Interventions to reduce partisan animosity

Megastudy testing 25 treatments to reduce antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity

Scholars warn that partisan divisions in the mass public threaten the health of American democracy. We conducted a megastudy (n = 32,059 participants) testing 25 treatments designed by academics and practitioners to reduce Americans' partisan animosity and antidemocratic attitudes. We find that many treatments reduced partisan animosity, most strongly by highlighting relatable sympathetic individuals with different political beliefs or by emphasizing common identities shared by rival partisans. We also identify several treatments that reduced support for undemocratic practices-most strongly by correcting misperceptions of rival partisans' views or highlighting the threat of democratic collapse-which shows that antidemocratic attitudes are not intractable. Taken together, the study's findings identify promising general strategies for reducing partisan division and improving democratic attitudes, shedding theoretical light on challenges facing American democracy.

Attraction to politically extreme users on social media

Political segregation is a pressing issue, particularly on social media platforms. Recent research suggests that one driver of segregation is political acrophily-people's preference for others in their political group who have more extreme (rather than more moderate) political views. However, acrophily has been found in lab experiments, where people choose to interact with others based on little information. Furthermore, these studies have not examined whether acrophily is associated with animosity toward one's political out-group. Using a combination of a survey experiment (N = 388) and an analysis of the retweet network on Twitter (3,898,327 unique ties), we find evidence for users' tendency for acrophily in the context of social media. We observe that this tendency is more pronounced among conservatives on Twitter and that acrophily is associated with higher levels of out-group animosity. These findings provide important in- and out-of-the-lab evidence for understanding acrophily on social media.

Affective polarization is uniformly distributed across American States

US partisans view each other with increasing negativity. While many attribute the growth of such affective polarization to nationally cross-cutting forces, such as ideological partisan sorting or access to partisan media, others emphasize the effects of contextual and institutional forces. For the first time, we introduce and explore data sufficiently granular to fully map the extent of partisan animosity across the US states. With a massive, nationally representative survey we find that, counter to expectations, variation in affective polarization across states is relatively small, and is instead largely a function of individual-level attitudinal (but not demographic) characteristics. While elections pit regions of the country against others, our results suggest affective polarization is a national, not regional, problem, requiring national interventions.

A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation of a divided society

We propose a framework integrating insights from computational social science, political, and social psychology to explain how extreme polarization can occur in deeply divided societies. Extreme polarization in a society emerges through a dynamic and complex process where societal, group, and individual factors interact. Dissent at different levels of analysis represents the driver of this process, where societal-level ideological dissent divides society into opposing camps, each with contrasting collective narratives. Within these opposing camps, further dissent leads to the formation of splinter factions and radical cells-sub-groups with increasingly extreme views. At the group level, collective narratives underpinning group identity become more extreme as society fragments. At the individual level, this process involves the internalization of an extreme group narrative and norms sanctioning radical behavior. The intense bonding within these groups and the convergence of personal and group identities through identity fusion increase the likelihood of radical group behavior.

Liberal-conservative asymmetries in anti-democratic tendencies are partly explained by psychological differences in a nationally representative U.S. sample

Based on theory and research in political psychology, we hypothesized that liberal-conservative differences in right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and political system justification would contribute to asymmetries in anti-democratic tendencies. These hypotheses were tested in a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults (N = 1557). Results revealed that conservatives were less supportive of political equality and legal rights and guarantees and more willing to defect from democratic "rules of the game" and vote for anti-democratic candidates, even after adjusting for political extremism. Mediational analyses suggested that conservatives' anti-democratic tendencies were partially attributable to higher levels of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Conservatives also scored higher in political system justification, which was associated with support for free speech and mitigated anti-democratic tendencies. Democrats and Republicans who approved January 6, 2021, insurrectionists were more conservative and higher in right-wing authoritarianism than those who did not. Implications for social psychology and society are discussed.

