Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity

For the Good of the Globe: Moral Reasons for States to Mitigate Global Catastrophic Biological Risks

Actions to prepare for and prevent pandemics are a common topic for bioethical analysis. However, little attention has been paid to global catastrophic biological risks more broadly, including pandemics with artificial origins, the creation of agents for biological warfare, and harmful outcomes of human genome editing. What's more, international policy discussions often focus on economic arguments for state action, ignoring a key potential set of reasons for states to mitigate global catastrophic biological risks: moral reasons. In this paper, I frame the mitigation of such risks as a global public good, and I explore three possible categories of moral reasons that might motivate states to provide this global public good: nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and interstate obligations. Whilst there are strong objections to moral nationalism as a reason for states to act, moral cosmopolitanism may provide a broad reason which is further supplemented for individual states through the elaboration of interstate moral obligations. The obligations I consider are moral leadership, fairness, and reciprocity. Moral reasons for individual states action may more effectively or more appropriately motivate states to mitigate global catastrophic biological risks.

Pandemic refuges: Lessons from 2 years of COVID-19

This paper relates evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic to the concept of pandemic refuges, as developed in literature on global catastrophic risk. In this literature, a refuge is a place or facility designed to keep a portion of the population alive during extreme global catastrophes. COVID-19 is not the most extreme pandemic scenario, but it is nonetheless a very severe global event, and it therefore provides an important source of evidence. Through the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic, several political jurisdictions have achieved low spread of COVID-19 via isolation from the rest of the world and can therefore classify as pandemic refuges. Their suppression and elimination of COVID-19 demonstrates the viability of pandemic refuges as a risk management measure. Whereas prior research emphasizes island nations as pandemic refuges, this paper uses case studies of China and Western Australia to show that other types of jurisdictions can also successfully function as pandemic refuges. The paper also refines the concept of pandemic refuges and discusses implications for future pandemics.

Global Catastrophic Biological Risks in the Post-COVID-19 World: Time to Act Is Now

Global Catastrophic Biological Risks (GCBRs) refer to events with biological agents that can result in unprecedented or catastrophic disasters that are beyond the collective response-abilities of nation-states and the existing governance instruments of global governance and international affairs. This article offers a narrative review, with a view to new hypothesis development to rethink GCBRs after coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) so as to better prepare for future pandemics and ecological crises, if not to completely prevent them. To determine GCBRs' spatiotemporal contexts, define causality, impacts, differentiate the risk and the event, would improve theorization of GCBRs compared to the impact-centric current definition. This could in turn lead to improvements in preparedness, response, allocation of resources, and possibly deterrence, while actively discouraging lack of due biosecurity diligence. Critical governance of GCBRs in ways that unpack the political power-related dimensions could be particularly valuable because the future global catastrophic events might be different in quality, scale, and actors. Theorization of GCBRs remains an important task going forward in the 21st century in ways that draw from experiences in the field, while integrating flexibility, versatility, and critically informed responses to GCBRs.

Assumptions, uncertainty, and catastrophic/existential risk: National risk assessments need improved methods and stakeholder engagement

Two key shortcomings of national risk assessments (NRAs) are: (1) lack of justification and transparency around important foundational assumptions of the process, (2) omission of almost all the largest scale risks. Using a demonstration set of risks, we illustrate how NRA process assumptions around time horizon, discount rate, scenario choice, and decision rule impact on risk characterization and therefore any subsequent ranking. We then identify a neglected set of large-scale risks that are seldom included in NRAs, namely global catastrophic risks and existential threats to humanity. Under a highly conservative approach that considers only simple probability and impact metrics, the use of significant discount rates, and harms only to those currently alive at the time, we find these risks have likely salience far greater than their omission from national risk registers might suggest. We highlight the substantial uncertainty inherent in NRAs and argue that this is reason for more engagement with stakeholders and experts. Widespread engagement with an informed public and experts would legitimize key assumptions, encourage critique of knowledge, and ease shortcomings of NRAs. We advocate for a deliberative public tool that can support informed two-way communication between stakeholders and governments. We outline the first component of such a tool for communication and exploration of risks and assumptions. The most important factors for an "all hazards" approach to NRA are ensuring license for key assumptions and that all the salient risks are included before proceeding to ranking of risks and considering resource allocation and value.

Optimizing Island Refuges against global Catastrophic and Existential Biological Threats: Priorities and Preparations

Human civilization is vulnerable to global catastrophic biological threats and existential threats. Policy to mitigate the impact of major biological threats should consider worst-case scenarios. We aimed to strengthen existing research on island refuges as a mitigating mechanism against such threats by considering five additional factors as well as recent literature on catastrophic risks and resilience. We also analyzed the performance of potential refuge islands during early phases the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a composite indicator (scored from 0-1) based on 14 global macroindices, we present analysis supporting Australia (0.71), New Zealand (0.64), and Iceland (0.58) as the leading candidate island nation refuges to safeguard the survival of humanity and a flourishing technological civilization from the threat of a catastrophic pandemic. Data from the COVID-19 pandemic supports this finding where islands have performed relatively well. We discuss the persisting weaknesses of even the best candidate refuges and the growing literature describing what preparations such a refuge should ensure to enhance resilience. Refuge preparations by Australia and New Zealand, in particular, may additionally provide some immunity against winter-inducing catastrophes such as global nuclear war. Existing disaster resilience frameworks such as the Sendai framework could be worded to mandate preventive measures against global catastrophic and existential threats. The issue of island refuges against certain global catastrophic risks should be raised at relevant international political summits.

