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Hyusein G, Göksun T. Give your ideas a hand: the role of iconic hand gestures in enhancing divergent creative thinking. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2024; 88:1298-1313. [PMID: 38538819 PMCID: PMC11142943 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-024-01932-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/30/2023] [Accepted: 01/29/2024] [Indexed: 06/02/2024]
Abstract
Hand gestures play an integral role in multimodal language and communication. Even though the self-oriented functions of gestures, such as activating a speaker's lexicon and maintaining visuospatial imagery, have been emphasized, gestures' functions in creative thinking are not well-established. In the current study, we investigated the role of iconic gestures in verbal divergent thinking-a creative thinking process related to generating many novel ideas. Based on previous findings, we hypothesized that iconic gesture use would facilitate divergent thinking in young adults, especially those with high mental imagery skills. Participants performed Guildford's Alternative Uses Task in a gesture-spontaneous and in a gesture-encouraged condition. We measured fluency (number of ideas), originality (uniqueness of ideas), flexibility (number of idea categories), and elaboration (number of details) in divergent thinking. The results showed that producing iconic gestures in the gesture-encouraged condition positively predicted fluency, originality, and elaboration. In the gesture-spontaneous condition, producing iconic gestures also positively predicted elaboration but negatively predicted flexibility. Mental imagery skills did not interact with the effects of gestures on divergent thinking. These results suggest that iconic gestures are a promising candidate for enhancing almost all aspects of divergent thinking. Overall, the current study adds a new dimension to the self-oriented function of iconic gestures, that is, their contribution to creative thinking.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Tilbe Göksun
- Department of Psychology, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
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2
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Nedergaard JSK, Lupyan G. Not Everybody Has an Inner Voice: Behavioral Consequences of Anendophasia. Psychol Sci 2024:9567976241243004. [PMID: 38728320 DOI: 10.1177/09567976241243004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/12/2024] Open
Abstract
It is commonly assumed that inner speech-the experience of thought as occurring in a natural language-is a human universal. Recent evidence, however, suggests that the experience of inner speech in adults varies from near constant to nonexistent. We propose a name for a lack of the experience of inner speech-anendophasia-and report four studies examining some of its behavioral consequences. We found that adults who reported low levels of inner speech (N = 46) had lower performance on a verbal working memory task and more difficulty performing rhyme judgments compared with adults who reported high levels of inner speech (N = 47). Task-switching performance-previously linked to endogenous verbal cueing-and categorical effects on perceptual judgments were unrelated to differences in inner speech.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Gary Lupyan
- Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Madison
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3
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Maw KJ, Beattie G, Burns EJ. Cognitive strengths in neurodevelopmental disorders, conditions and differences: A critical review. Neuropsychologia 2024; 197:108850. [PMID: 38467371 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2024.108850] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2023] [Revised: 03/04/2024] [Accepted: 03/07/2024] [Indexed: 03/13/2024]
Abstract
Neurodevelopmental disorders are traditionally characterised by a range of associated cognitive impairments in, for example, sensory processing, facial recognition, visual imagery, attention, and coordination. In this critical review, we propose a major reframing, highlighting the variety of unique cognitive strengths that people with neurodevelopmental differences can exhibit. These include enhanced visual perception, strong spatial, auditory, and semantic memory, superior empathy and theory of mind, along with higher levels of divergent thinking. Whilst we acknowledge the heterogeneity of cognitive profiles in neurodevelopmental conditions, we present a more encouraging and affirmative perspective of these groups, contrasting with the predominant, deficit-based position prevalent throughout both cognitive and neuropsychological research. In addition, we provide a theoretical basis and rationale for these cognitive strengths, arguing for the critical role of hereditability, behavioural adaptation, neuronal-recycling, and we draw on psychopharmacological and social explanations. We present a table of potential strengths across conditions and invite researchers to systematically investigate these in their future work. This should help reduce the stigma around neurodiversity, instead promoting greater social inclusion and significant societal benefits.
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4
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Kay L, Keogh R, Pearson J. Slower but more accurate mental rotation performance in aphantasia linked to differences in cognitive strategies. Conscious Cogn 2024; 121:103694. [PMID: 38657474 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103694] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2023] [Revised: 04/16/2024] [Accepted: 04/18/2024] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
Mental rotation tasks are frequently used as standard measures of mental imagery. However, aphantasia research has brought such use into question. Here, we assessed a large group of individuals who lack visual imagery (aphantasia) on two mental rotation tasks: a three-dimensional block-shape, and a human manikin rotation task. In both tasks, those with aphantasia had slower, but more accurate responses than controls. Both groups demonstrated classic linear increases in response time and error-rate as functions of angular disparity. In the three-dimensional block-shape rotation task, a within-group speed-accuracy trade-off was found in controls, whereas faster individuals in the aphantasia group were also more accurate. Control participants generally favoured using object-based mental rotation strategies, whereas those with aphantasia favoured analytic strategies. These results suggest that visual imagery is not crucial for successful performance in classical mental rotation tasks, as alternative strategies can be effectively utilised in the absence of holistic mental representations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lachlan Kay
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
| | - Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
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5
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Zeman A. Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes. Trends Cogn Sci 2024; 28:467-480. [PMID: 38548492 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.02.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2023] [Revised: 02/09/2024] [Accepted: 02/13/2024] [Indexed: 05/12/2024]
Abstract
The vividness of imagery varies between individuals. However, the existence of people in whom conscious, wakeful imagery is markedly reduced, or absent entirely, was neglected by psychology until the recent coinage of 'aphantasia' to describe this phenomenon. 'Hyperphantasia' denotes the converse - imagery whose vividness rivals perceptual experience. Around 1% and 3% of the population experience extreme aphantasia and hyperphantasia, respectively. Aphantasia runs in families, often affects imagery across several sense modalities, and is variably associated with reduced autobiographical memory, face recognition difficulty, and autism. Visual dreaming is often preserved. Subtypes of extreme imagery appear to be likely but are not yet well defined. Initial results suggest that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for visual imagery extremes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Zeman
- Centre for Clinical Brain Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK; University of Exeter Medical School, Exeter, UK.
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6
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Bouyer LN, Arnold DH. Deep Aphantasia: a visual brain with minimal influence from priors or inhibitory feedback? Front Psychol 2024; 15:1374349. [PMID: 38646116 PMCID: PMC11026567 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1374349] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/23/2024] [Accepted: 02/20/2024] [Indexed: 04/23/2024] Open
Abstract
The authors are both self-described congenital aphantasics, who feel they have never been able to have volitional imagined visual experiences during their waking lives. In addition, Loren has atypical experiences of a number of visual phenomena that involve an extrapolation or integration of visual information across space. In this perspective, we describe Loren's atypical experiences of a number of visual phenomena, and we suggest these ensue because her visual experiences are not strongly shaped by inhibitory feedback or by prior expectations. We describe Loren as having Deep Aphantasia, and Derek as shallow, as for both a paucity of feedback might prevent the generation of imagined visual experiences, but for Loren this additionally seems to disrupt activity at a sufficiently early locus to cause atypical experiences of actual visual inputs. Our purpose in describing these subjective experiences is to alert others to the possibility of there being sub-classes of congenital aphantasia, one of which-Deep Aphantasia, would be characterized by atypical experiences of actual visual inputs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Loren N Bouyer
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| | - Derek H Arnold
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
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Pounder Z, Eardley AF, Loveday C, Evans S. No clear evidence of a difference between individuals who self-report an absence of auditory imagery and typical imagers on auditory imagery tasks. PLoS One 2024; 19:e0300219. [PMID: 38568916 PMCID: PMC10990234 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0300219] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/27/2023] [Accepted: 02/25/2024] [Indexed: 04/05/2024] Open
Abstract
Aphantasia is characterised by the inability to create mental images in one's mind. Studies investigating impairments in imagery typically focus on the visual domain. However, it is possible to generate many different forms of imagery including imagined auditory, kinesthetic, tactile, motor, taste and other experiences. Recent studies show that individuals with aphantasia report a lack of imagery in modalities, other than vision, including audition. However, to date, no research has examined whether these reductions in self-reported auditory imagery are associated with decrements in tasks that require auditory imagery. Understanding the extent to which visual and auditory imagery deficits co-occur can help to better characterise the core deficits of aphantasia and provide an alternative perspective on theoretical debates on the extent to which imagery draws on modality-specific or modality-general processes. In the current study, individuals that self-identified as being aphantasic and matched control participants with typical imagery performed two tasks: a musical pitch-based imagery and voice-based categorisation task. The majority of participants with aphantasia self-reported significant deficits in both auditory and visual imagery. However, we did not find a concomitant decrease in performance on tasks which require auditory imagery, either in the full sample or only when considering those participants that reported significant deficits in both domains. These findings are discussed in relation to the mechanisms that might obscure observation of imagery deficits in auditory imagery tasks in people that report reduced auditory imagery.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zoë Pounder
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Alison F. Eardley
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom
| | - Catherine Loveday
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom
| | - Samuel Evans
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom
- Neuroimaging, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom
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8
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Keogh R, Lau H. New ways of studying subjective experience. Neurosci Res 2024; 201:1-2. [PMID: 38307348 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2024.01.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/04/2024]
Affiliation(s)
- Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia; School of Psychology, UNSW, Sydney, Australia
| | - Hakwan Lau
- RIKEN Center for Brain Science, Saitama, Japan.