Attraction by pairwise coherence explains the emergence of ideological sorting

Political polarization has become a growing concern in democratic societies, as it drives tribal alignments and erodes civic deliberation among citizens. Given its prevalence across different countries, previous research has sought to understand under which conditions people tend to endorse extreme opinions. However, in polarized contexts, citizens not only adopt more extreme views but also become correlated across issues that are, a priori, seemingly unrelated. This phenomenon, known as "ideological sorting", has been receiving greater attention in recent years but the micro-level mechanisms underlying its emergence remain poorly understood. Here, we study the conditions under which a social dynamic system is expected to become ideologically sorted as a function of the mechanisms of interaction between its individuals. To this end, we developed and analyzed a multidimensional agent-based model that incorporates two mechanisms: homophily (where people tend to interact with those holding similar opinions) and pairwise-coherence favoritism (where people tend to interact with ingroups holding politically coherent opinions). We numerically integrated the model's master equations that perfectly describe the system's dynamics and found that ideological sorting only emerges in models that include pairwise-coherence favoritism. We then compared the model's outcomes with empirical data from 24,035 opinions across 67 topics and found that pairwise-coherence favoritism is significantly present in datasets that measure political attitudes but absent across topics not considered related to politics. Overall, this work combines theoretical approaches from system dynamics with model-based analyses of empirical data to uncover a potential mechanism underlying the pervasiveness of ideological sorting.

Explaining contentious political issues promotes open-minded thinking

Cognitive scientists suggest that inviting people to explain contentious political issues might reduce intergroup toxicity because it exposes people to how poorly they understand the issue. However, whether providing explanations can result in more open-minded political thinking remains unclear. On one hand, inviting people to explain a political issue might make them more impartial and open-minded in their thinking. On the other hand, an invitation to explain a contentious political issue might lead to myside bias-rationalization of one's default position. Here, we address these contrasting predictions in five experiments (N = 1884; three pre-registered), conducted across a variety of contexts: with graduate students interacting with an actor in a laboratory setting, with US residents at the peak of the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections, with UK residents before the highly polarized 2019 Brexit vote, and with gun-control partisans. Across studies, we found that explaining politically contentious topics resulted in more open-minded thinking, an effect that generalized across coded (Studies 1-4) and self-report (Studies 3-4) measures. We also observed that participants who were made to feel like their explanations were welcomed felt closer to their discussion partner (Studies 3-4), an effect that generalized to all outgroup members with whom they disagreed with about the politically contentious issue (Study 4). We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings, and the potential for explanations to foster open-minded political engagement.

The affective gap: a call for a comprehensive examination of the discrete emotions underlying affective polarization

Bakker and Lelkes (2024) point at a critical gap in research on affective polarisation: the limited understanding of its affective components, mainly due to the reliance on a unidimensional operationalisation of affect in affective polarisation. They advocate for a broader approach to study affect, integrating explicit and implicit measures, and call on emotion specialists to address this gap. Acknowledging the complexity of affect in the ideological divide, we argue that the lack of a thorough examination of the distinct role of discrete emotions constitutes the primary "affective gap". Drawing from studies on the relationship between ideological groups and utilising a discrete emotions approach, we contest the prevailing assumption that hatred predominantly underlies affective polarisation. Instead, we propose that disappointment, better captures the intricate dynamics between ideological groups. We argue that such nuanced approach, regarding the affective component of affective polarisation enhances our understanding of the phenomenon and shed light on its implications for societies.

Zero-sum beliefs and the avoidance of political conversations

Although researchers have argued that exposure to diverse views may help reduce political divisions in society, people often avoid discussing politics with ideologically opposed others. We investigate the avoidance of political conversations surrounding highly contested elections in Israel and the U.S. Specifically, we examine the relationship between people's belief that politics is a zero-sum game and their tendency to avoid talking about politics with ideologically opposed others. In two studies conducted in the days leading up to their countries' elections, we found that Israeli and American voters who view politics as zero-sum avoided political discussions with ideologically opposed others. Furthermore, zero-sum beliefs about politics statistically predicted the avoidance of political conversations through two distinct mechanisms: perceived conflict and a lack of receptiveness to opposing views. Finally, in a longitudinal design, we found that zero-sum beliefs about politics statistically and robustly predicted the avoidance of political conversation one week later.

