Who's afraid of response bias?

Neural Signatures of Evidence Accumulation Encode Subjective Perceptual Confidence Independent of Performance

Confidence is an adaptive computation when environmental feedback is absent, yet there is little consensus regarding how perceptual confidence is computed in the brain. Difficulty arises because confidence correlates with other factors, such as accuracy, response time (RT), or evidence quality. We investigated whether neural signatures of evidence accumulation during a perceptual choice predict subjective confidence independently of these factors. Using motion stimuli, a central-parietal positive-going electroencephalogram component (CPP) behaves as an accumulating decision variable that predicts evidence quality, RT, accuracy, and confidence (Experiment 1, N = 25 adults). When we psychophysically varied confidence while holding accuracy constant (Experiment 2, N = 25 adults), the CPP still predicted confidence. Statistically controlling for RT, accuracy, and evidence quality (Experiment 3, N = 24 adults), the CPP still explained unique variance in confidence. The results indicate that a predecision neural signature of evidence accumulation, the CPP, encodes subjective perceptual confidence in decision-making independent of task performance.

Heart is deceitful above all things: Threat expectancy induces the illusory perception of increased heartrate

It has been suggested that our perception of the internal milieu, or the body's internal state, is shaped by our beliefs and previous knowledge about the body's expected state, rather than being solely based on actual interoceptive experiences. This study investigated whether heartbeat perception could be illusorily distorted towards prior subjective beliefs, such that threat expectations suffice to induce a misperception of heartbeat frequency. Participants were instructed to focus on their cardiac activity and report their heartbeat, either tapping along to it (Experiment 1) or silently counting (Experiment 2) while ECG was recorded. While completing this task, different cues provided valid predictive information about the intensity of an upcoming cutaneous stimulation (high- vs. low- pain). Results showed that participants expected a heart rate increase over the anticipation of high- vs. low-pain stimuli and that this belief was perceptually instantiated, as suggested by their interoceptive reports. Importantly, the perceived increase was not mirrored by the real heart rate. Perceptual modulations were absent when participants executed the same task but with an exteroceptive stimulus (Experiment 3). The findings reveal, for the first time, an interoceptive illusion of increased heartbeats elicited by threat expectancy and shed new light on interoceptive processes through the lenses of Bayesian predictive processes, providing tantalizing insights into how such illusory phenomena may intersect with the recognition and regulation of people's internal states.

Measuring vection: a review and critical evaluation of different methods for quantifying illusory self-motion

The sensation of self-motion in the absence of physical motion, known as vection, has been scientifically investigated for over a century. As objective measures of, or physiological correlates to, vection have yet to emerge, researchers have typically employed a variety of subjective methods to quantify the phenomenon of vection. These measures can be broadly categorized into the occurrence of vection (e.g., binary choice yes/no), temporal characteristics of vection (e.g., onset time/latency, duration), the quality of the vection experience (e.g., intensity rating scales, magnitude estimation), or indirect (e.g., distance travelled) measures. The present review provides an overview and critical evaluation of the most utilized vection measures to date and assesses their respective merit. Furthermore, recommendations for the selection of the most appropriate vection measures will be provided to assist with the process of vection research and to help improve the comparability of research findings across different vection studies.

Texture congruence modulates perceptual bias but not sensitivity to visuotactile stimulation during the rubber hand illusion

The sense of body ownership is the feeling that one's body belongs to oneself. To study body ownership, researchers use bodily illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI), which involves experiencing a visible rubber hand as part of one's body when the rubber hand is stroked simultaneously with the hidden real hand. The RHI is based on a combination of vision, touch, and proprioceptive information following the principles of multisensory integration. It has been posited that texture incongruence between rubber hand and real hand weakens the RHI, but the underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. To investigate this, we recently developed a novel psychophysical RHI paradigm. Based on fitting psychometric functions, we discovered the RHI resulted in shifts in the point of subjective equality when the rubber hand and the real hand were stroked with matching materials. We analysed these datasets further by using signal detection theory analysis, which distinguishes between the participants' sensitivity to visuotactile stimulation and the associated perceptual bias. We found that texture incongruence influences the RHI's perceptual bias but not its sensitivity to visuotactile stimulation. We observed that the texture congruence bias effect was the strongest in shorter visuotactile asynchronies (50-100 ms) and weaker in longer asynchronies (200 ms). These results suggest texture-related perceptual bias is most prominent when the illusion's sensitivity is at its lowest. Our findings shed light on the intricate interactions between top-down and bottom-up processes in body ownership, the links between body ownership and multisensory integration, and the impact of texture congruence on the RHI.

