Direct Electrophysiological Correlates of Body Ownership in Human Cerebral Cortex

Schizophrenia and the bodily self

Despite the historically consolidated psychopathological perspective, on the one hand, contemporary organicistic psychiatry often highlights abnormalities in neurotransmitter systems like dysregulation of dopamine transmission, neural circuitry, and genetic factors as key contributors to schizophrenia. Neuroscience, on the other, has so far almost entirely neglected the first-person experiential dimension of this syndrome, mainly focusing on high-order cognitive functions, such as executive function, working memory, theory of mind, and the like. An alternative view posits that schizophrenia is a self-disorder characterized by anomalous self-experience and awareness. This view may not only shed new light on the psychopathological features of psychosis but also inspire empirical research targeting the bodily and neurobiological changes underpinning this disorder. Cognitive neuroscience can today address classic topics of phenomenological psychopathology by adding a new level of description, finally enabling the correlation between the first-person experiential aspects of psychiatric diseases and their neurobiological roots. Recent empirical evidence on the neurobiological basis of a minimal notion of the self, the bodily self, is presented. The relationship between the body, its motor potentialities and the notion of minimal self is illustrated. Evidence on the neural mechanisms underpinning the bodily self, its plasticity, and the blurring of self-other distinction in schizophrenic patients is introduced and discussed. It is concluded that brain-body function anomalies of multisensory integration, differential processing of self- and other-related bodily information mediating self-experience, might be at the basis of the disruption of the self disorders characterizing schizophrenia.

Eliciting the rubber hand illusion by the activation of nociceptive C and Aδ fibers

ABSTRACT

The coherent perceptual experience of one's own body depends on the processing and integration of signals from multiple sensory modalities, including vision, touch, and proprioception. Although nociception provides critical information about damage to the tissues of one's body, little is known about how nociception contributes to own-body perception. A classic experimental approach to investigate the perceptual and neural mechanisms involved in the multisensory experience of one's own body is the rubber hand illusion (RHI). During the RHI, people experience a rubber hand as part of their own body (sense of body ownership) caused by synchronized stroking of the rubber hand in the participant's view and the hidden participant's real hand. We examined whether the RHI can be elicited by visual and "pure" nociceptive stimulation, ie, without tactile costimulation, and if so, whether it follows the basic perceptual rules of the illusion. In 6 separate experiments involving a total of 180 healthy participants, we used a Nd:YAP laser stimulator to specifically target C and Aδ fibers in the skin and compared the illusion condition (congruent visuonociceptive stimulation) to control conditions of incongruent visuonociceptive, incongruent visuoproprioceptive, and no nociceptive stimulation. The illusion was quantified through direct (questionnaire) and indirect (proprioceptive drift) behavioral measures. We found that a nociceptive rubber hand illusion (N-RHI) could be elicited and that depended on the spatiotemporal congruence of visuonociceptive signals, consistent with basic principles of multisensory integration. Our results suggest that nociceptive information shapes multisensory bodily awareness and contributes to the sense of body ownership.

Subcortical contributions to the sense of body ownership

The sense of body ownership (i.e. the feeling that our body or its parts belong to us) plays a key role in bodily self-consciousness and is believed to stem from multisensory integration. Experimental paradigms such as the rubber hand illusion have been developed to allow the controlled manipulation of body ownership in laboratory settings, providing effective tools for investigating malleability in the sense of body ownership and the boundaries that distinguish self from other. Neuroimaging studies of body ownership converge on the involvement of several cortical regions, including the premotor cortex and posterior parietal cortex. However, relatively less attention has been paid to subcortical structures that may also contribute to body ownership perception, such as the cerebellum and putamen. Here, on the basis of neuroimaging and neuropsychological observations, we provide an overview of relevant subcortical regions and consider their potential role in generating and maintaining a sense of ownership over the body. We also suggest novel avenues for future research targeting the role of subcortical regions in making sense of the body as our own.

Minimal self-consciousness and the flying man argument

The concept of minimal self-consciousness or "minimal self" is equivalent to a very basic form of first-person, pre-reflective self-awareness, which includes bodily self-awareness, and is related to phenomenal experience (qualia) and sentience. This phenomenological concept plays a role in characterizations of the senses of ownership and agency; in recent debates about Buddhist conceptions of the no-self; in explanations of illusions such as the Rubber Hand Illusion; as well as in characterizations of schizophrenia as a self-disorder. Despite its relevance to these complex investigations, a number of theorists have recently pointed out that the concept is not well defined. In order to provide some clarification about the notion of minimal self and how it relates to bodily and sensory processes this paper reaches back to the ideas expressed in a famous medieval thought experiment proposed in the 11th century: Avicenna's Flying Man argument. The paper then provides a review of some of the contemporary debates about the minimal self, pointing especially to questions about the role of bodily and social processes.

From rubber hands to neuroprosthetics: Neural correlates of embodiment

Our interaction with the world rests on the knowledge that we are a body in space and time, which can interact with the environment. This awareness is usually referred to as sense of embodiment. For the good part of the past 30 years, the rubber hand illusion (RHI) has been a prime tool to study embodiment in healthy and people with a variety of clinical conditions. In this paper, we provide a critical overview of this research with a focus on the RHI paradigm as a tool to study prothesis embodiment in individuals with amputation. The RHI relies on well-documented multisensory integration mechanisms based on sensory precision, where parietal areas are involved in resolving the visuo-tactile conflict, and premotor areas in updating the conscious bodily representation. This mechanism may be transferable to prosthesis ownership in amputees. We discuss how these results might transfer to technological development of sensorised prostheses, which in turn might progress the acceptability by users.

