent. Induced illusory control significantly enhanced people's persistence in both of these motivationally challenging situations. Our findings demonstrate that motivation is dependent upon perceived, rather than objective, control, and reveal that this can be leveraged to counteract quitting behavior when things get hard, for instance in rehabilitation, physical activity interventions, or other training settings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bettina Studer
- Institute of Clinical Neuroscience and Medical Psychology, Medical Faculty, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany.
- Department of Neurology, Mauritius Hospital Meerbusch, Meerbusch, Germany.
| | - Shawn N Geniole
- Neuropsychopharmacology and Biopsychology Unit, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
- Social-Neuroendocrinology Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Nipissing University, North Bay, Ontario, Canada
- Department of Psychology, University of the Fraser Valley, Abbotsford, Canada
| | - Maike L Becker
- Neuropsychopharmacology and Biopsychology Unit, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
| | - Christoph Eisenegger
- Neuropsychopharmacology and Biopsychology Unit, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
| | - Stefan Knecht
- Institute of Clinical Neuroscience and Medical Psychology, Medical Faculty, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany
- Department of Neurology, Mauritius Hospital Meerbusch, Meerbusch, Germany
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16
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Prazak M, Herbel DO. The role of military chaplaincy in addressing service member help avoidance: A critical review with treatment implications. J Health Care Chaplain 2020; 28:108-127. [PMID: 32692302 DOI: 10.1080/08854726.2020.1793094] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
The problem of suicide and mental health difficulties generally among military service members has a prominent and central role at present. Notoriously, suicides have long represented more military deaths than actual combat. However, despite attempts to address this and related difficulties, the problem continues to rise, rather than subsist. The present review begins with an exploration of the severity and prevalence of mental health difficulties in the military, with a focus on suicide and trauma in particular. It then identifies and expands upon the three key barriers to help-seeking within a military context, and applies the aforementioned discussion to the valuable but understudied and underutilized role of healthcare chaplaincy in a military setting. Discussion of the steps that may be taken to better communicate the value and function of healthcare chaplaincy across the service from leadership to service members follows.
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17
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Senan S, Msetfi RM, El Keshky M, Halbrook Y. The relationship between perception of control and mood: The intervening effect of cultural values in a Saudi Arabian sample. PLoS One 2019; 14:e0220509. [PMID: 31437160 PMCID: PMC6705794 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0220509] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2019] [Accepted: 07/17/2019] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
The relationship between the constructs of perceived control and symptoms of mood disorders has been demonstrated. The current study evaluates cultural values both as an individual difference moderating variable and as one of the mechanisms through which the association between perceived control and mood disturbances may operate. The hypotheses were examined with a sample of 615 participants recruited in Saudi Arabia. Participants completed measures of perceived control, individualism and collectivism, and symptoms of depression and bipolar disorder. In general, the results supported a model in which higher levels of perceived control promote a less symptomatic mood state. In most cases, cultural values positively mediated the relationship between perceived control and mood disturbance with lower symptom levels predicted. However, when the components of perceived control were examined separately, high perceived mastery together with highly individualistic values predicted higher levels of bipolar symptoms. In this sample, there was less evidence of cultural values moderating the control–mood disturbance relationship. Only one moderator relationship was identified, which showed low control linking to higher symptom levels only in those who disagreed with individualistic values. Overall, our data are in agreement with the notion that pre-existing cultural values have an important effect on mood disorder symptoms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Salha Senan
- Department of Psychology, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
| | - Rachel. M. Msetfi