How to get rich from inflation

We seem to have rich experience across our visual field. Yet we are surprisingly poor at tasks involving the periphery and low spatial attention. Recently, Lau and collaborators have argued that a phenomenon known as "subjective inflation" allows us to reconcile these phenomena. I show inflation is consistent with multiple interpretations, with starkly different consequences for richness and for theories of consciousness more broadly. What's more, we have only weak reasons favouring any of these interpretations over the others. I provisionally argue for an interpretation on which subjective experience is genuinely rich, but (in peripheral/unattended areas) unreliable as a guide to the external world. The main challenge for this view is that it appears to imply that experience in the periphery is not just unreliable but unstable. However, I argue that this consequence, while initially appearing unintuitive, is in fact plausible.

Predictions and rewards affect decision-making but not subjective experience

To survive, organisms constantly make decisions to avoid danger and maximize rewards in information-rich environments. As a result, decisions about sensory input are not only driven by sensory information but also by other factors, such as the expected rewards of a decision (known as the payoff matrix) or by information about temporal regularities in the environment (known as cognitive priors or predictions). However, it is unknown to what extent these different types of information affect subjective experience or whether they merely result in nonperceptual response criterion shifts. To investigate this question, we used three carefully matched manipulations that typically result in behavioral shifts in decision criteria: a visual illusion (Müller-Lyer condition), a punishment scheme (payoff condition), and a change in the ratio of relevant stimuli (base rate condition). To gauge shifts in subjective experience, we introduce a task in which participants not only make decisions about what they have just seen but are also asked to reproduce their experience of a target stimulus. Using Bayesian ordinal modeling, we show that each of these three manipulations affects the decision criterion as intended but that the visual illusion uniquely affects sensory experience as measured by reproduction. In a series of follow-up experiments, we use computational modeling to show that although the visual illusion results in a distinct drift-diffusion (DDM) parameter profile relative to nonsensory manipulations, reliance on DDM parameter estimates alone is not sufficient to ascertain whether a given manipulation is perceptual or nonperceptual.

Quantifying body ownership information processing and perceptual bias in the rubber hand illusion

Bodily illusions have fascinated humankind for centuries, and researchers have studied them to learn about the perceptual and neural processes that underpin multisensory channels of bodily awareness. The influential rubber hand illusion (RHI) has been used to study changes in the sense of body ownership - that is, how a limb is perceived to belong to one's body, which is a fundamental building block in many theories of bodily awareness, self-consciousness, embodiment, and self-representation. However, the methods used to quantify perceptual changes in bodily illusions, including the RHI, have mainly relied on subjective questionnaires and rating scales, and the degree to which such illusory sensations depend on sensory information processing has been difficult to test directly. Here, we introduce a signal detection theory (SDT) framework to study the sense of body ownership in the RHI. We provide evidence that the illusion is associated with changes in body ownership sensitivity that depend on the information carried in the degree of asynchrony of correlated visual and tactile signals, as well as with perceptual bias and sensitivity that reflect the distance between the rubber hand and the participant's body. We found that the illusion's sensitivity to asynchrony is remarkably precise; even a 50 ms visuotactile delay significantly affected body ownership information processing. Our findings conclusively link changes in a complex bodily experience such as body ownership to basic sensory information processing and provide a proof of concept that SDT can be used to study bodily illusions.

