Task complexity interacts with state-space uncertainty in the arbitration between model-based and model-free learning

Neurocomputational model of compulsivity: deviating from an uncertain goal-directed system

Despite a theory that an imbalance in goal-directed versus habitual systems serve as building blocks of compulsions, research has yet to delineate how this occurs during arbitration between the two systems in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Inspired by a brain model in which the inferior frontal cortex selectively gates the putamen to guide goal-directed or habitual actions, this study aimed to examine whether disruptions in the arbitration process via the fronto-striatal circuit would underlie imbalanced decision-making and compulsions in patients. Thirty patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder [mean (standard deviation) age = 26.93 (6.23) years, 12 females (40%)] and 30 healthy controls [mean (standard deviation) age = 24.97 (4.72) years, 17 females (57%)] underwent functional MRI scans while performing the two-step Markov decision task, which was designed to dissociate goal-directed behaviour from habitual behaviour. We employed a neurocomputational model to account for an uncertainty-based arbitration process, in which a prefrontal arbitrator (i.e. inferior frontal gyrus) allocates behavioural control to a more reliable strategy by selectively gating the putamen. We analysed group differences in the neural estimates of uncertainty of each strategy. We also compared the psychophysiological interaction effects of system preference (goal-directed versus habitual) on fronto-striatal coupling between groups. We examined the correlation between compulsivity score and the neural activity and connectivity involved in the arbitration process. The computational model captured the subjects' preferences between the strategies. Compared with healthy controls, patients had a stronger preference for the habitual system (t = -2.88, P = 0.006), which was attributed to a more uncertain goal-directed system (t = 2.72, P = 0.009). Before the allocation of controls, patients exhibited hypoactivity in the inferior frontal gyrus compared with healthy controls when this region tracked the inverse of uncertainty (i.e. reliability) of goal-directed behaviour (P = 0.001, family-wise error rate corrected). When reorienting behaviours to reach specific goals, patients exhibited weaker right ipsilateral ventrolateral prefronto-putamen coupling than healthy controls (P = 0.001, family-wise error rate corrected). This hypoconnectivity was correlated with more severe compulsivity (r = -0.57, P = 0.002). Our findings suggest that the attenuated top-down control of the putamen by the prefrontal arbitrator underlies compulsivity in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Enhancing fronto-striatal connectivity may be a potential neurotherapeutic approach for compulsivity and adaptive decision-making.

Synergizing habits and goals with variational Bayes

Behaving efficiently and flexibly is crucial for biological and artificial embodied agents. Behavior is generally classified into two types: habitual (fast but inflexible), and goal-directed (flexible but slow). While these two types of behaviors are typically considered to be managed by two distinct systems in the brain, recent studies have revealed a more sophisticated interplay between them. We introduce a theoretical framework using variational Bayesian theory, incorporating a Bayesian intention variable. Habitual behavior depends on the prior distribution of intention, computed from sensory context without goal-specification. In contrast, goal-directed behavior relies on the goal-conditioned posterior distribution of intention, inferred through variational free energy minimization. Assuming that an agent behaves using a synergized intention, our simulations in vision-based sensorimotor tasks explain the key properties of their interaction as observed in experiments. Our work suggests a fresh perspective on the neural mechanisms of habits and goals, shedding light on future research in decision making.

From compulsivity to compulsion: the neural basis of compulsive disorders

Compulsive behaviour, an apparently irrational perseveration in often maladaptive acts, is a potential transdiagnostic symptom of several neuropsychiatric disorders, including obsessive-compulsive disorder and addiction, and may reflect the severe manifestation of a dimensional trait termed compulsivity. In this Review, we examine the psychological basis of compulsions and compulsivity and their underlying neural circuitry using evidence from human neuroimaging and animal models. Several main elements of this circuitry are identified, focused on fronto-striatal systems implicated in goal-directed behaviour and habits. These systems include the orbitofrontal, prefrontal, anterior cingulate and insular cortices and their connections with the basal ganglia as well as sensoriomotor and parietal cortices and cerebellum. We also consider the implications for future classification of impulsive-compulsive disorders and their treatment.