- Centre for Social Issues Research, Department of Psychology, University of Limerick, Limerick, Republic of Ireland
- Health Research Institute, University of Limerick, Limerick, Republic of Ireland
- Computational Psychopathology Research Group, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Mogeda El Keshky
- Department of Psychology, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts, Assiut University, Assiut, Egypt
| | - Yemaya Halbrook
- Centre for Social Issues Research, Department of Psychology, University of Limerick, Limerick, Republic of Ireland
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18
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Barberia I, Vadillo MA, Rodríguez-Ferreiro J. Persistence of Causal Illusions After Extensive Training. Front Psychol 2019; 10:24. [PMID: 30733692 PMCID: PMC6353834 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/21/2018] [Accepted: 01/07/2019] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
We carried out an experiment using a conventional causal learning task but extending the number of learning trials participants were exposed to. Participants in the standard training group were exposed to 48 learning trials before being asked about the potential causal relationship under examination, whereas for participants in the long training group the length of training was extended to 288 trials. In both groups, the event acting as the potential cause had zero correlation with the occurrence of the outcome, but both the outcome density and the cause density were high, therefore providing a breeding ground for the emergence of a causal illusion. In contradiction to the predictions of associative models such the Rescorla-Wagner model, we found moderate evidence against the hypothesis that extending the learning phase alters the causal illusion. However, assessing causal impressions recurrently did weaken participants’ causal illusions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Itxaso Barberia
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament y Psicologia de la Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Miguel A Vadillo
- Departamento de Psicología Básica, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| | - Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament y Psicologia de la Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.,Institut de Neurociències, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
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19
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Simões RAG, Benvenuti MFL, Rodrigues ADS, Coutinho SP, Muñoz MÁ, Bizarro L. Persistence of repeated self-reported illusion of control as a product of action and outcome association in productive and preventive scenarios. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2019; 84:1184-1197. [PMID: 30719543 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-019-01147-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2018] [Accepted: 01/22/2019] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Individuals interpret themselves as causal agents when executing an action to achieve an outcome, even when action and outcome are independent. How can illusion of control be managed? Once established, does it decay? This study aimed to analyze the effects of valence, probability of the outcome [p(O)] and probability of the actions performed by the participant [p(A)], on the magnitude of judgments of control and corresponding associative measures (including Rescorla-Wagner's, Probabilistic Contrast, and Cheng's Power Probabilistic Contrast models). A traffic light was presented on a computer screen to 81 participants who tried to control the green or red lights by pressing the spacebar, after instructions describing a productive or a preventive scenario. There were 4 blocks of 50 trials under all of 4 different p(O)s in random order (0.10, 0.30, 0.70, and 0.90). Judgments were assessed in a bidimensional scale. The 2 × 4 × 4 mixed experimental design was analyzed through General Linear Models, including factor group (between-subject valence), and block and p(O) (within subjects). There was a small effect of group and a large and direct effect of p(O) on judgments. Illusion was reported by 66% of the sample and was positive in the productive group. The oscillation of p(O) produced stronger illusions; decreasing p(O)s produced nil or negative illusions. Only Rescorla-Wagner's could model causality properly. The reasons why p(A) and the other models could not generate significant results are discussed. The results help to comprehend the importance of keeping moderate illusions in productive and preventive scenarios.
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Affiliation(s)
- Reinaldo Augusto Gomes Simões
- Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Instituto de Psicologia, Rua Ramiro Barcelos, 2600, Porto Alegre, RS, 90035-003, Brazil. .,Mind, Brain and Behavior Research Center-CIMCYC, Universidad de Granada, Campus de la Cartuja s/n, 18071, Granada, Spain.