Illusory object recognition is either perceptual or cognitive in origin depending on decision confidence

We occasionally misinterpret ambiguous sensory input or report a stimulus when none is presented. It is unknown whether such errors have a sensory origin and reflect true perceptual illusions, or whether they have a more cognitive origin (e.g., are due to guessing), or both. When participants performed an error-prone and challenging face/house discrimination task, multivariate electroencephalography (EEG) analyses revealed that during decision errors (e.g., mistaking a face for a house), sensory stages of visual information processing initially represent the presented stimulus category. Crucially however, when participants were confident in their erroneous decision, so when the illusion was strongest, this neural representation flipped later in time and reflected the incorrectly reported percept. This flip in neural pattern was absent for decisions that were made with low confidence. This work demonstrates that decision confidence arbitrates between perceptual decision errors, which reflect true illusions of perception, and cognitive decision errors, which do not.

Further evidence and theoretical framework for a subliminal sensory buffer store (SSBS)

We recently provided evidence that strongly masked stimuli are not erased or overwritten but are briefly stored in a subliminal sensory buffer store (SSBS), where information can accumulate through repetition and become consciously accessible. SSBS supports a direct prediction made by the global workspace theory of consciousness (GWT) and has implications on discussions about conscious overflow and the problem of the criterion. Here we show that the presentation sequence and the time from the target presentation to evaluation does not significantly impact perception. We suggest that selected information from this subliminal sensory buffer store is transferred into a type of supraliminal short-term memory that keeps stable representations for longer durations with full conscious access. We argue that the level of conscious access of memory storage has a greater impact on subsequent reportability than initial phenomenology and needs to be included more prominently in discussions on perception and consciousness.

The nature of blindsight: implications for current theories of consciousness

Blindsight regroups the different manifestations of preserved discriminatory visual capacities following the damage to the primary visual cortex. Blindsight types differentially impact objective and subjective perception, patients can report having no visual awareness whilst their behaviour suggests visual processing still occurs at some cortical level. This phenomenon hence presents a unique opportunity to study consciousness and perceptual consciousness, and for this reason, it has had an historical importance for the development of this field of research. From these studies, two main opposing models of the underlying mechanisms have been established: (a) blindsight is perception without consciousness or (b) blindsight is in fact degraded vision, two views that mirror more general theoretical options about whether unconscious cognition truly exists or whether it is only a degraded form of conscious processing. In this article, we want to re-examine this debate in the light of recent advances in the characterization of blindsight and associated phenomena. We first provide an in-depth definition of blindsight and its subtypes, mainly blindsight type I, blindsight type II and the more recently described blindsense. We emphasize the necessity of sensitive and robust methodology to uncover the dissociations between perception and awareness that can be observed in brain-damaged patients with visual field defects at different cognitive levels. We discuss these different profiles of dissociation in the light of both contending models. We propose that the different types of dissociations reveal a pattern of relationship between perception, awareness and metacognition that is actually richer than what is proposed by either of the existing models. Finally, we consider this in the framework of current theories of consciousness and touch on the implications the findings of blindsight have on these.

Voice Hearing in Borderline Personality Disorder Across Perceptual, Subjective, and Neural Dimensions

BACKGROUND

Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) commonly occur in the context of borderline personality disorder (BPD) yet remain poorly understood. AVH are often perceived by patients with BPD as originating from inside the head and hence viewed clinically as "pseudohallucinations," but they nevertheless have a detrimental impact on well-being.

METHODS

The current study characterized perceptual, subjective, and neural expressions of AVH by using an auditory detection task, experience sampling and questionnaires, and functional neuroimaging, respectively.

RESULTS

Perceptually, reported AVH correlated with a bias for reporting the presence of a voice in white noise. Subjectively, questionnaire measures indicated that AVH were significantly distressing and persecutory. In addition, AVH intensity, but not perceived origin (i.e., inside vs outside the head), was associated with greater concurrent anxiety. Neurally, fMRI of BPD participants demonstrated that, relative to imagining or listening to voices, periods of reported AVH induced greater blood oxygenation level-dependent activity in anterior cingulate and bilateral temporal cortices (regional substrates for language processing). AVH symptom severity was associated with weaker functional connectivity between anterior cingulate and bilateral insular cortices.