No reduction in motor-evoked potential amplitude during the rubber hand illusion

INTRODUCTION

In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), touches are applied to a fake hand at the same time as touches are applied to a participant's real hand that is hidden in a congruent position. Synchronous (but not asynchronous) tactile stimulation of the two hands may induce the sensation that the fake hand is the participant's own. As such, the illusion is commonly used to examine the sense of body ownership. Some studies indicate that in addition to the subjective experience of limb ownership reported by participants, the RHI can also reduce corticospinal excitability (e.g., as reflected in motor-evoked potential [MEP] amplitude) and alter parietal-motor cortical connectivity in passive participants. These findings have been taken to support a link between motor cortical processing and the subjective experience of body ownership.

METHODS

In this study, we tried to replicate the reduction in MEP amplitude associated with the RHI and uncover the components of the illusion that might explain these changes. As such, we used single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation to probe the excitability of the corticospinal motor system as participants experienced the RHI.

RESULTS

Despite participants reporting the presence of the illusion and showing shifts in perceived real hand position towards the fake limb supporting its elicitation, we did not observe any associated reduction in MEP amplitude.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that a reduction in MEP amplitude is not a reliable outcome of the RHI and argue that if such effects do occur, they are unlikely to be large or functionally relevant.

Quantifying body ownership information processing and perceptual bias in the rubber hand illusion

Bodily illusions have fascinated humankind for centuries, and researchers have studied them to learn about the perceptual and neural processes that underpin multisensory channels of bodily awareness. The influential rubber hand illusion (RHI) has been used to study changes in the sense of body ownership - that is, how a limb is perceived to belong to one's body, which is a fundamental building block in many theories of bodily awareness, self-consciousness, embodiment, and self-representation. However, the methods used to quantify perceptual changes in bodily illusions, including the RHI, have mainly relied on subjective questionnaires and rating scales, and the degree to which such illusory sensations depend on sensory information processing has been difficult to test directly. Here, we introduce a signal detection theory (SDT) framework to study the sense of body ownership in the RHI. We provide evidence that the illusion is associated with changes in body ownership sensitivity that depend on the information carried in the degree of asynchrony of correlated visual and tactile signals, as well as with perceptual bias and sensitivity that reflect the distance between the rubber hand and the participant's body. We found that the illusion's sensitivity to asynchrony is remarkably precise; even a 50 ms visuotactile delay significantly affected body ownership information processing. Our findings conclusively link changes in a complex bodily experience such as body ownership to basic sensory information processing and provide a proof of concept that SDT can be used to study bodily illusions.

Proprioceptive uncertainty promotes the rubber hand illusion

Body ownership is the multisensory perception of a body as one's own. Recently, the emergence of body ownership illusions like the visuotactile rubber hand illusion has been described by Bayesian causal inference models in which the observer computes the probability that visual and tactile signals come from a common source. Given the importance of proprioception for the perception of one's body, proprioceptive information and its relative reliability should impact this inferential process. We used a detection task based on the rubber hand illusion where participants had to report whether the rubber hand felt like their own or not. We manipulated the degree of asynchrony of visual and tactile stimuli delivered to the rubber hand and the real hand under two levels of proprioceptive noise using tendon vibration applied to the lower arm's antagonist extensor and flexor muscles. As hypothesized, the probability of the emergence of the rubber hand illusion increased with proprioceptive noise. Moreover, this result, well fitted by a Bayesian causal inference model, was best described by a change in the a priori probability of a common cause for vision and touch. These results offer new insights into how proprioceptive uncertainty shapes the multisensory perception of one's own body.

Neural Substrates of Body Ownership and Agency during Voluntary Movement

Body ownership and the sense of agency are two central aspects of bodily self-consciousness. While multiple neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural correlates of body ownership and agency separately, few studies have investigated the relationship between these two aspects during voluntary movement when such experiences naturally combine. By eliciting the moving rubber hand illusion with active or passive finger movements during functional magnetic resonance imaging, we isolated activations reflecting the sense of body ownership and agency, respectively, as well as their interaction, and assessed their overlap and anatomic segregation. We found that perceived hand ownership was associated with activity in premotor, posterior parietal, and cerebellar regions, whereas the sense of agency over the movements of the hand was related to activity in the dorsal premotor cortex and superior temporal cortex. Moreover, one section of the dorsal premotor cortex showed overlapping activity for ownership and agency, and somatosensory cortical activity reflected the interaction of ownership and agency with higher activity when both agency and ownership were experienced. We further found that activations previously attributed to agency in the left insular cortex and right temporoparietal junction reflected the synchrony or asynchrony of visuoproprioceptive stimuli rather than agency. Collectively, these results reveal the neural bases of agency and ownership during voluntary movement. Although the neural representations of these two experiences are largely distinct, there are interactions and functional neuroanatomical overlap during their combination, which has bearing on theories on bodily self-consciousness.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does the brain generate the sense of being in control of bodily movement (agency) and the sense that body parts belong to one's body (body ownership)? Using fMRI and a bodily illusion triggered by movement, we found that agency is associated with activity in premotor cortex and temporal cortex, and body ownership with activity in premotor, posterior parietal, and cerebellar regions. The activations reflecting the two sensations were largely distinct, but there was overlap in premotor cortex and an interaction in somatosensory cortex. These findings advance our understanding of the neural bases of and interplay between agency and body ownership during voluntary movement, which has implications for the development of advanced controllable prosthetic limbs that feel like real limbs.