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9
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Krempel R, Monzel M. Aphantasia and involuntary imagery. Conscious Cogn 2024; 120:103679. [PMID: 38564857 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103679] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/25/2023] [Revised: 03/06/2024] [Accepted: 03/09/2024] [Indexed: 04/04/2024]
Abstract
Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Raquel Krempel
- Center for Logic, Epistemology and History of Science, State University of Campinas, R. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, 251 - Cidade Universitária, Campinas, SP 13083-859, Brazil; Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 4200 Fifth Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA.
| | - Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology, Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany.
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Monzel M, Handlogten J, Reuter M. No verbal overshadowing in aphantasia: The role of visual imagery for the verbal overshadowing effect. Cognition 2024; 245:105732. [PMID: 38325233 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105732] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/27/2023] [Revised: 01/16/2024] [Accepted: 01/19/2024] [Indexed: 02/09/2024]
Abstract
The verbal overshadowing effect refers to the phenomenon that the verbal description of a past complex stimulus impairs its subsequent recognition. Theoretical explanations range from interference between different mental representations to the activation of different processing orientations or a provoked shift in the recognition criterion. In our study, 61 participants with aphantasia (= lack of mental imagery) and 70 controls participated in a verbal overshadowing paradigm. The verbal overshadowing effect did not occur in people with aphantasia, although the effect was replicated in controls. We speculate that this is either due to the lack of visual representations in people with aphantasia that verbal descriptions could interfere with, or to the absence of a shift in processing orientation during verbalisation. To rule out criterion-based explanations, further research is needed to distinguish between discriminability and response bias in people with aphantasia. Finally, data indicated that the verbal overshadowing effect may even be reversed in individuals with aphantasia, partly due to a lower memory performance in the no verbalisation condition. Effects of further variables are discussed, such as mental strategies, memory confidence, and difficulty, quantity and quality of verbalisation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany.
| | | | - Martin Reuter
- Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany
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Keogh R, Pearson J. Revisiting the blind mind: Still no evidence for sensory visual imagery in individuals with aphantasia. Neurosci Res 2024; 201:27-30. [PMID: 38311033 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2024.01.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2023] [Revised: 01/23/2024] [Accepted: 01/23/2024] [Indexed: 02/06/2024]
Abstract
The inability to visualise was given the name aphantasia in 2015 by Zeman and colleagues. In 2018 we published research showing that fifteen individuals who self-identified as having aphantasia also demonstrated a lack of sensory visual imagery when undergoing the binocular rivalry imagery paradigm, suggesting more than just a metacognitive difference. Here we update these findings with over fifty participants with aphantasia and show that there is evidence for a lack of sensory imagery in aphantasia. How the binocular rivalry paradigm scores relate to the vividness of visual imagery questionnaire (VVIQ) and how aphantasia can be confirmed is discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia; School of Psychology, UNSW, Sydney, Australia.
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12
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Dupont W, Papaxanthis C, Madden-Lombardi C, Lebon F. Explicit and implicit motor simulations are impaired in individuals with aphantasia. Brain Commun 2024; 6:fcae072. [PMID: 38515440 PMCID: PMC10957132 DOI: 10.1093/braincomms/fcae072] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/06/2023] [Revised: 01/11/2024] [Accepted: 03/13/2024] [Indexed: 03/23/2024] Open
Abstract
Individuals with aphantasia report having difficulties or an inability to generate visual images of objects or events. So far, there is no evidence showing that this condition also impacts the motor system and the generation of motor simulations. We probed the neurophysiological marker of aphantasia during explicit and implicit forms of motor simulation, i.e. motor imagery and action observation, respectively. We tested a group of individuals without any reported imagery deficits (phantasics) as well as a group of individuals self-reporting the inability to mentally simulate images or movements (aphantasics). We instructed the participants to explicitly imagine a maximal pinch movement in the visual and kinaesthetic modalities and to observe a video showing a pinch movement. By means of transcranial magnetic stimulation, we triggered motor-evoked potentials in the target right index finger. As expected, the amplitude of motor-evoked potentials, a marker of corticospinal excitability, increased for phantasics during kinaesthetic motor imagery and action observation relative to rest but not during visual motor imagery. Interestingly, the amplitude of motor-evoked potentials did not increase in any of the conditions for the group of aphantasics. This result provides neurophysiological evidence that individuals living with aphantasia have a real deficit in activating the motor system during motor simulations.
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Affiliation(s)
- William Dupont
- UFR des Sciences du Sport, INSERM UMR1093-CAPS, Université Bourgogne, Dijon F-21000, France
| | | | - Carol Madden-Lombardi
- UFR des Sciences du Sport, INSERM UMR1093-CAPS, Université Bourgogne, Dijon F-21000, France
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris, France
| | - Florent Lebon
- UFR des Sciences du Sport, INSERM UMR1093-CAPS, Université Bourgogne, Dijon F-21000, France
- Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Paris, France
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13
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Contemori G, Oletto CM, Battaglini L, Bertamini M. On the relationship between foveal mask interference and mental imagery in peripheral object recognition. Proc Biol Sci 2024; 291:20232867. [PMID: 38471562 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2023.2867] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/02/2024] [Indexed: 03/14/2024] Open
Abstract
A delayed foveal mask affects perception of peripheral stimuli. The effect is determined by the timing of the mask and by the similarity with the peripheral stimulus. A congruent mask enhances performance, while an incongruent one impairs it. It is hypothesized that foveal masks disrupt a feedback mechanism reaching the foveal cortex. This mechanism could be part of a broader circuit associated with mental imagery, but this hypothesis has not as yet been tested. We investigated the link between mental imagery and foveal feedback. We tested the relationship between performance fluctuations caused by the foveal mask-measured in terms of discriminability (d') and criterion (C)-and the scores from two questionnaires designed to assess mental imagery vividness (VVIQ) and another exploring object imagery, spatial imagery and verbal cognitive styles (OSIVQ). Contrary to our hypotheses, no significant correlations were found between VVIQ and the mask's impact on d' and C. Neither the object nor spatial subscales of OSIVQ correlated with the mask's impact. In conclusion, our findings do not substantiate the existence of a link between foveal feedback and mental imagery. Further investigation is needed to determine whether mask interference might occur with more implicit measures of imagery.