Long-term cost-effectiveness of interventions for loss of electricity/industry compared to artificial general intelligence safety

Extreme solar storms, high-altitude electromagnetic pulses, and coordinated cyber attacks could disrupt regional/global electricity. Since electricity basically drives industry, industrial civilization could collapse without it. This could cause anthropological civilization (cities) to collapse, from which humanity might not recover, having long-term consequences. Previous work analyzed technical solutions to save nearly everyone despite industrial loss globally, including transition to animals powering farming and transportation. The present work estimates cost-effectiveness for the long-term future with a Monte Carlo (probabilistic) model. Model 1, partly based on a poll of Effective Altruism conference participants, finds a confidence that industrial loss preparation is more cost-effective than artificial general intelligence safety of ~ 88% and ~ 99+% for the 30 millionth dollar spent on industrial loss interventions and the margin now, respectively. Model 2 populated by one of the authors produces ~ 50% and ~ 99% confidence, respectively. These confidences are likely to be reduced by model and theory uncertainty, but the conclusion of industrial loss interventions being more cost-effective was robust to changing the most important 4–7 variables simultaneously to their pessimistic ends. Both cause areas save expected lives cheaply in the present generation and funding to preparation for industrial loss is particularly urgent.

Validation analysis of Global Health Security Index (GHSI) scores 2019

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic powerfully demonstrates the consequences of biothreats. Countries will want to know how to better prepare for future events. The Global Health Security Index (GHSI) is a broad, independent assessment of 195 countries' preparedness for biothreats that may aid this endeavour. However, to be useful, the GHSI's external validity must be demonstrated. We aimed to validate the GHSI against a range of external metrics to assess how it could be utilised by countries.

METHODS

Global aggregate communicable disease outcomes were correlated with GHSI scores and linear regression models were examined to determine associations while controlling for a number of global macroindices. GHSI scores for countries previously exposed to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome and Ebola and recipients of US Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) investment were compared with matched control countries. Possible content omissions in light of the progressing COVID-19 pandemic were assessed.

RESULTS

GHSI scores for countries had strong criterion validity against the Joint External Evaluation ReadyScore (rho=0.82, p<0.0001), and moderate external validity against deaths from communicable diseases (-0.56, p<0.0001). GHSI scores were associated with reduced deaths from communicable diseases (F(3, 172)=22.75, p<0.0001). The proportion of deaths from communicable diseases decreased 4.8% per 10-point rise in GHSI. Recipient countries of the GHSA (n=31) and SARS-affected countries (n=26), had GHSI scores 6.0 (p=0.0011) and 8.2 (p=0.0010) points higher than matched controls, respectively. Biosecurity and biosafety appear weak globally including in high-income countries, and health systems, particularly in Africa, are not prepared. Notably, the GHSI does not account for all factors important for health security.

CONCLUSION

The GHSI shows promise as a valid tool to guide action on biosafety, biosecurity and systems preparedness. However, countries need to look beyond existing metrics to other factors moderating the impact of future pandemics and other biothreats. Consideration of anthropogenic and large catastrophic scenarios is also needed.

Existential Risks to Humanity Should Concern International Policymakers and More Could Be Done in Considering Them at the International Governance Level

In this perspective, we consider the possible role of the United Nations (UN) with respect to existential risks to human civilization and the survival of humanity. We illustrate how existential risks have been discussed at an international governance level, specifically in documents in the UN Digital Library. In this large corpus, discussions of nuclear war account for over two-thirds (69%, 67/97) of mentions of existential risks, while mention of other existential risks, or such risks as a category, appears scant. We take these observations to imply inadequate attention to these significant threats. These deficits, combined with the need for a global response to many risks, suggest that UN member nations should urgently advocate for appropriate action at the UN to address threats, such as artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, geoengineering, and supervolcanic eruption, in analogous fashion to existing attempts to mitigate the threats from nuclear war or near-Earth objects.

Defence in Depth Against Human Extinction: Prevention, Response, Resilience, and Why They All Matter

We look at classifying extinction risks in three different ways, which affect how we can intervene to reduce risk. First, how does it start causing damage? Second, how does it reach the scale of a global catastrophe? Third, how does it reach everyone? In all of these three phases there is a defence layer that blocks most risks: First, we can prevent catastrophes from occurring. Second, we can respond to catastrophes before they reach a global scale. Third, humanity is resilient against extinction even in the face of global catastrophes. The largest probability of extinction is posed when all of these defences are weak, that is, by risks we are unlikely to prevent, unlikely to successfully respond to, and unlikely to be resilient against. We find that it's usually best to invest significantly into strengthening all three defence layers. We also suggest ways to do so tailored to the classes of risk we identify. Lastly, we discuss the importance of underlying risk factors - events or structural conditions that may weaken the defence layers even without posing a risk of immediate extinction themselves.