Muscle activity prior to experiencing the rubber hand illusion is associated with alterations in perceived hand location

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a perceptual illusion in which one is made to feel that a hand-shaped object is part of their body. This illusion is believed to be the result of the integration of afferent information. However, there has been an increasing amount of evidence that suggests efferent information plays a role in this illusion as well. Previous research has found that individuals who are afflicted by pathological lack of movement experience the RHI more vividly than control participants. Whereas individuals who move their hands more than the general population (i.e. professional pianists) experience the RHI less vividly than control participants. Based upon the available evidence it would seem that muscle activity prior to experiencing the RHI should be associated with how vividly one experiences different indices of the illusion. In the present study we tested this possibility by having participants perform a maximum voluntary muscle contraction task prior to experiencing three variants of the RHI (moving active, moving passive and classic). It was found that electromyographic features known to be indicative of muscle fatigue exhibited a positive association with proprioceptive drift when stimulation was synchronous or visual movement only (with the exception of the passive moving RHI synchronous condition). More work is needed to better characterize the muscular processes associated with experiencing the RHI.

Tactile temporal order judgment during rubber hand illusion: Distinct modulation of the point of subjective simultaneity and temporal resolution

During the rubber hand illusion (RHI), individuals feel a fake hand as their own (ownership) and a perceived position of their real hand shifts toward the fake hand (proprioceptive drift; PD), which represents updating of multisensory hand representations. Bimanual tactile temporal order judgment (TOJ) includes processes of localizing tactile stimuli in space, for which multisensory hand representations are essential. According to the common processes, we examined tactile TOJ performance during the RHI and non-RHI. Temporal resolution (TR) as TOJ accuracy worsened during the non-RHI compared to the RHI. Additionally, a significant correlation between TR and PD was observed only in the non-RHI condition. However, the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS), which offers relative weighting of tactile inputs from the right and left hands, was correlated with illusory hand ownership. These results suggest that PSS and TR from tactile TOJ during RHI relate to self-attribution and localization of the hand, respectively.

Neural dynamics of illusory tactile pulling sensations

Directional tactile pulling sensations are integral to everyday life, but their neural mechanisms remain unknown. Prior accounts hold that primary somatosensory (SI) activity is sufficient to generate pulling sensations, with alternative proposals suggesting that amodal frontal or parietal regions may be critical. We combined high-density EEG with asymmetric vibration, which creates an illusory pulling sensation, thereby unconfounding pulling sensations from unrelated sensorimotor processes. Oddballs that created opposite direction pulls to common stimuli were compared to the same oddballs after neutral common stimuli (symmetric vibration) and to neutral oddballs. We found evidence against the sensory-frontal N140 and in favor of the midline P200 tracking the emergence of pulling sensations, specifically contralateral parietal lobe activity 264-320ms, centered on the intraparietal sulcus. This suggests that SI is not sufficient to generate pulling sensations, which instead depend on the parietal association cortex, and may reflect the extraction of orientation information and related spatial processing.

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Tactile pulling sensations are difficult to isolate in the human brain

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Illusory pulls from asymmetric vibration allow neural activity to be isolated

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Pulling sensations are driven by parietal lobe activity 264-320ms post-stimulus

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Spatial processing in the parietal lobe may be essential for pulling sensations

The rubber hand illusion is accompanied by a distributed reduction of alpha and beta power in the EEG

Previous studies have reported correlates of bodily self-illusions such as the rubber hand in signatures of rhythmic brain activity. However, individual studies focused on specific variations of the rubber hand paradigm, used different experimental setups to induce this, or used different control conditions to isolate the neurophysiological signatures related to the illusory state, leaving the specificity of the reported illusion-signatures unclear. We here quantified correlates of the rubber hand illusion in EEG-derived oscillatory brain activity and asked two questions: which of the observed correlates are robust to the precise nature of the control conditions used as contrast for the illusory state, and whether such correlates emerge directly around the subjective illusion onset. To address these questions, we relied on two experimental configurations to induce the illusion, on different non-illusion conditions to isolate neurophysiological signatures of the illusory state, and we implemented an analysis directly focusing on the immediate moment of the illusion onset. Our results reveal a widespread suppression of alpha and beta-band activity associated with the illusory state in general, whereby the reduction of beta power prevailed around the immediate illusion onset. These results confirm previous reports of a suppression of alpha and beta rhythms during body illusions, but also highlight the difficulties to directly pinpoint the precise neurophysiological correlates of the illusory state.

Multisensory and Sensorimotor Integration in the Embodied Self: Relationship between Self-Body Recognition and the Mirror Neuron System

The embodied self is rooted in the self-body in the "here and now". The senses of self-ownership and self-agency have been proposed as the basis of the sense of embodied self, and many experimental studies have been conducted on this subject. This review summarizes the experimental research on the embodied self that has been conducted over the past 20 years, mainly from the perspective of multisensory integration and sensorimotor integration regarding the self-body. Furthermore, the phenomenon of back projection, in which changes in an external object (e.g., a rubber hand) with which one has a sense of ownership have an inverse influence on the sensation and movement of one's own body, is discussed. This postulates that the self-body illusion is not merely an illusion caused by multisensory and/or sensorimotor integration, but is the incorporation of an external object into the self-body representation in the brain. As an extension of this fact, we will also review research on the mirror neuron system, which is considered to be the neural basis of recognition of others, and discuss how the neural basis of self-body recognition and the mirror neuron system can be regarded as essentially the same.

