Balancing the scales? Evaluating the impact of results-based financing on maternal health outcomes and related inequality of opportunity in Zimbabwe

This study evaluates the impact of results-based financing (RBF) on maternal health outcomes and the inequality of opportunity (IOP) in these outcomes in Zimbabwe. We employ a difference-in-differences approach that leverages the staggered implementation of the programme across 60 districts, exploiting temporal variation in the introduction of RBF and individual-level variation in birth timing. Our analysis uses nationally representative, pooled cross-sectional data from the 2005/2006, 2010/2011, and 2015 Zimbabwe demographic and health surveys. Employing the extended two-way fixed effects (ETWFE) estimator to address biases associated with staggered rollouts, we find significant positive effects of RBF on maternal health outcomes. The programme is associated with an increase in the number of prenatal care visits by 0.185 units (p < 0.01), first-trimester care by 7.7 percentage points (pp) (p < 0.01), facility births by 8.6 pp (p < 0.01), and professional delivery assistance by 3.4 pp (p < 0.01), while reducing C-section rates by 1.3 pp (p < 0.01). Additionally, RBF is associated with reductions in IOP in prenatal care visits, early prenatal care, facility births, and professional delivery assistance by 3.8, 1.3, 8.4, and 4.9 pp (p < 0.01), respectively. These findings underscore the potential of RBF to enhance maternal health outcomes and promote health equity. Integrating equity considerations into health system strengthening initiatives is essential. Policymakers should ensure that health interventions improve access and balance opportunities across various socio-economic and demographic groups. This evidence suggests that RBF schemes can improve access to and equity in healthcare services, particularly in low-income settings such as Zimbabwe.

How personnel diversity and affective bonds affect performance-based financing: a moderator analysis of a difference-in-difference estimator

To spur improvement in health-care service quality and quantity, performance-based financing (PBF) is an increasingly common policy tool, especially in low- and middle-income countries. This study examines how personnel diversity and affective bonds in primary care clinics affect their ability to improve care quality in PBF arrangements. Leveraging data from a large-scale matched PBF intervention in Tajikistan including 208 primary care clinics, we examined how measures of personnel diversity (position and tenure variety) and affective bonds (mutual support and group pride) were associated with changes in the level and variability of clinical knowledge (diagnostic accuracy of 878 clinical vignettes) and care processes (completion of checklist items in 2485 instances of direct observations). We interacted the explanatory variables with exposure to PBF in cluster-robust, linear regressions to assess how these explanatory variables moderated the PBF treatment's association with clinical knowledge and care process improvements. Providers and facilities with higher group pride exhibited higher care process improvement (greater checklist item completion and lower variability of items completed). Personnel diversity and mutual support showed little significant associations with the outcomes. Organizational features of clinics exposed to PBF may help explain variation in outcomes and warrant further research and intervention in practice to identify and test opportunities to leverage them. Group pride may strengthen clinics' ability to improve care quality in PBF arrangements. Improving health-care facilities' pride may be an affordable and effective way to enhance health-care organization adaptation.

Global health systems strengthening: FIGO's strategic view on reducing maternal and newborn mortality worldwide

OBJECTIVE

To demonstrate that successful health systems strengthening (HSS) projects have addressed disparities and inequities in maternal and perinatal care in low-income countries.

METHODS

A comprehensive literature review covered the period between 1980 and 2022, focusing on successful HSS interventions within health systems' seven core components that improved maternal and perinatal care.

RESULTS

The findings highlight the importance of integrating quality interventions into robust health systems, as this has been shown to reduce maternal and newborn mortality. However, several challenges, including service delivery gaps, poor data use, and funding deficits, continue to hinder the delivery of quality care. To improve maternal and newborn health outcomes, a comprehensive HSS strategy is essential, which should include infrastructure enhancement, workforce skill development, access to essential medicines, and active community engagement.

CONCLUSION

Effective health systems, leadership, and community engagement are crucial for a comprehensive HSS approach to catalyze progress toward universal health coverage and global improvements in maternal and newborn health.

Sustaining essential health services in Lao PDR in the context of donor transition and COVID-19

Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) aims at graduating from least developed country status by 2026 and must increase the level of domestic financing for health. This paper examines how the government has prepared for the decline of external assistance and how donors have applied their transition approaches. Adapting a World Health Organization (WHO) framework, reflections and lessons were generated based on literature review, informal and formal consultations and focus group discussions with the Lao PDR government and development partners including budget impact discussion. The government has taken three approaches to transition from external to domestic funding: mobilizing domestic resources, increasing efficiency across programs and prioritization with a focus on strengthening primary health care (PHC). The government has increased gradually domestic government health expenditures as a share of the government expenditure from 2.6% in 2013 to 4.9% in 2019. The Ministry of Health has made efforts to design and roll out integrated service delivery of maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health services, immunization and nutrition; integrated 13 information systems of key health programs into one single District Health Information Software 2; and prioritized PHC, which has led to shifting donors towards supporting PHC. Donors have revisited their aid policies designed to improve sustainability and ownership of the government. However, the government faces challenges in improving cross-programmatic efficiency at the operational level and in further increasing the health budget due to the economic crisis aggravated during Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Working to implement donor transition strategies under the current economic situation and country challenges, calls into question the criteria used to evaluate transition. This criterion needs to include more appropriate indicators other than gross national income per capita, which does not reflect a country's readiness and capacity of the health system. There should be a more country-tailored strategy and support for considering the context and system-wide readiness during donor transition.

Comparison of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs in primary care of selected countries: a comparative study

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives or facilities to health workers based on the achievement of predetermined performance goals. Various P4P programs have been implemented around the world. There is a question of which model is suitable for p4p implementation to achieve better results. The purpose of this study is to compare pay for performance models in different countries.

METHODS

This is a descriptive-comparative study comparing the P4P model in selected countries in 2022. Data for each country are collected from reliable databases and are tabulated to compare their payment models. the standard framework of the P4P model is used for data analysis.

RESULTS

we used the standard P4P model framework to compare pay for performance programs in the primary care sector of selected countries because this framework can demonstrate all the necessary features of payment programs, including performance domains and measures, basis for reward or penalty, nature of the reward or penalty, and data reporting. The results of this study show that although the principles of P4P are almost similar in the selected countries, the biggest difference is in the definition of performance domains and measures.

CONCLUSIONS

Designing an effective P4P program is very complex, and its success depends on a variety of factors, from the socioeconomic and cultural context and the healthcare goals of governments to the personal characteristics of the healthcare provider. considering these factors and the general framework of the features of P4P programs are critical to the success of the p4p design and implementation.

An in-depth qualitative study of health care providers' experiences of performance-based financing program as a nation-wide adopted policy in Cameroon: A principal-agent perspective

OBJECTIVES

The study applies the principal-agent approach to explore providers' experiences before and after the introduction of performance-based financing (PBF) in Cameroon, challenges and facilitators in the implementation process, and mechanisms in place to ensure sustainability.

METHODS

The study was an in-depth qualitative study whose goal was to provide multiple descriptions of experiences and insights from a principal-agent analysis perspective. Purposive sampling was used to identify the key characteristics of the participants relevant to the study. A snowballing technique was used to further identify eligible participants. Only healthcare providers who were exposed to the previous system and could reflect on and provide meaningful data that captured the everyday experiences before and after the implementation of PBF were included. Data were collected from three districts in the Southwest region of Cameroon from May 2021 to August 2021. Data were transcribed and analyzed using MaxQDA.

RESULTS

A total of 17 interviews and 3 focus group discussions (24 participants) were conducted with healthcare providers and key stakeholders involved in PBF. The respondents described a range of changes that they had experienced since the introduction of PBF. Each of these changes was categorized as either positive or negative. Positive changes were framed into 14 dominant categories: motivation, negotiations, innovation, resource allocation, autonomy, decentralization, transparency, improved quality of care, separation of function, performance, equity considerations, opportunity to recruit, participation in decision-making, and improved access to and utilization of maternal health services. The main challenges (negative experiences) reported were framed into nine categories: management of change, retention issues, conflict of interest, poor understanding of the PBF concept, resistance to change, verification challenges, delays in payment of PBF incentives, data entry and documentation, and challenges in meeting the equity considerations of the poor and vulnerable. Despite the challenges, providers preferred the decentralized approach to the centralized system.

CONCLUSION

PBF is a national strategy for achieving universal health coverage in Cameroon, and the experiences of providers provide a vital guide to refine national policy. The introduction of PBF has provided positive changes to providers' quality of care when compared to the previous system. Addressing the delays in PBF payments will help to overcome the challenges to implementation and provide opportunities for health facilities to be more efficient and improve their performance. Despite the limitations of delay in payment, PBF helps to align the incentives of the health workers (agent) with those of the Ministry of Health (principal).