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Affiliation(s)
- Giulio Contemori
- Department of General Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy
| | | | - Luca Battaglini
- Department of General Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy
| | - Marco Bertamini
- Department of General Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy
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14
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Reed LS, Evans LH. The positive dimension of schizotypy is associated with self-report measures of autobiographical memory and future thinking but not experimenter-scored indices. Memory 2024; 32:383-395. [PMID: 38466582 DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2024.2325525] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/24/2023] [Accepted: 02/19/2024] [Indexed: 03/13/2024]
Abstract
ABSTRACTThe ability to remember our past and to imagine the future are critical to our sense of self. Previous research has indicated that they are disrupted in schizophrenia. However, it is unclear (i) whether this is found when examining experimenter-scored indices of content and/or participants' self-report of phenomenological characteristics, and (ii) how these abilities might be related to symptoms. This study sought to address these questions by taking a dimensional approach and measuring positive and negative schizotypal experiences in healthy people (n = 90). Participants were given cue words. For some, they remembered an event from the past and for others they generated an event in the future. No significant relationships were found with any aspect of schizotypy when participants' descriptions were scored by the experimenter according to a standardised episodic content measure. In contrast, several significant positive correlations were observed for past memory and future thinking when examining the positive dimension of schizotypy and participants' ratings, particularly to sensory characteristics of the experience and mental pre- or reliving. These results indicate enhanced subjective experiences of autobiographical memory and future thinking in those who report delusional and hallucinatory-like occurrences, which might be linked to mental imagery or metacognitive alterations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lucie S Reed
- Cardiff University Brain Research Imaging Centre (CUBRIC), School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
| | - Lisa H Evans
- Cardiff University Brain Research Imaging Centre (CUBRIC), School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
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15
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Reeder RR, Sala G, van Leeuwen TM. A novel model of divergent predictive perception. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae006. [PMID: 38348335 PMCID: PMC10860603 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/12/2023] [Revised: 01/16/2024] [Accepted: 01/23/2024] [Indexed: 02/15/2024] Open
Abstract
Predictive processing theories state that our subjective experience of reality is shaped by a balance of expectations based on previous knowledge about the world (i.e. priors) and confidence in sensory input from the environment. Divergent experiences (e.g. hallucinations and synaesthesia) are likely to occur when there is an imbalance between one's reliance on priors and sensory input. In a novel theoretical model, inspired by both predictive processing and psychological principles, we propose that predictable divergent experiences are associated with natural or environmentally induced prior/sensory imbalances: inappropriately strong or inflexible (i.e. maladaptive) high-level priors (beliefs) combined with low sensory confidence can result in reality discrimination issues, a characteristic of psychosis; maladaptive low-level priors (sensory expectations) combined with high sensory confidence can result in atypical sensory sensitivities and persistent divergent percepts, a characteristic of synaesthesia. Crucially, we propose that whether different divergent experiences manifest with dominantly sensory (e.g. hallucinations) or nonsensory characteristics (e.g. delusions) depends on mental imagery ability, which is a spectrum from aphantasia (absent or weak imagery) to hyperphantasia (extremely vivid imagery). We theorize that imagery is critically involved in shaping the sensory richness of divergent perceptual experience. In sum, to predict a range of divergent perceptual experiences in both clinical and general populations, three factors must be accounted for: a maladaptive use of priors, individual level of confidence in sensory input, and mental imagery ability. These ideas can be expressed formally using nonparametric regression modeling. We provide evidence for our theory from previous work and deliver predictions for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Reshanne R Reeder
- Department of Psychology, Institute of Population Health, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, United Kingdom
| | - Giovanni Sala
- Department of Psychology, Institute of Population Health, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, United Kingdom
| | - Tessa M van Leeuwen
- Department of Communication and Cognition, Tilburg School of Humanities and Digital Sciences, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
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16
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Speed LJ, Eekhof LS, Mak M. The role of visual imagery in story reading: Evidence from aphantasia. Conscious Cogn 2024; 118:103645. [PMID: 38241954 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103645] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2023] [Revised: 12/01/2023] [Accepted: 01/09/2024] [Indexed: 01/21/2024]
Abstract
Aphantasia is a condition in which people are unable to experience visual imagery. Since visual imagery is thought to be key to language processing, we hypothesized the experience of a story would differ between individuals with aphantasia and controls. Forty-seven individuals with aphantasia were compared to fifty-one matched controls on their experience of reading a short story and their general reading habits. Aphantasics were less likely to be engaged with, interested in, and absorbed in the story, and experienced reduced emotional engagement with and sympathy for the story characters, compared to controls. Yet, aphantasics and controls did not differ in how much they liked or appreciated the story, and in general, the reading habits of the two groups also did not differ. Results have implications for embodied theories of language, suggesting visual imagery may influence how a story is experienced, but it is not the only route to story enjoyment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laura J Speed
- Centre for Language Studies, Radboud University, Netherlands.
| | - Lynn S Eekhof
- Centre for Language Studies, Radboud University, Netherlands
| | - Marloes Mak
- Centre for Language Studies, Radboud University, Netherlands
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17
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Arnold DH, Saurels BW, Anderson N, Andresen I, Schwarzkopf DS. Predicting the subjective intensity of imagined experiences from electrophysiological measures of oscillatory brain activity. Sci Rep 2024; 14:836. [PMID: 38191506 PMCID: PMC10774351 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-50760-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/19/2023] [Accepted: 12/24/2023] [Indexed: 01/10/2024] Open
Abstract
Most people can conjure images and sounds that they experience in their minds. There are, however, marked individual differences. Some people report that they cannot generate imagined sensory experiences at all (aphantasics) and others report that they have unusually intense imagined experiences (hyper-phantasics). These individual differences have been linked to activity in sensory brain regions, driven by feedback. We would therefore expect imagined experiences to be associated with specific frequencies of oscillatory brain activity, as these can be a hallmark of neural interactions within and across regions of the brain. Replicating a number of other studies, relative to a Resting-State we find that the act of engaging in auditory or in visual imagery is linked to reductions in the power of oscillatory brain activity across a broad range of frequencies, with prominent peaks in the alpha band (8-12 Hz). This oscillatory activity, however, did not predict individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences. For audio imagery, these were rather predicted by reductions within the theta (6-9 Hz) and gamma (33-38 Hz) bands, and by increases in beta (15-17 Hz) band activity. For visual imagery these were predicted by reductions in lower (14-16 Hz) and upper (29-32 Hz) beta band activity, and by an increase in mid-beta band (24-26 Hz) activity. Our data suggest that there is sufficient ground truth in the subjective reports people use to describe the intensity of their imagined sensory experiences to allow these to be linked to the power of distinct rhythms of brain activity. In future, we hope to combine this approach with better measures of the subjective intensity of imagined sensory experiences to provide a clearer picture of individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences, and of why these eventuate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Derek H Arnold
- Perception Lab, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.
| | - Blake W Saurels
- Perception Lab, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - Natasha Anderson
- Perception Lab, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - Isabella Andresen
- Perception Lab, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - Dietrich S Schwarzkopf
- School of Optometry and Vision Science, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
- Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK
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18
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Moriya J. Visual mental imagery of atypical color objects attracts attention to an imagery-matching object. Atten Percept Psychophys 2024; 86:49-61. [PMID: 37872433 DOI: 10.3758/s13414-023-02804-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/01/2023] [Indexed: 10/25/2023]
Abstract
Mental imagery attracts attention to imagery-matching stimuli. However, it remains unknown whether voluntarily imagined atypical color also attracts attention to a stimulus that matches the imagery when the imagined stimuli are color-diagnostic objects, which are strongly associated with typical color. This study investigated whether people can voluntarily imagine atypical colors of such objects and attend to imagery-matching stimuli. Participants in the imagery group were instructed to imagine an atypical color of the black-white objects according to the instructed color or voluntarily selected color, whereas participants in the control group were instructed to attend to the objects without any instruction of imagery. Thereafter, they detected a color target in a visual search task. Results revealed that participants in the imagery group directed attention to the imagery-matching atypical color, not to the original color of the object in the search. Meanwhile, participants in the control group did not demonstrate any attentional guidance. These results suggest that voluntarily imagining atypical color can attenuate mental representations of the original color imagery and change attention to a stimulus that matches imagery.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jun Moriya
- Faculty of Sociology, Kansai University, 3-3-35 Yamate-cho, Suita-shi, Osaka, Japan.
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19
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Schwarzkopf DS. What is the true range of mental imagery? Cortex 2024; 170:21-25. [PMID: 37949779 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.09.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/15/2023] [Revised: 08/28/2023] [Accepted: 09/12/2023] [Indexed: 11/12/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Dietrich S Schwarzkopf
- School of Optometry & Vision Science, University of Auckland, New Zealand; Experimental Psychology, University College London, UK.
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20
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Blomkvist A, Marks DF. Defining and 'diagnosing' aphantasia: Condition or individual difference? Cortex 2023; 169:220-234. [PMID: 37948876 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.09.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/05/2023] [Revised: 06/16/2023] [Accepted: 09/26/2023] [Indexed: 11/12/2023]
Abstract
Research into the newly-coined 'condition' of 'aphantasia', an individual difference involving the self-reported absence of voluntary visual imagery, has taken off in recent years, and more and more people are 'self-diagnosing' as aphantasic. Yet, there is no consensus on whether aphantasia should really be described as a 'condition', and there is no battery of psychometric instruments to detect or 'diagnose' aphantasia. Instead, researchers currently rely on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) to 'diagnose' aphantasia. We review here fundamental and methodological problems affecting aphantasia research stemming from an inadequate focus on how we should define aphantasia, whether aphantasia is a pathological condition, and the extensive use of VVIQ as a 'diagnostic test' for aphantasia. Firstly, we draw attention to 'literature blindness' for visual imagery research from the 1960s-1990s concerning individual differences in visual imagery vividness. Secondly, despite aphantasia being defined as a 'condition' where voluntary visual imagery is absent as indicated by the lowest score on the VVIQ, aphantasia studies inconsistently employ samples comprised of a mixture of participants with no visual imagery and low visual imagery, and we argue that this hinders the uncovering of the underlying cause of aphantasia. Thirdly, the scores used to designate the boundary between aphantasia and non-aphantasia are arbitrary and differ between studies, compromising the possibility for cross-study comparison of results. Fourthly, the problems of 'diagnosing' aphantasia are not limited to the academic sphere, as one can 'self-diagnose' online, for example by using the variant-VVIQ on the Aphantasia Network website. However, the variant-VVIQ departs from the original in ways likely to impact validity and accuracy, which could lead people to falsely believe they have been 'diagnosed' with aphantasia by a scientifically-validated measure. Fifthly, we discuss the hypothesis that people who believe they have been 'diagnosed' with aphantasia might be vulnerable to health anxiety, distress, and stigma. We conclude with a discussion about some fundamental aspects of how to classify a disorder, and suggest the need for a new psychometric measure of aphantasia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrea Blomkvist
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK.