CONCLUSION

In summary, our results indicate that AVH in participants with BPD are (1) underpinned by aberrant perceptual-cognitive mechanisms for signal detection, (2) experienced subjectively as persecutory and distressing, and (3) associated with distinct patterns of neural activity that inform proximal mechanistic understanding. Our findings are like analogous observations in patients with schizophrenia and validate the clinical significance of the AVH experience in BPD, often dismissed as "pseudohallucinations." These highlight a need to reconsider this experience as a treatment priority.

The Filter Detection Task for measurement of breathing-related interoception and metacognition

The study of the brain's processing of sensory inputs from within the body ('interoception') has been gaining rapid popularity in neuroscience, where interoceptive disturbances are thought to exist across a wide range of chronic physiological and psychological conditions. Here we present a task and analysis procedure to quantify specific dimensions of breathing-related interoception, including interoceptive sensitivity, decision bias, metacognitive bias, and metacognitive performance. Two major developments address some of the challenges presented by low trial numbers in interoceptive experiments: (i) a novel adaptive algorithm to maintain task performance at 70-75% accuracy; (ii) an extended hierarchical metacognitive model to estimate regression parameters linking metacognitive performance to relevant (e.g. clinical) variables. We demonstrate the utility of the task and analysis developments, using both simulated data and three empirical datasets. This methodology represents an important step towards accurately quantifying interoceptive dimensions from a simple experimental procedure that is compatible with clinical settings.

Effect of bundle set interventions on physiologic alarms and alarm fatigue in an intensive care unit: A quality improvement project

OBJECTIVE

To determine if the implementation of an evidence-based bundle designed to reduce the number of physiologic monitor alarms reduces alarm fatigue in intensive care nurses.

DESIGN

This quality improvement project retrospectively reviewed alarm data rates, types, and frequency to identify the top three problematic physiologic alarms in an intensive care unit. An alarm management bundle was implemented to reduce the number of alarms. The Nurses' Alarm Fatigue Questionnaire was used to measure nurses' alarms fatigue pre- and post-implementation of the bundle.

SETTING

A combined medical surgical intensive care unit at an accredited hospital in the United States.

RESULTS

The top three problematic alarms identified during the pre-implementation phase were arrhythmia, invasive blood pressure, and respiration alarms. All three identified problematic physiologic alarms had a reduction in frequency with arrhythmia alarms demonstrating the largest decrease in frequency (46.82%). When measuring alarm fatigue, the overall total scores increased from pre- (M = 30.59, SD = 5.56) to post-implementation (M = 32.60, SD = 4.84) indicating no significant difference between the two periods.

CONCLUSION

After implementing an alarm management bundle, all three identified problematic physiologic alarms decreased in frequency. Despite the reduction in these alarms, there was not a reduction in nurses' alarm fatigue.

Continuous flash suppression: Known and unknowns

Studies utilizing continuous flash suppression (CFS) provide valuable information regarding conscious and nonconscious perception. There are, however, crucial unanswered questions regarding the mechanisms of suppression and the level of visual processing in the absence of consciousness with CFS. Research suggests that the answers to these questions depend on the experimental configuration and how we assess consciousness in these studies. The aim of this review is to evaluate the impact of different experimental configurations and the assessment of consciousness on the results of the previous CFS studies. We review studies that evaluated the influence of different experimental configuration on the depth of suppression with CFS and discuss how different assessments of consciousness may impact the results of CFS studies. Finally, we review behavioral and brain recording studies of CFS. In conclusion, previous studies provide evidence for survival of low-level visual information and complete impairment of high-level visual information under the influence of CFS. That is, studies suggest that nonconscious perception of lower-level visual information happens with CFS, but there is no evidence for nonconscious high-level recognition with CFS.