Multisensory Integration Dominates Hypnotisability and Expectations in the Rubber Hand Illusion

Some recent papers by P. Lush and colleagues have argued that the rubber hand illusion (RHI), where participants can feel a rubber hand as their own under appropriate multisensory stimulation, may be caused mainly by hypnotic suggestibility and expectations (demand characteristics). These papers rely primarily on a study with 353 participants who took part in a RHI experiment carried out in a classical way with brush stroking. Participants experienced a synchronous condition where the rubber hand was seen to be touched in synchrony with touch felt on their corresponding hidden real hand, or the touches were applied asynchronously as a control. Each participant had a related measure of their hypnotisability on a scale known as the Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotisability (SWASH). The authors found a correlation between the questionnaire ratings of the RHI in the synchronous condition and the SWASH score. From this, they concluded that the RHI is largely driven by suggestibility and further proposed that suggestibility and expectations may even entirely explain the RHI. Here we examine their claims in a series of extensive new analyses of their data. We find that at every level of SWASH, the synchronous stimulation results in greater levels of the illusion than the asynchronous condition; moreover, proprioceptive drift is greater in the synchronous case at every level of SWASH. Thus, while the level of hypnotisability does modestly influence the subjective reports (higher SWASH is associated with somewhat higher illusion ratings), the major difference between the synchronous and asynchronous stimulation is always present. Furthermore, by including in the model the participants' expectancy ratings of how strongly they initially believed they would experience the RHI in the two conditions, we show that expectations had a very small effect on the illusion ratings; model comparisons further demonstrate that the multisensory condition is two-to-three-times as dominant as the other factors, with hypnotisability contributing modestly and expectations negligibly. Thus, although the results indicate that trait suggestibility may modulate the RHI, presumably through intersubject variations in top-down factors, the findings also suggest that the primary explanation for the RHI is as a multisensory bodily illusion.

Intrinsic neural activity predisposes susceptibility to a body illusion

Susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion (RHI) varies. To date, however, there is no consensus explanation of this variability. Previous studies, focused on the role of multisensory integration, have searched for neural correlates of the illusion. But those studies have failed to identify a sufficient set of functionally specific neural correlates. Because some evidence suggests that frontal α power is one means of tracking neural instantiations of self, we hypothesized that the higher the frontal α power during the eyes-closed resting state, the more stable the self. As a corollary, we infer that the more stable the self, the less susceptible are participants to a blurring of boundaries—to feeling that the rubber hand belongs to them. Indeed, we found that frontal α amplitude oscillations negatively correlate with susceptibility. Moreover, since lower frequencies often modulate higher frequencies, we explored the possibility that this might be the case for the RHI. Indeed, some evidence suggests that high frontal α power observed in low-RHI participants is modulated by δ frequency oscillations. We conclude that while neural correlates of multisensory integration might be necessary for the RHI, sufficient explanation involves variable intrinsic neural activity that modulates how the brain responds to incompatible sensory stimuli.

Multivariate Analysis of Evoked Responses during the Rubber Hand Illusion Suggests a Temporal Parcellation into Manipulation and Illusion-Specific Correlates

The neurophysiological processes reflecting body illusions such as the rubber hand remain debated. Previous studies investigating the neural responses evoked by the illusion-inducing stimulation have provided diverging reports as to when these responses reflect the illusory state of the artificial limb becoming embodied. One reason for these diverging reports may be that different studies contrasted different experimental conditions to isolate potential correlates of the illusion, but individual contrasts may reflect multiple facets of the adopted experimental paradigm and not just the illusory state. To resolve these controversies, we recorded EEG responses in human participants and combined multivariate (cross-)classification with multiple Illusion and non-Illusion conditions. These conditions were designed to probe for markers of the illusory state that generalize across the spatial arrangements of limbs or the specific nature of the control object (a rubber hand or participant’s real hand), hence which are independent of the precise experimental conditions used as contrast for the illusion. Our results reveal a parcellation of evoked responses into a temporal sequence of events. Around 125 and 275 ms following stimulus onset, the neurophysiological signals reliably differentiate the illusory state from non-Illusion epochs. These results consolidate previous work by demonstrating multiple neurophysiological correlates of the rubber hand illusion and illustrate how multivariate approaches can help pinpointing those that are independent of the precise experimental configuration used to induce the illusion.

The role of motor memory dynamics in structuring bodily self-consciousness

Bodily self-consciousness has been considered a sensorimotor root of self-consciousness. If this is the case, how does sensorimotor memory, which is important for the prediction of sensory consequences of volitional actions, influence awareness of bodily self-consciousness? This question is essential for understanding the effective acquisition and recovery of self-consciousness following its impairment, but it has remained unexamined. Here, we investigated how body ownership and agency recovered following body schema distortion in a virtual reality environment along with two kinds of motor memories: memories that were rapidly updated and memories that were gradually updated. We found that, although agency and body ownership recovered in parallel, the recovery of body ownership was predicted by fast memories and that of agency was predicted by slow memories. Thus, the bodily self was represented in multiple motor memories with different dynamics. This finding demystifies the controversy about the causal relationship between body ownership and agency.