| | - Marcelo Frota Lobato Benvenuti
- Universidade de São Paulo, Instituto de Psicologia, Av. Prof. Mello Moraes, 1721, São Paulo, SP, 05508-030, Brazil.,Instituto Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia sobre Comportamento, Cognição e Ensino, Rodovia Washington Luís, km 235, São Carlos, SP, 13565-905, Brazil
| | - Aline de Souza Rodrigues
- Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Instituto de Psicologia, Rua Ramiro Barcelos, 2600, Porto Alegre, RS, 90035-003, Brazil
| | - Stela Pereira Coutinho
- Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Instituto de Psicologia, Rua Ramiro Barcelos, 2600, Porto Alegre, RS, 90035-003, Brazil
| | - Miguel Ángel Muñoz
- Mind, Brain and Behavior Research Center-CIMCYC, Universidad de Granada, Campus de la Cartuja s/n, 18071, Granada, Spain
| | - Lisiane Bizarro
- Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Instituto de Psicologia, Rua Ramiro Barcelos, 2600, Porto Alegre, RS, 90035-003, Brazil
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20
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Paynter J, Luskin-Saxby S, Keen D, Fordyce K, Frost G, Imms C, Miller S, Trembath D, Tucker M, Ecker U. Evaluation of a template for countering misinformation-Real-world Autism treatment myth debunking. PLoS One 2019; 14:e0210746. [PMID: 30699155 PMCID: PMC6353548 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0210746] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/27/2018] [Accepted: 12/08/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Misinformation poses significant challenges to evidence-based practice. In the public health domain specifically, treatment misinformation can lead to opportunity costs or direct harm. Alas, attempts to debunk misinformation have proven sub-optimal, and have even been shown to “backfire”, including increasing misperceptions. Thus, optimized debunking strategies have been developed to more effectively combat misinformation. The aim of this study was to test these strategies in a real-world setting, targeting misinformation about autism interventions. In the context of professional development training, we randomly assigned participants to an “optimized-debunking” or a “treatment-as-usual” training condition and compared support for non-empirically-supported treatments before, after, and six weeks following completion of online training. Results demonstrated greater benefits of optimized debunking immediately after training; thus, the implemented strategies can serve as a general and flexible debunking template. However, the effect was not sustained at follow-up, highlighting the need for further research into strategies for sustained change.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jessica Paynter
- School of Applied Psychology/Menzies Health Institute, Griffith University, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia
- * E-mail:
| | - Sarah Luskin-Saxby
- School of Applied Psychology/Menzies Health Institute, Griffith University, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia
| | - Deb Keen
- Griffith Institute for Educational Research, Griffith University, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia
| | - Kathryn Fordyce
- North West Tasmania Autism Specific Early Learning and Care Centre, St Giles Society, Burnie, Tasmania, Australia
| | - Grace Frost
- Daphne Street Autism Specific Early Learning and Care Centre, Anglicare South Australia, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia
| | - Christine Imms
- Centre for Disability & Development Research, Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
| | - Scott Miller
- Early Intervention Services, Autism Association of Western Australia, Perth, Western Australia, Australia
| | - David Trembath
- Menzies Health Institute Queensland, Griffith University, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia
| | - Madonna Tucker
- Research and Assessment, AEIOU Foundation, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
| | - Ullrich Ecker
- School of Psychological Science, University of Western Australia, Perth, Western Australia, Australia
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21
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MacFarlane D, Hurlstone MJ, Ecker UKH. Reducing demand for ineffective health remedies: overcoming the illusion of causality. Psychol Health 2018; 33:1472-1489. [DOI: 10.1080/08870446.2018.1508685] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Douglas MacFarlane
- School of Psychological Science, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia
| | - Mark J. Hurlstone
- School of Psychological Science, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia
| | - Ullrich K. H. Ecker
- School of Psychological Science, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia
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22
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Comparing illusion of control and superstitious behavior: Rate of responding influences judgment of control in a free-operant procedure. LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 2018. [DOI: 10.1016/j.lmot.2017.10.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
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23
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What about the Male Victims? Exploring the Impact of Gender Stereotyping on Implicit Attitudes and Behavioural Intentions Associated with Intimate Partner Violence. SEX ROLES 2018. [DOI: 10.1007/s11199-018-0949-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
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24
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Pilditch TD, Custers R. Communicated beliefs about action-outcomes: The role of initial confirmation in the adoption and maintenance of unsupported beliefs. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2018; 184:46-63. [PMID: 28478953 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2017.04.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2016] [Revised: 03/24/2017] [Accepted: 04/18/2017] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
As agents seeking to learn how to successfully navigate their environments, humans can both obtain knowledge through direct experience, and second-hand through communicated beliefs. Questions remain concerning how communicated belief (or instruction) interacts with first-hand evidence integration, and how the former can bias the latter. Previous research has revealed that people are more inclined to seek out confirming evidence when they are motivated to uphold the belief, resulting in confirmation bias. The current research explores whether merely communicated beliefs affect evidence integration over time when it is not of interest to uphold the belief, and all evidence is readily available. In a novel series of on-line experiments, participants chose on each trial which of two options to play for money, being exposed to outcomes of both. Prior to this, they were exposed to favourable communicated beliefs regarding one of two options. Beliefs were either initially supported or undermined by subsequent probabilistic evidence (probabilities reversed halfway through the task, rendering the options equally profitable overall). Results showed that while communicated beliefs predicted initial choices, they only biased subsequent choices when supported by initial evidence in the first phase of the experiment. Findings were replicated across contexts, evidence sequence lengths, and probabilistic distributions. This suggests that merely communicated beliefs can prevail even when not supported by long run evidence, and in the absence of a motivation to uphold them. The implications of the interaction between communicated beliefs and initial evidence for areas including instruction effects, impression formation, and placebo effects are discussed.