The impact of performance-based financing within local health systems: Evidence from Mozambique

Most evidence on Performance Based Financing (PBF) in low-income settings has focused on services delivered by providers in targeted health administrations, with limited understanding of how effects on health and care vary within them. We evaluated the population effects of a program implemented in two provinces in Mozambique, focusing on child, maternal and HIV/AIDS care and knowledge. We used a difference-in-difference estimation strategy applied to data on mothers from the Demographic Health Surveys, linked to information on their closest health facility. The impact of PBF was limited. HIV testing during antenatal care increased, particularly for women who were wealthier, more educated, or residing in Gaza Province. Knowledge about transmission of HIV from mother-to-child, and its prevention, increased, particularly for women who were less wealthy, less educated, or residing in Nampula Province. Exploiting the roll-out by facility, we found that the effects were concentrated on less wealthy and less educated women, whose closest facility was in the referral network of a PBF facility. Results suggest that HIV testing and knowledge promotion increased in the whole district, as a strategy to boost referral for highly incentivized HIV services delivered in PBF facilities. However, demand-side constraints may prevent the use of those services.

Reviewing the evidence on health financing for effective coverage: do financial incentives work?

The widening gap between improving healthcare coverage rates and stagnating health outcomes across low-income and middle-income countries highlights the need for investments in quality of care, in addition to access. New research, presented in a World Bank report, examines one type of relevant policy reform: performance-based financing (PBF), which is a package reform that always includes performance pay to front-line health workers and often also provides facility autonomy, transparency and community engagement. A large body of rigorous studies and new analysis show that in under-resourced, centralised health systems, PBF can result in gains to service utilisation, but only has limited impacts on quality. Even the relative benefits of PBF on service utilisation are less clear when compared with (1) direct facility financing which provides front-line facilities with operating budgets and provider autonomy, but not performance pay and (2) demand-side financial support for health services (ie, conditional cash transfers and vouchers). Thus, the central component of PBF—the performance pay—appears to add little value over flexible payment systems and provider autonomy. The analysis shows that this lack of impact is unsurprising because most of the constraints to improving quality do not lie with the health worker in these settings. While PBF was conceived as a complex package ‘blueprint’, we review the evidence to conclude that only some elements seem to make sense. To improve quality of care, health financing should pivot from performance pay while retaining the elements of direct facility financing, autonomy, transparency and community engagement.

The effect of performance-based financing interventions on out-of-pocket expenses intended to improve access to and utilization of maternal health services in sub-Saharan Africa: protocol for a systematic review and meta-analysis

BACKGROUND

Out-of-pocket expenses have been reported as a major barrier to accessing antenatal care and skilled birth delivery in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Performance-based financing (PBF) is one of several strategies introduced in lower- and middle-income countries to strengthen a weak health system. This review aims to synthesize evidence on the effectiveness of PBF interventions implemented with the objective of reducing out-of-pocket expenses and improving access to and utilization of ANC and skilled birth delivery and family planning in sub-Saharan Africa. It will consider evidence across health sectors and identify gaps in the evidence. METHODS AND ANALYSIS: This protocol is reported according to Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis Protocols (PRISMA-P) guideline. The systematic review will apply a three-step strategy to search five databases (CINAHL, PubMed, Ovid Medline, EMBASE, Cochrane.) and grey literature with the help of a librarian. Two independent reviewers will conduct screening to determine eligibility and critical appraisal of selected studies using the risk of bias criteria developed by the Cochrane EPOC Group and the New Castle Ottawa Scale for observational studies. The certainty of evidence for the outcomes will be assessed using "Grades of Recommendation, Assessment, Development, and Evaluation" (GRADE) approach. This review will consider experimental and quasi-experimental study designs and observational studies. Studies published in English and French language(s) will be included. Studies published since the introduction of PBF in sub-Saharan Africa will be included. Data will be collected on each item that contributes to out-of-pocket expenses. This review will adopt the Multiple Dimensions of Access Framework to organize the findings.

DISCUSSION

This systematic review will support evidence-informed data for the performance-based financing community and government by identifying, describing, and assessing the impact of performance-based financing interventions on out-of-pocket expenses in promoting access and utilization of ANC, skilled birth delivery, and family planning across health sectors.

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW REGISTRATION

This review has been registered with PROSPERO, Registration number CRD42020222893 .

Exploring the Efficiency of Primary Health Care Provision in Rural and Sparsely Populated Areas: A Case Study from Mongolia

Mongolia is facing serious challenges in the health sector and the macro-economic sphere that have important implications for health financing and to complete universal health coverage. In this context, improving the efficiency of primary health care facilities appears as a critical issue. We study the efficiency of Soum Health Centres (SHCs), that provide primary care in rural Mongolia. Based on activity and resources data collected for all SHCs of Mongolia in 2017 and 2018 we estimate bias-adjusted efficiency scores. A double bootstrap truncated regression procedure is then used to study the factors associated with SHCs’ efficiency. On average, SHCs could potentially engage in the same activity while reducing overall resource use by around 23%. A comparatively higher population density and dependency ratio in the district where they are located tend to favour SHCs’ efficiency. Conversely, the higher the poverty rate in the soum, the lower the efficiency. We find a positive association between SHCs’ efficiency and the proportion of doctors in the health workforce. The human resources allocation process and the capitation formula currently used to pay SHCs should be adjusted based on the size and socioeconomic/demographic characteristics of the population living in the catchment area of SHCs.

An Investigation of the Relationship Between the Performance and Management Practices of Health Facilities Under a Performance-Based Financing Scheme in Nigeria

Whereas the effect of performance-based financing (PBF) on improving the quantity and quality of health services has been established, little is known about what matters for health facilities to improve performance under a PBF scheme. This study examined the associations between management practices and the performance of primary health care centers (PHCCs) under a PBF scheme in Nigeria. This study utilized longitudinal data on monthly institutional deliveries and outpatient visits collected between December 2011 and March 2016 from 111 randomly selected PHCCs in Adamawa, Ondo, and Nasarawa states of Nigeria. A management practices scorecard, based on a health facility survey conducted in April/May 2016, was used to derive management practices scores for the 111 PHCCs. The management practices examined included activities to recruit and retain clients, staff's attention to performance targets, listening and responding to client feedback, teamwork building, and addressing low-performing staff. A multilevel, multilinear regression model was used to investigate the associations between health facility performance (monthly number of institutional deliveries and outpatient visits) and management practices at the PHCCs, adjusting for key control variables (number of skilled health workers, the size of PHCC catchment population, PHCC quality score, seasonality, and states). Following PBF introduction, PHCCs with medium management score had 0.42 (95% CI 0.18-0.65; p<0.001) and 9.93 (95% CI 6.15-13.71; p<0.001) higher monthly improvement rates for institutional delivery and outpatient visits respectively compared to the PHCCs with low management score. Also, the PHCCs with high management scores had 0.49 (95%CI 0.28-0.70; p<0.001) and 5.10 (95%CI 1.76-8.44; p<0.003) higher monthly improvement rates for institutional delivery and outpatient visits compared to the PHCCs with low management scores. These findings suggest the importance of management practices in facilitating the effect of PBF on health facility performance, and the need to strengthen PHCC management practices in low- and-middle-income countries.

Is Performance-Based Financing A Pathway to Strategic Purchasing in Sub-Saharan Africa? A Synthesis of the Evidence

Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have implemented performance-based financing (PBF) to improve health system performance. Much of the debate and analysis relating to PBF has focused on whether PBF "works"-that is, whether it leads to improvements in indicators tied to incentive-based payments. Because PBF schemes embody key elements of strategic health purchasing, this study examines the question of whether and how PBF programs in sub-Saharan Africa influence strategic purchasing more broadly within country health financing arrangements. We searched PubMed, Scopus, EconLit, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, Google Scholar, Google, and the World Health Organization and World Bank's repositories for studies that focused on the implementation experience or effects of PBF in sub-Saharan African and published in English from 2000 to 2020. We identified 44 papers and used framework analysis to analyze the data and generate key findings. The evidence we reviewed shows that PBF has the potential to raise awareness about strategic purchasing, improve governance and institutional arrangements, and strengthen strategic purchasing functions. However, these effects are minimal in practice because PBF has been introduced as narrow, often pilot, projects that run parallel to and have little integration with the mainstream health financing system. We concluded that PBF has not systematically transformed health purchasing in countries in sub-Saharan Africa but that the experience with PBF can provide valuable lessons for how system-wide strategic purchasing can be implemented most effectively in that region-either in countries that currently have PBF schemes and aim to integrate them into broader purchasing systems, or in countries that are not currently implementing PBF. We also concluded that for countries to pursue more holistic approaches to strategic health purchasing and achieve better health outcomes, they need to implement health financing reforms within or aligned with existing financing systems.