Diametrical modulation of tactile and visual perceptual thresholds during the rubber hand illusion: a predictive coding account

During the rubber hand illusion (RHI), the synchronous stroking of the participants' concealed hand and a visible rubber hand induces a conflict among visuo-tactile inputs, leading healthy subjects to perceive the illusion of being touched on the rubber hand, as if it were part of their body. The predictive coding theory suggests that the RHI emerges to settle the conflict, attenuating somatosensory inputs in favour of visual ones, which "capture" tactile sensations. Here, we employed the psychophysical measure of perceptual threshold to measure a behavioural correlate of the somatosensory and visual modulations, to better understand the mechanisms underpinning the illusion. Before and after the RHI, participants underwent a tactile (Experiment 1) and a visual (Experiment 2) task, wherein they had to detect stimuli slightly above the perceptual threshold. According to the predictive coding framework, we found a significant decrease of tactile detection (i.e. increased tactile perceptual threshold) and a significant increase of visual detection (i.e.  decreased visual perceptual threshold), suggesting a diametrical modulation of somatosensory and visual perceptual processes. These findings provide evidence of how our system plastically adapts to uncertainty, attributing different weights to sensory inputs to restore a coherent representation of the own body.

Embodying an artificial hand increases blood flow to the investigated limb

Background: The autonomic nervous system is the main determinant of the blood flow directed towards a body part, and it is tightly connected to the representation of the body in the brain; would the experimental modulation of the sense of ownership of the limb affect its blood perfusion? Methods: In healthy participants, we employed the rubber hand illusion paradigm to modulate limb ownership while we monitored the brachial artery blood flow and resistance of the investigated limb. Results: In all conditions with brush-stroking, we found an initial drop in the blood flow due to tactile stimulation. Subsequently, in the illusion condition where both the rubber and real hand experience synchronous brush-stroking, the blood flow rose significantly faster and reached significantly higher values. Moreover, the increase in blood flow correlated to the embodiment level measured by questionnaires and, negatively, to the change of peripherical vascular resistance. Conclusions: These findings demonstrate that modulating the representation of a body part impacts its blood perfusion.

Precision control for a flexible body representation

Adaptive body representation requires the continuous integration of multisensory inputs within a flexible 'body model' in the brain. The present review evaluates the idea that this flexibility is augmented by the contextual modulation of sensory processing 'top-down'; which can be described as precision control within predictive coding formulations of Bayesian inference. Specifically, I focus on the proposal that an attenuation of proprioception may facilitate the integration of conflicting visual and proprioceptive bodily cues. Firstly, I review empirical work suggesting that the processing of visual vs proprioceptive body position information can be contextualised 'top-down'; for instance, by adopting specific attentional task sets. Building up on this, I review research showing a similar contextualisation of visual vs proprioceptive information processing in the rubber hand illusion and in visuomotor adaptation. Together, the reviewed literature suggests that proprioception, despite its indisputable importance for body perception and action control, can be attenuated top-down (through precision control) to facilitate the contextual adaptation of the brain's body model to novel visual feedback.

Comparison of Functional Connectivity during Visual-Motor Illusion, Observation, and Motor Execution

This study investigated the functional connectivity during visual-motor illusion and compared it with observation and motor execution using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Thirty subjects were randomly assigned to: illusion, observation, and motor execution group. Illusion group watched own finger joint movement video image and induced kinesthetic illusion, while the other group only performed observation or motor execution. Continuous brain activity was measured using fNIRS and functional connectivity was analyzed. The illusion group perceived (using 7-point Likert scale) a higher degree of kinesthetic illusion and sense of body ownership than the observation group. Visual-motor illusion was associated with stronger functional connectivity between the left premotor cortex and the left parietal area compared with observation and motor execution only, suggesting that these areas respond to visual-motor illusion.

Little evidence for an effect of the rubber hand illusion on basic movement

Body ownership refers to the distinct sensation that our observed body belongs to us, which is believed to stem from multisensory integration. This is commonly shown through the rubber hand illusion (RHI), which induces a sense of ownership over a false limb. Whilst the RHI may interfere with object-directed action and alter motor cortical activity, it is not yet clear whether a sense of ownership over an artificial hand has functional consequences for movement production per se. As such, we performed two motion-tracking experiments (n = 117) to examine the effects of the RHI on the reaction time, acceleration, and velocity of rapid index finger abduction. We observed little convincing evidence that the induction of the RHI altered these kinematic variables. Moreover, the subjective sensations of rubber hand ownership, referral of touch, and agency did not convincingly correlate with kinematic variables, and nor did proprioceptive drift, suggesting that changes in body representation elicited by the RHI may not influence basic movement. Whilst experiment 1 suggested that individuals reporting a greater sensation of the real hand disappearing performed movements with smaller acceleration and velocity following illusion induction, we did not replicate this effect in a second experiment, suggesting that these effects may be small or not particularly robust. Overall, these results indicate that manipulating the conscious experience of body ownership has little impact on basic motor control, at least in the RHI with healthy participants.