| | - David F Marks
- 13200 Arles, Bouches-du-Rhône, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, France
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21
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Cabbai G, Brown CRH, Dance C, Simner J, Forster S. Mental imagery and visual attentional templates: A dissociation. Cortex 2023; 169:259-278. [PMID: 37967476 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.09.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2023] [Revised: 08/10/2023] [Accepted: 09/26/2023] [Indexed: 11/17/2023]
Abstract
There is a growing interest in the relationship between mental images and attentional templates as both are considered pictorial representations that involve similar neural mechanisms. Here, we investigated the role of mental imagery in the automatic implementation of attentional templates and their effect on involuntary attention. We developed a novel version of the contingent capture paradigm designed to encourage the generation of a new template on each trial and measure contingent spatial capture by a template-matching visual feature (color). Participants were required to search at four different locations for a specific object indicated at the start of each trial. Immediately prior to the search display, color cues were presented surrounding the potential target locations, one of which matched the target color (e.g., red for strawberry). Across three experiments, our task induced a robust contingent capture effect, reflected by faster responses when the target appeared in the location previously occupied by the target-matching cue. Contrary to our predictions, this effect remained consistent regardless of self-reported individual differences in visual mental imagery (Experiment 1, N = 216) or trial-by-trial variation of voluntary imagery vividness (Experiment 2, N = 121). Moreover, contingent capture was observed even among aphantasic participants, who report no imagery (Experiment 3, N = 91). The magnitude of the effect was not reduced in aphantasics compared to a control sample of non-aphantasics, although the two groups reported substantial differences in their search strategy and exhibited differences in overall speed and accuracy. Our results hence establish a dissociation between the generation and implementation of attentional templates for a visual feature (color) and subjectively experienced imagery.
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Affiliation(s)
- Giulia Cabbai
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.
| | | | - Carla Dance
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
| | - Julia Simner
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
| | - Sophie Forster
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
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22
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Monzel M, Dance C, Azañón E, Simner J. Aphantasia within the framework of neurodivergence: Some preliminary data and the curse of the confidence gap. Conscious Cogn 2023; 115:103567. [PMID: 37708622 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103567] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/28/2023] [Revised: 08/15/2023] [Accepted: 08/22/2023] [Indexed: 09/16/2023]
Abstract
Aphantasia is a neurocognitive phenomenon affecting voluntary visual imagery, such that it is either entirely absent, or markedly impaired. Using both the social and medical models of disability, this article discusses the extent to which aphantasia can be understood as a disorder or just a form of neutral neurodivergence, given that imagery plays a central role in thinking and memory for most other people. Preliminary school performance data are presented, showing that low imagery does not necessarily complicate life, especially given compensatory strategies and low societal barriers. In addition, we discuss the consequences of labelling aphantasia a disorder with regard to self- and public stigma, and we provide further data regarding a confidence gap, by which aphantasics perceive themselves as performing worse than they objectively do. We conclude that aphantasia should be understood as neutral neurodivergence and that labelling it a disorder is not only wrong, but potentially harmful.
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Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, Bonn, Germany.
| | - Carla Dance
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, BN1 9QJ, UK
| | - Elena Azañón
- Department of Neurology, University Medical Center, Leipziger Str. 44, 39120 Magdeburg, Germany; Center for Behavioral Brain Sciences (CBBS), Universitätsplatz 2, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany; Department of Behavioral Neurology, Leibniz Institute for Neurobiology, Brenneckestr. 6, 39118 Magdeburg, Germany; Center for Intervention and Research on adaptive and maladaptive brain Circuits underlying mental health, Jena-Magdeburg-Halle
| | - Julia Simner
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, BN1 9QJ, UK
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23
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Dance CJ, Hole G, Simner J. The role of visual imagery in face recognition and the construction of facial composites. Evidence from Aphantasia. Cortex 2023; 167:318-334. [PMID: 37597266 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.06.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/08/2022] [Revised: 05/02/2023] [Accepted: 06/20/2023] [Indexed: 08/21/2023]
Abstract
People with aphantasia have a markedly impaired ability to form visual images in the mind's eye. Here, by testing people with and without aphantasia, we examine the relationship between visual imagery and face processing. We show that aphantasics have weaker face recognition than people with visual imagery, using both self-report (Prosopagnosia Index) and behavioural measures (Cambridge Face Memory Test). However, aphantasics nonetheless have a fully intact ability to construct facial composites from memory (i.e., composites produced using EFIT6 by aphantasics and imagers were rated as equally accurate in terms of their resemblance to a target face). Additionally, we show that aphantasics were less able than imagers to see the resemblance between composites and a target face, suggestive of potential issues with face matching (perception). Finally, we show that holistic and featural methods of composite construction using EFIT6 produce equally accurate composites. Our results suggest that face recognition, but not face composite construction, is facilitated by the ability to represent visual properties as 'pictures in the mind'. Our findings have implications for the study of aphantasia, and also for forensic settings, where face composite systems are commonly used to aid criminal investigations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carla J Dance
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, UK.
| | - Graham Hole
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, UK
| | - Julia Simner
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, UK
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24
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Dando CJ, Nahouli Z, Hart A, Pounder Z. Real-world implications of aphantasia: episodic recall of eyewitnesses with aphantasia is less complete but no less accurate than typical imagers. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:231007. [PMID: 37885991 PMCID: PMC10598423 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.231007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/28/2023]
Abstract
Individuals with aphantasia report an inability to voluntarily visually image and reduced episodic memory, yet episodic accounts provided by witnesses and victims are fundamental for criminal justice. Using the mock-witness paradigm, we investigated eyewitness memory of individuals with aphantasia versus typical imagers. Participants viewed a mock crime and 48 hours later were interviewed about the event, randomly allocated to one of three conditions. Two interview conditions included techniques designed to support episodic retrieval mode, namely (i) Mental Reinstatement of Context (MRC) and (ii) Sketch Reinstatement of Context (Sketch-RC). A third Control condition did not include retrieval support. Aphantasic mock-eyewitnesses recalled 30% less correct information and accounts were less complete, but they made no more errors and were as accurate as typical imagers. Interaction effects revealed reduced correct recall and less complete accounts for aphantasic participants in MRC interviews versus Sketch-RC and Control. Aphantaisic participants in the Control outperformed those in both the Sketch-RC and MRC, although Sketch-RC improved completeness by 15% versus MRC. Our pattern of results indicates reduced mental imagery ability might be compensated for by alternative self-initiated cognitive strategies. Findings offer novel insights into episodic recall performance in information gathering interviews when ability to voluntarily visualize is impoverished.
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Affiliation(s)
- Coral J. Dando
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Science, University of Westminster, London W1B 2HW, UK
| | | | - Alison Hart
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Science, University of Westminster, London W1B 2HW, UK
| | - Zoe Pounder
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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25
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Servais A, Préa N, Hurter C, Barbeau EJ. Why and when do you look away when trying to remember? Gaze aversion as a marker of the attentional switch to the internal world during memory retrieval. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2023; 240:104041. [PMID: 37774488 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2023.104041] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2022] [Revised: 09/15/2023] [Accepted: 09/21/2023] [Indexed: 10/01/2023] Open
Abstract
It is common to look away while trying to remember specific information, for example during autobiographical memory retrieval, a behavior referred to as gaze aversion. Given the competition between internal and external attention, gaze aversion is assumed to play a role in visual decoupling, i.e., suppressing environmental distractors during internal tasks. This suggests a link between gaze aversion and the attentional switch from the outside world to a temporary internal mental space that takes place during the initial stage of memory retrieval, but this assumption has never been verified so far. We designed a protocol where 33 participants answered 48 autobiographical questions while their eye movements were recorded with an eye-tracker and a camcorder. Results indicated that gaze aversion occurred early (median 1.09 s) and predominantly during the access phase of memory retrieval-i.e., the moment when the attentional switch is assumed to take place. In addition, gaze aversion lasted a relatively long time (on average 6 s), and was notably decoupled from concurrent head movements. These results support a role of gaze aversion in perceptual decoupling. Gaze aversion was also related to higher retrieval effort and was rare during memories which came spontaneously to mind. This suggests that gaze aversion might be required only when cognitive effort is required to switch the attention toward the internal world to help retrieving hard-to-access memories. Compared to eye vergence, another visual decoupling strategy, the association with the attentional switch seemed specific to gaze aversion. Our results provide for the first time several arguments supporting the hypothesis that gaze aversion is related to the attentional switch from the outside world to memory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anaïs Servais
- Centre de recherche Cerveau et Cognition (CerCo), UMR5549 (CNRS-UPS), Pavillon Baudot, 31052 Toulouse, France; National Civil Aviation School (ENAC), 7 avenue Edouard Belin, 31055 Toulouse, France.
| | - Noémie Préa
- Centre de recherche Cerveau et Cognition (CerCo), UMR5549 (CNRS-UPS), Pavillon Baudot, 31052 Toulouse, France
| | - Christophe Hurter
- National Civil Aviation School (ENAC), 7 avenue Edouard Belin, 31055 Toulouse, France.
| | - Emmanuel J Barbeau
- Centre de recherche Cerveau et Cognition (CerCo), UMR5549 (CNRS-UPS), Pavillon Baudot, 31052 Toulouse, France.