No impact of performance-based financing on the availability of essential medicines in Burkina Faso: A mixed-methods study

Access to safe, effective, and affordable essential medicines (EM) is critical to quality health services and as such has played a key role in innovative health system strengthening approaches such as Performance-based Financing (PBF). Available literature indicates that PBF can improve EM availability, but has not done so consistently in the past. Qualitative explorations of the reasons are yet scarce. We contribute to expanding the literature by estimating the impact of PBF on EM availability and stockout in Burkina Faso and investigating mechanisms of and barriers to change. The study used an explanatory mixed methods design. The quantitative study component followed a quasi-experimental design (difference-in-differences), comparing how EM availability and stockout had changed three years after implementation in 12 PBF and in 12 control districts. Qualitative data was collected from purposely selected policy and implementation stakeholders at all levels of the health system and community, using in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, and explored using deductive coding and thematic analysis. We found no impact of PBF on EM availability and stockouts in the quantitative data. Qualitative narratives converge in that EM supply had increased as a result of PBF, albeit not fully satisfactorily and sustainably so. Reasons include persisting contextual challenges, most importantly a public medicine procurement monopoly; design challenges, specifically a disconnect and disbalance in incentive levels between service provision and service quality indicators; implementation challenges including payment delays, issues around performance verification, and insufficient implementation of activities to strengthen stock management skills; and concurrently implemented policies, most importantly a national user fee exemption for children and pregnant women half way through the impact evaluation period. The case of PBF and EM availability in Burkina Faso illustrates the difficulty of incentivizing and effecting holistic change in EM availability in the presence of strong contextual constraints and powerful concurrent policies.

Examining policy intentions and actual implementation practices: How organizational factors influence health management information systems in Uttar Pradesh, India

This study investigates the implementation of a recent health management information systems (HMIS) policy reform in Uttar Pradesh, India, which aims to improve the quality and use of HMIS data in decision-making. Through in-depth interviews, meeting observations and a policy document review, this study sought to capture the experiences of district-level staff (street-level bureaucrats) who were responsible for HMIS policy implementation. Findings revealed that issues of weak HMIS implementation were partly due to human resources shortages both in number and technical skill. Delays in recruitment and the presence of inactive staff overburdened existing staff and weakened the implementation of HMIS activities at the block- and district-levels. District staff also explained how inadequate computer literacy and limited technical understanding further contributed to low HMIS data quality. The organizational culture was even more constraining: working within a very rigid and hierarchical organization was challenging for district data staff, who were expected to manage day-to-day HMIS activities, but lacked the discretion and authority to do so effectively. Consequently, they had to escalate minor issues to district leadership for action and were expected to follow their supervisors' directives- even if they contradicted HMIS policy guidelines. High performance pressures associated with achieving top district rankings deviated focus away from HMIS data quality issues. Many district-level respondents described their superiors' "fixation" with becoming a top-ranking district often resulted in disregard for the quality of data informing district rankings. Furthermore, the review of district rankings only partially encouraged district-level leadership to investigate reasons for low-performing indicators. Instead, low district rankings often resulted in punitive action. The study recommends the importance of incorporating the perspectives of district staff, and recognizing their discretion, and authority when designing policy implementation processes, and finally concludes with potential strategies for strengthening the current HMIS policy reform.

What happens when performance-based financing meets free healthcare? Evidence from an interrupted time-series analysis

In spite of the wide attention performance-based financing (PBF) has received over the past decade, no evidence is available on its impacts on quantity and mix of service provision nor on its interaction with parallel health financing interventions. Our study aimed to examine the PBF impact on quantity and mix of service provision in Burkina Faso, while accounting for the parallel introduction of a free healthcare policy. We used Health Management Information System data from 838 primary-level health facilities across 24 districts and relied on an interrupted time-series analysis with independent controls. We placed two interruptions, one to account for PBF and one to account for the free healthcare policy. In the period before the free healthcare policy, PBF produced significant but modest increases across a wide range of maternal and child services, but a significant decrease in child immunization coverage. In the period after the introduction of the free healthcare policy, PBF did not affect service provision in intervention compared with control facilities, possibly indicating a saturation effect. Our findings indicate that PBF can produce modest increases in service provision, without altering the overall service mix. Our findings, however, also indicate that the introduction of other health financing reforms can quickly crowd out the effects produced by PBF. Further qualitative research is required to understand what factors allow healthcare providers to increase the provision of some, but not all services and how they react to the joint implementation of PBF and free health care.

Impact of Performance-Based Financing on effective coverage for curative child health services in Burkina Faso: Evidence from a quasi-experimental design

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the impact of Performance-Based Financing (PBF) on effective coverage of child curative health services in primary healthcare facilities in Burkina Faso.

METHODS

An impact evaluation of a PBF pilot programme, using an experiment nested within a quasi-experimental design, was carried out in 12 intervention and 12 comparison districts in six regions of Burkina Faso. Across the 24 districts, primary healthcare facilities (537 both at baseline and endline) and households (baseline = 7978 endline = 7898) were surveyed. Within these households, 12 350 and 15 021 under-five-year-olds caretakers were interviewed at baseline and endline respectively. Linking service quality to service utilisation, we used difference-in-differences to estimate the impact of PBF on effective coverage of curative child health services.

RESULTS

Our study failed to detect any effect of PBF on effective coverage. Looking specifically into quality of care indicators, we detected a positive effect of PBF on structural elements of quality of care related to general service readiness, but not on the overall facility quality score, capturing both service readiness and the content of childcare.

CONCLUSION

The current study makes a unique contribution to PBF literature, as this is the first study assessing PBF impact on effective coverage for curative child health services in low-income settings. The absence of any significant effects of PBF on effective coverage suggests that PBF programmes require a stronger design focus on quality of care elements especially when implemented in a context of free healthcare policy.

Paying for performance to improve the delivery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries

BACKGROUND

There is growing interest in paying for performance (P4P) as a means to align the incentives of healthcare providers with public health goals. Rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in improving health care and health in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is lacking; this is an update of the 2012 review on this topic.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the effects of paying for performance on the provision of health care and health outcomes in low- and middle-income countries.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, and 10 other databases between April and June 2018. We also searched two trial registries, websites, online resources of international agencies, organizations and universities, and contacted experts in the field. Studies identified from rerunning searches in 2020 are under 'Studies awaiting classification.'

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized or non-randomized trials, controlled before-after studies, or interrupted time series studies conducted in LMICs (as defined by the World Bank in 2018). P4P refers to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. To be included, a study had to report at least one of the following outcomes: patient health outcomes, changes in targeted measures of provider performance (such as the delivery of healthcare services), unintended effects, or changes in resource use.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We extracted data as per original review protocol and narratively synthesised findings. We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. Given diversity and variability in intervention types, patient populations, analyses and outcome reporting, we deemed meta-analysis inappropriate. We noted the range of effects associated with P4P against each outcome of interest. Based on intervention descriptions provided in documents, we classified design schemes and explored variation in effect by scheme design.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 59 studies: controlled before-after studies (19), non-randomized (16) or cluster randomized trials (14);  and interrupted time-series studies (9). One study included both an interrupted time series and a controlled before-after study. Studies focused on a wide range of P4P interventions, including target payments and payment for outputs as modified by quality (or quality and equity assessments). Only one study assessed results-based aid. Many schemes were funded by national governments (23 studies) with the World Bank funding most externally funded schemes (11 studies). Targeted services varied; however, most interventions focused on reproductive, maternal and child health indicators. Participants were predominantly located in public or in a mix of public, non-governmental and faith-based facilities (54 studies). P4P was assessed predominantly at health facility level, though districts and other levels were also involved. Most studies assessed the effects of P4P against a status quo control (49 studies); however, some studies assessed effects against comparator interventions (predominantly enhanced financing intended to match P4P funds (17 studies)). Four studies reported intervention effects against both comparator and status quo. Controlled before-after studies were at higher risk of bias than other study designs. However, some randomised trials were also downgraded due to risk of bias. The interrupted time-series studies provided insufficient information on other concurrent changes in the study context. P4P compared to a status quo control For health services that are specifically targeted, P4P may slightly improve health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may also improve service quality overall (low certainty evidence); and probably increases the availability of health workers, medicines and well-functioning infrastructure and equipment (moderate certainty evidence). P4P may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of services (low certainty evidence) and may have few or no distorting unintended effects on outcomes that were not targeted (low-certainty evidence), but few studies assessed these. For secondary outcomes, P4P may make little or no difference to provider absenteeism, motivation or satisfaction (low certainty evidence); but may improve patient satisfaction and acceptability (low certainty evidence); and may positively affect facility managerial autonomy (low certainty evidence). P4P probably makes little to no difference to management quality or facility governance (low certainty evidence). Impacts on equity were mixed (low certainty evidence). For health services that are untargeted, P4P probably improves some health outcomes (moderate certainty evidence); may improve the delivery, use and quality of some health services but may make little or no difference to others (low certainty evidence); and may have few or no distorting unintended effects (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on the availability of medicines and other resources are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). P4P compared to other strategies For health outcomes and services that are specifically targeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may improve service quality (low certainty evidence); and may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of health services and on the availability of equipment and medicines (low certainty evidence). For health outcomes and services that are untargeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes and to the delivery and use of health services (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on service quality, resource availability and unintended effects are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). Findings of subgroup analyses Results-based aid, and schemes using payment per output adjusted for service quality, appeared to yield the greatest positive effects on outcomes. However, only one study evaluated results-based aid, so the effects may be spurious. Overall, schemes adjusting both for quality of service and rewarding equitable delivery of services appeared to perform best in relation to service utilization outcomes.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The evidence base on the impacts of P4P schemes has grown considerably, with study quality gradually increasing. P4P schemes may have mixed effects on outcomes of interest, and there is high heterogeneity in the types of schemes implemented and evaluations conducted. P4P is not a uniform intervention, but rather a range of approaches. Its effects depend on the interaction of several variables, including the design of the intervention (e.g., who receives payments ), the amount of additional funding,  ancillary components (such as technical support) and contextual factors (including organizational context).