Illusory Body Ownership Affects the Cortical Response to Vicarious Somatosensation

Fundamental human feelings such as body ownership (“this” body is “my” body) and vicariousness (first-person-like experience of events occurring to others) are based on multisensory integration. Behavioral links between body ownership and vicariousness have been shown, but the neural underpinnings remain largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we investigated the neural effects of altered body ownership on vicarious somatosensation. While recording functional brain imaging data, first, we altered participants’ body ownership by robotically delivering tactile stimulations (“tactile” stroking) in synchrony or not with videos of a virtual hand being brushed (“visual” stroking). Then, we manipulated vicarious somatosensation by showing videos of the virtual hand being touched by a syringe’s plunger (touch) or needle (pain). Only after the alteration of body ownership (synchronous visuo-tactile stroking) and specifically during late epochs of vicarious somatosensation, vicarious pain was associated with lower activation in premotor and anterior cingulate cortices with respect to vicarious touch. At the methodological level, the present study highlights the importance of the neural response’s temporal evolution. At the theoretical level, it shows that the higher-level (cognitive) impact of a lower-level (sensory) body-related processing (visuo-tactile) is not limited to body ownership but also extends to other psychological body-related domains, such as vicarious somatosensation.

Task-Related c-Fos Expression in the Posterior Parietal Cortex During the "Rubber Tail Task" Is Diminished in Ca2+-Dependent Activator Protein for Secretion 2 (Caps2)-Knockout Mice

Rubber hand illusion (RHI), a kind of body ownership illusion, is sometimes atypical in individuals with autism spectrum disorder; however, the brain regions associated with the illusion are still unclear. We previously reported that mice responded as if their own tails were being touched when rubber tails were grasped following synchronous stroking to rubber tails and their tails (a "rubber tail illusion", RTI), which is a task based on the human RHI; furthermore, we reported that the RTI response was diminished in Ca²⁺-dependent activator protein for secretion 2-knockout (Caps2-KO) mice that exhibit autistic-like phenotypes. Importance of the posterior parietal cortex in the formation of illusory perception has previously been reported in human imaging studies. However, the local neural circuits and cell properties associated with this process are not clear. Therefore, we aimed to elucidate the neural basis of the RTI response and its impairment by investigating the c-Fos expression in both wild-type (WT) and Caps2-KO mice during the task since the c-Fos expression occurred soon after the neural activation. Immediately following the delivery of the synchronous stroking to both rubber tails and actual tails, the mice were perfused. Subsequently, whole brains were cryo-sectioned, and each section was immunostained with anti-c-Fos antibody; finally, c-Fos positive cell densities among the groups were compared. The c-Fos expression in the posterior parietal cortex was significantly lower in the Caps2-KO mice than in the WT mice. Additionally, we compared the c-Fos expression in the WT mice between synchronous and asynchronous conditions and found that the c-Fos-positive cell densities were significantly higher in the claustrum and primary somatosensory cortex of the WT mice exposed to the synchronous condition than those exposed to the asynchronous condition. Hence, the results suggest that decreased c-Fos expression in the posterior parietal cortex may be related to impaired multisensory integrations in Caps2-KO mice.

Bodily self-perception during voluntary actions: The causal contribution of premotor cortex and cerebellum

Voluntary actions are accompanied by the experience of controlling one's own movements (sense of agency) and the feeling that the moving body part belongs to one's self (sense of body ownership). So far, agency and body ownership have been investigated separately, leaving the neural underpinnings of the relation between the two largely unexplored. The aim of this study was to explore the causal role of two multisensory brain regions, that is the premotor cortex (PMc) and the cerebellum, in agency and body ownership concurrently on the same behavioral task, i.e., the moving Rubber Hand Illusion (mRHI). Participants watched a rubber hand while moving their hidden hand. The type of movement (active or passive) and posture of the rubber hand (congruent or incongruent) differed in three conditions (active congruent, passive congruent, active incongruent), so that agency and ownership could be elicited either separately or concurrently. Agency and ownership were measured by subjective report and proprioceptive drift. Sham and anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) were delivered to the PMc (Experiment 1) or the cerebellum (Experiment 2) prior to the mRHI task. Independent of the site or type of tDCS, subjective reports revealed that both agency and ownership were evoked in the active congruent condition, ownership but not agency in the passive congruent condition, and agency but not ownership in the active incongruent condition. The proprioceptive drift was evoked in the active congruent and the passive congruent condition. Anodal tDCS over the PMc reduced the feeling of agency in the active congruent condition, while it enhanced proprioceptive drift when applied over the cerebellum. These findings suggest a specific causal contribution of the PMc and the cerebellum to bodily self-perception during voluntary movement, with the PMc mainly involved in awareness of action and the cerebellum in proprioceptive adaptation of body position in space.

The rubber hand illusion in children: What are we measuring?

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a much-studied bodily illusion that has been used in a wide number of populations to investigate the plasticity of the mental body representation. In adult participants, the wide adoption of the illusion has led to a proliferation of experimental variations of the illusion, and with that, considerable apparent inconsistencies in both empirical results and conceptual interpretations. In turn, this makes it challenging to integrate empirical findings and to identify what those findings together can tell us about the representation of the body in the brain. More recently, scientists have started applying the illusion to populations of children, in order to better understand how body representations develop in both typically developing children and in clinical populations. With this field now starting to expand, we believe it is both urgent and important to prevent unintended methodological variability from hindering the consistency of the paediatric literature as it has the adult literature. With this aim in mind, we review the 12 currently available paediatric RHI studies, and summarise their key methodological choices and conceptual definitions. We highlight a number of important discrepancies, particularly where seemingly equivalent analysis choices might significantly affect the interpretation of results, and make recommendations for future studies. We hope this will allow this important and emerging field to benefit from the synergy that results from multiple studies using convergent and consistent empirical methods.