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26
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Monzel M, Vetterlein A, Hogeterp SA, Reuter M. No increased prevalence of prosopagnosia in aphantasia: Visual recognition deficits are small and not restricted to faces. Perception 2023; 52:629-644. [PMID: 37321679 DOI: 10.1177/03010066231180712] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/17/2023]
Abstract
Aphantasia and prosopagnosia are both rare conditions with impairments in visual cognition. While prosopagnosia refers to a face recognition deficit, aphantasics exhibit a lack of mental imagery. Current object recognition theories propose an interplay of perception and mental representations, making an association between recognition performance and visual imagery plausible. While the literature assumes a link between aphantasia and prosopagnosia, other impairments in aphantasia have been shown to be rather global. Therefore, we assumed that aphantasics do not solely exhibit impairments in face recognition but rather in general visual recognition performance, probably moderated by stimulus complexity. To test this hypothesis, 65 aphantasics were compared to 55 controls in a face recognition task, the Cambridge Face Memory Test, and a corresponding object recognition task, the Cambridge Car Memory Test. In both tasks, aphantasics performed worse than controls, indicating mild recognition deficits without face-specificity. Additional correlations between imagery vividness and performance in both tasks were found, suggesting that visual imagery influences visual recognition not only in imagery extremes. Stimulus complexity produced the expected moderation effect but only for the whole imagery-spectrum and only with face stimuli. Overall, the results imply that aphantasia is linked to a general but mild deficit in visual recognition.
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27
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Liu J, Bartolomeo P. Probing the unimaginable: The impact of aphantasia on distinct domains of visual mental imagery and visual perception. Cortex 2023; 166:338-347. [PMID: 37481856 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.06.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/18/2023] [Revised: 03/09/2023] [Accepted: 06/15/2023] [Indexed: 07/25/2023]
Abstract
Different individuals experience varying degrees of vividness in their visual mental images. The distribution of these variations across different imagery domains, such as object shape, color, written words, faces, and spatial relationships, remains unknown. To address this issue, we conducted a study with 117 healthy participants who reported different levels of imagery vividness. Of these participants, 44 reported experiencing absent or nearly absent visual imagery, a condition known as "aphantasia". These individuals were compared to those with typical (N = 42) or unusually vivid (N = 31) imagery ability. We used an online version of the French-language Battérie Imagination-Perception (eBIP), which consists of tasks tapping each of the above-mentioned domains, both in visual imagery and in visual perception. We recorded the accuracy and response times (RTs) of participants' responses. Aphantasic participants reached similar levels of accuracy on all tasks compared to the other groups (Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA, BF = .02). However, their RTs were slower in both imagery and perceptual tasks (BF = 266), and they had lower confidence in their responses on perceptual tasks (BF = 7.78e5). A Bayesian regression analysis revealed that there was an inverse correlation between subjective vividness and RTs for the entire participant group: higher levels of vividness were associated with faster RTs. The pattern was similar in all the explored domains. The findings suggest that individuals with congenital aphantasia experience a slowing in processing visual information in both imagery and perception, but the precision of their processing remains unaffected. The observed performance pattern lends support to the hypotheses that congenital aphantasia is primarily a deficit of phenomenal consciousness, or that it employs alternative strategies other than visualization to access preserved visual information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jianghao Liu
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, 75013 Paris, France; Dassault Systèmes, Vélizy-Villacoublay, France.
| | - Paolo Bartolomeo
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, 75013 Paris, France
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28
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Bergmann J, Ortiz-Tudela J. Feedback signals in visual cortex during episodic and schematic memory retrieval and their potential implications for aphantasia. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 152:105335. [PMID: 37524137 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105335] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2023] [Revised: 07/26/2023] [Accepted: 07/28/2023] [Indexed: 08/02/2023]
Abstract
Recent findings indicate that visual feedback derived from episodic memory can be traced down to the earliest stages of visual processing, whereas feedback stemming from schema-related memories only reach intermediate levels in the visual processing hierarchy. In this opinion piece, we examine these differences in light of the 'what' and 'where' streams of visual perception. We build upon this new framework to propose that the memory deficits observed in aphantasics might be better understood as a difference in high-level feedback processing along the 'what' stream, rather than an episodic memory impairment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johanna Bergmann
- Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Javier Ortiz-Tudela
- Mind, Brain, and Behavior Research Center, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Granada, Spain; Department of Psychology, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Hessen, Germany.
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29
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Beran MJ, James BT, French K, Haseltine EL, Kleider-Offutt HM. Assessing aphantasia prevalence and the relation of self-reported imagery abilities and memory task performance. Conscious Cogn 2023; 113:103548. [PMID: 37451040 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103548] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/15/2021] [Revised: 06/04/2023] [Accepted: 06/29/2023] [Indexed: 07/18/2023]
Abstract
Aphantasia is the experience of having little to no visual imagery. We assessed the prevalence rate of aphantasia in 5,010 people from the general population of adults in the United States through self-report and responses to two visual imagery scales. The self-reported prevalence rate of aphantasia was 8.9% in this sample. However, not all participants who reported themselves as aphantasic showed low-imagery profiles on the questionnaire scales, and scale prevalence was much lower (1.5%). Self-reported aphantasic individuals reported lower dream frequencies and self-talk and showed poorer memory performance compared to individuals who reported average and high mental imagery. Self-reported aphantasic individuals showed a greater preference for written instruction compared to video instruction for learning a hypothetical new task although there were differences for men and women in this regard. Categorizing aphantasia using a scale measure and relying on self-identification may provide a more consistent picture of who lacks visual imagery.
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30
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Abstract
In a complex world, we are constantly faced with environmental stimuli that shape our moment-to-moment experiences. But just as rich and complex as the external world is the internal milieu-our imagination. Imagination offers a powerful vehicle for playing out hypothetical experiences in the mind's eye. It allows us to mentally time travel to behold what the future might bring, including our greatest desires or fears. Indeed, imagined experiences tend to be emotion-laden. How and why are humans capable of this remarkable feat? Based on psychological findings, we highlight the importance of imagination for emotional aspects of cognition and behavior, namely in the generation and regulation of emotions. Based on recent cognitive neuroscience work, we identify putative neural networks that are most critical for emotional imagination, with a major focus on the default mode network. Finally, we briefly highlight the possible functional implications of individual differences in imagination. Overall, we hope to address why humans have the capacity to simulate hypothetical emotional experiences and how this ability can be harnessed in adaptive (and sometimes maladaptive) ways. We end by discussing open questions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chantelle M Cocquyt
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
| | - Daniela J Palombo
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
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31
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Takahashi J, Saito G, Omura K, Yasunaga D, Sugimura S, Sakamoto S, Horikawa T, Gyoba J. Diversity of aphantasia revealed by multiple assessments of visual imagery, multisensory imagery, and cognitive style. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1174873. [PMID: 37546458 PMCID: PMC10403065 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1174873] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/27/2023] [Accepted: 06/26/2023] [Indexed: 08/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Aphantasia-a condition wherein individuals have a reduced or absent construction of voluntary visual imagery-is diagnosed using either the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) or self-identification. However, a significant discrepancy exists between the proportions of aphantasia in the populations assessed using these two criteria. It is unclear why the reported proportions differ excessively and what percentage of people cannot form visual imagery. We investigated the replicability of the proportion of people with aphantasia using both criteria in the same population of participants. Therefore, we explored the potential causes of the discrepancy and characteristics of putative aphantasia in terms of multisensory imagery, cognitive style, and face recognition ability. First, we conducted an online sampling study (Study 1: N = 2,871) using the VVIQ, self-identification of a reduction in visual imagery, Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (QMI), and Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ). We found that 3.7 and 12.1% fulfilled the VVIQ and self-identification criteria, respectively, roughly replicating the proportions reported in previous studies. The self-identification criterion-but not the VVIQ criterion-contains items related to face recognition; hence, we suspected that face recognition ability was factor contributing to this discrepancy and conducted another online sampling study (Study 2: N = 774). We found a significant correlation between VVIQ and face recognition ability in the control group with self-identification, but not in the group defined by low VVIQ (VVIQ ≤32). As the participants in the control group with self-identification tended to exhibit moderately high VVIQ scores but low face recognition ability, we reason that the discrepancy can be partially explained by the contamination of individual differences in face recognition ability. Additional analyses of Study 1 revealed that the aphantasia group included participants who lacked all types of sensory imagery or only visual imagery in multisensory imagery and exhibited a non-specific cognitive style. This study indicates that the VVIQ alone may be insufficient to diagnose individuals who report an inability to form visual imagery. Furthermore, we highlight the importance of multiple assessments-along with the VVIQ-to better understand the diversity of imagery in aphantasia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Junichi Takahashi
- Faculty of Human Development and Culture, Fukushima University, Fukushima, Japan
| | - Godai Saito
- Department of Psychology, Graduate School of Arts and Letters, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan
| | - Kazufumi Omura
- Faculty of Education, Art and Science, Yamagata University, Yamagata, Japan
| | - Daichi Yasunaga
- Faculty of Letters, College of Human and Social Sciences, Kanazawa University, Kanazawa, Japan
| | | | - Shuichi Sakamoto
- Research Institute of Electrical Communication, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan
| | - Tomoyasu Horikawa
- NTT Communication Science Laboratories, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Atsugi, Japan
| | - Jiro Gyoba
- Department of Psychology, College of Psychology and Education, Shokei Gakuin University, Natori, Japan
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Raffaelli Q, Andrews ES, Cegavske CC, Abraham FF, Edgin JO, Andrews-Hanna JR. Dreams share phenomenological similarities with task-unrelated thoughts and relate to variation in trait rumination and COVID-19 concern. Sci Rep 2023; 13:7102. [PMID: 37130841 PMCID: PMC10152021 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-33767-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/29/2022] [Accepted: 04/18/2023] [Indexed: 05/04/2023] Open
Abstract
While recent neurocognitive theories have proposed links between dreams and waking life, it remains unclear what kinds of waking thoughts are most similar in their phenomenological characteristics to those of dreams. To investigate this question and examine relevance of dreams to significant personal concerns and dispositional mental health traits, we employed ecological momentary assessment and trait questionnaires across 719 young adults who completed the study during the COVID-19 pandemic, a time marked by considerable societal concern. Across the group and at the level of individual differences, dreams showed the highest correspondence with task-unrelated thoughts. Participants who self-reported greater COVID-19 concern rated their dreams as more negative and unconstructive, a relationship which was moderated by trait rumination. Furthermore, dreams perceived as more negative unconstructive and immersive in nature associated with increased trait rumination beyond variation in rumination explained by waking task-unrelated thoughts alone. Together, these results point to similarities between perceived characteristics of dreams and task-unrelated thoughts, and support a relationship between dreams, current concerns, and mental health.