Adapting results-based financing to respond to endogenous and exogenous moderators in Zimbabwe

Purpose

This study examines key adaptations that occurred in the Zimbabwean Results-Based Financing (RBF) programme between 2010 and 2017, locating the endogenous and exogenous factors that required adaptive response and the processes from which changes were made.

Design/methodology/approach

The study is based on a desk review and thematic analysis of 64 policy and academic literatures supplemented with 28 multi-stakeholder interviews.

Findings

The programme experienced substantive adaption between 2010 and 2017, demonstrating a significant level of responsiveness towards increasing efficiency as well as to respond to unforeseen factors that undermined RBF mechanisms. The programme was adaptive due to its phased design, which allowed revision competencies and responsive adaptation, which provide useful insights for other low-and-middle income countries (LMICs) settings where graduated scale-up might better meet contextualised needs. However, exogenous factors were often not systematically examined or reported in RBF evaluations, demonstrating that adaptation could have been better anticipated, planned, reported and communicated, especially if RBF is to be a more effective health system reform tool.

Originality/value

RBF is an increasingly popular health system reform tool in LMICs. However, there are questions about how exogenous factors affect RBF performance and acknowledgement that unforeseen endogenous programme design and implementation factors also greatly affect the performance of RBF. As a result, a better understanding of how RBF operates and adapts to programme level (endogenous) and exogenous (external) factors in LMICs is necessary.

Political economy analysis of the performance-based financing programme in Afghanistan

BACKGROUND

Performance-based financing (PBF) has attracted considerable attention in recent years in low and middle-income countries. Afghanistan's Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) implemented a PBF programme between 2010 and 2015 to strengthen the utilisation of maternal and child health services in primary health facilities. This study aimed to examine the political economy factors influencing the adoption, design and implementation of the PBF programme in Afghanistan.

METHODS

Retrospective qualitative research methods were employed using semi structured interviews as well as a desk review of programme and policy documents. Key informants were selected purposively from the national level (n = 9), from the province level (n = 6) and the facility level (n = 15). Data analysis was inductive as well as deductive and guided by a political economy analysis framework to explore the factors that influenced the adoption and design of the PBF programme. Thematic content analysis was used to analyse the data.

RESULTS

The global policy context, and implementation experience in other LMIC, shaped PBF and its introduction in Afghanistan. The MoPH saw PBF as a promise of additional resources needed to rebuild the country's health system after a period of conflict. The MoPH support for PBF was also linked to their past positive experience of performance-based contracting. Power dynamics and interactions between PBF programme actors also shaped the policy process. The PBF programme established a centralised management structure which strengthened MoPH and donor ability to manage the programme, but overlooked key stakeholders, such as provincial health offices and non-state providers. However, MoPH had limited input in policy design, resulting in a design which was not well tailored to the national setting.

CONCLUSIONS

This study shows that PBF programmes need to be designed and adapted according to the local context, involving all relevant actors in the policy cycle. Future studies should focus on conducting empirical research to not only understand the multiple effects of PBF programmes on the performance of health systems but also the main political economy dynamics that influence the PBF programmes in different stages of the policy process.

Measuring management practices in primary health care facilities - development and validation of management practices scorecard in Nigeria

Background

In low- and middle-income countries, there is scarcity of validated and reliable measurement tools for health facility management, and many interventions to improve primary health care (PHC) facilities are designed without adequate evidence base on what management practices are critical.

Objective

This article developed and validated a scorecard to measure management practices at primary health care facilities under the performance-based financing (PBF) scheme in Nigeria.

Methods

Relevant management practice domains and indicators for PHC facilities were determined based on literature review and a prior qualitative study conducted in Nigeria. The domains and indicators were tested for face validity via experts review and organized into an interviewer-administered scorecard. A stratified random sampling of PHC facilities in three States in Nigeria was conducted to assess the reliability and construct validity of the scorecard. Inter-rater reliability using inter-class correlation (ICC) (1, k) was assessed with one-way ANOVA. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to assess the construct validity, and an updated factor structure were developed.

Results

32 indicators and 6 management practice domains were initially described. Ordinal responses were derived for each indicator. Data on the scorecard were obtained from 111 PHC facilities. The ICC of mean ratings for each team of judges was 0.94. The EFA identified 6 domains (Stakeholder engagement and communication; Community-level activities; Update of plan and target; Performance management; Staff attention to planning, target, and performance; and Drugs and financial management) and reduced the number of indicators to 17. The average communality of selected items was 0.45, and item per factor ratio was 17:6.

Conclusions

Despite a few areas for further refinement, this paper presents a reliable and valid scorecard for measuring management practices in PHC facilities. The scorecard can be applied for routine supervisory visits to PHC facilities, and can help accumulate knowledge on facility management, how it affects performance, and how it may be strengthened.

What theories underpin performance-based financing? A scoping review

PURPOSE

The study aims to explore the theoretical bases justifying the use of performance-based financing (PBF) in the health sector in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).

DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

The authors conducted a scoping review of the literature on PBF so as to identify the theories utilized to underpin it and analyzed its theoretical justifications.

FINDINGS

Sixty-four studies met the inclusion criteria. Economic theories were predominant, with the principal-agent theory being the most commonly-used theory, explicitly referred to by two-thirds of included studies. Psychological theories were also common, with a wide array of motivation theories. Other disciplines in the form of management or organizational science, political and social science and systems approaches also contributed. However, some of the theories referred to contradicted each other. Many of the studies included only casually alluded to one or more theories, and very few used these theories to justify or support PBF. No theory emerged as a dominant, consistent and credible justification of PBF, perhaps except for the principal-agent theory, which was often inappropriately applied in the included studies, and when it included additional assumptions reflecting the contexts of the health sector in LMICs, might actually warn against adopting PBF.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Overall, this review has not been able to identify a comprehensive, credible, consistent, theoretical justification for using PBF rather than alternative approaches to health system reforms and healthcare providers' motivation in LMICs.

ORIGINALITY/VALUE

The theoretical justifications of PBF in the health sector in LMICs are under-documented. This review is the first of this kind and should encourage further debate and theoretical exploration of the justifications of PBF.

Performance-based Financing versus "Unconditional" Direct Facility Financing - False Dichotomy?

A debate about how best to finance essential health care in low- and middle-income settings has been running for decades, with public health systems often failing to provide reliable and adequate funding for primary health care in particular. Since 2000, many have advocated and experimented with performance-based financing as one approach to addressing this problem. More recently, in light of concerns over high transaction costs, mixed results and challenges of sustainability, a less conditional approach, sometimes called direct facility financing, has come into favor. In this commentary, we examine the evidence for the effectiveness of both modalities and argue that they share many features and requirements for effectiveness. In the right context, both can contribute to health system strengthening, and they should be seen as potentially complementary, rather than as rivals.

A realist review to assess for whom, under what conditions and how pay for performance programmes work in low- and middle-income countries

Pay for performance (P4P) programmes are popular health system-focused interventions aiming to improve health outcomes in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs). This realist review aims to understand how, why and under what circumstance P4P works in LMICs.We systematically searched peer-reviewed and grey literature databases, and examined the mechanisms underpinning P4P effects on: utilisation of services, patient satisfaction, provider productivity and broader health system, and contextual factors moderating these. This evidence was then used to construct a causal loop diagram.We included 112 records (19 grey literature; 93 peer-reviewed articles) assessing P4P schemes in 36 countries. Although we found mixed evidence of P4P's effects on identified outcomes, common pathways to improved outcomes include: community outreach; adherence to clinical guidelines, patient-provider interactions, patient trust, facility improvements, access to drugs and equipment, facility autonomy, and lower user fees. Contextual factors shaping the system response to P4P include: degree of facility autonomy, efficiency of banking, role of user charges in financing public services; staffing levels; staff training and motivation, quality of facility infrastructure and community social norms. Programme design features supporting or impeding health system effects of P4P included: scope of incentivised indicators, fairness and reach of incentives, timely payments and a supportive, robust verification system that does not overburden staff. Facility bonuses are a key element of P4P, but rely on provider autonomy for maximum effect. If health system inputs are vastly underperforming pre-P4P, they are unlikely to improve only due to P4P. This is the first realist review describing how and why P4P initiatives work (or fail) in different LMIC contexts by exploring the underlying mechanisms and contextual and programme design moderators. Future studies should systematically examine health system pathways to outcomes for P4P and other health system strengthening initiatives, and offer more understanding of how programme design shapes mechanisms and effects.