Neurocomputational mechanisms involved in adaptation to fluctuating intentions of others

Humans frequently interact with agents whose intentions can fluctuate between competition and cooperation over time. It is unclear how the brain adapts to fluctuating intentions of others when the nature of the interactions (to cooperate or compete) is not explicitly and truthfully signaled. Here, we use model-based fMRI and a task in which participants thought they were playing with another player. In fact, they played with an algorithm that alternated without signaling between cooperative and competitive strategies. We show that a neurocomputational mechanism with arbitration between competitive and cooperative experts outperforms other learning models in predicting choice behavior. At the brain level, the fMRI results show that the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex track the difference of reliability between these experts. When attributing competitive intentions, we find increased coupling between these regions and a network that distinguishes prediction errors related to competition and cooperation. These findings provide a neurocomputational account of how the brain arbitrates dynamically between cooperative and competitive intentions when making adaptive social decisions.

Distinct roles of monkey OFC-subcortical pathways in adaptive behavior

To be the most successful, primates must adapt to changing environments and optimize their behavior by making the most beneficial choices. At the core of adaptive behavior is the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) of the brain, which updates choice value through direct experience or knowledge-based inference. Here, we identify distinct neural circuitry underlying these two separate abilities. We designed two behavioral tasks in which macaque monkeys updated the values of certain items, either by directly experiencing changes in stimulus-reward associations, or by inferring the value of unexperienced items based on the task's rules. Chemogenetic silencing of bilateral OFC combined with mathematical model-fitting analysis revealed that monkey OFC is involved in updating item value based on both experience and inference. In vivo imaging of chemogenetic receptors by positron emission tomography allowed us to map projections from the OFC to the rostromedial caudate nucleus (rmCD) and the medial part of the mediodorsal thalamus (MDm). Chemogenetic silencing of the OFC-rmCD pathway impaired experience-based value updating, while silencing the OFC-MDm pathway impaired inference-based value updating. Our results thus demonstrate a dissociable contribution of distinct OFC projections to different behavioral strategies, and provide new insights into the neural basis of value-based adaptive decision-making in primates.

Impairment of arbitration between model-based and model-free reinforcement learning in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Introduction

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterized by an imbalance between goal-directed and habitual learning systems in behavioral control, but it is unclear whether these impairments are due to a single system abnormality of the goal-directed system or due to an impairment in a separate arbitration mechanism that selects which system controls behavior at each point in time.

Methods

A total of 30 OCD patients and 120 healthy controls performed a 2-choice, 3-stage Markov decision-making paradigm. Reinforcement learning models were used to estimate goal-directed learning (as model-based reinforcement learning) and habitual learning (as model-free reinforcement learning). In general, 29 high Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) score controls, 31 low OCI-R score controls, and all 30 OCD patients were selected for the analysis.

Results

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients showed less appropriate strategy choices than controls regardless of whether the OCI-R scores in the control subjects were high (p = 0.012) or low (p < 0.001), specifically showing a greater model-free strategy use in task conditions where the model-based strategy was optimal. Furthermore, OCD patients (p = 0.001) and control subjects with high OCI-R scores (H-OCI-R; p = 0.009) both showed greater system switching rather than consistent strategy use in task conditions where model-free use was optimal.

Conclusion

These findings indicated an impaired arbitration mechanism for flexible adaptation to environmental demands in both OCD patients and healthy individuals reporting high OCI-R scores.

Advanced Reinforcement Learning and Its Connections with Brain Neuroscience

In recent years, brain science and neuroscience have greatly propelled the innovation of computer science. In particular, knowledge from the neurobiology and neuropsychology of the brain revolutionized the development of reinforcement learning (RL) by providing novel interpretable mechanisms of how the brain achieves intelligent and efficient decision making. Triggered by this, there has been a boom in research about advanced RL algorithms that are built upon the inspirations of brain neuroscience. In this work, to further strengthen the bidirectional link between the 2 communities and especially promote the research on modern RL technology, we provide a comprehensive survey of recent advances in the area of brain-inspired/related RL algorithms. We start with basis theories of RL, and present a concise introduction to brain neuroscience related to RL. Then, we classify these advanced RL methodologies into 3 categories according to different connections of the brain, i.e., micro-neural activity, macro-brain structure, and cognitive function. Each category is further surveyed by presenting several modern RL algorithms along with their mathematical models, correlations with the brain, and open issues. Finally, we introduce several important applications of RL algorithms, followed by the discussions of challenges and opportunities for future research.