Normal observers show no evidence for blindsight in facial emotion perception

Some researchers have argued that normal human observers can exhibit "blindsight-like" behavior: the ability to discriminate or identify a stimulus without being aware of it. However, we recently used a bias-free task to show that what looks like blindsight may in fact be an artifact of typical experimental paradigms' susceptibility to response bias. While those findings challenge previous reports of blindsight in normal observers, they do not rule out the possibility that different stimuli or techniques could still reveal perception without awareness. One intriguing candidate is emotion processing, since processing of emotional stimuli (e.g. fearful/happy faces) has been reported to potentially bypass conscious visual circuits. Here we used the bias-free blindsight paradigm to investigate whether emotion processing might reveal "featural blindsight," i.e. ability to identify a face's emotion without introspective access to the task-relevant features that led to the discrimination decision. However, we saw no evidence for emotion processing "featural blindsight": as before, whenever participants could identify a face's emotion they displayed introspective access to the task-relevant features, matching predictions of a Bayesian ideal observer. These results add to the growing body of evidence that perceptual discrimination ability without introspective access may not be possible for neurologically intact observers.

Difficult Turned Easy: Suggestion Renders a Challenging Visual Task Simple

Suggestions can cause some individuals to miss or disregard existing visual stimuli, but can they infuse sensory input with nonexistent information? Although several prominent theories of hypnotic suggestion propose that mental imagery can change our perceptual experience, data to support this stance remain sparse. The present study addressed this lacuna, showing how suggesting the presence of physically absent, yet critical, visual information transforms an otherwise difficult task into an easy one. Here, we show how adult participants who are highly susceptible to hypnotic suggestion successfully hallucinated visual occluders on top of moving objects. Our findings support the idea that, at least in some people, suggestions can add perceptual information to sensory input. This observation adds meaningful weight to theoretical, clinical, and applied aspects of the brain and psychological sciences.

Causal manipulation of feed-forward and recurrent processing differentially affects measures of consciousness

It has been theorized that cortical feed-forward and recurrent neural activity support unconscious and conscious cognitive processes, respectively. Here we causally tested this proposition by applying event-related transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) at early and late times relative to visual stimuli, together with a pulse designed to suppress conscious detection. Consistent with pre-registered hypotheses, early TMS affected residual, reportedly 'unseen' capacity. However, conscious perception also appeared critically dependent upon feed-forward processing to a greater extent than the later recurrent phase. Additional exploratory analyses suggested that these early effects dissociated from top-down criterion measures, which were most affected by later TMS. These findings are inconsistent with a simple dichotomy where feed-forward and recurrent processes correspond to unconscious and conscious mechanisms. Instead, different components of awareness may correspond to different phases of cortical dynamics in which initial processing is broadly perceptual whereas later recurrent processing might relate to decision to report.

Spontaneous Brain Oscillations and Perceptual Decision-Making

Making rapid decisions on the basis of sensory information is essential to everyday behaviors. Why, then, are perceptual decisions so variable despite unchanging inputs? Spontaneous neural oscillations have emerged as a key predictor of trial-to-trial perceptual variability. New work casting these effects in the framework of models of perceptual decision-making has driven novel insight into how the amplitude of spontaneous oscillations impact decision-making. This synthesis reveals that the amplitude of ongoing low-frequency oscillations (<30 Hz), particularly in the alpha-band (8-13 Hz), bias sensory responses and change conscious perception but not, surprisingly, the underlying sensitivity of perception. A key model-based insight is that various decision thresholds do not adapt to alpha-related changes in sensory activity, demonstrating a seeming suboptimality of decision mechanisms in tracking endogenous changes in sensory responses.

Auditory Perceptual History Is Propagated through Alpha Oscillations

Perception is a proactive, “predictive” process, in which the brain relies, at least in part, on accumulated experience to make best guesses about the world to test against sensory data, updating the guesses as new experience is acquired. Using novel behavioral methods, the present study demonstrates the role of alpha rhythms in communicating past perceptual experience. Participants were required to discriminate the ear of origin of brief sinusoidal tones that were presented monaurally at random times within a burst of uncorrelated dichotic white noise masks. Performance was not constant but varied with delay after noise onset in an oscillatory manner at about 9 Hz (alpha rhythm). Importantly, oscillations occurred only for trials preceded by a target tone to the same ear, either on the previous trial or two trials back. These results suggest that communication of perceptual history generates neural oscillations within specific perceptual circuits, strongly implicating behavioral oscillations in predictive perception and with formation of working memory.