No effects of pilot performance-based intervention implementation and withdrawal on the coverage of maternal and child health services in the Koulikoro region, Mali: an interrupted time series analysis

Performance-based financing (PBF) has been promoted and increasingly implemented across low- and middle-income countries to increase the utilization and quality of primary health care. However, the evidence of the impact of PBF is mixed and varies substantially across settings. Thus, further rigorous investigation is needed to be able to draw broader conclusions about the effects of this health financing reform. We examined the effects of the implementation and subsequent withdrawal of the PBF pilot programme in the Koulikoro region of Mali on a range of relevant maternal and child health indicators targeted by the programme. We relied on a control interrupted time series design to examine the trend in maternal and child health service utilization rates prior to the PBF intervention, during its implementation and after its withdrawal in 26 intervention health centres. The results for these 26 intervention centres were compared with those for 95 control health centres, with an observation window that covered 27 quarters. Using a mixed-effects negative binomial model combined with a linear spline regression model and covariates adjustment, we found that neither the introduction nor the withdrawal of the pilot PBF programme bore a significant impact in the trend of maternal and child health service use indicators in the Koulikoro region of Mali. The absence of significant effects in the health facilities could be explained by the context, by the weaknesses in the intervention design and by the causal hypothesis and implementation. Further inquiry is required in order to provide policymakers and practitioners with vital information about the lack of effects detected by our quantitative analysis.

Pay-for-performance reduces bypassing of health facilities: Evidence from Tanzania

Many patients and expectant mothers in low-income countries bypass local health facilities in search of better-quality services. This study examines the impact of a payment-for-performance (P4P) scheme on bypassing practices among expectant women in Tanzania. We expect the P4P intervention to reduce incidences of bypassing by improving the quality of services in local health facilities, thereby reducing the incentive to migrate. We used a difference-in-difference regression model to assess the impact of P4P on bypassing after one year and after three years. In addition, we implemented a machine learning approach to identify factors that predict bypassing. Overall, 38% of women bypassed their local health service provider to deliver in another facility. Our analysis shows that the P4P scheme significantly reduced bypassing. On average, P4P reduced bypassing in the study area by 17% (8 percentage points) over three years. We also identified two main predictors of bypassing - facility type and the distance to the closest hospital. Women are more likely to bypass if their local facility is a dispensary instead of a hospital or a health center. Women are less likely to bypass if they live close to a hospital.

Pay for Performance: A Reflection on How a Global Perspective Could Enhance Policy and Research

Pay-for-performance (P4P) is the provision of financial incentives to healthcare providers based on pre-specified performance targets. P4P has been used as a policy tool to improve healthcare provision globally. However, researchers tend to cluster into those working on high or low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), with still limited knowledge exchange, potentially constraining opportunities for learning from across income settings. We reflect here on some commonalities and differences in the design of P4P schemes, research questions, methods and data across income settings. We highlight how a global perspective on knowledge synthesis could lead to innovations and further knowledge advancement.

The role of health system context in the design and implementation of performance-based financing: evidence from Cote d'Ivoire

Low quality of care is a significant problem for health systems in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). Policymakers are increasingly interested in using performance-based financing (PBF), a system-wide provider payment reform, conditioned on both quantity and quality of performance, to improve quality of care. The health system context influences both the design and the implementation of these programmes and thus their effectiveness. This study analyses how context has influenced the design and implementation of PBF in improving the quality of primary care in one particular setting, Cote d'Ivoire, a lower-middle income country with some of the poorest health outcomes in the world. Based on literature, an analytical framework was developed identifying five pathways through which financial incentives can influence the quality of primary care: earmarking, conditioning, provider behaviour, community involvement and management. Guided by this framework, semistructured interviews were conducted with policymakers and providers to diagnose the context and to assess the links between financing and quality of care at the primary care level. PBF in Cote d'Ivoire was found to have increased data availability and quality, facility-wide and disease-specific inputs, provider motivation and management practices in contracted facilities, but had limited success in improving process and outcome measures of quality, as well as community involvement and the provision of non-incentivised services. These limitations were attributable to a centralised health system structure constraining the decision space of health providers; financing and governance challenges across the health sector; and shortcomings with regard to the design of the PBF quality checklist and incentive structures in Cote d'Ivoire. In order to improve the quality of primary care, health sector reforms such as PBF should incorporate the organisational and service delivery context more broadly into their design and implementation, as is the case in other countries.

Implementing performance-based financing in peripheral health centres in Mali: what can we learn from it?

Introduction

Numerous sub-Saharan African countries have experimented with performance-based financing (PBF) with the goal of improving health system performance. To date, few articles have examined the implementation of this type of complex intervention in Francophone West Africa. This qualitative research aims to understand the process of implementing a PBF pilot project in Mali's Koulikoro region.

Method

We conducted a contrasted multiple case study of performance in 12 community health centres in three districts. We collected 161 semi-structured interviews, 69 informal interviews and 96 non-participant observation sessions. Data collection and analysis were guided by the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research adapted to the research topic and local context.

Results

Our analysis revealed that the internal context of the PBF implementation played a key role in the process. High-performing centres exercised leadership and commitment more strongly than low-performing ones. These two characteristics were associated with taking initiatives to promote PBF implementation and strengthening team spirit. Information regarding the intervention was best appropriated by qualified health professionals. However, the limited duration of the implementation did not allow for the emergence of networks or champions. The enthusiasm initially generated by PBF quickly dissipated, mainly due to delays in the implementation schedule and the payment modalities.

Conclusion

PBF is a complex intervention in which many actors intervene in diverse contexts. The initial level of performance and the internal and external contexts of primary healthcare facilities influence the implementation of PBF. Future work in this area would benefit from an interdisciplinary approach combining public health and anthropology to better understand such an intervention. The deductive–inductive approach must be the stepping-stone of such a methodological approach.

Understanding efficiency and the effect of pay-for-performance across health facilities in Tanzania

BACKGROUND

Ensuring efficient use and allocation of limited resources is crucial to achieving the UHC goal. Performance-based financing that provides financial incentives for health providers reaching predefined targets would be expected to enhance technical efficiency across facilities by promoting an output-oriented payment system. However, there is no study which has systematically assessed efficiency scores across facilities before and after the introduction of pay-for-performance (P4P). This paper seeks to fill this knowledge gap.

METHODS

We used data of P4P evaluation related to healthcare inputs (staff, equipment, medicines) and outputs (outpatient consultations and institutional deliveries) from 75 health facilities implementing P4P in Pwani region, and 75 from comparison districts in Tanzania. We measured technical efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis and obtained efficiency scores across facilities before and after P4P scheme. We analysed which factors influence technical efficiency by regressing the efficiency scores over a number of contextual factors. We also tested the impact of P4P on efficiency through a difference-in-differences regression analysis.

RESULTS

The overall technical efficiency scores ranged between 0.40 and 0.65 for hospitals and health centres, and around 0.20 for dispensaries. Only 21% of hospitals and health centres were efficient when outpatient consultations and deliveries were considered as output, and <3% out of all facilities were efficient when outpatient consultations only were considered as outputs. Higher efficiency scores were significantly associated with the level of care (hospital and health centre) and wealthier catchment populations. Despite no evidence of P4P effect on efficiency on average, P4P might have improved efficiency marginally among public facilities.

CONCLUSION

Most facilities were not operating at their full capacity indicating potential for improving resource usage. A better understanding of the production process at the facility level and of how different healthcare financing reforms affects efficiency is needed. Effective reforms should improve inputs, outputs but also efficiency.

Intended and unintended effects: community perspectives on a performance-based financing programme in Malawi

Background

Several performance-based financing (PBF) evaluations have been undertaken in low-income countries, yet few have examined community perspectives of care amid PBF programme implementation. We assessed community members' perspectives of Support for Service Delivery Integration - Performance-Based Incentives ('SSDI-PBI'), a PBF intervention in Malawi, and explored some of the unintended effects that emerged amid implementation.

Methods

We conducted 30 focus group discussions: 17 with community leaders and 13 with mothers within catchment areas of SSDI-PBI implementing facilities. We analysed data using the framework approach.

Results

Community leaders and women had mixed impressions regarding the effect of SSDI-PBI on service delivery in facilities. They highlighted several improvements (including improved dialogue between staff and community, and cleaner, better-equipped facilities with enhanced privacy), but also persisting challenges (including inadequate and overworked staff, overcrowded facilities and long distances to facilities) related to services in SSDI-PBI-implementing facilities. Further, respondents described how four targeted service indicators related to maternal risk factor management, antenatal care (ANC) in the first trimester, skilled birth attendance and couple's HIV testing sparked unintended negative effects as experienced by women and communities. The unintended effects included women returning home for delivery, women feeling uncertain about their pregnancy status, women feeling betrayed or frustrated by the quality of care provided and partnerless women being denied ANC.