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Affiliation(s)
- Quentin Raffaelli
- Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, 1503 E University Blvd., Tucson, AZ, 85721, USA.
- Cognitive Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA.
| | - Eric S Andrews
- Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, 1503 E University Blvd., Tucson, AZ, 85721, USA
- Cognitive Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
| | - Caitlin C Cegavske
- Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, 1503 E University Blvd., Tucson, AZ, 85721, USA
| | - Freya F Abraham
- Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, 1503 E University Blvd., Tucson, AZ, 85721, USA
| | - Jamie O Edgin
- Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, 1503 E University Blvd., Tucson, AZ, 85721, USA
| | - Jessica R Andrews-Hanna
- Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, 1503 E University Blvd., Tucson, AZ, 85721, USA.
- Cognitive Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA.
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Fan CL, Sokolowski HM, Rosenbaum RS, Levine B. What about "space" is important for episodic memory? WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2023; 14:e1645. [PMID: 36772875 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1645] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/19/2022] [Revised: 01/16/2023] [Accepted: 01/18/2023] [Indexed: 02/12/2023]
Abstract
Early cognitive neuroscientific research revealed that the hippocampus is crucial for spatial navigation in rodents, and for autobiographical episodic memory in humans. Researchers quickly linked these streams to propose that the human hippocampus supports memory through its role in representing space, and research on the link between spatial cognition and episodic memory in humans has proliferated over the past several decades. Different researchers apply the term "spatial" in a variety of contexts, however, and it remains unclear what aspect of space may be critical to memory. Similarly, "episodic" has been defined and tested in different ways. Naturalistic assessment of spatial memory and episodic memory (i.e., episodic autobiographical memory) is required to unify the scale and biological relevance in comparisons of spatial and mnemonic processing. Limitations regarding the translation of rodent to human research, human ontogeny, and inter-individual variability require greater consideration in the interpretation of this literature. In this review, we outline the aspects of space that are (and are not) commonly linked to episodic memory, and then we discuss these dimensions through the lens of individual differences in naturalistic autobiographical memory. Future studies should carefully consider which aspect(s) of space are being linked to memory within the context of naturalistic human cognition. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carina L Fan
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.,Rotman Research Institute, Baycrest, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
| | | | - R Shayna Rosenbaum
- Rotman Research Institute, Baycrest, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.,Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
| | - Brian Levine
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.,Rotman Research Institute, Baycrest, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.,Department of Medicine, Neurology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
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Comparative effects of hypnotic suggestion and imagery instruction on bodily awareness. Conscious Cogn 2023; 108:103473. [PMID: 36706563 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103473] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2022] [Revised: 10/31/2022] [Accepted: 01/12/2023] [Indexed: 01/26/2023]
Abstract
Bodily awareness is informed by both sensory data and prior knowledge. Although misleading sensory signals have been repeatedly shown to affect bodily awareness, only scant attention has been given to the influence of cognitive variables. Hypnotic suggestion has recently been shown to impact visuospatial and sensorimotor representations of body-part size although the mechanisms subserving this effect are yet to be identified. Mental imagery might play a causal or facilitative role in this effect, as it has been shown to influence body awareness in previous studies. Nonetheless, current views ascribe only an epiphenomenal role to imagery in the implementation of hypnotic suggestions. This study compared the effects of hypnotic suggestion and imagery instruction for influencing the visuospatial and sensorimotor aspects of body-size representation. Both experimental manipulations produced significant increases (elongation) in both representations compared to baseline, although the effects were larger in the hypnotic suggestion condition. The effects of both manipulations were highly correlated across participants, suggesting overlapping mechanisms. Self-reports suggested that the use of voluntary imagery did not significantly contribute to the efficacy of either manipulation. Rather, top-down effects on body representations seem to be partly driven by response expectancies, spontaneous imagery, and hypnotic suggestibility in both conditions. These results are in line with current theories of suggestion and raise fundamental questions regarding the mechanisms driving the influence of cognition on body representations.
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Monzel M, Keidel K, Reuter M. Is it really empathy? The potentially confounding role of mental imagery in self-reports of empathy. JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jrp.2023.104354] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/05/2023]
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McLoone B, Grützner C, Stuart MT. Counterpossibles in science: an experimental study. SYNTHESE 2023; 201:27. [PMID: 36688003 PMCID: PMC9838439 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-04014-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/22/2022] [Accepted: 12/14/2022] [Indexed: 06/17/2023]
Abstract
A counterpossible is a counterfactual whose antecedent is impossible. The vacuity thesis says all counterpossibles are true solely because their antecedents are impossible. Recently, some have rejected the vacuity thesis by citing purported non-vacuous counterpossibles in science. One limitation of this work, however, is that it is not grounded in experimental data. Do scientists actually reason non-vacuously about counterpossibles? If so, what is their basis for doing so? We presented biologists (N = 86) with two counterfactual formulations of a well-known model in biology, the antecedents of which contain what many philosophers would characterize as a metaphysical impossibility. Participants consistently judged one counterfactual to be true, the other to be false, and they explained that they formed these judgments based on what they perceived to be the mathematical relationship between the antecedent and consequent. Moreover, we found no relationship between participants' judgments about the (im)possibility of the antecedent and whether they judged a counterfactual to be true or false. These are the first experimental results on counterpossibles in science with which we are familiar. We present a modal semantics that can capture these judgments, and we deal with a host of potential objections that a defender of the vacuity thesis might make.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brian McLoone
- Department of Philosophy, Portland State University, Portland, USA
- Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA
| | | | - Michael T. Stuart
- Institute for Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Taipei, Taiwan
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
- Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, UK
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Lupyan G, Uchiyama R, Thompson B, Casasanto D. Hidden Differences in Phenomenal Experience. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13239. [PMID: 36633912 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13239] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/02/2022] [Revised: 11/11/2022] [Accepted: 12/06/2022] [Indexed: 01/13/2023]
Abstract
In addition to the many easily observable differences between people, there are also differences in people's subjective experiences that are harder to observe, and which, as a consequence, remain hidden. For example, people vary widely in how much visual imagery they experience. But those who cannot see in their mind's eye, tend to assume everyone is like them. Those who can, assume everyone else can as well. We argue that a study of such hidden phenomenal differences has much to teach cognitive science. Uncovering and describing this variation (a search for unknown unknowns) may help predict otherwise puzzling differences in human behavior. The very existence of certain differences can also act as a stress test for some cognitive theories. Finally, studying hidden phenomenal differences is the first step toward understanding what kinds of environments may mask or unmask links between phenomenal experience and observable behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gary Lupyan
- Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Madison
| | - Ryutaro Uchiyama
- Nanyang Technological University NTU-Cambridge Centre for Lifelong Learning and Individualised Cognition
| | - Bill Thompson
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley
| | - Daniel Casasanto
- Department of Human Development & Department of Psychology, Cornell University
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Cushing CA, Dawes AJ, Hofmann SG, Lau H, LeDoux JE, Taschereau-Dumouchel V. A generative adversarial model of intrusive imagery in the human brain. PNAS NEXUS 2023; 2:pgac265. [PMID: 36733294 PMCID: PMC9887942 DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac265] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2022] [Accepted: 01/20/2023] [Indexed: 01/24/2023]
Abstract
The mechanisms underlying the subjective experiences of mental disorders remain poorly understood. This is partly due to long-standing over-emphasis on behavioral and physiological symptoms and a de-emphasis of the patient's subjective experiences when searching for treatments. Here, we provide a new perspective on the subjective experience of mental disorders based on findings in neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI). Specifically, we propose the subjective experience that occurs in visual imagination depends on mechanisms similar to generative adversarial networks that have recently been developed in AI. The basic idea is that a generator network fabricates a prediction of the world, and a discriminator network determines whether it is likely real or not. Given that similar adversarial interactions occur in the two major visual pathways of perception in people, we explored whether we could leverage this AI-inspired approach to better understand the intrusive imagery experiences of patients suffering from mental illnesses such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and acute stress disorder. In our model, a nonconscious visual pathway generates predictions of the environment that influence the parallel but interacting conscious pathway. We propose that in some patients, an imbalance in these adversarial interactions leads to an overrepresentation of disturbing content relative to current reality, and results in debilitating flashbacks. By situating the subjective experience of intrusive visual imagery in the adversarial interaction of these visual pathways, we propose testable hypotheses on novel mechanisms and clinical applications for controlling and possibly preventing symptoms resulting from intrusive imagery.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cody A Cushing