A Pilot Study of Metacognitive Training in U.S. Republican Leaners: Reducing Polarization Toward LGBTIQ+ Persons

Negative attitudes and stigmatization toward sexual minorities is a cause of minority stress of non-heterosexual persons on an individual level and has a negative impact on democratic coexistence in postmodern, plural society on a societal level. Derived from clinical research, we developed a short metacognitive training (MCT) intended to induce doubt toward inaccurate beliefs about LGBTIQ+ persons. We expected this MCT to reduce homonegativity, threat perceptions of LGBTIQ+ persons, and to foster extended outgroup tolerance compared to an education and a no-treatment control condition. We tested this hypothesis in U.S. Republican leaners who represent a social group that is likely to hold homonegative attitudes. We randomly assigned 490 U.S. Republican leaners to an MCT condition comprising 16 questions and respective answers (n = 166) vs. an education control condition (n = 164) vs. a no-treatment control condition (n = 160). We found that Republican leaners after receiving MCT (1) had a significant reduction of homonegativity (ds ≥ 0.28), (2) significantly perceived LGBTIQ+ persons as less threatening (ds ≥ 0.30), and (3) were significantly more tolerant of various outgroups such as LGBTIQ+ persons, feminists, liberals, and climate activists (ds ≥ 0.23) relative to both control conditions. The small effects of this short intervention and the possibility of systematically applying MCT in social discourse to reduce homonegativity with its potential significance for LGBTIQ+ individuals' mental health are discussed. Furthermore, we highlight this pilot study's significance toward intervention possibilities regarding political division and polarization in postmodern, democratic societies.

Academics are more specific, and practitioners more sensitive, in forecasting interventions to strengthen democratic attitudes

Concern over democratic erosion has led to a proliferation of proposed interventions to strengthen democratic attitudes in the United States. Resource constraints, however, prevent implementing all proposed interventions. One approach to identify promising interventions entails leveraging domain experts, who have knowledge regarding a given field, to forecast the effectiveness of candidate interventions. We recruit experts who develop general knowledge about a social problem (academics), experts who directly intervene on the problem (practitioners), and nonexperts from the public to forecast the effectiveness of interventions to reduce partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence. Comparing 14,076 forecasts submitted by 1,181 forecasters against the results of a megaexperiment (n = 32,059) that tested 75 hypothesized effects of interventions, we find that both types of experts outperformed members of the public, though experts differed in how they were accurate. While academics' predictions were more specific (i.e., they identified a larger proportion of ineffective interventions and had fewer false-positive forecasts), practitioners' predictions were more sensitive (i.e., they identified a larger proportion of effective interventions and had fewer false-negative forecasts). Consistent with this, practitioners were better at predicting best-performing interventions, while academics were superior in predicting which interventions performed worst. Our paper highlights the importance of differentiating types of experts and types of accuracy. We conclude by discussing factors that affect whether sensitive or specific forecasters are preferable, such as the relative cost of false positives and negatives and the expected rate of intervention success.

Partisan styles of self-presentation in U.S. Twitter bios

Political polarization in the United States goes beyond divided opinions on key political issues, extending to realms of culture, lifestyle, and social identity once thought to be apolitical. Using a sample of 1 million Twitter bios, this study investigates how users' partisan self-presentation on social media tends to include cultural as well as political markers. Representing the text in Twitter bios as semantic networks, the study reveals clear partisan differences in how users describe themselves, even on topics that seem apolitical. Consequently, active Twitter users' political alignments can be statistically inferred from the non-political references in their bios, even in the absence of explicitly partisan language. These findings offer further evidence of partisan polarization that is aligned with lifestyle preferences. Further research is needed to determine if users are aware of that alignment, which might indicate the politicization of lifestyle preferences. The findings also suggest an under-recognized way social media can promote polarization, not through political discourse or argument, but simply in how users present cultural and lifestyle preferences on those platforms.

A framework for promoting online prosocial behavior via digital interventions

Digital interventions for prosocial behavior are increasingly being studied by psychologists. However, academic findings remain largely underutilized by practitioners. We present a practical review and framework for distinguishing three categories of digital interventions--proactive, interactive, and reactive--based on the timing of their implementation. For each category, we present digital, scalable, automated, and scientifically tested interventions and review their empirical evidence. We provide tips for applying these interventions and advice for successful collaborations between academic researchers and practitioners.