Conclusion

PBF programmes such as SSDI-PBI may improve some aspects of service delivery. However, to achieve system improvement, not only should necessary tools (such as medicines, equipment and human resources) be in place, but also programme priorities must be congruent with cultural expectations. Finally, facilities must be better supported to expect and then address increases in client load and heightened expectations in relation to services.

Effects in spite of tough constraints - A theory of change based investigation of contextual and implementation factors affecting the results of a performance based financing scheme extended to malnutrition in Burundi

BACKGROUND

From January 2015 to December 2016, the health authorities in Burundi piloted the inclusion of child nutrition services into the pre-existing performance-based financing free health care policy (PBF-FHC). An impact evaluation, focused on health centres, found positive effects both in terms of volume of services and quality of care. To some extent, this result is puzzling given the harshness of the contextual constraints related to the fragile setting.

METHODS

With a multi-methods approach, we explored how contextual and implementation constraints interacted with the pre-identified tracks of effect transmission embodied in the intervention. For our analysis, we used a hypothetical Theory of Change (ToC) that mapped a set of seven tracks through which the intervention might develop positive effects for children suffering from malnutrition. We built our analysis on (1) findings from the facility surveys and (2) extra qualitative data (logbooks, interviews and operational document reviews).

FINDINGS

Our results suggest that six constraints have weighted upon the intervention: (1) initial low skills of health workers; (2) unavailability of resources (including nutritional dietary inputs and equipment); (3) payment delays; (4) suboptimal information; (5) restrictions on autonomy; and (6) low intensity of supervision. Together, they have affected the intensity of the intervention, especially during its first year. From our analysis of the ToC, we noted that the positive effects largely occurred as a result of the incentive and information tracks. Qualitative data suggests that health centres have circumvented the many constraints by relying on a community-based recruitment strategy and a better management of inputs at the level of the facility and the patient himself.

CONCLUSION

Frontline actors have agency: when incentives are right, they take the initiative and find solutions. However, they cannot perform miracles: Burundi needs a holistic societal strategy to resolve the structural problem of child malnutrition.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

Clinical Trials.gov Identifier: NCT02721160; March 2016 (retrospectively registered).

Pay Me Later is Not Always Positively Associated with Bank Risk Reduction—From the Perspective of Long-Term Compensation and Black Box Effect

The relationship between executive compensation and bank risk-taking is one of the core topics of corporate governance theory. Especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, due to the characteristics of banks, such as systemic risk, this relationship has become more important. However, though usually calculated on the basis of cash salary and inside equity, which can promote risk incentives, inside debt was considered a tool for risk reduction in prior empirical analyses. Based on actual bank situations, we had doubts about this relationship and wanted to verify the specific relationship between inside debt and risk. We initiated this research by setting up a theoretical model between inside debt and bank default risk and by simulating the result using data from Wells Fargo & Co. to draw the function image. We are the first to define the three kinds of compensation in three dimensions. Then, considering bankruptcy, we found the black box effect exists. Therefore, different from prior views, pay me later not only reduces but also increases risk. We expect our findings to offer help to the formulation of policies for pay contracts.

How does performance-based financing affect the availability of essential medicines in Cameroon? A qualitative study

Performance-based financing (PBF) is being implemented across low- and middle-income countries to improve the availability and quality of health services, including medicines. Although a few studies have examined the effects of PBF on the availability of essential medicines (EMs) in low- and middle-income countries, there is limited knowledge of the mechanisms underlying these effects. Our research aimed to explore how PBF in Cameroon influenced the availability of EMs, and to understand the pathways leading to the experiential dimension related with the observed changes. The design was an exploratory qualitative study. Data were collected through in-depth interviews, using semi-structured questionnaires. Key informants were selected using purposive sampling. The respondents (n = 55) included health services managers, healthcare providers, health authorities, regional drugs store managers and community members. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed using qualitative data analysis software. Thematic analysis was performed. Our findings suggest that the PBF programme improved the perceived availability of EMs in three regions in Cameroon. The change in availability of EMs experienced by stakeholders resulted from several pathways, including the greater autonomy of facilities, the enforced regulation from the district medical team, the greater accountability of the pharmacy attendant and supply system liberalization. However, a sequence of challenges, including delays in PBF payments, limited autonomy, lack of leadership and contextual factors such as remoteness or difficulty in access, was perceived to hinder the capacity to yield optimal changes, resulting in heterogeneity in performance between health facilities. The participants raised concerns regarding the quality control of drugs, the inequalities between facilities and the fragmentation of the drug management system. The study highlights that some specific dimensions of PBF, such as pharmacy autonomy and the liberalization of drugs supply systems, need to be supported by equity interventions, reinforced regulation and measures to ensure the quality of drugs at all levels.

What Happens When Donors Pull Out? Examining Differences in Motivation Between Health Workers Who Recently Had Performance-Based Financing (PBF) Withdrawn With Workers Who Never Received PBF in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Background: A motivated workforce is necessary to ensure the delivery of high quality health services. In developing countries, performance-based financing (PBF) is often employed to increase motivation by providing financial incentives linked to performance. However, given PBF schemes are usually funded by donors, their long-term financing is not always assured, and the effects of withdrawing PBF on motivation are largely unknown. This cross-sectional study aimed to identify differences in motivation between workers who recently had donor-funded PBF withdrawn, with workers who had not received PBF.

Methods: Quantitative data were collected from 485 health workers in 5 provinces using a structured survey containing questions on motivation which were based on an established motivation framework. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to verify dimensions of motivation, and multiple regression to assess differences in motivation scores between workers who had previously received PBF and those who never had. Qualitative interviews were also carried out in Kasai Occidental province with 16 nurses who had previously or never received PBF.

Results: The results indicated that workers in facilities where PBF had been removed scored significantly lower on most dimensions of motivation compared to workers who had never received PBF. The removal of the PBF scheme was blamed for an exodus of staff due to the dramatic reduction in income, and negatively impacted on relationships between staff and the local community.

Conclusion: Donors and governments unable to sustain PBF or other donor-payments should have clear exit strategies and institute measures to mitigate any adverse effects on motivation following withdrawal.

Responding to policy makers' evaluation needs: combining experimental and quasi-experimental approaches to estimate the impact of performance based financing in Burkina Faso

BACKGROUND

The last two decades have seen a growing recognition of the need to expand the impact evaluation toolbox from an exclusive focus on randomized controlled trials to including quasi-experimental approaches. This appears to be particularly relevant when evaluation complex health interventions embedded in real-life settings often characterized by multiple research interests, limited researcher control, concurrently implemented policies and interventions, and other internal validity-threatening circumstances. To date, however, most studies described in the literature have employed either an exclusive experimental or an exclusive quasi-experimental approach.

METHODS

This paper presents the case of a study design exploiting the respective advantages of both approaches by combining experimental and quasi-experimental elements to evaluate the impact of a Performance-Based Financing (PBF) intervention in Burkina Faso. Specifically, the study employed a quasi-experimental design (pretest-posttest with comparison) with a nested experimental component (randomized controlled trial). A difference-in-differences approach was used as the main analytical strategy.

DISCUSSION

We aim to illustrate a way to reconcile scientific and pragmatic concerns to generate policy-relevant evidence on the intervention's impact, which is methodologically rigorous in its identification strategy but also considerate of the context within which the intervention took place. In particular, we highlight how we formulated our research questions, ultimately leading our design choices, on the basis of the knowledge needs expressed by the policy and implementing stakeholders. We discuss methodological weaknesses of the design arising from contextual constraints and the accommodation of various interests, and how we worked ex-post to address them to the best extent possible to ensure maximal accuracy and credibility of our findings. We hope that our case may be inspirational for other researchers wishing to undertake research in settings where field circumstances do not appear to be ideal for an impact evaluation.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

Registered with RIDIE (RIDIE-STUDY-ID- 54412a964bce8 ) on 10/17/2014.

Experiences of care in the context of payment for performance (P4P) in Tanzania

BACKGROUND

Tanzania is one of many low income countries committed to universal health coverage and Sustainable Development Goals. Despite these bold goals, there is growing concern that the country could be off-track in meeting these goals. This prompted the Government of Tanzania to look for ways to improve health outcomes in these goals and this led to the introduction of Payment for Performance (P4P) in the health sector. Since the inception of P4P in Tanzania a number of impact, cost-effective and process evaluations have been published with less attention being paid to the experiences of care in this context of P4P, which we argue is important for policy agenda setting. This study therefore explores these experiences from the perspectives of health workers, service users and community health governing committee members.

METHODS

A qualitative study design was used to elicit experiences of health workers, health service users and health governing committee members in Rufiji district of the Pwani region in Tanzania. The Payment for Performance pilot was introduced in Pwani region in 2011 and data presented in this article is based on this pilot. A total of 31 in-depth interviews with health workers and 9 focus group discussions with health service users and health governing committee members were conducted. Collected data was analysed through qualitative content analysis.