- Department of Psychology, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, 90095, USA
| | - Alexei J Dawes
- RIKEN Center for Brain Science, Wako, Saitama 351-0106, Japan
| | - Stefan G Hofmann
- Department of Clinical Psychology, Philipps-University Marburg, 35037 Marburg, Germany
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Boston University, Boston, MA, 02215, USA
| | - Hakwan Lau
- RIKEN Center for Brain Science, Wako, Saitama 351-0106, Japan
| | - Joseph E LeDoux
- Center for Neural Science and Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, 10012, USA
- Department of Psychiatry, and Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, New York University Langone Medical School, New York, NY, 10016, USA
| | - Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel
- Department of Psychiatry and Addictology, Université de Montréal, Montreal, Quebec H3T 1J4, Canada
- Centre de Recherche de l'Institut Universitaire en Santé Mentale de Montréal, Montreal, Quebec H1N 3M5, Canada
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Monzel M, Vetterlein A, Reuter M. No general pathological significance of aphantasia: An evaluation based on criteria for mental disorders. Scand J Psychol 2022; 64:314-324. [PMID: 36463494 DOI: 10.1111/sjop.12887] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2022] [Revised: 10/21/2022] [Accepted: 11/08/2022] [Indexed: 12/07/2022]
Abstract
As awareness of the phenomenon of aphantasia (= lack of voluntary imagery) has increased in recent years, many psychotherapists ponder its clinical implications. The present study investigates whether aphantasia meets the criteria for mental disorders, i.e. statistical rarity, impairment in activities of daily living, violation of social norms and inappropriate behavior and personal distress. Prevalence of aphantasia was determined meta-analytically based on 3,543 participants. An international sample of 156 participants with aphantasia (58.3% male; Mage = 35.23) and 131 controls (65.6% male; Mage = 28.88) was assessed with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, the Questionnaire for the Assessment of Everyday Memory Performance and the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire, as well as measures of depression, anxiety and well-being. The prevalence of aphantasia was estimated at 3.5 to 4.8%. Participants with aphantasia scored significantly lower than controls on every day and autobiographical memory, but not on theory of mind. A subgroup of 34.7% of participants with aphantasia reported distress significantly associated with lower well-being and high levels of anxiety and depression. The level of distress increased with poorer performance in autobiographical memory and theory of mind. Although aphantasia meets the criterion of statistical rarity, the impact on activities of daily living and personal distress is too weak to justify a classification as a mental disorder. In a subgroup, however, distress can reach clinically relevant levels. In individual cases, it is therefore advisable to conduct a psychological assessment, for example by means of the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire.
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Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology University of Bonn Bonn Germany
| | | | - Martin Reuter
- Department of Psychology University of Bonn Bonn Germany
- Center for Economics and Neuroscience (CENs), Laboratory of Neurogenetics University of Bonn Bonn Germany
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Cooper RA, Ritchey M. Patterns of episodic content and specificity predicting subjective memory vividness. Mem Cognit 2022; 50:1629-1643. [PMID: 35246786 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-022-01291-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/10/2022] [Indexed: 12/30/2022]
Abstract
The ability to remember and internally represent events is often accompanied by a subjective sense of "vividness". Vividness measures are frequently used to evaluate the experience of remembering and imagining events, yet little research has considered the objective attributes of event memories that underlie this subjective judgment, and individual differences in this mapping. Here, we tested how the content and specificity of event memories support subjectively vivid recollection. Over three experiments, participants encoded events containing a theme word and three distinct elements - a person, a place, and an object. In a memory test, memory for event elements was assessed at two levels of specificity - semantic gist (names) and perceptual details (lure discrimination). We found a strong correspondence between memory vividness and memory for gist information that did not vary by which elements were contained in memory. There was a smaller, additive benefit of remembering specific perceptual details on vividness, which, in one study, was driven by memory for place details. Moreover, we found individual differences in the relationship between memory vividness and objective memory attributes primarily along the specificity dimension, such that one cluster of participants used perceptual detail to inform memory vividness whereas another cluster was more driven by gist information. Therefore, while gist memory appears to drive vividness on average, there were idiosyncrasies in this pattern across participants. When assessing subjective ratings of memory and imagination, research should consider how these ratings map onto objective memory attributes in the context of their study design and population.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rose A Cooper
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.
- Roux Institute, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.
| | - Maureen Ritchey
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Boston, MA, USA
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Cavedon-Taylor D. Predictive processing and perception: What does imagining have to do with it? Conscious Cogn 2022; 106:103419. [PMID: 36252520 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/18/2021] [Revised: 07/29/2022] [Accepted: 09/29/2022] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
Abstract
Predictive processing (PP) accounts of perception are unique not merely in that they postulate a unity between perception and imagination, but in claiming that (i) perception should be conceptualised in terms of imagination and (ii) the two involve an identity of neural implementation. This paper argues against these claims, on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, the manner in which PP theorists link perception and imagination belies an impoverished account of imagery as cloistered from the external world in its intentionality, akin to a virtual reality, as well as endogenously generated. Yet this ignores a whole class of imagery whose intentionality is directed on the actual environment-projected mental imagery-and also ignores the fact that imagery may be triggered crossmodally in a bottom-up, stimulus-driven way. Empirically, claiming that imagery and perception share neural circuitry ignores relevant clinical results in this area. These evidence substantial perception/imagery neural dissociations, most notably in the case of aphantasia. Taken together, the arguments here suggest that PP theorists should substantially temper, if not outright abandon, their claim to a perception/imagination unity.
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Wittmann BC, Şatırer Y. Decreased associative processing and memory confidence in aphantasia. Learn Mem 2022; 29:412-420. [PMID: 36253008 PMCID: PMC9578376 DOI: 10.1101/lm.053610.122] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/06/2022] [Accepted: 09/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
Visual imagery and mental reconstruction of scenes are considered core components of episodic memory retrieval. Individuals with absent visual imagery (aphantasia) score lower on tests of autobiographical memory, suggesting that aphantasia may be associated with differences in episodic and associative processing. In this online study, we tested aphantasic participants and controls on associative recognition and memory confidence for three types of associations encoded incidentally: associations between visual-visual and audio-visual stimulus pairs, associations between an object and its location on the screen, and intraitem associations. Aphantasic participants had a lower rate of high-confidence hits in all associative memory tests compared with controls. Performance on auditory-visual associations was correlated with individual differences in a measure of object imagery in the aphantasic group but not in controls. No overall group difference in memory performance was found, indicating that visual imagery selectively contributes to memory confidence. Analysis of the encoding task revealed that aphantasics made fewer associative links between the stimuli, suggesting a role for visual imagery in associative processing of visual and auditory input. These data enhance our understanding of visual imagery contributions to associative memory and further characterize the cognitive profile of aphantasia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bianca C Wittmann
- Department of Psychology, Justus Liebig University, 35394 Giessen, Germany
| | - Yılmaz Şatırer
- Department of Psychology, Justus Liebig University, 35394 Giessen, Germany
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Cavedon-Taylor D. Aphantasia and psychological disorder: Current connections, defining the imagery deficit and future directions. Front Psychol 2022; 13:822989. [PMID: 36312098 PMCID: PMC9614338 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.822989] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/26/2021] [Accepted: 09/14/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Aphantasia is a condition characterized by a deficit of mental imagery. Since several psychopathologies are partially maintained by mental imagery, it may be illuminating to consider the condition against the background of psychological disorder. After outlining current findings and hypotheses regarding aphantasia and psychopathology, this paper suggests that some support for defining aphantasia as a lack of voluntary imagery may be found here. The paper then outlines potentially fruitful directions for future research into aphantasia in general and its relation to psychopathology in particular, including rethinking use of the SUIS to measure involuntary imagery, whether aphantasia offers protection against addiction, and whether hyperphantasia is a potential risk factor for maladaptive daydreaming, among others.