Model-based prioritization for acquiring protection

Protection often involves the capacity to prospectively plan the actions needed to mitigate harm. The computational architecture of decisions involving protection remains unclear, as well as whether these decisions differ from other beneficial prospective actions such as reward acquisition. Here we compare protection acquisition to reward acquisition and punishment avoidance to examine overlapping and distinct features across the three action types. Protection acquisition is positively valenced similar to reward. For both protection and reward, the more the actor gains, the more benefit. However, reward and protection occur in different contexts, with protection existing in aversive contexts. Punishment avoidance also occurs in aversive contexts, but differs from protection because punishment is negatively valenced and motivates avoidance. Across three independent studies (Total N = 600) we applied computational modeling to examine model-based reinforcement learning for protection, reward, and punishment in humans. Decisions motivated by acquiring protection evoked a higher degree of model-based control than acquiring reward or avoiding punishment, with no significant differences in learning rate. The context-valence asymmetry characteristic of protection increased deployment of flexible decision strategies, suggesting model-based control depends on the context in which outcomes are encountered as well as the valence of the outcome.

Frontostriatal Functional Connectivity Underlies the Association between Punishment Sensitivity and Procrastination

Procrastination is defined as putting off an intended course of action voluntarily despite the harmful consequences. Previous studies have suggested that procrastination is associated with punishment sensitivity in that high punishment sensitivity results in increased negative utility for task performance. We hypothesized the effects of punishment sensitivity on procrastination would be mediated by a network connecting the caudate nucleus and prefrontal cortex, both of which have been previously associated with self-control and emotional control during procrastination. We employed voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) to examine the neural substrates of punishment sensitivity and its relationship with procrastination (N = 268). The behavioral results indicated a strong positive correlation between measures of punishment sensitivity and procrastination. The VBM analysis revealed that the gray matter (GM) volume of the right caudate was significantly positively correlated with punishment sensitivity. The primary rsFC analysis revealed connectivity between this caudate location and the bilateral middle frontal gyrus (MFG) was significantly negatively correlated with punishment sensitivity. A mediation model indicated punishment sensitivity completely mediated the relation between functional connectivity within a caudate–bilateral MFG network and procrastination. Our results support the theory that those with higher punishment sensitivity have weaker effective emotional self-control supported by the caudate–MFG network, resulting in greater procrastination.

Stress-sensitive inference of task controllability

Estimating the controllability of the environment enables agents to better predict upcoming events and decide when to engage controlled action selection. How does the human brain estimate controllability? Trial-by-trial analysis of choices, decision times and neural activity in an explore-and-predict task demonstrate that humans solve this problem by comparing the predictions of an 'actor' model with those of a reduced 'spectator' model of their environment. Neural blood oxygen level-dependent responses within striatal and medial prefrontal areas tracked the instantaneous difference in the prediction errors generated by these two statistical learning models. Blood oxygen level-dependent activity in the posterior cingulate, temporoparietal and prefrontal cortices covaried with changes in estimated controllability. Exposure to inescapable stressors biased controllability estimates downward and increased reliance on the spectator model in an anxiety-dependent fashion. Taken together, these findings provide a mechanistic account of controllability inference and its distortion by stress exposure.