Partisan animosity through the lens of blame: Partisan animosity can be reduced by a historicist thinking intervention

Partisan animosity has been on the rise in America. Partisan animosity involves blame, wherein political partisans blame outparty members for their beliefs and actions. Here, we examine whether a historicist thinking intervention-drawn from research on blame mitigation-can reduce partisan animosity. The intervention consisted of three components: (1) a narrative about the idiosyncratic development of one political opponent paired with (2) a message about how unique life experiences shape everyone's political beliefs and (3) a suggestion that outparty members can be changed by future formative experiences. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the intervention reduced cold feelings-measured via Feeling Thermometer-towards the outparty for both Democrats and Republicans. Experiments 3 and 4 focused on more specific emotional changes. Experiment 3 showed that, for Democrats, the intervention increased compassion. Experiment 4 showed that, for Republicans, the intervention reduced disgust, disapproval, anger, and contempt, but had no impact on compassion. For Democrats, but not for Republicans, reductions in animosity were mediated by reduced perceptions of control of self-formation, the mediator identified in prior work on historicist thinking and blame mitigation.

Cross-partisan discussions reduced political polarization between UK voters, but less so when they disagreed

Can brief, unmoderated cross-partisan discussions reduce political polarization, even when partisans disagree on the issue under discussion? This article reports results from an experiment that matched 582 UK Labour and Conservative party voters for a ten-minute, unmoderated chat discussion about a contentious issue in a wait-list control design. Issue disagreement between discussing partisans randomly varied, and was visible throughout the discussion. Results show that after the discussion, out-partisan sympathy and willingness to have cross-partisan discussions increased. There was no statistically significant effect on opinions. The effect on sympathy was lower when partisans' issue opinions were further apart. Treatment effects correlate with reported experiences of perspective-getting, inclusion in the discussion, commonality and reduced misperceptions. Conservative respondents about to discuss immigration softened their views just prior to the discussion.

Reputations for treatment of outgroup members can prevent the emergence of political segregation in cooperative networks

Reputation systems promote cooperation and tie formation in social networks. But how reputations affect cooperation and the evolution of networks is less clear when societies are characterized by fundamental, identity-based, social divisions like those centered on politics in the contemporary U.S. Using a large web-based experiment with participants (N = 1073) embedded in networks where each tie represents the opportunity to play a dyadic iterated prisoners' dilemma, we investigate how cooperation and network segregation varies with whether and how reputation systems track behavior toward members of the opposing political party (outgroup members). As predicted, when participants know others' political affiliation, early cooperation patterns show ingroup favoritism. As a result, networks become segregated based on politics. However, such ingroup favoritism and network-level political segregation is reduced in conditions in which participants know how others behave towards participants from both their own party and participants from the other party. These findings have implications for our understanding of reputation systems in polarized contexts.

Leveraging AI for democratic discourse: Chat interventions can improve online political conversations at scale

Political discourse is the soul of democracy, but misunderstanding and conflict can fester in divisive conversations. The widespread shift to online discourse exacerbates many of these problems and corrodes the capacity of diverse societies to cooperate in solving social problems. Scholars and civil society groups promote interventions that make conversations less divisive or more productive, but scaling these efforts to online discourse is challenging. We conduct a large-scale experiment that demonstrates how online conversations about divisive topics can be improved with AI tools. Specifically, we employ a large language model to make real-time, evidence-based recommendations intended to improve participants' perception of feeling understood. These interventions improve reported conversation quality, promote democratic reciprocity, and improve the tone, without systematically changing the content of the conversation or moving people's policy attitudes.

Emphasizing Similarities Between Politically Opposed Groups and Their Influence in Perceptions of the Political Opposition: Evidence From Five Experiments

Across five experiments (four pre-registered, N = 4,431), we investigate whether emphasizing similarities between Republicans and Democrats can improve intergroup relations between the two groups. Members of both groups who were presented with evidence emphasizing similarities rather than differences in the psychological attitudes of both parties reported greater inclusion of the political opposition in the self, greater belief that common ground can be reached for major social issues, and warmer feelings toward the opposition. Inclusion of the political outgroup in the self mediated the effect of the similarities condition on additional outcomes, relating to more positive and less threatening perceptions of political opposition members. These findings held even when compared with a baseline condition with no information presented to participants. We conclude that by emphasizing the study of group similarities and by disseminating research in a way that highlights similarities, researchers could reduce intergroup hostilities in the political domain.