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Bo O'Connor B, Fowler Z. How Imagination and Memory Shape the Moral Mind. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 2022; 27:226-249. [PMID: 36062349 DOI: 10.1177/10888683221114215] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Interdisciplinary research has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions. However, extant work on moral cognition has largely overlooked the contributions of episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in time plays a broadly influential role in cognition and behavior. Yet, existing research has only begun exploring the influence of episodic representation on moral cognition. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral cognition, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and open questions. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on moral thought, and better understanding its interactions with other mental processes to fundamentally shape our sense of right and wrong.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Zoë Fowler
- University at Albany, State University of New York, USA
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Furman M, Fleitas-Rumak P, Lopez-Segura P, Furman M, Tafet G, de Erausquin GA, Ortiz T. Cortical activity involved in perception and imagery of visual stimuli in a subject with aphantasia. An EEG case report. Neurocase 2022; 28:344-355. [PMID: 36103716 DOI: 10.1080/13554794.2022.2122848] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/14/2022]
Abstract
Aphantasia has been described as the inability to voluntarily evoke mental images using the "mind's eye." We studied a congenital aphantasic subject using neuropsychological testsand 64 channel EEG recordings, in order to studycortical activity involved in perception and imagery evaluating event-related potentials(N170, P200, N250). The subject is in the normal range of the neuropsychological tests performed, except for specific imagery tests. The EEG results show that when he evokes the same mental image, he starts the evoking process from left temporal instead of frontal areas, he does not activate occipital visual nor left anterior parietal areas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mariano Furman
- Departamento de Medicina Legal Psiquiatría y Patología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| | - Pablo Fleitas-Rumak
- Departamento de Toxicología y Farmacología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Pilar Lopez-Segura
- Departamento de Medicina Legal Psiquiatría y Patología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| | - Martín Furman
- Asociación Civil Accionar Prevención, Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Gustavo Tafet
- Fundación Internacional para el Desarrollo de las Neurociencias, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Gabriel A de Erausquin
- Glenn Biggs Institute for Alzheimer and Neurodegenerative Diseases, University of Texas Health San Antonio, USA
| | - Tomás Ortiz
- Departamento de Medicina Legal Psiquiatría y Patología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
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Wardell V, Grilli MD, Palombo DJ. Simulating the best and worst of times: the powers and perils of emotional simulation. Memory 2022; 30:1212-1225. [PMID: 35708272 DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2022.2088796] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Abstract
We are remarkably capable of simulating events that we have never experienced. These simulated events often paint an emotional picture to behold, such as the best and worst possible outcomes that we might face. This review synthesises dispersed literature exploring the role of emotion in simulation. Drawing from work that suggests that simulations can influence our preferences, decision-making, and prosociality, we argue for a critical role of emotion in informing the consequences of simulation. We further unpack burgeoning evidence suggesting that the effects of emotional simulation transcend the laboratory. We propose avenues by which emotional simulation may be harnessed for both personal and collective good in applied contexts. We conclude by offering important future directions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Victoria Wardell
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
| | - Matthew D Grilli
- Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
| | - Daniela J Palombo
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
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Spatial transformation in mental rotation tasks in aphantasia. Psychon Bull Rev 2022; 29:2096-2107. [PMID: 35680760 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-022-02126-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/16/2022] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Aphantasia refers to the inability to summon images to one's own mind's eye, resulting in selective deficits of voluntary object imagery. In the present study, we investigated whether M. X., a case of acquired aphantasia, can still retain some form of spatial transformation processes even though he is unable to subjectively experience voluntary object imagery. M. X. and a group of control participants were asked to complete a letter mental rotation task (MRT), typically used to assess the nature of the spatial transformation, while behavioural and electrophysiological responses were recorded. M. X. was able to complete the MRTs as accurately as controls, showing the pattern of increasing RTs as a function of rotation angle typical of MRTs. However, event-related potential (ERP) results showed systematic differences between M. X. and controls. On canonical letter trials, the rotation-related negativity (RRN), an ERP component considered as the psychophysiological correlate of the spatial transformation of mental rotation (MR), was present in both M. X. and controls and similarly modulated by rotation angle. However, no such modulation was observed for M. X. on mirror-reversed letter trials. These findings suggest that, at least under specific experimental conditions, the inability to create a depictive representation of the stimuli does not prevent the engagement of spatial transformation in aphantasia. However, the ability to apply spatial transformation varies with tasks and might be accounted for by the specific type of mental representation that can be accessed.
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Palermo L, Boccia M, Piccardi L, Nori R. Congenital lack and extraordinary ability in object and spatial imagery: An investigation on sub-types of aphantasia and hyperphantasia. Conscious Cogn 2022; 103:103360. [PMID: 35691243 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103360] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/06/2021] [Revised: 05/26/2022] [Accepted: 05/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Studies that have shown a distinction between object and spatial imagery suggest more than one type of aphantasia and hyperphantasia, yet this has not been systematically investigated in studies on imagery ability extremes. Also, if the involuntary imagery is preserved in aphantasia and how this condition affects other skills is not fully clear. We collected data on spatial and object imagery, retrospective, and prospective memory, face recognition, and sense of direction (SOD), suggesting a distinction between two subtypes of aphantasia/hyperphantasia. Spatial aphantasia is associated with difficulties in visuo-spatial mental imagery and SOD. Instead, in object aphantasia there are difficulties in imaging single items and events - with no mental visualization of objects, out-of-focus, and black-and-white mental images more frequent than expected - in SOD and face recognition. Furthermore, associative involuntary imagery can be spared in aphantasia. The opposite pattern of performance was found in spatial and object hyperphantasia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Liana Palermo
- Department of Medical and Surgical Sciences, 'Magna Graecia' University of Catanzaro, Catanzaro, Italy.
| | - Maddalena Boccia
- Department of Psychology, 'Sapienza' University of Rome, Rome, Italy; I.R.C.C.S. Santa Lucia Foundation, Rome, Italy
| | - Laura Piccardi
- Department of Psychology, 'Sapienza' University of Rome, Rome, Italy; I.R.C.C.S. Santa Lucia Foundation, Rome, Italy
| | - Raffaella Nori
- Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
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Vitali H, Campus C, De Giorgis V, Signorini S, Gori M. The vision of dreams: from ontogeny to dream engineering in blindness. J Clin Sleep Med 2022; 18:2051-2062. [PMID: 35499135 PMCID: PMC9340600 DOI: 10.5664/jcsm.10026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022]
Abstract
The mechanisms involved in the origin of dreams remain one of the great unknowns in science. In the 21st century, studies in the field have focused on 3 main topics: functional networks that underlie dreaming, neural correlates of dream contents, and signal propagation. We review neuroscientific studies about dreaming processes, focusing on their cortical correlations. The involvement of frontoparietal regions in the dream-retrieval process allows us to discuss it in light of the Global Workspace theory of consciousness. However, dreaming in distinct sleep stages maintains relevant differences, suggesting that multiple generators are implicated. Then, given the strong influence of light perception on sleep regulation and the mostly visual content of dreams, we investigate the effect of blindness on the organization of dreams. Blind individuals represent a worthwhile population to clarify the role of perceptual systems in dream generation, and to make inferences about their top-down and/or bottom-up origin. Indeed, congenitally blind people maintain the ability to produce visual dreams, suggesting that bottom-up mechanisms could be associated with innate body schemes or multisensory integration processes. Finally, we propose the new dream-engineering technique as a tool to clarify the mechanisms of multisensory integration during sleep and related mental activity, presenting possible implications for rehabilitation in sensory-impaired individuals. The Theory of Proto-consciousness suggests that the interaction of brain states underlying waking and dreaming ensures the optimal functioning of both. Therefore, understanding the origin of dreams and capabilities of our brain during a dreamlike state, we could introduce it as a rehabilitative tool. CITATION Vitali H, Campus C, De Giorgis V, Signorini S, Gori M. The vision of dreams: from ontogeny to dream engineering in blindness. J Clin Sleep Med. 2022;18(8):2051-2062.
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Affiliation(s)
- Helene Vitali
- U-VIP: Unit for Visually Impaired People, Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia, Genova, Italy
| | - Claudio Campus
- U-VIP: Unit for Visually Impaired People, Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia, Genova, Italy
| | | | | | - Monica Gori
- U-VIP: Unit for Visually Impaired People, Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia, Genova, Italy
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Lambert AJ, Sibley CG. On the importance of consistent terminology for describing sensory imagery and its absence: A response to Monzel et al. (2022). Cortex 2022; 152:153-156. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2022.03.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/16/2022] [Revised: 03/21/2022] [Accepted: 03/22/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
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