•

We demonstrate the role of alpha rhythms in the propagation of perceptual history

•

Auditory decisions were rhythmically biased by stimuli presented 1 or 2 trials back

•

Bias oscillated at ∼9 Hz only when successive stimuli occurred in the same ear

•

Alpha is strongly implicated in predictive perception and working memory formation

Decoupling sensory from decisional choice biases in perceptual decision making

The contribution of sensory and decisional processes to perceptual decision making is still unclear, even in simple perceptual tasks. When decision makers need to select an action from a set of balanced alternatives, any tendency to choose one alternative more often-choice bias-is consistent with a bias in the sensory evidence, but also with a preference to select that alternative independently of the sensory evidence. To decouple sensory from decisional biases, here we asked humans to perform a simple perceptual discrimination task with two symmetric alternatives under two different task instructions. The instructions varied the response mapping between perception and the category of the alternatives. We found that from 32 participants, 30 exhibited sensory biases and 15 decisional biases. The decisional biases were consistent with a criterion change in a simple signal detection theory model. Perceptual decision making, thus, even in simple scenarios, is affected by sensory and decisional choice biases.

Cross-Domain Association in Metacognitive Efficiency Depends on First-Order Task Types

An important yet unresolved question is whether or not metacognition consists of domain-general or domain-specific mechanisms. While most studies on this topic suggest a dissociation between metacognitive abilities at the neural level, there are inconsistent reports at the behavioral level. Specifically, while McCurdy et al. (2013) found a positive correlation between metacognitive efficiency for visual perception and memory, such correlation was not observed in Baird et al. (2013). One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the former included two-alternative-forced choice (2AFC) judgments in both their visual and memory tasks, whereas the latter used 2AFC for one task and yes/no (YN) judgments for the other. To test the effect of task on cross-domain association in metacognitive efficiency, we conducted two online experiments to mirror McCurdy et al. (2013) and Baird et al. (2013) with considerable statistical power (n = 100), and replicated the main findings of both studies. The results suggest that the use of task could affect cross-domain association in metacognitive efficiency. In the third experiment with the same sample size, we used YN judgments for both tasks and did not find a significant cross-domain correlation in metacognitive efficiency. This suggests that the cross-domain correlation found in McCurdy et al. (2013) was not simply due to the same task being used for both domains, and the absence of cross-domain correlation in Baird et al. (2013) might be due to the use of YN judgments. Our results highlight the importance of avoiding confusion between 2AFC and YN judgments in behavioral tasks for metacognitive research, which is a common problem in many behavioral studies.

Conscious access in the near absence of attention: critical extensions on the dual-task paradigm

Whether conscious perception requires attention remains a topic of intense debate. While certain complex stimuli such as faces and animals can be discriminated outside the focus of spatial attention, many simpler stimuli cannot. Because such evidence was obtained in dual-task paradigms involving no measure of subjective insight, it remains unclear whether accurate discrimination of unattended complex stimuli is the product of automatic, unconscious processing, as in blindsight, or is accessible to consciousness. Furthermore, these paradigms typically require extensive training over many hours, bringing into question whether this phenomenon can be achieved in naive subjects. We developed a novel dual-task paradigm incorporating confidence ratings to calculate metacognition and adaptive staircase procedures to reduce training. With minimal training, subjects were able to discriminate face-gender in the near absence of top-down attentional amplification, while also displaying above-chance metacognitive accuracy. By contrast, the discrimination of simple coloured discs was significantly impaired and metacognitive accuracy dropped to chance-level, even in a partial-report condition. In a final experiment, we used blended face/disc stimuli and confirmed that face-gender but not colour orientation can be discriminated in the dual task. Our results show direct evidence for metacognitive conscious access in the near absence of attention for complex, but not simple, stimuli.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play

Working memory (WM), an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. WM has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system-that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious WM. In this article, we focus on visual working memory (VWM) and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious WM. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious WM store, though we offer independent reasons to think that WM may operate on unconsciously perceived information.