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25
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A comparator-hypothesis account of biased contingency detection. Behav Processes 2018; 154:45-51. [PMID: 29447853 DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2018.02.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/15/2017] [Revised: 02/10/2018] [Accepted: 02/10/2018] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Our ability to detect statistical dependencies between different events in the environment is strongly biased by the number of coincidences between them. Even when there is no true covariation between a cue and an outcome, if the marginal probability of either of them is high, people tend to perceive some degree of statistical contingency between both events. The present paper explores the ability of the Comparator Hypothesis to explain the general pattern of results observed in this literature. Our simulations show that this model can account for the biasing effects of the marginal probabilities of cues and outcomes. Furthermore, the overall fit of the Comparator Hypothesis to a sample of experimental conditions from previous studies is comparable to that of the popular Rescorla-Wagner model. These results should encourage researchers to further explore and put to the test the predictions of the Comparator Hypothesis in the domain of biased contingency detection.
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26
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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of a foreign language
on the causality bias (i.e., the illusion that two events are causally related
when they are not). We predict that using a foreign language could reduce the
illusions of causality. A total of 36 native English speakers participated in
Experiment 1, 80 native Spanish speakers in Experiment 2. They performed a
standard contingency learning task, which can be used to detect causal
illusions. Participants who performed the task in their native tongue replicated
the illusion of causality effect, whereas those performing the task in their
foreign language were more accurate in detecting that the two events were
causally unrelated. Our results suggest that presenting the information in a
foreign language could be used as a strategy to debias individuals against
causal illusions, thereby facilitating more accurate judgements and decisions in
non-contingent situations. They also contribute to the debate on the nature and
underlying mechanisms of the foreign language effect, given that the illusion of
causality is rooted in basic associative processes.
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27
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Revenga Frauca J. [The rise of «diets without»: From therapeutics to fashions]. Aten Primaria 2017; 49:568-569. [PMID: 29129338 PMCID: PMC6876024 DOI: 10.1016/j.aprim.2017.10.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2017] [Accepted: 10/16/2017] [Indexed: 11/05/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Juan Revenga Frauca
- Facultad de Ciencias de la Salud, Universidad San Jorge, Villanueva de Gállego, Zaragoza, España.