Attenuation of sensory processing in the primary somatosensory cortex during rubber hand illusion

The neural representation of the body is easily altered by the integration of multiple sensory signals in the brain. The “rubber hand illusion” (RHI) is one of the most popular experimental paradigms to investigate this phenomenon. During this illusion, a feeling of ownership of the rubber hand is created. Some studies have shown that somatosensory processing in the brain is attenuated when RHI occurs. However, it is unknown where attenuation of somatosensory processing occurs. Here, we show that somatosensory processing is attenuated in the primary somatosensory cortex. We found that the earliest response of somatosensory evoked potentials, which is thought to originate from the primary somatosensory cortex, was attenuated during RHI. Furthermore, this attenuation was observed before the occurrence of the illusion. Our results suggest that attenuation of sensory processing in the primary somatosensory cortex is one of the factors influencing the occurrence of the RHI.

The Untapped Potential of Virtual Reality in Rehabilitation of Balance and Gait in Neurological Disorders

Dynamic systems theory transformed our understanding of motor control by recognizing the continual interaction between the organism and the environment. Movement could no longer be visualized simply as a response to a pattern of stimuli or as a demonstration of prior intent; movement is context dependent and is continuously reshaped by the ongoing dynamics of the world around us. Virtual reality is one methodological variable that allows us to control and manipulate that environmental context. A large body of literature exists to support the impact of visual flow, visual conditions, and visual perception on the planning and execution of movement. In rehabilitative practice, however, this technology has been employed mostly as a tool for motivation and enjoyment of physical exercise. The opportunity to modulate motor behavior through the parameters of the virtual world is often ignored in practice. In this article we present the results of experiments from our laboratories and from others demonstrating that presenting particular characteristics of the virtual world through different sensory modalities will modify balance and locomotor behavior. We will discuss how movement in the virtual world opens a window into the motor planning processes and informs us about the relative weighting of visual and somatosensory signals. Finally, we discuss how these findings should influence future treatment design.

The contribution of stimulating multiple body parts simultaneously to the illusion of owning an entire artificial body

The full-body ownership illusion exploits multisensory perception to induce a feeling of ownership of an entire artificial body. Although previous research has shown that synchronous visuotactile stimulation of a single body part is sufficient for illusory ownership of the whole body, the effect of combining multisensory stimulation across multiple body parts remains unknown. Therefore, 48 healthy adults participated in a full-body ownership illusion with conditions involving synchronous (illusion) or asynchronous (control) visuotactile stimulation to one, two, or three body parts simultaneously (2×3 design). We used questionnaires to isolate illusory ownership of five specific body parts (left arm, right arm, trunk, left leg, right leg) from the full-body ownership experience and sought to test not only for increased ownership in synchronous versus asynchronous conditions but also for potentially varying degrees of full-body ownership illusion intensity related to the number of body parts stimulated. Illusory full-body ownership and all five body-part ownership ratings were significantly higher following synchronous stimulation than asynchronous stimulation (p-values < .01). Since non-stimulated body parts also received significantly increased ownership ratings following synchronous stimulation, the results are consistent with an illusion that engages the entire body. Furthermore, we noted that ownership ratings for right body parts (which were often but not always stimulated in this experiment) were significantly higher than ownership ratings for left body parts (which were never stimulated). Regarding the effect of stimulating multiple body parts simultaneously on explicit full-body ownership ratings, there was no evidence of a significant main effect of the number of stimulations (p = .850) or any significant interaction with stimulation synchronicity (p = .160), as assessed by linear mixed modelling. Instead, median ratings indicated a moderate affirmation (+1) of an illusory full-body sensation in all three synchronous conditions, a finding mirrored by comparable full-body illusion onset times. In sum, illusory full-body ownership appears to be an 'all-or-nothing' phenomenon and depends upon the synchronicity of visuotactile stimulation, irrespective of the number of stimulated body parts.

Virtual reality alters cortical oscillations related to visuo-tactile integration during rubber hand illusion

Virtual reality (VR) enables the fast, free, and highly controllable setting of experimental body images. Illusions pertaining to a body, such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI), can be easily conducted in VR settings, and some phenomena, such as full-body illusions, are only realized in virtual environments. However, the multisensory-integration process in VR is not yet fully understood. Thus, it remains to be clarified if specific phenomena that occur under VR settings manifest in real life as well. One useful investigative approach is measuring brain activities during a psychological experiment. Electroencephalography (EEG) oscillatory activities provide insight into the human multisensory integration process. Nevertheless, EEG data can be vulnerable to VR noise, which causes measurement and analytical difficulties for EEG data recorded in VR environments. Here, we achieve an experimental RHI setting using a head-mounted display that provides a VR visual space and VR dummy hand along with EEG measurements. We compared EEG data collected in both real and VR environments and observed the gamma and theta band oscillatory activities. Ultimately, we observed statistically significant differences between congruent (RHI) and incongruent (not RHI) conditions in the real environment, which is consistent with previous studies. Differences in the VR condition were observed only on the late theta band oscillation, suggesting that the VR setting itself altered the perceptual and sensory integration mechanisms. Thus, we must model this difference between real and VR settings whenever we use VR to investigate our bodily self-perception.