RESULTS

Study informants reported positive experiences with Payment for Performance and highlighted its potential in improving the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of care (AAAQ). However, the study found that persistent barriers for achieving AAAQ still exist in the health system of Tanzania and these contribute to negative experiences of care in the context of P4P.

CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest that there are a number of positive aspects of care that can be improved by Payment for Performance. However its targeted nature on specific services means that these improvements cannot be generalized at health facility level. Additionally, health workers can go as far as they can in improving health services but some factors that act as barriers as demonstrated in this study are out of their control even in the context of Payment for Performance. In this regard there is need to exercise caution when implementing such initiatives, despite seemingly positive targeted outcomes.

Stakeholder Perceptions and Context of the Implementation of Performance-Based Financing in District Hospitals in Mali

BACKGROUND

To improve the performance of the healthcare system, Mali's government implemented a pilot project of performance-based financing (PBF) in the field of reproductive health. It was established in the Koulikoro region. This research analyses the process of implementing PBF at district hospital (DH) level, something which has rarely been done in Africa.

METHODS

This qualitative research is based on a multiple, explanatory, and contrasting case study with nested levels of analysis. It covered three of the 10 DHs in the Koulikoro region. We conducted 36 interviews: 12 per DH with council of circle's members (2) and health personnel (10). We also conducted 24 non-participant observation sessions, 16 informal interviews, and performed a literature review. We performed data analysis using the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR).

RESULTS

Stakeholders perceived the PBF pilot project as a vertical intervention from outside that focused solely on reproductive health. Local actors were not involved in the design of the PBF model. Several difficulties regarding the quality of its design and implementation were highlighted: too short duration of the intervention (8 months), choice and insufficient number of indicators according to the priority of the donors, and impossibility of making changes to the model during its implementation. All health workers adhered to the principles of PBF intervention. Except for members of the district health management team (DHMT) involved in the implementation, respondents only had partial knowledge of the PBF intervention. The implementation of PBF appeared to be easier in District 3 Hospital compared to District 1 and District 2 because it benefited from a pre-pilot project and had good leadership.

CONCLUSION

The PBF programme offered an opportunity to improve the quality of care provided to the population through the motivation of health personnel in Mali. However, several obstacles were observed during the implementation of the PBF pilot project in DHs. When designing and implementing PBF in DHs, it is necessary to consider factors that can influence the implementation of a complex intervention.

What can motivate Lady Health Workers in Pakistan to engage more actively in tuberculosis case-finding?

Background

Many interventions to motivate community health workers to perform better rely on financial incentives, even though it is not clear that monetary gain is the main motivational driver. In Pakistan, Lady Health Workers (LHW) are responsible for delivering community level primary healthcare, focusing on rural and urban slum populations. There is interest in introducing large-scale interventions to motivate LHW to be more actively involved in improving tuberculosis case-finding, which is low in Pakistan.

Methods

Our study investigated how to most effectively motivate LHW to engage more actively in tuberculosis case-finding. The study was embedded within a pilot intervention that provided financial and other incentives to LHW who refer the highest number of tuberculosis cases in three districts in Sindh province. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 LHW and 12 health programme managers and analysed these using a framework categorising internal and external sources of motivation.

Results

Internal drivers of motivation, such as religious rewards and social recognition, were salient in our study setting. While monetary gain was identified as a motivator by all interviewees, programme managers expressed concerns about financial sustainability, and LHW indicated that financial incentives were less important than other sources of motivation. LHW emphasised that they typically used financial incentives provided to cover patient transport costs to health facilities, and therefore financial incentives were usually not perceived as rewards for their performance.

Conclusions

This study indicated that interventions in addition to, or instead of, financial incentives could be used to increase LHW engagement in tuberculosis case-finding. Our finding about the strong role of internal motivation (intrinsic, religious) in Pakistan suggests that developing context-specific strategies that tap into internal motivation could allow infectious disease control programmes to improve engagement of community health workers without being dependent on funding for financial incentives.

Stunted scale-up of a performance-based financing program on HIV and maternal-child health services in Mozambique - a policy analysis

OBJECTIVE

A performance-based financing (PBF) program was implemented for services for HIV, prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) and maternal/child health (MCH) in two provinces of Mozambique. This study investigates the determinants of policy scale-up to help accelerate the expansion of PBF in Mozambique and globally from pilot projects to national policies.

METHODS

A retrospective policy programme analysis was carried out using in-depth key informant interviews. A total of 24 interviews were conducted with stakeholders from donor agencies, the implementing NGO, district and provincial health offices, and the Ministry of Health.

RESULTS

Stakeholders reported that the scale-up process of PBF was influenced by three key determinants: political power, financial sustainability, and available capacity and evidence. In Mozambique, PBF scaled-up provincially but not nationally due to these determinants. The adoption of PBF in Mozambique involved a restricted range of policy actors at the central level and was strongly driven by the donor and a PBF champion. Provincial scale-up was fostered by political support and increasing capacity over time.

CONCLUSION

There was a generalised ambivalence and lack of incentive to scale-up PBF from the implementing NGO. Coupled with the lack of evidence of a positive effect, and of cost-effectiveness in comparison with other models to improve health service delivery and health system strengthening, it is difficult to argue for the need to scale up the PBF programme studied. Care needs to be taken to base the adoption of health policies, including PBF, on a situational analysis and on evidence of intervention effectiveness, cost-benefits and contextual fit.

The Importance of Leadership and Organizational Capacity in Shaping Health Workers' Motivational Reactions to Performance-Based Financing: A Multiple Case Study in Burkina Faso

BACKGROUND

Performance-based financing (PBF) is currently tested in many low- and middle-income countries as a health system strengthening strategy. One of the main mechanisms through which PBF is assumed to effect change is by motivating health workers to improve their service delivery performance. This article aims at a better understanding of such motivational effects of PBF. In particular, the study focused on organizational context factors and health workers' perceptions thereof as moderators of the motivational effects of PBF, which to date has been little explored.

METHODS

We conducted a multiple case study in 2 district hospitals and 16 primary health facilities across three districts. Health facilities were purposely sampled according to pre-PBF performance levels. Within sampled facilities, 82 clinical skilled healthcare workers were in-depth interviewed one year after the start of the PBF intervention. Data were analyzed using a blended deductive and inductive process, using self-determination theory (SDT) as an analytical framework.

RESULTS

Results show that the extent to which PBF contributed to positive, sustainable forms of motivation depended on the "ground upon which PBF fell," beyond health workers' individual personalities and disposition. In particular, health workers described three aspects of the organizational context in which PBF was implemented: the extent to which existing hierarchies fostered as opposed to hindered participation and transparency; managers' handling of the increased performance feedback inherent in PBF; and facility's pre-PBF levels in regards to infrastructure, equipment, and human resources.

CONCLUSION

Our results underline the importance of leadership styles and pre-implementation performance levels in shaping health workers' motivational reactions to PBF. Ancillary interventions aimed at fostering participatory as opposed to directional leadership or start-up support to low-performing health facilities will likely boost PBF effects in regards to the development of valuable motivational capacities.

Factors associated with misreporting in performance-based financing in Burkina Faso: Implications for risk-based verification

Performance-based financing (PBF) has been piloted in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) as a strategy to improve access to and quality of health services. As a key component of PBF, quantity verification is carried out to ensure that reported data matches the actual number of services provided. However, cost concerns have led to a call for risk-based verification. Existing evidence suggests misreporting is associated with factors such as complexity of indicators, high service volume, and accepted error margin. In contrast, evidence on the association of key facility characteristics with misreporting in PBF is scarce. We contributed to filling this gap in knowledge by combining administrative data from a large-scale pilot PBF program in Burkina Faso with data from a health facility assessment in the context of an impact evaluation of the intervention. Our results showed the coexistence of both overreporting and underreporting and that misreporting varied by service indicator and health district. We also found that the number of clinical staff at the facility, the population size in the facility catchment area, and the distance between the facility and the district administration were associated with the probability of misreporting. We recommend further research of these factors in the move towards risk-based verification. In addition, given that our analysis identified relevant associations, but could not explain them, we recommend further qualitative inquiry into verification processes.

Designing and evaluating provider results-based financing for tuberculosis care in Georgia: a realist evaluation protocol

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, Georgian researchers and policymakers were developing a policy to improve the performance of the national tuberculosis (TB) control programme. The research programme 'Designing and Evaluating Provider Results-Based Financing for Tuberculosis Care in Georgia: Understanding Costs, Mechanisms of Effect and Impact (Results4TB)' was initiated to inform the policy formulation phase, document the policy implementation and assess the effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and the processes of change. To achieve this, the research team intends to combine an impact evaluation, a cost-effectiveness study and a realist evaluation (RE) within an overarching theory-informed design. This protocol is the RE component of the programme.

METHODS

A realist methodological approach will be adopted to guide the research design and evaluation. RE answers the question of 'what works in which conditions for whom?' and starts with the development of an initial programme theory (IPT). The IPT will feed into other phases of the realist research cycle (study design, data collection, data analysis and synthesis and theory refinement). Data will be collected in a multiple embedded case study design (five intervention and three control sites) through document reviews, in-depth interviews, non-participant observations and context mapping at facility and national levels. Additional data from other research components (cost-effectiveness and impact evaluation) will aid data triangulation.

ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION

The Institutional Review Boards of the National Centre for Disease Control and Public Health in Georgia (ref. IRB # 2018-019) and the Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp (ref. IRB #- 1240/18) have granted ethical approval to the study.

TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER

ISRCTN14667607.

Does payment for performance increase performance inequalities across health providers? A case study of Tanzania

The impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes in the health sector has been documented, but there has been little attention to the distributional effects of P4P across health facilities. We examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed whether increased service coverage due to P4P differed across facilities in Tanzania. We used two service outcomes that improved due to P4P [facility-based deliveries and provision of antimalarials during antenatal care (ANC)], to also assess whether incentive design matters for performance inequalities. We used data from 150 facilities from intervention and comparison areas in January 2012 and 13 months later. Our primary data were gathered through facility survey and household survey, while data on performance payouts were obtained from the programme administrator. Descriptive inequality measures were used to examine the distribution of payouts across facility subgroups. Difference-in-differences regression analyses were used to identify P4P differential effects on the two service coverage outcomes across facility subgroups. We found that performance payouts were initially higher among higher-level facilities (hospitals and health centres) compared with dispensaries, among facilities with more medical commodities and among facilities serving wealthier populations, but these inequalities declined over time. P4P had greater effects on coverage of institutional deliveries among facilities with low baseline performance, serving middle wealth populations and located in rural areas. P4P effects on antimalarials provision during ANC was similar across facilities. Performance inequalities were influenced by the design of incentives and a range of facility characteristics; however, the nature of the service being targeted is also likely to have affected provider response. Further research is needed to examine in more detail the effects of incentive design on outcomes and researchers should be encouraged to report on design aspects in their evaluations of P4P and systematically monitor and report subgroup effects across providers.

Coming Full Circle: How Health Worker Motivation and Performance in Results-Based Financing Arrangements Hinges on Strong and Adaptive Health Systems

BACKGROUND

This paper presents findings from a study which sought to understand why health workers working under the results-based financing (RBF) arrangements in Zimbabwe reported being satisfied with the improvements in working conditions and compensation, but paradoxically reported lower motivation levels compared to those not working under RBF arrangements.

METHODS

A qualitative study was conducted amongst health workers and managers working in health facilities that were implementing the RBF arrangements and those that were not. Through purposeful sampling, 4 facilities in RBF implementing districts that reported poor motivation and satisfaction, were included as study sites. Four facilities located in non-RBF districts which reported high motivation and satisfaction were also included. Data was collected through in-depth interviews and analyzed using the framework approach.

RESULTS

Results based financing arrangements introduce a wide range of new institutional arrangements, roles, tasks, and ways of doing things, for facility staff, facility managers and, district and provincial health management teams. Findings reveal that insufficient preparedness of people and processes for this change, constrained managers and workers performance. Results based financing arrangements introduce explicit and tacit changes, including but not limited to, incentive logics, in the system. Findings show that unless systematic efforts are made to enable the absorption of these changes in the system: eg, through reconfiguring the decision space available at various levels, through clarification of accountability relationships, through building personnel and process capacities, before instituting changes, the full potential of the RBF arrangements cannot be realised.

CONCLUSION

Our study demonstrates the importance of analysing existing institutional, management and governance arrangements and capabilities and taking these into account when designing and implementing RBF interventions. Introducing RBF arrangements cannot alone overcome chronic systemic weaknesses. For a system wide change, as RBF arguably is, to be effected, explicit organisational change management processes need to be put in place, across the system. Carefully designed processes, which take into account the interest and willingness of various actors to change, and which are cognizant of and constructively engage with potential bottlenecks and points of resistance, should accompany any health system change initiative.

Should performance-based incentives be used to motivate health care providers? Views of health sector managers in Cambodia, China and Pakistan

This study qualitatively investigates what factors apart from or in addition to financial incentives can encourage better performance of frontline health care providers. We interviewed health sector managers in Pakistan, Cambodia and China, and they highlighted many potential limitations in the applicability of financial incentives in their contexts. There was a consistent view that providers are not always primarily driven by monetary rewards and that non-monetary rewards - such as recognition from direct supervisors and career development - could have a greater influence on performance. Managers also highlighted several challenges related to the design and implementation of performance management schemes: supervisors may not have performance information necessary to determine which agents to reward; when performance information is available, organisational culture may value other attributes such as social ties or years of experience; finally, concentration of power at higher levels of the health system can reduce supervisors' ability to manage performance, rewards and accountability. Although health sector managers were enthusiastic about measures to improve performance of providers, our study indicated that specific social, cultural and health system factors may mean that non-monetary rewards and structural changes to support a more transparent and meritocratic working environment should also be considered.

Performance indicator as the main and the only goal: a "dark side" of the intervention aims to accelerate HIV treatment entry among people who inject drugs in Kyiv, Ukraine

BACKGROUND

To improve healthcare entry and antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation for HIV-positive people who inject drugs (PWID) in Ukraine, an intervention built upon a successful community-based harm reduction project and the existing best practices was developed. In this article, we present the results of the study conducted in collaboration with one of the recipient organizations of the intervention in Kyiv. The research question was formulated as follows: how does the interaction between different actors work to lead it to a positive outcome (initiation PWIDs into ART) within the limited period of the intervention implementation?

METHODS

The central focus of the study was on the work activities of case managers. Their daily routines as well as their interactions with their clients and medical workers were observed and analyzed. Using the institutional ethnography approach, we explore the institutional orders, power imbalances, and social factors that play different roles in coordinating the process of PWIDs entry into healthcare and HIV treatment.

RESULTS

The most intriguing result of the study is that the performance indicator that must be completed in order to receive a full salary-as a way to manage the activities of case managers-produces conditions for them to develop their cooperation with medical workers but leaves the clients and their needs out of this "boat" because interaction with them, in fact, does not help to meet case managers' goals.

CONCLUSIONS

Accountability of case managers' work assumes the primacy of the result over the process, which makes the process itself less important and the need to achieve the goal becomes the main and the only goal. This can be identified as an unintended consequence of the intervention implementation on the ground, or wider-an unintended consequence of the payment by results practice as a part of the general number-based policy.

Methods to improve quality performance at scale in lower- and middle-income countries

Universal Health Coverage is one of the Sustainable Development Goal targets. But coverage without quality health services limits benefits to populations. Performance-based financing programs (PBF) use strategic purchasing of services to expand coverage and promote quality by measuring quality and rewarding good performance. The widespread presence of PBF programs in lower and middle-income countries provide an opportunity to introduce and test new approaches for measuring and improving quality at scale. This article describes four approaches to improve quality of health services at scale in PBF programs. These approaches looked at structural and process measures of quality as well as outcome measures like patient satisfaction. Three types of tools were used in these approaches: clinical vignettes, competency tests and patient satisfaction surveys. Specific tools within each of the approaches are used in Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo.

Measuring and paying for quality of care in performance-based financing: Experience from seven low and middle-income countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia)

BACKGROUND

Performance-based financing (PBF) both measures and determines payments based on the quality of care delivered and is emerging as a potential tool to improve quality.

METHODS

Comparative case study methodology was used to analyze common challenges and lessons learned in quality of care across seven PBF programs (Democratic Republic of Congo, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia). The eight case studies, across seven PBF programs, compared were commissioned by the USAID-funded Translating Research into Action (TRAction) project (n = 4), USAID's Health Finance and Government project (n = 3), and from the Global Delivery Initiative (n = 1).

RESULTS

The programs show similar design features to assess quality, but significant heterogeneity in their application. The seven programs included 18 unique quality checklists, containing over 1400 quality of care indicators, with an average per checklist of 116 indicators (ranging from 26-228). The quality checklists share a focus on structural components of quality (representing 80% of indicators on average, ranging from 38%-91%). Process indicators constituted an average of 20% across all checklists (ranging from 8.4% to 61.5%), with the majority measuring the correct application of care protocols for MCH services including child immunization. The sample included only one example of an outcome indicator from Kyrgyzstan. Performance data demonstrated a modest upward improvement over time in checklist scores across schemes, however, achievements plateaued at 60%-70%, with small or rural clinics reporting difficulty achieving payment thresholds due to limited resources and poor infrastructure. Payment allocations (distribution) and thresholds (for payments), data transparency, and approaches to measuring (verification) of quality differ across schemes.

CONCLUSIONS

Similarities exist in the processes that govern the design of PBF mechanisms, yet substantial heterogeneity in the experiences of implementing quality of care components in PBF programs are evident. This comparison suggests tailoring further the quality component of PBF programs to local and country contexts, and a need to better understand how quality is measured in practice. The growing operational experiences with PBF programs in different settings offer opportunities to learn from best practices, improve ongoing and future programs, and inform research to alleviate current challenges.