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28
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Moreno-Fernández MM, Blanco F, Matute H. Causal illusions in children when the outcome is frequent. PLoS One 2017; 12:e0184707. [PMID: 28898294 PMCID: PMC5595306 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0184707] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2016] [Accepted: 08/29/2017] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Causal illusions occur when people perceive a causal relation between two events that are actually unrelated. One factor that has been shown to promote these mistaken beliefs is the outcome probability. Thus, people tend to overestimate the strength of a causal relation when the potential consequence (i.e. the outcome) occurs with a high probability (outcome-density bias). Given that children and adults differ in several important features involved in causal judgment, including prior knowledge and basic cognitive skills, developmental studies can be considered an outstanding approach to detect and further explore the psychological processes and mechanisms underlying this bias. However, the outcome density bias has been mainly explored in adulthood, and no previous evidence for this bias has been reported in children. Thus, the purpose of this study was to extend outcome-density bias research to childhood. In two experiments, children between 6 and 8 years old were exposed to two similar setups, both showing a non-contingent relation between the potential cause and the outcome. These two scenarios differed only in the probability of the outcome, which could either be high or low. Children judged the relation between the two events to be stronger in the high probability of the outcome setting, revealing that, like adults, they develop causal illusions when the outcome is frequent.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Fernando Blanco
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
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29
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Thorwart A, Livesey EJ. Three Ways That Non-associative Knowledge May Affect Associative Learning Processes. Front Psychol 2016; 7:2024. [PMID: 28082943 PMCID: PMC5186804 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/30/2016] [Accepted: 12/13/2016] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Associative learning theories offer one account of the way animals and humans assess the relationship between events and adapt their behavior according to resulting expectations. They assume knowledge about event relations is represented in associative networks, which consist of mental representations of cues and outcomes and the associative links that connect them. However, in human causal and contingency learning, many researchers have found that variance in standard learning effects is controlled by "non-associative" factors that are not easily captured by associative models. This has given rise to accounts of learning based on higher-order cognitive processes, some of which reject altogether the notion that humans learn in the manner described by associative networks. Despite the renewed focus on this debate in recent years, few efforts have been made to consider how the operations of associative networks and other cognitive operations could potentially interact in the course of learning. This paper thus explores possible ways in which non-associative knowledge may affect associative learning processes: (1) via changes to stimulus representations, (2) via changes to the translation of the associative expectation into behavior (3) via a shared source of expectation of the outcome that is sensitive to both the strength of associative retrieval and evaluation from non-associative influences.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anna Thorwart
- Department of Psychology, Philipps-Universität MarburgMarburg, Germany
| | - Evan J. Livesey
- School of Psychology, The University of Sydney, SydneyNSW, Australia
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30
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Abstract
Decades of research in causal and contingency learning show that people's estimations of the degree of contingency between two events are easily biased by the relative probabilities of those two events. If two events co-occur frequently, then people tend to overestimate the strength of the contingency between them. Traditionally, these biases have been explained in terms of relatively simple single-process models of learning and reasoning. However, more recently some authors have found that these biases do not appear in all dependent variables and have proposed dual-process models to explain these dissociations between variables. In the present paper we review the evidence for dissociations supporting dual-process models and we point out important shortcomings of this literature. Some dissociations seem to be difficult to replicate or poorly generalizable and others can be attributed to methodological artifacts. Overall, we conclude that support for dual-process models of biased contingency detection is scarce and inconclusive.
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Affiliation(s)
- Miguel A Vadillo
- 1 Primary Care and Public Health Sciences, King's College London, UK.,2 Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, UK
| | - Fernando Blanco
- 3 Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Ion Yarritu
- 3 Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- 3 Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
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Abstract
Causal learning is the ability to progressively incorporate raw information about dependencies between events, or between one's behavior and its outcomes, into beliefs of the causal structure of the world. In spite of the fact that some cognitive biases in gambling disorder can be described as alterations of causal learning involving gambling-relevant cues, behaviors, and outcomes, general causal learning mechanisms in gamblers have not been systematically investigated. In the present study, we compared gambling disorder patients against controls in an instrumental causal learning task. Evidence of illusion of control, namely, overestimation of the relationship between one's behavior and an uncorrelated outcome, showed up only in gamblers with strong current symptoms. Interestingly, this effect was part of a more complex pattern, in which gambling disorder patients manifested a poorer ability to discriminate between null and positive contingencies. Additionally, anomalies were related to gambling severity and current gambling disorder symptoms. Gambling-related biases, as measured by a standard psychometric tool, correlated with performance in the causal learning task, but not in the expected direction. Indeed, performance of gamblers with stronger biases tended to resemble the one of controls, which could imply that anomalies of causal learning processes play a role in gambling disorder, but do not seem to underlie gambling-specific biases, at least in a simple, direct way.