Impact of visuomotor feedback on the embodiment of virtual hands detached from the body

It has been shown that mere observation of body discontinuity leads to diminished body ownership. However, the impact of body discontinuity has mainly been investigated in conditions where participants observe a collocated static virtual body from a first-person perspective. This study explores the influence of body discountinuity on the sense of embodiment, when rich visuomotor correlations between a real and an artificial virtual body are established. In two experiments, we evaluated body ownership and motor performance, when participants interacted in virtual reality either using virtual hands connected or disconnected from a body. We found that even under the presence of congruent visuomotor feedback, mere observation of body discontinuity resulted in diminished embodiment. Contradictory evidence was found in relation to motor performance, where further research is needed to understand the role of visual body discontinuity in motor tasks. Preliminary findings on physiological reactions to a threat were also assessed, indicating that body visual discontinuity does not differently impact threat-related skin conductance responses. The present results are in accordance with past evidence showing that body discontinuity negatively impacts embodiment. However, further research is needed to understand the influence of visuomotor feedback and body morphological congruency on motor performance and threat-related physiological reactions.

Which hand is mine? Discriminating body ownership perception in a two-alternative forced-choice task

The experience of one's body as one's own is referred to as the sense of body ownership. This central part of human conscious experience determines the boundary between the self and the external environment, a crucial distinction in perception, action, and cognition. Although body ownership is known to involve the integration of signals from multiple sensory modalities, including vision, touch, and proprioception, little is known about the principles that determine this integration process, and the relationship between body ownership and perception is unclear. These uncertainties stem from the lack of a sensitive and rigorous method to quantify body ownership. Here, we describe a two-alternative forced-choice discrimination task that allows precise and direct measurement of body ownership as participants decide which of two rubber hands feels more like their own in a version of the rubber hand illusion. In two experiments, we show that the temporal and spatial congruence principles of multisensory stimulation, which determine ownership discrimination, impose tighter constraints than previously thought and that texture congruence constitutes an additional principle; these findings are compatible with theoretical models of multisensory integration. Taken together, our results suggest that body ownership constitutes a genuine perceptual multisensory phenomenon that can be quantified with psychophysics in discrimination experiments.

Consistent inter-individual differences in susceptibility to bodily illusions

Illusory senses of ownership and agency (that the hand or effector that we see belongs to us and moves at our will, respectively) support the embodiment of prosthetic limbs, tele-operated surgical devices, and human-machine interfaces. We exposed forty-eight individuals to four different procedures known to elicit illusory ownership or agency over a fake visible rubber hand or finger. The illusory ownership or agency arising from the hand correlated with that of the finger. For both body parts, sensory stimulation across different modalities (visual with tactile or visual with kinesthetic) produced illusions of similar strength. However, the strengths of the illusions of ownership and agency were unrelated within individuals, supporting the proposal that distinct neuropsychological processes underlie these two senses. Developing training programs to enhance susceptibility to illusions of agency or ownership for people with lower natural susceptibility could broaden the usefulness of the above technologies.

Statistical inference of body representation in the macaque brain

The sense of one's own body is a pillar of self-consciousness and could be investigated by inducing human illusions of artificial objects as part of the self. Here, we present a nonhuman primate version of a rubber-hand illusion that allowed us to determine its computational and neuronal mechanisms. We implemented a video-based system in a reaching task in monkeys and combined a casual inference model to establish an objective and quantitative signature for the monkey's body representation. Similar to humans, monkeys were more likely to perceive an external object as part of the self when the dynamics (spatial disparity) and the features (shape and structure) of visual (V) input was closer to proprioceptive (P) signals. Neural signals in the monkey's premotor cortex reflected the strength of illusion and the likelihood of misattributing the illusory hand to oneself, thus, revealing a cortical representation of body ownership.

Statistical inference of body representation in the macaque brain

How humans and potentially other animals construct the experience of ”being a self" remains one of the most intriguing questions in neuroscience. Over the past years, substantial advances have been made in understanding psychological mechanisms of bodily self through experimental manipulations in humans, such as rubber-hand illusion in which arbitrary objects may be ascribed with ownership and perceived as part of the self. The present study provides a demonstration in macaque monkeys and establishes objective and quantitative signatures of body representation at a single-trial level. Furthermore, we show that neural signals in macaque’s premotor cortex reflect the strength of illusion and the likelihood of misattributing the illusory arm to oneself, thus, revealing a cortical representation of bodily self-consciousness.

The sense of one’s own body is a pillar of self-consciousness and could be investigated by inducing human illusions of artificial objects as part of the self. Here, we present a nonhuman primate version of a rubber-hand illusion that allowed us to determine its computational and neuronal mechanisms. We implemented a video-based system in a reaching task in monkeys and combined a casual inference model to establish an objective and quantitative signature for the monkey’s body representation. Similar to humans, monkeys were more likely to perceive an external object as part of the self when the dynamics (spatial disparity) and the features (shape and structure) of visual (V) input was closer to proprioceptive (P) signals. Neural signals in the monkey’s premotor cortex reflected the strength of illusion and the likelihood of misattributing the illusory hand to oneself, thus, revealing a cortical representation of body ownership.