Reexamining unconscious response priming: A liminal-prime paradigm

Research on the limits of unconscious processing typically relies on the subliminal-prime paradigm. However, this paradigm is limited in the issues it can address. Here, we examined the implications of using the liminal-prime paradigm, which allows comparing unconscious and conscious priming with constant stimulation. We adapted an iconic demonstration of unconscious response priming to the liminal-prime paradigm. On the one hand, temporal attention allocated to the prime and its relevance to the task increased the magnitude of response priming. On the other hand, the longer RTs associated with the dual task inherent to the paradigm resulted in response priming being underestimated, because unconscious priming effects were shorter-lived than conscious-priming effects. Nevertheless, when the impact of long RTs was alleviated by considering the fastest trials or by imposing a response deadline, conscious response priming remained considerably larger than unconscious response priming. These findings suggest that conscious perception strongly modulates response priming.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation to visual cortex induces suboptimal introspection

Blindsight patients with damage to the visual cortex can discriminate objects but report no conscious visual experience. This provides an intriguing opportunity to allow the study of subjective awareness in isolation from objective performance capacity. However, blindsight is rare, so one promising way to induce the effect in neurologically intact observers is to apply transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the visual cortex. Here, we used a recently-developed criterion-free method to conclusively rule out an important alternative interpretation of TMS-induced performance without awareness: that TMS-induced blindsight may be just due to conservative reporting biases for conscious perception. Critically, using this criterion-free paradigm we have previously shown that introspective judgments were optimal even under visual masking. However, here under TMS, observers were suboptimal, as if they were metacognitively blind to the visual disturbances caused by TMS. We argue that metacognitive judgments depend on observers' internal statistical models of their own perceptual systems, and introspective suboptimality arises when external perturbations abruptly make those models invalid - a phenomenon that may also be happening in actual blindsight.

Prestimulus alpha-band power biases visual discrimination confidence, but not accuracy

The magnitude of power in the alpha-band (8-13Hz) of the electroencephalogram (EEG) prior to the onset of a near threshold visual stimulus predicts performance. Together with other findings, this has been interpreted as evidence that alpha-band dynamics reflect cortical excitability. We reasoned, however, that non-specific changes in excitability would be expected to influence signal and noise in the same way, leaving actual discriminability unchanged. Indeed, using a two-choice orientation discrimination task, we found that discrimination accuracy was unaffected by fluctuations in prestimulus alpha power. Decision confidence, on the other hand, was strongly negatively correlated with prestimulus alpha power. This finding constitutes a clear dissociation between objective and subjective measures of visual perception as a function of prestimulus cortical excitability. This dissociation is predicted by a model where the balance of evidence supporting each choice drives objective performance but only the magnitude of evidence supporting the selected choice drives subjective reports, suggesting that human perceptual confidence can be suboptimal with respect to tracking objective accuracy.

Dissociating Perceptual Confidence from Discrimination Accuracy Reveals No Influence of Metacognitive Awareness on Working Memory

Visual awareness is hypothesized to be intimately related to visual working memory (WM), such that information present in WM is thought to have necessarily been represented consciously. Recent work has challenged this longstanding view by demonstrating that visual stimuli rated by observers as unseen can nevertheless be maintained over a delay period. These experiments have been criticized, however, on the basis that subjective awareness ratings may contain response bias (e.g., an observer may report no awareness when in fact they had partial awareness). We mitigated this issue by investigating WM for visual stimuli that were matched for perceptual discrimination capacity (d'), yet which varied in subjective confidence ratings (so-called relative blindsight). If the degree of initial subjective awareness of a stimulus facilitates later maintenance of that information, WM performance should improve for stimuli encoded with higher confidence. In contrast, we found that WM performance did not benefit from higher visual discrimination confidence. This relationship was observed regardless of WM load (1 or 3). Insofar as metacognitive ratings (e.g., confidence, visibility) reflect visual awareness, these results challenge a strong relationship between conscious perception and WM using a paradigm that controls for discrimination accuracy and is less subject to response bias (since confidence is manipulated within subjects). Methodologically, we replicate prior efforts to induce relative blindsight using similar stimulus displays, providing a general framework for isolating metacognitive awareness in order to examine the function of consciousness.