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32
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Matute H, Blanco F, Yarritu I, Díaz-Lago M, Vadillo MA, Barberia I. Illusions of causality: how they bias our everyday thinking and how they could be reduced. Front Psychol 2015; 6:888. [PMID: 26191014 PMCID: PMC4488611 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00888] [Citation(s) in RCA: 58] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/01/2015] [Accepted: 06/15/2015] [Indexed: 12/01/2022] Open
Abstract
Illusions of causality occur when people develop the belief that there is a causal connection between two events that are actually unrelated. Such illusions have been proposed to underlie pseudoscience and superstitious thinking, sometimes leading to disastrous consequences in relation to critical life areas, such as health, finances, and wellbeing. Like optical illusions, they can occur for anyone under well-known conditions. Scientific thinking is the best possible safeguard against them, but it does not come intuitively and needs to be taught. Teaching how to think scientifically should benefit from better understanding of the illusion of causality. In this article, we review experiments that our group has conducted on the illusion of causality during the last 20 years. We discuss how research on the illusion of causality can contribute to the teaching of scientific thinking and how scientific thinking can reduce illusion.
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Affiliation(s)
- Helena Matute
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Fernando Blanco
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Ion Yarritu
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Marcos Díaz-Lago
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Miguel A. Vadillo
- Primary Care and Public Health Sciences, King’s College London, London, UK
| | - Itxaso Barberia
- Departamento de Psicología Básica, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
- EventLab, Departamento de Personalidad, Evaluación y Tratamiento Psicológico, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
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33
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Reducing the illusion of control when an action is followed by an undesired outcome. Psychon Bull Rev 2015; 21:1087-93. [PMID: 24448764 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-014-0584-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
The illusion of control is the belief that our behavior produces an effect that is actually independent from it. This illusion is often at the core of superstitious and pseudoscientific thinking. Although recent research has proposed several evidence-based strategies that can be used to reduce the illusion, the majority of these experiments have involved positive illusions-that is, those in which the potential outcomes are desired (e.g., recovery from illness or earning points). By contrast, many real-life superstitions and pseudosciences are tied to negative illusions-that is, those in which the potential consequences are undesired. Examples are walking under a ladder, breaking a mirror, or sitting in row 13, all of which are supposed to generate bad luck. Thus, the question is whether the available evidence on how to reduce positive illusions would also apply to situations in which the outcomes are undesired. We conducted an experiment in which participants were exposed to undesired outcomes that occurred independently of their behavior. One strategy that has been shown to reduce positive illusions consists of warning people that the outcomes might have alternative causes, other than the participants' actions, and telling them that the best they can do to find out whether an alternative cause is at work is to act on only about 50% of the trials. When we gave our participants this information in an experiment in which the outcomes were undesired, their illusion was enhanced rather than reduced, contrary to what happens when the outcome is desired. This suggests that the strategies that reduce positive illusions may work in just the opposite way when the outcome is undesired.