Serotonin neurons modulate learning rate through uncertainty

Regulating how fast to learn is critical for flexible behavior. Learning about the consequences of actions should be slow in stable environments, but accelerate when that environment changes. Recognizing stability and detecting change are difficult in environments with noisy relationships between actions and outcomes. Under these conditions, theories propose that uncertainty can be used to modulate learning rates ("meta-learning"). We show that mice behaving in a dynamic foraging task exhibit choice behavior that varied as a function of two forms of uncertainty estimated from a meta-learning model. The activity of dorsal raphe serotonin neurons tracked both types of uncertainty in the foraging task as well as in a dynamic Pavlovian task. Reversible inhibition of serotonin neurons in the foraging task reproduced changes in learning predicted by a simulated lesion of meta-learning in the model. We thus provide a quantitative link between serotonin neuron activity, learning, and decision making.

Prefrontal solution to the bias-variance tradeoff during reinforcement learning

Evidence that the brain combines different value learning strategies to minimize prediction error is accumulating. However, the tradeoff between bias and variance error, which imposes different constraints on each learning strategy's performance, poses a challenge for value learning. While this tradeoff specifies the requirements for optimal learning, little has been known about how the brain deals with this issue. Here, we hypothesize that the brain adaptively resolves the bias-variance tradeoff during reinforcement learning. Our theory suggests that the solution necessitates baseline correction for prediction error, which offsets the adverse effects of irreducible error on value learning. We show behavioral evidence of adaptive control using a Markov decision task with context changes. The prediction error baseline seemingly signals context changes to improve adaptability. Critically, we identify multiplexed representations of prediction error baseline within the ventrolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, key brain regions known to guide model-based and model-free reinforcement learning.

Parallel and hierarchical neural mechanisms for adaptive and predictive behavioral control

Our brain can be recognized as a network of largely hierarchically organized neural circuits that operate to control specific functions, but when acting in parallel, enable the performance of complex and simultaneous behaviors. Indeed, many of our daily actions require concurrent information processing in sensorimotor, associative, and limbic circuits that are dynamically and hierarchically modulated by sensory information and previous learning. This organization of information processing in biological organisms has served as a major inspiration for artificial intelligence and has helped to create in silico systems capable of matching or even outperforming humans in several specific tasks, including visual recognition and strategy-based games. However, the development of human-like robots that are able to move as quickly as humans and respond flexibly in various situations remains a major challenge and indicates an area where further use of parallel and hierarchical architectures may hold promise. In this article we review several important neural and behavioral mechanisms organizing hierarchical and predictive processing for the acquisition and realization of flexible behavioral control. Then, inspired by the organizational features of brain circuits, we introduce a multi-timescale parallel and hierarchical learning framework for the realization of versatile and agile movement in humanoid robots.

Effects of subclinical depression on prefrontal-striatal model-based and model-free learning

Depression is characterized by deficits in the reinforcement learning (RL) process. Although many computational and neural studies have extended our knowledge of the impact of depression on RL, most focus on habitual control (model-free RL), yielding a relatively poor understanding of goal-directed control (model-based RL) and arbitration control to find a balance between the two. We investigated the effects of subclinical depression on model-based and model-free learning in the prefrontal-striatal circuitry. First, we found that subclinical depression is associated with the attenuated state and reward prediction error representation in the insula and caudate. Critically, we found that it accompanies the disrupted arbitration control between model-based and model-free learning in the predominantly inferior lateral prefrontal cortex and frontopolar cortex. We also found that depression undermines the ability to exploit viable options, called exploitation sensitivity. These findings characterize how subclinical depression influences different levels of the decision-making hierarchy, advancing previous conflicting views that depression simply influences either habitual or goal-directed control. Our study creates possibilities for various clinical applications, such as early diagnosis and behavioral therapy design.