Reducing political polarization in the United States with a mobile chat platform

Do anonymous online conversations between people with different political views exacerbate or mitigate partisan polarization? We created a mobile chat platform to study the impact of such discussions. Our study recruited Republicans and Democrats in the United States to complete a survey about their political views. We later randomized them into treatment conditions where they were offered financial incentives to use our platform to discuss a contentious policy issue with an opposing partisan. We found that people who engage in anonymous cross-party conversations about political topics exhibit substantial decreases in polarization compared with a placebo group that wrote an essay using the same conversation prompts. Moreover, these depolarizing effects were correlated with the civility of dialogue between study participants. Our findings demonstrate the potential for well-designed social media platforms to mitigate political polarization and underscore the need for a flexible platform for scientific research on social media.

The attitudinal space framework: Embracing the multidimensionality of attitudinal diversity

Attitude polarization describes an increasing attitude difference between groups and is increasingly recognized as a multidimensional phenomenon. However, a unified framework to study polarization across multiple dimensions is lacking. We introduce the attitudinal space framework (ASF) to fully quantify attitudinal diversity. We highlight two key measures-attitudinal extremization and attitudinal dispersion-to quantify across- and within-group attitudinal patterns. First, we show that affective polarization in the US electorate is weaker than previously thought based on mean differences alone: in both Democrat and Republican partisans, attitudinal dispersion increased between 1988 and 2008. Second, we examined attitudes toward wolves in Germany. Despite attitude differences between regions with and without wolves, we did not find differences in attitudinal extremization or dispersion, suggesting only weak attitude polarization. These results illustrate how the ASF is applicable to a wide range of social systems and offers an important avenue to understanding societal transformations.

Martin Buber: guide for a psychology of suffering

Martin Buber was untrained in psychology, yet his teaching provides helpful guidance for a psychological science of suffering. His ideas deserve attention at three distinct levels. For each of these, his ideas align with research findings, but also push beyond them. At the individual level, Buber's radical approach to relationships disrupts typical social cognitive cycles of suffering and can thereby build a defense against suffering. At the community level, he provides guidance that can help create a society that cares for people who suffer. At the dyadic level, Buber's guidance also matters. His ideas point toward a therapeutic dyad that can help address suffering when the individual and community responses are not sufficient. Specifically, he guides us toward a holistic view of the person that transcends labels and also toward ineffable human relations. Here again, his ideas align with empirical research, but push beyond. Buber's unique take on relationships has much to offer scholars seeking to understand and alleviate suffering. Some might perceive Buber as ignoring evil. That possible criticism and others deserve consideration. Nonetheless, readiness to adjust theory in response to Buber and other psychological outsiders may be valuable when developing a psychology of suffering.

Interventions reducing affective polarization do not necessarily improve anti-democratic attitudes

There is widespread concern that rising affective polarization-particularly dislike for outpartisans-exacerbates Americans' anti-democratic attitudes. Accordingly, scholars and practitioners alike have invested great effort in developing depolarization interventions that reduce affective polarization. Critically, however, it remains unclear whether these interventions reduce anti-democratic attitudes, or only change sentiments towards outpartisans. Here we address this question with experimental tests (total n = 8,385) of three previously established depolarization interventions: correcting misperceptions of outpartisans, priming inter-partisan friendships and observing warm cross-partisan interactions between political leaders. While these depolarization interventions reliably reduced affective polarization, we do not find compelling evidence that these interventions reduced support for undemocratic candidates, support for partisan violence or prioritizing partisan ends over democratic means. Thus, future efforts to strengthen pro-democratic attitudes may do better if they target these outcomes directly. More broadly, these findings call into question the previously assumed causal effect of affective polarization on anti-democratic attitudes.