The Prioritization of Island Nations as Refuges from Extreme Pandemics

In this conceptual article with illustrative data, we suggest that it is useful to rank island nations as potential refuges for ensuring long-term human survival in the face of catastrophic pandemics (or other relevant existential threats). Prioritization could identify the several island nations that are most suitable for targeting social and political preparations and further investment in resiliency. We outline a prioritization methodology and as an initial demonstration, we then provide example rankings by considering 20 sovereign island states (all with populations greater than 250,000 and no land borders). Results describe each nation in nine resilience-relevant domains covering location, population, resources, and society according to published data. The results indicate that the most suitable island nations for refuge status are Australia, followed closely by New Zealand, and then Iceland, with other nations all well behind (including the relatively high-income ones of Malta and Japan). Nevertheless, some key contextual factors remain relatively unexplored. These include the capacity of the jurisdiction to rapidly close its borders when the emerging threat was first detected elsewhere, and whether or not large subnational islands should be the preferred focus for refuge design (e.g., the Australian state of Tasmania, the island of Hokkaido in Japan, or the South Island of New Zealand). Overall, this work provides conceptual thinking with some initial example analysis. Further research could refine the selection of metrics, how best to weight the relevant domains, and how the populations of prioritized island nations view their nation's selection as a potential refuge for human survival.

An upper bound for the background rate of human extinction

We evaluate the total probability of human extinction from naturally occurring processes. Such processes include risks that are well characterized such as asteroid impacts and supervolcanic eruptions, as well as risks that remain unknown. Using only the information that Homo sapiens has existed at least 200,000 years, we conclude that the probability that humanity goes extinct from natural causes in any given year is almost guaranteed to be less than one in 14,000, and likely to be less than one in 87,000. Using the longer track record of survival for our entire genus Homo produces even tighter bounds, with an annual probability of natural extinction likely below one in 870,000. These bounds are unlikely to be affected by possible survivorship bias in the data, and are consistent with mammalian extinction rates, typical hominin species lifespans, the frequency of well-characterized risks, and the frequency of mass extinctions. No similar guarantee can be made for risks that our ancestors did not face, such as anthropogenic climate change or nuclear/biological warfare.

Metabolic fatigue in resuscitators using personal protection equipment against biological hazard

OBJECTIVES

To describe the effects of wearing individual protection equipment against biological hazard when performing a simulated resuscitation.

METHODS

Uncontrolled quasi-experimental study involving 47 volunteers chosen by random sampling stratified by sex and professional category. We determined vital signs, anthropometric parameters and baseline lactate levels; subsequently, the volunteers put on level D individual protection equipment against biological hazard and performed a simulated resuscitation for 20 minutes. After undressing and 10 minutes of rest, blood was extracted again to determine lactate levels. Metabolic fatigue was defined as a level of lactic acid above 4 mmol/L at the end of the intervention.

RESULTS

25.5% of the participants finished the simulation with an unfavorable metabolic tolerance pattern. The variables that predict metabolic fatigue were the level of physical activity and bone mass -in a protective form- and muscle mass. People with a low level of physical activity had ten times the probability of metabolic fatigue compared to those with higher levels of activity (44% versus 4.5%, respectively).

CONCLUSIONS

Professionals who present a medium or high level of physical activity tolerate resuscitation tasks better with a level D individual biological protection suit in a simulated resuscitation.

Humanome Versus Microbiome: Games of Dominance and Pan-Biosurveillance in the Omics Universe

Global governance of pathogens such as Ebola virus and infectious diseases is central to global health, and to innovation in systems medicine. Worrisomely, the gaps in human immunity and healthcare services combined with novel pathogens emerging by travel, biotechnological advances, or the rupture of the host-species barrier challenge infectious diseases' global governance. Such biorisks and biothreats may scale up to global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs) spatiotemporally, either as individual or as collective risks. The scale and intensity of such threats challenge current thinking on surveillance, and calls for a move toward pan-biosurveillance. New multilayered, cross-sectoral, and adaptable strategies of prevention and intervention on GCBRs should be developed, considering human hosts in entirety, and in close relationship with other hosts (plants and animals). This also calls for the "Humanome," which we introduce in this study as the totality of human subjects plus any directly dependent biological or nonbiological entities (products, constructs, and interventions). Surveillance networks should be implemented by integrating communications, diagnostics, and robotics/aeronautics technologies. Suppression of pathogens must be enforced both before and during an epidemic outbreak, the former allowing more drastic measures before the pathogens harbor the host. We propose in this expert review that microbiome-level intervention might particularly prove as an effective solution in medical and environmental scales against traditional, currently emerging, and future infectious threats. We conclude with a discussion on the ways in which the humanome and microbiome contest and cooperate, and how this knowledge might usefully inform in addressing the GCBRs, bioterrorism, and associated threats in the pursuit of pan-biosurveillance.