The Role of the Rodent Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex in Simple Pavlovian Cue-Outcome Learning Depends on Training Experience

The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is a critical structure in the flexible control of value-based behaviors. OFC dysfunction is typically only detected when task or environmental contingencies change, against a backdrop of apparently intact initial acquisition and behavior. While intact acquisition following OFC lesions in simple Pavlovian cue-outcome conditioning is often predicted by models of OFC function, this predicted null effect has not been thoroughly investigated. Here, we test the effects of lesions and temporary muscimol inactivation of the rodent lateral OFC on the acquisition of a simple single cue-outcome relationship. Surprisingly, pretraining lesions significantly enhanced acquisition after overtraining, whereas post-training lesions and inactivation significantly impaired acquisition. This impaired acquisition to the cue reflects a disruption of behavioral control and not learning since the cue could also act as an effective blocking stimulus in an associative blocking procedure. These findings suggest that even simple cue-outcome representations acquired in the absence of OFC function are impoverished. Therefore, while OFC function is often associated with flexible behavioral control in complex environments, it is also involved in very simple Pavlovian acquisition where complex cue-outcome relationships are irrelevant to task performance.

Why and how the brain weights contributions from a mixture of experts

It has long been suggested that human behavior reflects the contributions of multiple systems that cooperate or compete for behavioral control. Here we propose that the brain acts as a "Mixture of Experts" in which different expert systems propose strategies for action. It will be argued that the brain determines which experts should control behavior at any one moment in time by keeping track of the reliability of the predictions within each system, and by allocating control over behavior in a manner that depends on the relative reliabilities across experts. fMRI and neurostimulation studies suggest a specific contribution of the anterior prefrontal cortex in this process. Further, such a mechanism also takes into consideration the complexity of the expert, favoring simpler over more cognitively complex experts. Results from the study of different expert systems in both experiential and social learning domains hint at the possibility that this reliability-based control mechanism is domain general, exerting control over many different expert systems simultaneously in order to produce sophisticated behavior.

Behavior- and Modality-General Representation of Confidence in Orbitofrontal Cortex

Every decision we make is accompanied by a sense of confidence about its likely outcome. This sense informs subsequent behavior, such as investing more-whether time, effort, or money-when reward is more certain. A neural representation of confidence should originate from a statistical computation and predict confidence-guided behavior. An additional requirement for confidence representations to support metacognition is abstraction: they should emerge irrespective of the source of information and inform multiple confidence-guided behaviors. It is unknown whether neural confidence signals meet these criteria. Here, we show that single orbitofrontal cortex neurons in rats encode statistical decision confidence irrespective of the sensory modality, olfactory or auditory, used to make a choice. The activity of these neurons also predicts two confidence-guided behaviors: trial-by-trial time investment and cross-trial choice strategy updating. Orbitofrontal cortex thus represents decision confidence consistent with a metacognitive process that is useful for mediating confidence-guided economic decisions.

Effects of 5-HT2C, 5-HT1A receptor challenges and modafinil on the initiation and persistence of gambling behaviours

RATIONALE

Problematic patterns of gambling are characterised by loss of control and persistent gambling often to recover losses. However, little is known about the mechanisms that mediate initial choices to begin gambling and then continue to gamble in the face of losing outcomes.

OBJECTIVES

These experiments first assessed gambling and loss-chasing performance under different win/lose probabilities in C57Bl/6 mice, and then investigated the effects of antagonism of 5-HT_2CR with SB242084, 5-HT_1AR agonism with 8-OH-DPAT and modafinil, a putative cognitive enhancer.

RESULTS

As seen in humans and other species, mice demonstrated the expected patterns of behaviour as the odds for winning were altered increasing gambling and loss-chasing when winning was more likely. SB242084 decreased the likelihood to initially gamble, but had no effects on subsequent gambling choices in the face of repeated losses. In contrast, 8-OH-DPAT had no effects on choosing to gamble in the first place, but once started 8-OH-DPAT increased gambling choices in a dose-sensitive manner. Modafinil effects were different to the serotonergic drugs in both decreasing the propensity to initiate gambling and chase losses.

CONCLUSIONS

We present evidence for dissociable effects of systemic drug administration on different aspects of gambling behaviour. These data extend and reinforce the importance of serotonergic mechanisms in mediating discrete components of gambling behaviour. They further demonstrate the ability of modafinil to reduce gambling behaviour. Our work using a novel mouse paradigm may be of utility in modelling the complex psychological and neurobiological underpinnings of gambling problems, including the analysis of genetic and environmental factors.