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34
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Yarritu I, Matute H. Previous knowledge can induce an illusion of causality through actively biasing behavior. Front Psychol 2015; 6:389. [PMID: 25904883 PMCID: PMC4389369 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00389] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/31/2014] [Accepted: 03/18/2015] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
It is generally assumed that the way people assess the relationship between a cause and an outcome is closely related to the actual evidence existing about the co-occurrence of these events. However, people's estimations are often biased, and this usually translates into illusions of causality. Some have suggested that such illusions could be the result of previous knowledge-based expectations. In the present research we explored the role that previous knowledge has in the development of illusions of causality. We propose that previous knowledge influences the assessment of causality by influencing the decisions about responding or not (i.e., presence or absence of the potential cause), which biases the information people are exposed to, and this in turn produces illusions congruent with such biased information. In a non-contingent situation in which participants decided whether the potential cause was present or absent (Experiment 1), the influence of expectations on participants' judgments was mediated by the probability of occurrence of the potential cause (determined by participants' responses). However, in an identical situation, except that the participants were not allowed to decide the occurrence of the potential cause (Experiment 2), only the probability of the cause was significant, not the expectations or the interaction. Together, these results support our hypothesis that knowledge-based expectations affect the development of causal illusions by the mediation of behavior, which biases the information received.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ion Yarritu
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto Bilbao, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto Bilbao, Spain
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35
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Abstract
PURPOSE OF REVIEW What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism, it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about the style of thinking and mental health. RECENT FINDINGS Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks involving time perception and estimates of personal circumstances, but not in other tasks. Unrealistic optimism remains a robust phenomenon across a variety of tasks and domains, and researchers are starting to explore its neural bases. However, the challenge is to determine to what extent and in what way unrealistic optimism is beneficial. SUMMARY We should revisit the hypothesis that optimistic cognitions are psychologically adaptive, whereas realistic thinking is not. Realistic beliefs and expectations can be conducive to wellbeing and good functioning, and wildly optimistic cognitions have considerable psychological costs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lisa Bortolotti
- Philosophy Department, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, UK
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Yarritu I, Matute H, Luque D. The dark side of cognitive illusions: when an illusory belief interferes with the acquisition of evidence-based knowledge. Br J Psychol 2015; 106:597-608. [PMID: 25641547 PMCID: PMC5024046 DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12119] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/12/2014] [Revised: 12/10/2014] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Cognitive illusions are often associated with mental health and well‐being. However, they are not without risk. This research shows they can interfere with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge. During the first phase of the experiment, one group of participants was induced to develop a strong illusion that a placebo medicine was effective to treat a fictitious disease, whereas another group was induced to develop a weak illusion. Then, in Phase 2, both groups observed fictitious patients who always took the bogus treatment simultaneously with a second treatment which was effective. Our results showed that the group who developed the strong illusion about the effectiveness of the bogus treatment during Phase 1 had more difficulties in learning during Phase 2 that the added treatment was effective.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ion Yarritu
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Deusto University, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Deusto University, Bilbao, Spain
| | - David Luque
- Biomedical Research Institute (IBIMA), University of Malaga, Spain.,School of Psychology, UNSW, Sydney, Australia
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Blanco F, Barberia I, Matute H. The lack of side effects of an ineffective treatment facilitates the development of a belief in its effectiveness. PLoS One 2014; 9:e84084. [PMID: 24416194 PMCID: PMC3885525 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0084084] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2013] [Accepted: 11/10/2013] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Some alternative medicines enjoy widespread use, and in certain situations are preferred over conventional, validated treatments in spite of the fact that they fail to prove effective when tested scientifically. We propose that the causal illusion, a basic cognitive bias, underlies the belief in the effectiveness of bogus treatments. Therefore, the variables that modulate the former might affect the latter. For example, it is well known that the illusion is boosted when a potential cause occurs with high probability. In this study, we examined the effect of this variable in a fictitious medical scenario. First, we showed that people used a fictitious medicine (i.e., a potential cause of remission) more often when they thought it caused no side effects. Second, the more often they used the medicine, the more likely they were to develop an illusory belief in its effectiveness, despite the fact that it was actually useless. This behavior may be parallel to actual pseudomedicine usage; that because a treatment is thought to be harmless, it is used with high frequency, hence the overestimation of its effectiveness in treating diseases with a high rate of spontaneous relief. This study helps shed light on the motivations spurring the widespread preference of pseudomedicines over scientific medicines. This is a valuable first step toward the development of scientifically validated strategies to counteract the impact of pseudomedicine on society.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fernando Blanco
- Universidad de Deusto, Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Itxaso Barberia
- Universidad de Deusto, Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- Universidad de Deusto, Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Bilbao, Spain
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